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Scholars regularly refer to Hegel and Clausewitz when writing about war and peace, but none consider the 
two authors together as having jointly founded a ‘dialectical school’ of war theory, a rich tradition in 
political science, philosophy, strategy, and counter-strategic thought which has impacted the field so much, 
that it is often overlooked. We assume that the concepts it provided us existed all along, when in fact, these 
were observed, developed, written to help us understand war’s features and its relationship to the state, for 
example, escalation, the fog of war, friction, war as the continuation of policy by other means civil society, 
state rights, and the war to end all wars, to name only a few. 
 
Their ideas about the dialectics of war have born the brunt of various criticisms, particularly because their 
use of holistic arguments have led some interpreters to refute this ‘whole’ by hacking away at what they 
perceive as its ‘parts’. For example, is the dialectical concept of war too closely tied to an ideal concept of 
state? In this case, it would exclude non-state actors, as well as any motivating factor that might not be 
policy-driven. And since this holism leads to absolute and universal concepts, for war itself, but arguably 
as well for war’s justification, has this led to making war more brutal? This thesis attempts to strike a 
balance between the original works and their many detractors, by setting limits to the holistic elements to 
the dialectical war theories, while also reclaiming the right to understand war as a whole, rather than 
merely the sum of what we perceive as its parts. To separate the two, however, means delving deep into the 
underlying logical and philosophical constructs upon which these theories are built, so that we can detach 
the synthetic from the analytic and the conditioned elements from the unconditioned, in order to frame 
arguments that are meant to be categorical, rather than qualified or relative.  
 
In order to do this, there are three phases to the argument. The first is a genealogy of dialectical war theory 
in which its origins in the metaphysical debates of the Enlightenment are explored, and how this impacted 
the quest in war theory to uncover ‘principles of war’. Clausewitz’s refutation of such ‘principles’ will be 
shown to have been total and irreversible in its effect.  
 
Next, the thesis will consider how dialectical reasoning builds upon itself, moving from the simple to the 
complex. The question of tactics and strategy sets the ground for revelations about the nature of war itself, 
and from this perception of war’s nature ultimately follows a set of questions regarding how war, its 
purpose and its limits, can be, and indeed have been framed within an apparently rational system of ethics.  
 
It is in fact at the crux of the ethical question that this thesis takes a turn, clarifying its purpose, once it 
reaches the third item of discussion. When Clausewitz and Hegel are considered from the perspective of 
being the ‘founders of a dialectical school of war theory’, we arrive at a difficult puzzle. The greater the 
two authors appear to converge methodologically, the greater an inverse process appears to take shape with 
regard to ethics. While exploring a convergence in their understanding of the dialectic, the thesis will 
explore how the two arrived as mutually-exclusive ethics: Clausewitz understood war as the ‘instrument’ 
of a responsible agent, the state, whereas Hegel’s concept of war was imbued with self-justification, as a 
‘right’ of the state. 
 
A likely root of the disagreement is proposed: the distinct understanding of either Hegel or Clausewitz with 
regard to the concepts ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’. Having drawn this tentative conclusion regarding the 
how and the why a convergence and divergence coexists, the text proceeds to explore how this would live 
out in real life, by providing what appears to be the most purified example of the material manifestation of 
this ethical divide on fighting doctrines. While the communists ‘connected’ with Clausewitz, the anarchists 
shunned him altogether and connected instead with Hegel. Despite fighting for a single cause, these two 
groups were split ethically and strategically on the very diagonal that cuts across Hegel and Clausewitz. 
This empirical study allows us to grasp in concrete terms, actual, categorical limits to ‘instrumentality’ and 













For reasons that will become more apparent throughout this thesis, my primary source 
for Clausewitz’s On War is not the Howard/Paret translation, despite the fact it has 
generally become the norm amongst scholars. Rather, I will be referring to the 
Graham translation (Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, Tr. J.J. Graham, Introduction Jan 
W. Honig, Barnes & Noble, 2004.). In my view, this older translation is far better 
suited to a study of the philosophical aspects of Clausewitz, since it is a more literal 
replica of the original, and while not always the most practical for everyday use, it is 
more helpful in uncovering word choices and concepts, which Clausewitz borrowed 































Hegel and Clausewitz have been described as ‘the two great thinkers on war,’1 
an exclusive title which is hardly an exaggeration. The success of these two Prussian 
writers, who lived during the same era, in the same city, and died only a few days 
apart, has much to do with the time and place in which they lived. Indeed, Prussia was 
a major intellectual centre at the time: the works of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and 
Goethe had set the bar high amongst contemporaries, while also stimulating a true 
golden age in philosophy. Furthermore, only decades earlier, Prussia had been at the 
height of its glory under Frederick II, and was suddenly reduced to a status one might 
compare to that of a puppet regime of the French, as a result of the formidable wars 
Napoleon brought eastward. The experience of war that the nation lived through 
undoubtedly served as a catalyst for Prussians to think about and write about war. Yet, 
beyond the context, something more contributed to raising Hegel and Clausewitz 
above all other war theorists, a shared method, which often has been missed in the 
interpretations of each, and has been altogether disregarded as a feature of both. 
 Hegel and Clausewitz are rarely considered in parallel, and have never been 
presented as the co-founders of a tradition in war theory. Whenever we do find both 
authors side by side in textbooks and articles, it is primarily to argue, as Creusinger, 
Schering, Howard and Gat have, that Clausewitz was influenced by Hegel, or as Aron 
and Paret argued, that he was not at all influenced by him. (The opposite influence, 
that is, Hegel being influenced by Clausewitz’s writings, could not have happened 
since Clausewitz’s major works were published after Hegel’s death.) While, 
                                                                
1 R. Girard. Achèver Clausewitz (Paris: Carnets Nord, 2007), p. 77 [emphasis added to reflect the 
original French grammar, in which exclusion is implied.]   
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admittedly, many other profound influences in the works of Clausewitz must be 
acknowledged in order best to appreciate Clausewitz’s analyses, namely 
Montesquieu,2 Machiavelli3 and Scharnhorst,4; this essay will nonetheless argue in 
the same spirit as those in the first group who hold that the convergence with the 
Hegelian way of thinking was important to the development of Clausewitz’s later 
works. That being said, there is no intention in the coming lines to offer additional 
‘proof’ of influences; this is not an inquiry into who influenced who and why. Rather, 
and arguably more importantly, the thesis seeks to demonstrate the convergence of 
ideas, not for the sake of historicism, but in order to analyze how methods and 
systems of logic built in philosophy made their way into the art of war, which it to 
say, how they came about, how they worked in first field, and why, as a result, they 
also provided useful conclusions in the other field.  
If Kant and Hegel’s influence on Clausewitz are often contested, this stems 
principally from a lack of systematic study and the reliance on impressions of an 
influence on the one side, and the dogmatic belief that unless one finds the smoking 
barrel, a direct quotation, there’s no point bothering at all to seek out gunshot holes 
and other demonstrations of someone having fired. There are two extremes positions 
on the matter. One group might argue that claiming there is no influence between two 
set of ideas on the grounds that one has not found a direct citation is a superficial 
                                                                
2 Raymond Aron, Penser la Guerre, Vol I (Paris : Gallimard, 1976),  pp 23-24.  
3 Clausewitz took the time to write about Machiavelli and also makes numerous allusions to his works 
in On War, particularly on the issues of militias and the people’s war. There is also undoubtedly much 
to be said about their similar concepts of art as means. In a letter written in 1809, Clausewitz explains 
with regret that Machiavelli’s Art of War lacks the liberty and independence of judgment which 
characterized his political writings. He also questions Machiavelli’s nostalgia for the wars of the 
Ancients, explaining that the solution is rather to revive the Spirit of war. (Clausewitz, Letter to Fichte,  
annexed in: Fichte, Machiavel et autres écrits philosophiques et politiques, Tr. et Pr. Par Luc Ferry et 
Alain Renaut (Paris : Payot, 1981), pp 197-203) 
4 In a letter to his fiancée, 28 Jan. 1807, Clausewitz refers to Scharnhorst as the ‘father and friend of my 
Spirit’; K. Linnebach (ed.) Carl und Marie von Clausewitz, Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und 
Tagebuchblättern (Berlin, 1916), p. 85. 
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interpretation which does not consider larger arguments that cannot be distilled into 
small linguistic segments. Yet, on the other hand, unless there is some analytical study 
with regard to the convergence of ideas on a larger scale, even finding one or two 
specific quotations would mean very little, since it could be shown that the tiniest 
direct link was offset by a much larger and all-encompassing lack of unity. Here the 
influence might be direct, but it would the influence itself, not the interpretation, that 
appears superficial.  
Perhaps the error has been to believe that a direct ‘influence’ is in fact what we 
are looking for. What matters most? Is it the origin of an idea, where it came from, 
and how someone found it, or is it not rather why they made use of it, and what effect 
this had on the outcome of their writings? It seems to me that the latter half is more 
important. Whenever Clausewitz’s ideas converged with those of Kant and Hegel, the 
effect was to generate some of the very most effective passages in his work. Whether 
Clausewitz’s genius was to generate the same frameworks of thought as both Kant 
and Hegel without having read either, which I doubt, the effect is that converging 
elements are there to be found, and the more we understand these, the better we can 
grasp the mechanics or underlying logic and methods that created many of these 
powerful passages in On War. One might salivate at being he who uncovers beyond 
all doubt direct links and direct influence, but if we limit our purpose to understanding 
Clausewitz better, it is enough to forgo this objective and cut to the chase: what are 
the similarities, what are the differences, and what effect do these generate.  
Exploring the various links between Clausewitz and either Kant or Hegel, 
however, means going up against a very credible and erudite source who stood on the 
opposite side of the argument. Raymond Aron, a 20th century pillar of French 
philosophy, wrote a thorough reflection on the works of Clausewitz in which he 
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makes a convincing case regarding the lack of influence that links Clausewitz to 
either Hegel or Kant, but one that has many flaws nonetheless. Proposing a 
counterargument, however, is no easy task, because it cannot be achieved without a 
deep reading of all three of the above Prussian thinkers. One must tease out not only 
general similarities, but quite specific terms, language and methods, which travelled 
from the two philosophers into the works of the war theorist. Peter Paret may argue 
that ‘Relating Clausewitz to Kant or Hegel almost necessarily results in forced and 
unconvincing historical constructions,’5 but in reality, these are only unconvincing 
insofar as they are forced.  
As long as this thesis sets as its limit to expose rather than force conclusions, 
then this task may yet have some serious merit: to help us understand both the origin 
and the meaning of various concepts in international relations that are often taken for 
granted and misrepresented. The problem with our knowledge of works of Kant, 
Hegel and Clausewitz on war and state is that these are so influential in the field of 
war theory and international relations, their impact so sweeping, that we often fail to 
notice their contributions at all. That is, we take for granted what their theories 
provided posterity, because they permeate every aspect of it and appear to us as 
common sense, when in fact these ideas and conclusions were not always known, they 
were observed, developed, and written. They include, among so many others, civil 
society, state interest and state rights, escalation in war, the distinction between 
strategy and tactics, absolute war and real war, the fog of war, friction in warfare, and 
the oft-cited adage ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’. These are 
Clausewitzian and Hegelian ideas. And if we turn to the philosopher who fathered the 
bases of their shared system of logic, Immanuel Kant, then we would also have to add 
                                                                
5 Paret, Peter. ‘Education, Politics and War in the Life of Clausewitz’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
Vol. 29, No. 3, (Jul-Sept 1968), p. 395 
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a few more concepts to the lot: perpetual peace, the League of Nations, and the United 
Nations. And finally, since we are using a family analogy, we might also add 
communism, anarchism, and class warfare, since Marx, Engels, Bakunin and 
Kropotkin might be described as the troublesome offspring of this revolution in 
thinking. Kant, followed by Hegel, provided the initial philosophical context, the 
method, and a system of logic that took shape in the words of the former, and was 
further developed in the words of the latter. Years later, the four revolutionary writers 
would found economic and sociological theories derived from this method of 
reasoning, whereas Clausewitz and Hegel lit the flame of its application to the study 
of war and state. Altogether, this single family of thought, split into three generations 
of theorists, played such an overwhelming role in shaping and defining our current 
conception of world affairs that we might be surprised to find that it could possibly 
originate in one single idea uniting them all, namely, the dialectic. 
 Once we have uncovered the dialectic as the source of these concepts, a 
second and more problematic issue comes up, which again, justifies further inquiry 
into the depth and meaning of dialectical reasoning among these authors. If Paret sees 
this as inconsequential, probably because he perceived dialectics to have been no 
more than ‘standard equipment’6 in 19th century German thought, what he misses is 
that dialectics might have been widespread, but they definitely were not standardized. 
There were distinctions with regard to the method from one author to another; and 
today, when the dialectic is no longer ‘standard equipment’ among scholars, it is 
useful to remind ourselves of the method’s origins, subtleties and complexities, if we 
wish to see what impact it had on the study of war. Both reasons for pushing ahead 
are in themselves legitimate, more so, given just how elusive dialectics can be. The 
                                                                
6 Peter Paret. Clausewitz and the State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 84 
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dialectical method, or methods rather, are difficult to grasp, and far more difficult to 
define. Scholars readily admit confusion with regard to its exact nature.7 Schneider 
proposes that there are in fact seven distinct and potentially unrelated ‘meaning-
clusters’ regarding the dialectic.8 It is surprising that ‘thinking in twos’, if you will, 
though it might at first appear quite simple, does in fact generate much complexity. 
This has everything to do with the fact we are dealing with a system of paradoxes by 
definition. The word ‘dialectic’ comes to us from the Greek, where the first element 
‘dia’ means ‘two’, and the second, ‘logos’ literally means ‘speech’ or more broadly, 
‘reasoning.’ Thus dialectics are the study of pairings, specifically oppositions, and the 
attempt to find truth at their intersection. The  method has its origins in the ancient 
Greek ‘dialogues’, where interlocutors clarified objects of contention by the process 
of taking opposite stances, in order to uncover or extract higher truths. However, 
when we speak of dialectics today, it is usually with reference to its more recent 
embodiment, inspired by the ancients, but reinvented by the later rationalists of the 
18th and 19th centuries, in the context of debates that will at first appear quite far 
removed from war studies.   
Indeed, to find the origin of modern dialectics, one must turn to the origin, that 
is, the metaphysical debates of the Enlightenment and the quest to prove scientifically 
the existence of God, miracles and the human soul. In the context of these debates, 
dialectics were not constructed as mere exchanges of divergent opinions between 
dialoguers, but instead the process of uncovering deep paradoxes, contradictions and 
mutually exclusive categories of human knowledge, which emerge from our attempts 
to know the immaterial world. Could anything be further removed from the very real 
                                                                
7 Richard A Ball. ‘The Dialectical Method, Its Application to Social Theory’, Social Forces, Vol. 57:3, 
(March 1979), p. 785 
8 Idem.  
14 
 
and concrete manifestations of war? What might ‘speaking in twos’ provide to the 
field of war theory? To answer this, one must begin by searching for the commonality 
in war and god, or rather between trying to discover order in the disorder of war, 
using the methods philosophers had tried in order to find cosmos and God in the 
chaos of the universe.  
The context for the method is holistic. In response to questions about God and 
the universe, the method was an attempt to frame the whole, as oppose to the 
empiricists and rationalists who attempted to build a theory of the whole merely as a 
sum of its parts, and the causal relations that united them. As a result, some of the 
language borrowed from spirituality reappear in the works of Hegel and Clausewitz, 
most notably, in Hegel’s concept of spirit ‘Geist’ and Clausewitz’s description of war 
as a ‘wondrous trinity’.9 Mimicking the concept of God, these theories attempt to 
uncover war’s eternal and universal essence.  
 The question then becomes, does dialectical logic actually provide an eternal 
and universal concept of war? Are their limits to its claims? Do these theories contain 
within themselves self-contradictions which existed from the very start, at inception, 
or which appeared historically as a result of any changes in weapons or political 
evolution, or any other factor which could conceivably impact the nature of war. That 
being said, an antithetical question must be asked, in taking this exploratory path: 
Even if we were to come to a positive conclusion on the matter, that there are self-
contradictions, in either of the two forms suggested above, would we be forced to 
admit that dialectics are invalid? Not necessarily. If a contradiction bears fruit, that is, 
resolves itself in new and more complex questions and paradoxes, then the process of 
exposing end points to logic can be, in fact, a very powerful means of heightening our 
                                                                
9 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter 1, p. 19 
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understanding. If it can be demonstrated that a final breakdown in the logic of the 
dialectics of war does indeed emerge, we may find ourselves exasperated to discover 
that it is precisely dialectical thinking which allows us to make sense of such 
contradictions, that is, the more we turn the dialectics of war onto itself and study it 
through its own lens, the more we may uncover its inherent weaknesses, but only as a 
result of the power of dialectical reasoning, which allows us not only to assess the 
subject critically, but also the very method for studying it. Turning the dialectic onto 
itself is both a means to shed light on the method’s greatest benefit, which is to 
expose its own internal contradictions and build upon them. The strength of the 
method is its weaknesses and vice-versa. It is a frustrating paradox. 
 This thesis will present three different levels of dialectical war theory. The 
first and second levels are the subject of Part I, and derive exclusively from the works 
of Clausewitz. The third involves both Hegel and Clausewitz, and will be featured in 
Part II. Roughly speaking, they represent three interrogations in the following order: 
‘How is war to be fought?’ ‘What is war?’ ‘And why is there war?’ The first is about 
method, the second is ontological, and the third deals with ethics, agency, and 
responsibility. At first this may appear a counterintuitive order of study, why consider 
the ‘how’ before the ‘what’? The answer will become clearer later, but it has to do 
with the fact that we necessarily begin with a subjective idea about the ‘what’, we 
know what it means for a nation or group of people to ‘go to war’. However, to 
achieve an objective idea of war’s internal logic, the nature of the beast, the study of 
war’s methods, and the contradictions that arise in studying attempts at codifying war 
into rules and principles releases an objective ontology of war that is far beyond the 
initial, subjective idea.  
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 With regard to method, or strategy and tactics, Clausewitz categorically 
refuted the works of Enlightenment war theorists, who had proclaimed various grand 
‘principles of war’ or ‘positive doctrines’ which were meant to provide generals with 
foolproof systems to ‘cause’ victory, with a physical or mathematical form of 
certainty. This refutaiton borrowed heavily from Kant and was not a fruitful dialectic, 
which opens discourse and ideas, but rather one that shut down a certain way of 
thinking. As we shall see in the first chapters of Part I, it destroyed the very principle 
of there being principles of war, and this refutation was total, irreversible and 
therefore sterile or dead in its tracks. Since then, attempts at salvaging the principles 
of war have succumbed to a mix of circular logic and self-defeating reductio ad 
absurdum forms of logic.  
 It is the other two ‘moments’ of Clausewitz dialectical theory which are fertile. 
The second moment is his exploration of the real war / absolute war dichotomy, in 
which the former is a representation of what war looks like in real life, with its 
material limitations, its frictions and fogs, and possibly limited aims, which hold back 
the rise to extremes in reciprocal violence. The second is the ideal form, what a war 
would look like if it had no such limitations at all. Inventing an ‘ideal’ is a conceptual 
method of analysis which allows us better to understand the beast: what is this all-out 
form of war that knows no bounds? It is a fertile question, because, unlike with his 
first level of dialectic, it is not merely refuting something that is illogical, it is positing 
a method of analysis regarding war, which must necessarily be flexible in time, 
because weaponry and aims in war or not fixed, but progress historically. Thus, real 
and absolute wars are not forced to take on the same form at all times and for all time.  
  With regard to the third question, ‘why’, the angle implied in the context of 
this study is not so much that of the ‘causes of war’, where the ‘why’ is directed at 
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this or that specific war or battle, but a larger, overarching concept of the question 
‘why’, where we are seeking an answer to what grounds wars ethically, why do we 
release this ‘evil’, how is war ‘rational’ within a system of ‘greater good’ and ‘lesser 
evils’, or alternatively, how do we ‘rationalize’ it? 
As we enter the question of ethics, there is an underlying stability to any 
rational attempt at theorizing about war: it is impossible to put forward a rational or 
rationalist theory of war without having a firm and inherent ethical framework upon 
which to edify it, for the simple reason that unjustified violence is inherently 
irrational, and irrational violence is inherently unjustified. This means that any 
rational theory of war which cannot clarify or generate a logically sound ethical 
system which frames it, cannot be a legitimate method for understanding war. It fails 
the surest test of its own validity.  
 Within this third level of dialectical analysis, we find in the works of Hegel 
and Clausewitz their most challenging and fruitful interrogations. When applied to 
modern war, they are even more interesting because the paradoxes they engage with 
are at the very crux of war’s historical development, the threshold of its own capacity 
to be rational or rationalized. The nineteenth and twentieth century gave rise to 
technologies and doctrines that were founded on seemingly absurd, irrational 
premises based on circular logic, concepts such as the ‘war to end all wars’ and 
‘mutually assured destruction,’ which might in fact have been carried out as rational 
policy, regardless of their apparent absurdity. Can the ethical constructs developed in 
the dialectical theories of war help clarify our ideas of war even at this very threshold 
between the rational and the irrational? The way to approach the question will be to 
determine where the limits of these theories are to be drawn, precisely on the question 
of ethics, because it is the larger picture, that which encompasses all of war, it is 
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developed in a way that mimics God in part because it represents the whole, but 
arguably also because its claim to provide judgment on ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in war is a 
secularization process, the usurpation of what once belonged exclusively to the 
powers of gods.  
   
The problem we encounter, in hoping to provide some analysis on these grand 
questions, and how they relate to dialectical war theory defined as a single tradition, is 
that no single, complete dialectical theory of war exists proper. The two we encounter 
in Hegel and Clausewitz are in fact only partial dialectical theories of war. In 
Clausewitz, we find that the work is generally not dialectical in construct and that the 
method applies principally to a few set of concepts, most notably in his discussion of 
the dual concepts of war as both ‘real’ and ‘absolute’. From this dichotomy emerges 
the idea that the political nature of war is inherent to both forms and thus serves as an 
explanatory and transcendental aspect of this contradiction. So Clausewitz has 
generated a concept of war that is dialectical in itself, but it floats in a universe of 
other considerations which are not dialectically constructed. While his theory attempts 
a holistic concept of war, it builds it up in a non-holistic thought environment, which 
limits this holism.   
Hegel does the inverse. His universe is dialectical and contains within this logic 
historical and social processes that produce war. That being said, war itself, the way it 
is described is not set up as a dialectical concept in-itself. In Hegel, we learn that the 
notion of right (Recht) emerges and how the state becomes a self-conscious subject, 
but the laws which are posited and the wars that are fought are not dialectically 
constructed, since it is not necessary to Hegel’s method. In Hegel, ‘war’ is simply 
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‘war’, a unitary concept which is willed and materialized by peoples and states, whose 
inherent right to wage war, regardless of its form, is ethically grounded in a dialectical 
system that generates the state. Hence, for Hegel war is not a dialectical thing, but 
everything around it, which gives it material life, the state, the citizen, the ethical 
logic for war, and history itself, are dialectically constructed. His holism surrounds 
war, but does not encompass it in the same way Clausewitz achieves. 
As a result of this split, it would be an overstatement to claim that we are 
studying ‘a dialectical theory of war’ in this essay. In fact, the exploration upon which 
we are embarking is a substratum of this: we shall consider the building blocks of 
such a theory, two methods of it that are at times similar, at times distinct, but in both 
cases fragments of what a whole dialectical theory of war might encompass. Luckily, 
this task has been made simpler for us, by what appears to be a fortuitous coincidence: 
while Hegel and Clausewitz are neither purely dialectical in their methodology, where 
they use the method and where they do not are perfectly symmetrical and reciprocal. 
Their distinctions allow us to clarify the methodology, while also shaping one if its 
apparent foundational contradictions, which occurs in the realm of ethics. 
If the study of Clausewitz and Hegel together is on the one hand facilitated by 
the symmetrical way in which both authors were using and not using the dialectic, the 
major conundrum appears in the question of ethics, where the conclusions of either 
author regarding the justification of war are mutually exclusive and in direct 
contradiction. Any attempt to bring together Clausewitz and Hegel methodologically 
into a single dialectical theory of war can only lead to a hopeless dead-end if by the 
same process we cannot reconcile an ethical dimension that encompasses the divide. 
We would wind up with an inapplicable theory of war, methodologically coherent, but 
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contradictory in its ethical conclusions. And this, would indeed fail the test mentioned 
above regarding ethics and rationality. 
The purpose of this essay is not to reconcile the two fragments, but perhaps 
provide the necessary groundwork which might allow such a project eventually to 
take shape. The task here is limited to showing the origins and development of the 
method by starting with a genealogy and ending with the ethical impasse between the 
two.  Though later chapters will describe in far more detail how both authors arrived 
at opposite ethical perspectives into the nature of war, it is worth briefly describing 
the disagreement, at this early stage in the thesis, as something to keep in mind 
throughout. Hegel portrays war as a self-justifying expression of ‘Right’ and a 
necessary aspect of the survival of the idea of a people, whose independence and 
existence are otherwise ‘mortal and transient.’10 He also suggests that war allows 
societies to maintain themselves and better themselves, as is made evident in the 
following two lines from the Philosophy of Right: 1) ‘Successful wars have checked 
domestic unrest and consolidated the power of the state at home,’11 and 2) ‘Just as the 
blowing of the winds preserves the seas from the foulness which would be the result 
of a prolonged calm, so as corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, 
let alone ‘perpetual’ peace’12  
Alternatively, Clausewitz distinguishes the political actor from the concept of 
war, and subordinates war as a tool of the political will, which he refers to as ‘the 
intelligence of the personified state’13. In that sense, war is not imbued with any self-
justification or inherent right. While most academics who quote Clausewitz on this 
                                                                
10 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), # 324 
11 Hegel. Philosophy of Right, # 324, p. 210 
12 Hegel. Philosophy of Right, # 324, p. 210 
13 Carl von Clausewitz. On War, Tr. Graham. Intro. Jan W. Honig (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 
Bk I, Ch1, p. 18 
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topic quickly skim the introduction and reach for what they assume is a founding 
maxim of the entire work, that ‘war is a continuation of policy by other means’, it is 
rather in Book VIII that we learn that the idea is a conclusion, a synthetic 
reconciliation of ‘real war’ and ‘absolute war’, in which the ‘unity is that war is only 
part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.’14 
Furthermore, this relationship is hierarchical: war is not an expression of a people’s 
collective being in itself; rather, the ‘all-overpowering element of War’ is made out 
into a ‘mere instrument’ of their political will or government.15 
Does this distinction between war understood a as instrumentality and war 
understood as a right actually have any bearing in real life? Does it have measurable, 
tangible impacts? If that were not the case, then the thesis as a whole would serve 
little purpose. It would wallow in the miseries of futility. The only way to show that it 
is significant is to provide a case study where we can isolate either approach. History 
provides us with one particular context where both ethical approaches have been 
isolated for us: the anti-bourgeois revolutions. Though the communists and anarchists 
most probably did so without being fully conscious of the distinction, were in fact 
embodying in their fighting doctrines this very ethical division. Although the two 
groups were fighting a single war, they diverged entirely on the political or anti-
political purpose and methods of their revolution. As a result, the Marxist would 
become heavily indebted to Clausewitz, while the Anarchists would shun him and 
bring their strategic thought more closely in line with Hegel. The very concrete set of 
examples that we uncover in the revolutionary left provides clear opportunities to 
understand in what sense the ethical divide splitting Clausewitz and Hegel had 
                                                                
14 Clausewitz. On War, Bk VIII, Ch. 6B, p. 674 
15 Clausewitz. On War, Bk VIII, Ch. 6B, p. 675 
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measurable effects on how war and revolution would be carried out, be it as an 
‘instrument’ or a ‘right’.  
To sum up, the thesis must accomplish three things. First, to tie the Hegelian 
and Clausewitzian methodologies back to their philosophical roots in the 
metaphysical debates of the enlightenment; second, to show what these ties meant and 
how they impacted and continue to impact our concept of war, and finally to show not 
only that within a converging methodology, a divergence on ethics could 
simultaneously appear, but also that this divergence in ethics has real and tangible 
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There are many reasons to be wary and concerned with how Hegel and 
Clausewitz understood war. And it is worth dealing with some of these problems 
before diving into this research project. To engage with Hegel and Clausewitz can be 
controversial,16 especially if the end goal is to legitimize and elevate their ideas. It has 
even been said of Clausewitz that he ‘glorified war […] and was obsessed by a cruel 
passion’17 It is therefore necessary to tread carefully and provide the proper context 
and clarification, because otherwise, one might quickly be brushed off as siding with 
authors who were apologists for bloodshed, and potentially even the intellectual 
backbone for 20th century totalitarianism, total war, and even genocide. In the case of 
Hegel, this conclusion is also widespread, as Shlomo Alvineri has argued, citing 
Heller, McGovern, Popper, and Bowle as examples.18  
In his introduction to Clausewitz, Rapoport also adds that, ‘regardless of how 
[he] pictured war “carried out to its logical conclusion”, in the present political and 
technological environment the actualization of Clausewitz’s absolute war is total war, 
that is, genocide’,19 while Van Creveld went further yet and more or less blamed 
Clausewitz specifically for Auschwitz.20 But are these severe judgments warranted? 
To make that call, one must go through a long and arduous process of working 
through the ethical dimensions of the whole, and not merely quotes plucked here and 
there. When the dialectical method is properly contextualized in the works of Hegel 
                                                                
16 Avineri rightly suggests that, ‘While one can be lukewarm about Locke and objectively detached 
even about Kant or Rousseau, Hegel brings out the partisan in everyone: one is either for or against, 
and in a rather extremist fashion.’  In   
Shlomo Avineri, Hegel Revisited, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 2, Reappraisals (Apr., 
1968), p. 133 
17 Anatol Rapoport, Introduction to Clausewitz’s On War in Clausewitz, On War, tr. Graham, 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 79-80 
18 Avineri, ‘The Problem of War in Hegel’s Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, No. 4 
(Oct.- Dec. 1961), p. 463 
19 Anatol Rapoport, Introduction to On War, in Clausewitz, p. 62 
20 Martin Van Creveld, Transformation of War, (Toronto: The Free Press, 1991) p. 65 
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and Clausewitz, it becomes simpler to refute these particular claims, but that alone is 
not enough to pass an alternative ethical judgment on the question. This short chapter 
is meant to clear enough space in the controversy so that we can move the debate on 
ethics and methodology away from context and deeper into the content itself.  
It is indeed a severe jump to from claiming that Hegel and Clausewitz are amoral 
philosophers, in the lineage of Machiavelli and Hobbes before them, to then 
construing this as an opportunity to forgo the neutrality of amorality and brand them 
all simply as ‘immoral’. Morality, amorality and immorality are products of the larger 
ethical systems that define what is good and evil, and what is a lesser evil or a greater 
good. The deeper we consider the origin and complexities of the systems put in place 
by the two authors upon which to make their claims, the more we shall be forced to 
abandon the tempting move to ‘brand’ the two philosophers of war into a small box. It 
will become clearer that they were not unethical philosophers at all, but rather 
philosophers whose judgments on the subject of war were anchored in a modern, 
secular ethic.  
Interestingly, the reason why the two authors have been brushed aside quickly, 
though not quite effectively, by authors keen on discrediting them the easy way, is 
built into two lines of argumentation that are very closely linked, though they might 
not appear so on the surface: the question of statehood and ethics. In the Hegelian 
tradition, as we shall see later, these two are one and the same, where the state is 
nothing more than the institutionalizing of an ethical system. The reader must keep in 
mind that it is important to distinguish the definition of ethics from the institutions 
that are built in its name, the form ethical concepts take when they are manifested, be 
it as a family unit, a group, a state, etc. The best way to achieve this distinction is 
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provided in fact by Hegel’s work, which firmly grounds the matter on a dialectical 
process that allows these functions, outcomes, and definitions to coexist.  
 
The State Argument 
 
The word ‘state’ will come up often in the next chapters and it is worth taking 
a step back at this point to qualify the term. We will consider what the term meant for 
Hegel briefly in the last lines of this section and will return to the question in full 
detail in Part II. For now, however, let us first consider how it relates to Clausewitz, 
since he bore the brunt of the ‘state-centric’ argument. This argument follows a 
typical route: since Clausewitz made his observations and prescriptions in the context 
of states in the 19th century, these are necessarily tainted and inapplicable outside the 
state model. The recurring claim is that since non-state actors play a more important 
role today, or since there are multilateral organization establishing supranational 
norms and laws, a theory built on the state model cannot be adapted. Such a black-
and-white breakdown of political actors into types is often a rhetorical tool of 
academicians, rather than a legitimate way to treat complex subject matter. Once we 
have considered these arguments in more detail, we might find that there are far more 
grey tones to uncover. 
The two main proponents of this categorical dismissal of Clausewitz are 
Martin Van Creveld and John Keegan, who use a variety of different angles to 
question the political nature of war, and emphasize its cultural, individual, and 
historical aspects. Van Creveld argues that individual soldiers who gain from war, be 
it by capturing enemy soldiers for ransom, gaining the spoils of war or pleasing the 
Gods, have a vested interest in the war, and this undermines the idea of war as a 
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political end of the state.21 Keegan adds, throughout his book, a similar confrontation 
of the Clausewitzian theory by suggesting that primitive warfare had no political ends 
but only cultural ones.  
 
[Primitive peoples] accorded a high degree of ceremony and ritual to 
combat, the spur to and ends of which bore scant relation to the causes 
and results which modern man perceives in the wars he fights.22 
 
In both cases, the authors attempt to invalidate ‘continuation of policy’ not by 
provide a direct hit to the centre of its idea, but with skirmishes at the flank: they 
showcase the existence of parallel determinants and motives in war, but they do not 
clarify in what sense these are in contradiction or for that matter mutually exclusive to 
Clausewitz’s argument.  Are they make or break arguments, or merely a sub-level of 
interesting considerations from which to enrich our understanding of war? It would be 
foolish not to agree that fact that the rituals of combat and the personal objectives of 
the soldier can play a role in determining the form war will take, and will likely 
inform the deliberations, one way or another, regarding where a battle might take 
place, and when, and why, but this very process of deliberation is in fact war’s social 
element, its collective and political element. If this process of deliberation exists in a 
state, or in a church, or in a tribal council, so be it, but this does not equate to an 
alternative formula where war is the continuation of religion by other means, or the 
continuation of tribalism by other means, it is in fact that instrumentalization of 
violence towards the policy aims of church, state, tribe, etc. Clausewitz’s formula is 
not undermined, only qualified further. In that sense, Keegan and Van Creveld have 
                                                                
21 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 66-72, 150, 151 
22 Keegan, A History of Warfare, p 114 
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made a useful contribution to the debate, have provided additional insight, but have 
not offered an effective refutation. 
When reductionism is used to equate state to political will, we find ourselves 
merely discrediting Clausewitz on a technicality. Keegan, on the issue of ‘war as the 
continuation of policy by other means’, attempts to refute the idea by attaching it to a 
static interpretation of the word ‘State’, he writes, “…Clausewitz’s thought is 
incomplete. It implies the existence of States, of State interest and of rational 
calculation about how they may be achieved. Yet war antedates the State, diplomacy 
and strategy by many millennia.”23 He does not explain how On War implies the 
existence of states, other than basing himself on the initial formulation of the state as 
the only embodiment of political will. 
Van Creveld does the same. ‘That organized violence should only be called 
“war” if it were waged by the State, for the State, and against the State was a postulate 
that Clausewitz took almost for granted.’24 From this, Van Creveld suggests that, ‘the 
dictum that war is the continuation of politics means nothing more or less than that it 
represents an instrument in the hands of the State, insofar as the State employs 
violence for political ends.’25 
Though Rapoport does not take the argument as far as Van Creveld and 
Keegan do, it is nonetheless worth considering the subtle deviation he makes of 
Clausewitz’s writing in order to make the ‘state’ argument. He conditions the words 
‘instrument of policy’ by tagging on the word ‘national’ to make his point.26 It is 
misleading, because while a state is necessarily a group infused with a political will 
                                                                
23 John Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. 3 
24 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War. p 36 
25 ibid. 
26 Rapoport,, Introduction to Clausewitz’s On War, pp. 50, 52 
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and capable of generating and enacting policy, policy and political will are not 
necessarily the product of statehood, nor does the formula ‘instrument of policy’ 
make that claim. That claim is not Clausewitz’s, but only Rapoports, who takes the 
formula and rewrites it in a new and misleading way: ‘instrument of national policy’. 
The state, or the nation-state if we want to take the idea further, is but one of many 
manifestation of coordinated and materialized political will, one institution out of 
many others capable of monopolizing violence and applying it towards its ends. 
It is also true of Kaldor’s analysis of the role of state in Clausewitz. The 
passages she uses from On War to claim that Clausewitz speaks of state and only 
states, is in fact devoid of the word state. He writes that war ‘is an act of violence 
intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will’, to which Kaldor adds two 
modifications, first, that stathood is ‘implied’ in the ‘we’ and the ‘our opponent’, and 
second, that this statehoods requires a ‘will’ that is clearly defined.27 Both are quite 
external not only textually, but if we look at the question deeper, contextually in 
Clausewitz’s experience of the state.    
If we understand the state, as Hegel and Clausewitz did, as a living thing, an 
embodiment of political will rather than some concept stuck in time, that is fulfilled, 
permanent and static, then it becomes easier to understand how the political nature of 
war is not identical or dependent on a state-centric concept of war.  There is room in 
the concept of war as the continuation of policy formula for stateless insurgents on 
one end, and multilateral UN peacekeepers on the other. That being said, it would be 
fair to argue that both Clausewitz and Hegel hoped that war would indeed be absorbed 
into the state, because they perceived the state as a desirable way to conduct rational 
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policy in the interest of the people who resided within it. At the time of writing, this 
state, or better yet, this ideal, rational state that both authors imagined was not a done 
deal. That is precisely why they could idealize it in the first place. Nowadays we do 
not have that luxury. We see the state as what it is or has become, not what it could 
be.  
The ideas of statehood and the political vigor of one’s society were indeed 
central to Clausewitz’s thought.28 Clausewitz’s life’s work was geared towards 
shaping and strengthening and unifying his nation. He even wrote, in a letter to his 
fiancée, ‘I sense within myself a specific striving after a noble purpose; in me – as in a 
well-administered state – all energies shall obey and serve this striving.’29 However, 
his notion of State was not and could not have been static and absolute in the way it is 
presented by Van Creveld and Keegan.  
The reason for the discrepancy can be attributed to historical differences. Van 
Creveld and Keegan are products of a time where states have for the most part been 
stable in their constitution and infused with internal coherence for decades, and in 
some cases centuries. This is particularly true in the Western world. During the 
revolutionary period, this was not the case at all. The entire political realm of Europe 
was fragile and in constant flux. Clearly, the authors are indeed using the term 
‘politics’ in a ‘very modern sense’, as Roxborough has argued, because ‘Prior to the 
modern secularization of discourse, which produced an autonomous sphere of politics, 
conflict about power (‘politics’) were not absent; political contention, rather, was 
often expressed in religious or tribal vocabulary.’30 I would not go so far as 
                                                                
28 Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State, p. 6 
29 Clausewitz to Marie v. Bruhl, 29 March 1807, Correspondence, p 102.  
30 Ian Roxborough, Clausewitz and the Sociology of War, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1994), p. 627 
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Roxborough to then claim that war as a continuation of politics by other means itself 
depends on how the terms are defined,31 but rather that one can build a convincing, 
though inaccurate argument based on that premise. 
Clausewitz had a fluid understanding of the nature of states which have, much 
like war itself, its own set of moral factors. His concept of nation was one which 
’achieves independence and unity, only to disappear once again’ and is infused with 
the metaphysical and temporal idea of Will.32 ‘Even a disarmed and defeated France, 
as a homogenous, unified, well-situated, well-protected, wealthy, warlike and Spirited 
nation, contains within herself the means of securing her long-term integrity and 
independence.’33 In discussing the demise of the Kingdom of Poland, he argued that 
sentimental grounds are insufficient to justify the restoration. He explained that it was 
impossible to grasp how or why nations come and go, but nonetheless warned the 
Germans against weak political structures and a divided sense of direction. 34  
Clausewitz’s experience in war adds more to this impression. He could not 
have viewed the State as the one and only embodiment of political will. The first 
campaign in which he fought, at the age of 12, was against Revolutionary France in 
1792-179335 before the revolution’s political Will was institutionalized as a State. The 
first Revolutionary War was declared against Austria by the French Assembly on 
April 20th 1792, four months before the monarchy was abolished in France on Sept. 
21s 1792 and the First Republic was proclaimed the next day. This was also eight 
months before France’s absolute monarch Louis XVI was executed for treason Jan 
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21st 1793. There was a complexity in the political situation in France which could not 
be simplified into a single concept of state. Many political forces were at play, and all 
had access to the implements of war, be it through conscription, loyalists or foreign 
armies.  
What then was the state for Clausewitz? It was a means of ‘placing heavy 
demands on its citizens since it served cultural and national ends and thus enabled 
both the individual and society to achieve their innate potentials.’36 Clausewitz’s 
notion of the state was built up on a classification of means and ends: a tool by which 
peoples achieve national and its cultural ends. It was not an end in itself. Immobility 
and lack of vitality was what Clausewitz loathed. During his captivity after the fall of 
Jena, he wrote about his compatriots. ‘With whips I would stir the lazy animal and 
teach it to burst the chains with which out of cowardice and fear it has permitted itself 
to be bound. I would spread an attitude throughout Germany, which like an antidote 
would eliminate with the destructive force the plague that is threatening to decay the 
Spirit of the nation.’37 In this phrase again he hammered on the separation between 
political will and statehood. His own interpretation of his role in embodying the 
national political will was in opposition to people in his own state, even though he 
understood them as his own people. He even went so far as to fight alongside the 
Russians against his own King because he was appalled that Prussia had sided with 
the French, against its own national interest.38 This is the ultimate proof that his 
concept of politics and state was complex rather than simple: he committed treason in 
order better to serve his county; out of patriotism, he crossed the line so as to free his 
homeland from those who conquered it and placed the king under tutelage. 
                                                                
36 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 6  
37 ibid. p. 129 
38 Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction. pp. 9-10 
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Clausewitz was in effect carrying out a ‘policy’ of the state which was in fact not at 
all concordant with the state itself. He was in effect that stateless insurgent, the 
freedom fighter who carries with him a strong ideal of politics, which justifies and 
instrumentalizes violence. 
With this in mind, it is worth reconsidering the argument that would discard 
Clausewitz on the grounds that the state has evolved or that non-state actor and 
international actors have come to the fore. Honig reminds us that ‘The Clausewitzian 
idea of all military effort as being driven by an interaction between the trinity of 
government, military and people may have been based on the idea of the state, but it is 
adaptable to forms of warring social organization that do not form states. Any 
community has its leaders, fighters and common people.’39 The same applies to 
Hegel, and I am tempted to take the argument one step further. Statehood is power 
legitimized, both internally and externally, whereby its territory, population, 
international voice, as well as the right to bear arms collectively are recognized. We 
should be capable of distinguishing groups whose objective is commercially driven 
from other ‘non-state’ actors that aspire to statehood in one form or another. Even 
though pirates and other organized crime groups and narco-states sometimes straddle 
a fine line, because the criminals are closely affiliated to political causes or attempt to 
usurp state power to benefit their criminal transactions, it remains that the proper 
measures of statehood, regardless of whether this state is achieved or emerging, is 
nothing more than its professed universality, that is to say, its legitimacy in the eyes 
of its people as a tool of their human development, coupled with its command of 
territory, a political system, and eventually, a likely result of the previous items, 
external recognition. Once we capture this distinction, it becomes clear that many, if 
                                                                
39 Jan Willem Honig. ‘Strategy in a Post Clausewitzian Setting’, in The Clausewitzian Dictum and the 
Future of Western Military Strategy, Ed. Gert de Nooy (The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1997), p. 109-110 
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not most non-state fighters have state aspirations, that is, aspirations to legitimize their 
political claims and rest them on territory, people and the monopoly of force.  Far 
from excluding emerging or willed states, these aspiring states are perhaps even more 
state-like in their expression, more concrete and powerful in the minds of their would-
be citizens who believe in them and who are willing to die for them, than in those 
states that have achieved their independence and may have succumbed to 
complacency and political apathy. And is this very political apathy not, at least in 
part, a result of having something that one has not fought for, or that one would not be 
willing or capable to fight for in their role within the realm of being a citizen of this 
established, bureaucratized, and professionalized political will? In the case of 
Clausewitz, he would have whipped these people, while he carried on their work of 
the defending the nation with every means at his disposal, even revolt against the 
state. 
When we consider Clausewitz as a rebel himself, who fights against his king, 
it becomes difficult to offer full credit to Rapoport’s argument that ‘revolutionary 
wars are not ‘Clausewitzian’ wars of sovereign states.’40 Sovereignty is not so clear-
cut in Clausewitz’s mind, and in fact if we truly want to take this discussion to its 
crux, it is all the more impossible that revolutions should be ‘non-Clausewitzian’ 
when we consider that Clausewitz’s main example throughout On War is precisely 
that, the revolutionary wars of Napoleon. As we shall see later in this work, revolution 
is the very root of Clausewitz’s interrogation on the nature of war, and his 
development of the concept ‘absolute war’ is exactly that, a term borrowed from 
Fichte to describe revolutionary wars, which Clausewitz further developed and 
defined.41    
                                                                
40 Rapoport, Introduction to Clausewitz’s On War, p. 53 
41 The full discussion is found in Part 1, Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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If we return now to Hegel, his concept of the state as an embodiment of an 
ethical system is far more significant than whatever shape or form its institutions 
might take, he is not proposing a traditional definition of state as some settled or 
immobile and fixed thing, but a process which creates itself, asserts itself, renews 
itself, etc. In fact, he regards the independence and existence of a people as something 
‘mortal’ and ‘transient’.42 Far from resting his idea of state on firm and immortal 
instruments, bureaucracies, constitutions, etc., for Hegel, the state is a far more fluid 
thing; it is the ‘actuality of concrete freedom.’43 Though cryptic when we encounter it 
at first, this central idea in Hegel’s notion of the state shed much light on the rest of 
his observations on the subject. However, it is too complex an idea to introduce 
properly so early in the text, and we shall consider it in full in Part II. At that point, it 
will become clear that the ethical system which governs our times, and which defines 
the range of activities which we allow the state to carry out, including war, are deeply 
intertwined with how we define freedom, and why some hold it as something so 
primordial to individual and collective development. Hegel teaches us that rights, both 
state rights and individual rights are not natural or god given, but created and 
developed as a process in an ethical community, which explains why these rights and 
liberties are constantly at risk and in flux. While Hegel was not an apologist for war, 
he nonetheless stood opposite those who hold that all wars are by definition evil and 
unethical, because he held freedom to be a greater good worth fighting for. If we 
consider the question of totalitarianism and Auschwitz in this context, we are forced 
to admit that as the total negation of freedom, both would be worth fighting against, if 
we stick word for word to what Hegel wrote. The association of Hegel to Nazism is 
for the most part an obscuration of facts. ‘Hegel was rarely cited in the Nazi literature, 
                                                                
42 Hegel. Philosophy of Right, # 324, p. 209-210 
43 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, # 260, p.160-161 
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and, when he was referred to, it was usually by way of disapproval. The Nazis 
‘official “philosopher” Alfred Rosenberg, mentioned, and denounced, Hegel twice in 
his best-selling Der Mythus des Zwanzigsten jahrhunderts.’44 It is not surprising since 
totalitarianism was the antipode of Hegel’s idea of the state as the actualization of 
individual freedom. The two were irreconcilable.  
How one defines the greater good is necessarily impacted by a variety of 
factors, such as culture, religion, and community, but it is important again to make the 
distinction between what it means to define this greater good and to institute it. War 
does not fit in the context of the former, no one defines war as a good thing in itself, 
but it relates to the latter. To instate one’s definition of the greater good is a political 
act. And it is within aspect of the equation that war may be legitimized, for Hegel and 
Clausewitz alike. Boxing in ‘politics’ into meaning state and only state, elevates a 
straw man and results in a refutation that is superficial at best, Bassford hit the nail on 
the head when he expressed the fact that Keegan was making use of ‘naive and one-
dimensional definition of the word politics.’45 The same can be said of many other 
interpreters of Clausewitz. 
 
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Argument 
 
The most damning and significant argument made by Keegan and Van 
Creveld is that following Clausewitz’s system of thought leads to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of ‘total war’. If such conclusions were proven true, then all copies of On 
                                                                
44 Walter Kaufmann, The Hegel Myth and its Method, From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in 
Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959) pp. 88-119 
45 Christopher Bassford, John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic, 
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War would best be gathered up for a book burning of massive proportions, as a 
safeguard for generations to come. That is, unless we perceive the opposite 
possibility: that writing the brutal reality of what war can be is in fact that very 
safeguard against war going too far, becoming too extreme, and being fought for the 
wrong reasons. 
The self-fulfilling argument was best spelled out by Keegan, who wrote that, 
‘In the post-primitive world, human ingenuity ripped ritual and ceremony, and the 
restraints they imposed on warmaking, away from warmaking practice, empowering 
men of violence to press its limits of tolerability to, and eventually beyond, the 
extreme. ‘War’ said Clausewitz the philosopher, ‘is an act of violence pushed to its 
utmost bounds.’ Clausewitz the practical warrior did not guess at the horrors toward 
which his philosophical logic led, but we have glimpsed them. […] Unless we unlearn 
the habits we have taught ourselves, we shall not survive.’46  
The reality is that one’s interpretation is completely dependent on whether or not 
we attribute to the authors a prescriptive purpose or a warning, or perhaps a mixture 
of both. In his reply to Keegan, Bassford brings our attention to this important passage 
in On War: 
 
Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody 
slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more 
respect to war, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and 
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blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until some one steps in 
with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.47 
 
To Keegan’s presentation of Clausewitz as a Napoleonist and Shaka as a 
Clausewitzian, and his argument in favour of greater ritualization, Bassford retorts:   
 
In actuality, then, Shaka, like Napoleon, was exactly what Clausewitz 
was warning us against, just as Keegan warns us against ’ethnic 
bigots, regional warlords, ideological intransigents, common pillagers 
and organized international criminals’. unfortunately, Keegan then 
goes on to tell us that ’there is a wisdom in ... symbolic ritual that 
needs to be rediscovered’. (Keegan, Warfare, p. 392) Perhaps he has 
forgotten the elaborate diplomatic dances that preceded the Gulf War 
and surround the problem in Bosnia. The danger in Keegan’s 
suggestion, as Clausewitz pointed out, is that one side will substitute 
ritual for action while the other side acts decisively. Or does Keegan 
think his criminals will join in the ritual and submit to its restraints?48 
 
A first aspect of these false interpretations can be attributed to the fact that one 
can accord far too much significance to the historical taints and the excessive word 
choices found in the texts, rather than the lessons proper. Some of these word choices 
are indeed quite maddening, but they should not blind us from the rest. It is important 
                                                                
47 Clausewitz, On War,Bk IV, Ch 11, p. 232 (note : Bassford uses the Howard/Paret translation, but for 
the sake of consistency, I have refered to the Graham translation) 
48 Bassford, John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic, p. 332 
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to keep in mind that both Hegel and Clausewitz lived through the very worst wars 
humanity had seen to date, and on top of that, they were writing on the subject of war 
from the perspective of a conquered people, they were on the losing side throughout 
most of the Napoleonic Wars, and both philosophers saw with their own eyes the 
French Revolutionary Army push forward into Jena-Auerstedt, site of the greatest 
Prussian defeat. How else were they to describe war? In soft and tender words meant 
not to offend?  
With a short list of excerpts, we can indeed make up a damning portrait of the 
authors as heartless war mongers, but having read these, we must then question 
whether or not such distillations and dilutions are fair and accurate representations of 
the whole. Clausewitz did write some brutal lines, such as ‘Self-imposed restrictions, 
almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International 
Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say 
physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is 
therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the 
ultimate object’49 He also wrote that ‘philanthropists may easily imagine there is a 
skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great 
bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible 
this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous 
things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the 
worst.’50  
                                                                
49 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. I, Ch 1, p. 1-2  
50 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. I, Ch 1, p. 2 
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Hegel also had his fair share of apparently sinister quotes, including ‘War is the 
moral health of peoples in their struggle against petrifaction’51, and elsewhere 
suggesting that that the ‘ethical element in war’ [das sittliche Moment des Krieges] in 
war is implied by the final end of the state to provide freedom, individual life, security 
and property to its people,52 leading him to conclude that, ‘war is not to be regarded 
as an absolute evil and as [purely accidental].’53 Whether or not he was an apologist 
for war, there is no doubt that Hegel stood opposite those who hold that all wars are 
by definition evil and unethical. 
                                                                
Having read these widely quoted extracts, used primarily by those who seek to 
dismiss the two authors, quickly, rather than meaningfully; the next step is to ask 
whether these actually provide proof that there is something either immoral or 
illogical at the core of Hegel and Clausewitz’s philosophizing. If war is a brutal thing, 
then should an honest representation of war’s nature not also use the word ‘brutal’ in 
order to be accurate? The question of morality comes afterwards. By giving us an 
honest and frightening glimpse into the coarse nature of war, Hegel and Clausewitz 
provide posterity with the clarity required for self-restraint and self-control when 
brandishing the beast that is war. While some may perceive the language as a call to 
arms, we may equally choose to read these passages as warnings. That decision 
resides in the reader far more than the writer. 
In the case of Clausewitz, failing to understand the dialectical constructs is 
problematic, because one such contradiction is the difference between a hypothetical 
‘absolute’ war and war in the real world. Unless we catch the dichotomy, we are 
bound to make the most basic misinterpretation: where either pole of the dichotomy is 
51 Hegel. The Phenomenology of Mind, Tr. Baillie, 2nd ed. (Blackmask, 2001), p. 432. 
52 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, #324, p. 209-210  
53 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, #324, p. 209-210 
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removed and considered in isolation. This would be like insisting to be served either a 
Ben’s or a Jerry’s ice cream cone, when in fact it is only Ben and Jerry’s that can 
provide you with your treat. It is the same, when we consider that Clausewitz 
described war having a conceptual, ‘absolute’ form, and a ‘real’ material form, where 
the former represents its unlimited potential for reciprocation towards extremes, and 
the latter framing war as something limited by its purpose, aim, and scope, as well as 
the material realities of battlefield (friction, fog of war, etc.). The two poles only exist 
as a relation to one another. It is only because Clausewitz has conceptualized an 
‘absolute’ that he must counter this conceptual and ideal formula with its opposite, a 
concrete manifestation, a real embodiment of the concept, which by the very process 
of being posited, is a demonstration that the ideal is not real. The ideal is meant to 
help us better conceptualize war, by freeing the inner logic from that which constrains 
and limits it. 
By foregoing this analysis, we perceive two singular poles, unrelated and equally 
attainable as objectives. However, the problem here is that at either of these poles, 
war becomes nonsensical: fully ‘real’ war would be so bogged down by limited 
objectives, insecurities, uncertainties, and material considerations that it would reach 
a point of complete immobility: a long wait where no force comes into play: a non-
war war. At the other end of the spectrum, a fully ‘absolute’ war would be so brutally 
fuelled by the reciprocation of extremes that it would eventually destroy everything 
one could possibly be fighting for in the first place, undermining its very own raison 
d’être.  
This failure to appreciate the dialectics of Clausewitz has been the norm, not the 
exception amongst scholars and soldiers alike. In fact, the very best example we have 
comes from someone who as both a soldier and a scholar, Ferdinand Foch, who 
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cherry-picked only the most extreme snippets one can find in Clausewitz’s On War, 
and contributed to the doctrine of attack à outrance during World War I. Foch’s 
interpretation of Clausewitz was built on a distillation process, whereby the passages 
he prioritized in On War were those in which Clausewitz referred to Napoleon as the 
closest anyone had ever gotten to embodying the ‘absolute’ form of war. Indeed, the 
chapter on modern war found in Principes de guerre, Foch quoted Napoleon once and 
Clausewitz seven times, and of these seven quotes, only one was not an elevation of 
Napoleon and the concept of absolute war. In Foch’s version of Clausewitz, the only 
parts of On War worth quoting are those that amplify war’s brutality, and Foch 
attempts even to amplify these further. Thus, when he quotes Clausewitz as having 
said, ‘blood is the price of victory,’54 he unsurprisingly forgets the rest of the sentence 
in which Clausewitz writes, ‘[...] it is not merely reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is 
more a killing of the enemy's courage than of the enemy's soldiers.’55 And elsewhere 
he continues to focus on the excerpts that amplify the extremes of war, rather than any 
principle of limitation, such as fog of war, friction and limited aims. So we find also 
among his chosen extracts: ‘The French Revolution by the force and energy of 
principles and the enthusiasm which with it inspired the people, threw the weight of 
the people and all the forces into the balance’; ’[Napoleon] relentlessly sought 
opportunities to engage in battle’; and, ‘In war everything is submitted to decision by 
arms’. 56 
J.C. Fuller was of the opinion that Foch’s interpretation was one based on ‘a 
Clausewitz drunk on violence’ and ‘tactically demented Napoleon,’57 which was 
probably not far from the mark. Foch’s focus on the Napoleonic character of war 
                                                                
54 Foch. Principes de la guerre, p. 33 
55 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. IV, Ch 11, p. 230 
56 Foch. Principes de la guerre, p. 21-44 
57 Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961), p. 128 
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should not come as a surprise; Foch himself was a devout Napoleonist. When France 
celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the Emperor’s death at the Arche de 
Triomphe, Foch delivered a glowing eulogy. The first line sets the tone: ‘Napoleon! If 
the prestige of this name conquered the admiration of the world, it is less certain that 
its luster continues to grow, as time casts a shadow on the greatness of the task 
accomplished.’58 Foch’s may have admired Clausewitz, but is not so clear that he 
actually understood him that well, given that ‘his own writing is totally different in 
character.’59 While Clausewitz stressed two important concepts in war, its political 
nature and the superiority of the defence, by the turn of the century, these two features 
had become somehow excluded from the analysis.60 If Foch was ‘dreadfully wrong 
[and] it took a sea of blood to prove it,’61 we must admit that many others at the time 
were equally off-track in their interpretation of Clausewitzian thought. Across Europe 
and in North America as well, war theorists and generals had fallen victim this form 
of distillation, ‘totally imbued with oversimplified neo-Clausewitzian ideas.’62 
 It is therefore not without reason that Liddell-Hart reacted harshly to this 
Clausewitz, but in reality, what he was reacting to were these bad interpretations of 
Clausewitz. Liddell-Hart’s famously gave Clausewitz the nickname “Mahdi of mass 
and mutual massacre’, on the grounds that Clausewitz, in his opinion, ‘was the source 
of the doctrine of “absolute war”, the fight to a finish theory which, beginning with 
the argument that “war is only a continuation of state policy by other means”, ended 
by making policy the slave of strategy.’63 Liddell-Hart had spelled out the most 
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damning criticism of Clausewitz that had yet been written; he was suggesting that 
Clausewitz’s theory was a self-fulfilling prophecy: that by defining strategy and war 
in a certain way, they were making war take that form ever more so. But this 
argument was only admissible insofar as it was an answer to misinterpretations of 
Clausewitz to begin with. If Clausewitz had been taken at his word, rather than his 
conceptual poles ripped apart from one another, then his writings would have 
maintained their strength of paradox, rather than taken on the weak form of isolated 
extremes. Liddell-Hart’s reactions were against a pseudo-Clausewitzian doctrine, 
which Clausewitz had never actually written.  
The pseudo-Clausewitzians of the turn of the century were not the true inheritors 
of Clausewitz, but undoubtedly the first to misread him so thoroughly badly as to 
generate self-fulfilling prophecies with regard to pre-empting war’s rise to extremes 
by starting off with one’s fullest national ability to produce extremes. By excluding 
half the concept, within a dialectical whole, one effectively destroys the root of the 
system before even engaging with it. Consequently, this does not pose a true problem 
to our analysis or reading of Clausewitz, because the problem is not with Clausewitz, 
but faulty interpretations of his work. 
With regard to Hegel, the question of war as ‘the moral health of peoples’ is a 
complicated one, which will be considered in greater detail later in the coming 
chapters. However, with regard to the issue of self-fulfilling prophecies, we have not 
completely solved the problem by eliminating it from our discussion of Clausewitz. 
There exists a far more compelling argument regarding self-fulfilling tendencies in 
the works of Hegel, who speaks of ‘necessity’ as though history is following a set 
path. In this case, we are no longer dealing with the particular absolute/real construct 
of war, but rather war within Hegel’s dialectics of history, and the materialization of 
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this evasive concept, which we will be studying in greater depth in Part II, the ‘world 
Spirit’ or Geist.  
Hannah Arendt questions the notion of history in Hegel’s philosophy, arguing 
that it commits a fallacy that ‘consists in describing and understanding the whole 
realm of human action, not in terms of the actor and the agent, but from the standpoint 
of the spectator who watches the spectacle, […] the truth inherent in it, [being that] all 
stories begun and enacted by men unfold their true meaning only when they have 
come to their end, so that it may indeed appear as though only the spectator, and not 
the agent, can hope to understand what actually happened.’64 A self-fulfilling 
prophecy argument is implied in that if events can be proclaimed as destiny, and the 
agents in the action perceive themselves as an active part of historically necessity’s 
fulfilment, then they it implies that they are turning Hegel around from studying the 
past into predicting the future, and setting the course to fulfilling it.  
Arguably, this fault is rather a product of Marxism than Hegelianism per se, and 
it would be difficult to deny that throughout the 19th and 20th century, this idea of 
‘historical necessity’ served as a justification and perhaps even the theoretical 
backbone of the ideological struggles against capitalism. However, while it was taken 
from Hegel’s system, historical necessity was not constructed in a way that could be 
pushed forward into the future, implying ‘necessary’ courses or directions for history 
and society. It was a misuse of Hegel’s method. In fact, Hegel was quite clear about 
how his system was not endowed with any claim about the future or the path which 
destiny was to take. In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, he wrote, ‘The owl of 
Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk,’65 by which he meant, in 
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reference to the Roman goddess of wisdom (Athena in Ancient Greece), ‘that 
philosophy understands reality only after the event. It cannot prescribe how the world 
ought to be.’ 66 
Just as we saw with Clausewitz, Hegel’s system is not self-prophetic in itself, but 
was used by ambitious interpreters to generate a self-fulfilling prophecy in his name. 
Both Hegel and Clausewitz were used and abused to provide clout and credibility to 
doctrines which they would never have acknowledged as their own. Arendt was right 
to suggest that historical actors made use of Hegel by proclaiming self-fulfilling 
prophecies: projecting ‘historical necessity’ forward onto the future thatt one’s 
idealogy is attempting to build. In many ways, the distillation of Clausewitz is a 
parallel phenomenon. In either case, one cannot blame the words in the text, if the 
fault clearly lies with the reader. Again, it is necessary to stress that with Hegel and 
Clausewitz alike, the only way properly to dispel the claims regarding self-fulfilling 
prophecies is to enhance our understanding of their dialectics, and the origin and logic 
of their systems.  
This ends our preliminary encounter with problems associated to the works 
Hegel and Clausewitz. They have been described as war-mongers and war apologists, 
and their systems have been called mere self-fulfilling prophecies, however, in the 
case of Clausewitz, there is simply a thorough lack of rigor any attempt to discredit 
the theory by first splitting apart the pairs ‘absolute’ and ‘real’ and then attacking the 
conceptual part, ‘absolute’ for the very reason that it is not ‘real’. With regard to 
Hegel, those who withhold the whole of his work in order to home in on tiny snippets 
are equally inapt, but the concern with historical necessity is a far more serious and 
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credible problem. The only way to cope with the latter is to stick strictly to Hegel’s 
own prescription regarding the future, separating Marxist interpretations from the 
original, and being openly critical to any claim that something can embody ‘historical 
necessity’ into the future as a proclaimed instrument of progress.    
With this short caveat, an open mind, and academic rigor, it is possible to deepen 
our understanding of both authors, and extract extremely potent lessons regarding war 
and peace. Much would be lost were we stop our analysis on account of an offensive 
line or a quick and superficial dismissal. There are, as we shall see, true problems 
with the historical evolution of the Clausewitzian and Hegelian systems, which are far 
more complex and significant than the non-problems above. Yet, to perceive them, we 
must start by understanding them well, and in the context of when they were written.  
If we arrive at endpoints in the logic that generates the contradictory systems of 
ethics at the heart of Hegel and Clausewitz’s, then it will be possible to make 
judgements not on the perceived ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ of their conclusions, but 
rather the conclusions themselves. And instead of teasing out historical anormalities 
in how states and non-state actors have evolved with regard to their conclusions, or 
how weapons and technology have changed over time, we will be able to consider in 
broader terms, ethical terms, the problems at the heart of these, in ways that apply not 
merely to the state, the faction, or the revolutionary, but the very abstractions that 
generate a sense of ‘good’ or ‘evil’, or ‘lesser evil’ that gives rise to the justification 
of political violence, its rationality and rationalization alike, and the form political 
violence takes, when the framework of ethics we attach it to changes. 
However, before we can hope to even approach this level of discussion on the 
dialectics of war without falling into the trap of oversimplification and superficial 
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judgments on the subject, we must start ground up. It means going back a few 
hundred years and understanding the philosophical context that gave rise to the 
dialectical method and its application to the question of war.  
To speak of a Hegelian and Clausewitzian ethic on the subject of war may 
appear counter-intuitive to those who perceive both authors as amoral or immoral. 
However, through our exploration of the Kantian revolution in thinking and its impact 
on these two authors, the notion of ‘instrumentality’ and ‘right’ will lose their opacity. 
We will rest our understanding of these not only on their inception, development, 
method, and ultimate clash, but also in action, where history provides a critical 
demonstration of its significance. From this process, it will be possible to understand 
and pass judgment not merely on the conditioning elements, what the context 
provides, but also those features of the dialectical theories of war that are 












PART ONE – The Birth of Dialectical 













Dialectical reasoning was introduced to the question of war’s nature and its 
methods by Clausewitz as a response to a historical impasse or breakdown in war 
theory. Fuelled by an optimistic quest to unearth true, immutable, and fundamental 
‘principles’ for the military arts, writers of the Enlightenment had fallen into a 
‘Pythagorean obsession,’67 as they aimed, but never actually succeeded in achieving a 
‘military science’ in the Newtonian or Galilean sense. War theorists had become 
increasingly didactical and pedantic in their use of geometry, mechanistic notions of 
the engagement, mathematical formulae, ballistics, clockwork and time management 
in this quest, but despite these efforts to isolate, organize, systematize the study of 
war, they wound up hitting a brick wall. These so-called principles and methods, 
which by many accounts had been the source of Prussia’s greatness under the reign of 
Frederick II, crumbled before the pressures of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars. Only through dialectical reasoning and its implication on the study of human 
understanding and the scope of possible knowledge, inspired by the works of Kant 
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and his disciples, could Clausewitz explain in what sense the methodology of the 
Enlightenment had failed and was necessarily predisposed to such failure.  
If the principles of war were meant to provide ready-made answers regardless 
of context, it was in fact context itself that had brought them to their final impasse. 
Whereas warfare between absolute monarchs had inherent limiting features, that is, a 
risk aversion based on the need to protect the institution of monarchy itself from self-
destruction, the types of risks peoples were willing to take in their revolution against 
this institution was of a higher scale. Hence the surge of intensity during the French 
Revolution, which, as Clausewitz described, ‘beggared all imagination.’68 The size of 
the engagements, the passions of the new citizen-soldiers, and the distances traveled 
by the troops – from one end of Europe to the other – would undermine the 
conceptual bases of military thinking. The social element of war had been unleashed, 
and no scientific theory, which claimed to provide the sure method towards victory, 
could stand up to the sheer power and disturbances of the masses, and the escalation 
of the stakes. The principles of war might have had some value to them, but only so 
long as all the players were abiding by the same rules and playing the same game. 
However, in the context of revolutionary fervour, the chessboard of European 
warfare, with its regular chequered squares and pieces, had been tossed to the floor, 
its principles dispersed.  
How could it be that even in the hands of the best veteran armies in Europe, 
these principles couldn’t contain the rise of Napoleon’s Revolutionary Army, 
composed of mere conscripts, young and inexperienced revolutionaries with little 
training and no experience in battle? Behind the veil of this larger question, other 
smaller questions also came to the fore, regarding specific examples of failed 
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strategies and tactics in the final days of the Napoleonic Wars: Why did the conquest 
of Moscow, instead of leading to the capitulation of the Russians, according to the 
‘principle’ by which the fall of any capital was decisive, instead lead to the demise of 
the great general? And why did Napoleon, this genius of war, fail at the Battle of 
Waterloo, despite having applied, almost word for word the prescriptions of perfected 
‘principles’ regarding attacking key points and operating from internal lines?  
The relationship between the ‘genius’ and ‘principles’ was in fact a central 
sophism that allowed Enlightenment war theory to support its claims regarding 
perfection in method. Since the two concepts were inherently fixed and immutable, 
but reciprocal by definition, when good or right principles failed, one could blame the 
lack of genius in how these were applied, and when bad or wrong principles 
succeeded, one could credit the genius of the general who made them work 
nonetheless, against nature. In either case, the two absolute concepts sustained one 
another thanks to the sophistry that linked them, coupled with an underlying 
expectation regarding the scientific method, the existence of principles and the 
validity of using the former to generate the latter. So long as the scientific method as 
an approach to the military arts went unquestioned in its fundaments, this relationship 
between genius and principles was enough to justify failure and success, but when the 
revolutionary wars struck, their intensity overwhelmed war theory in way that even 
this old stopgap, this easy solution to counter any scepticism, proved insufficient. 
It is easy to say, looking back, that Napoleon failed at Waterloo despite his 
genius, and despite the principles regarding key points and internal lines, because of 
many other aspects of the battle: he was heavily outnumbered and he was forced into 
a battle rather than having the opportunity to fight at a time and place that would have 
been more advantageous. Similarly, the Russian expedition failed, despite the 
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principle of capturing a capital, because his enemy simply decided not to concede. If 
the context can drive the principle, then the principle is only valid insofar as it is 
being applied at the right place at the right time, which means it neither universal nor 
absolute. Napoleon’s rise and fall had brought to light the fact that ‘truths’ found in 
the various doctrines of war were only as powerful as the ink and paper upon which 
they had been decreed in the first place. From this angle, it was unnecessary to claim 
that Frederick the Great possessed such thing as a ‘perfected’ military art. In fact, in 
debates which pitted highly divergent views on Frederick the Great’s strategy by 
Delbrück and Wilhelmine military writers, whether it rested on war of attrition 
attrition or acts of desperation, one consensus did emerge, that the ‘execution of his 
strategy was far from perfect’.69 Rather, Frederick had likely developed some relative 
gains in discipline and efficiency which gave Prussia a competitive advantage in 
warfare, compounded by the rise of Berlin as a European political, cultural and 
economic centre, as well a high level of conscription in the male population. There 
was nothing magical to any of it. There was no higher power residing in these 
principles which accorded them any inherent certainty. 
This was the great realization. But what it doesn’t clarify is: Why did war 
theorists come to believe that absolute principles were possible in the first place? 
There had to be some underlying expectations regarding validity and certainty in the 
way theorists were conceiving military thought. The first part of this answer can be 
found in Delbrück’s History of the Art of War, where he notes that during this time, 
‘it was believed that one could turn completely away from the decision by battle, and 
the method of pure manoeuvre was developed.’70 This first degree of separation or 
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isolation and elevation of a single aspect of war simplified the possibility of 
generating principles, since it cleared the field, so to speak: it eliminated the dynamic 
element itself, the soldiers using their weapons, focusing instead on fixed values such 
as terrain, geography, angles, and the predictable speed and movements of armies that 
are not in battle. The idea that a war could be won merely on manoeuvre changed the 
focus of war theory, making it more in line as well with the risk-aversion of princes 
and kings who sought relative gains in strength and holdings, rather than significant 
socio-political change. Delbrück notes that in the army regulations of the Elector of 
Saxony in 1752, it was written that, ‘A battle is the most important and most 
dangerous operation of war. In open country without a fortress the loss of a battle can 
be so decisive that it is seldom to be risked and never to be recommended. The 
masterpiece of a great general is to achieve the final purpose of a campaign by alert 
and safe manoeuvres without danger.’71     
The solution to this problem is in no way simple. Understanding how the 
validity expectations of scientific inquiry could be, and had been, transferred from the 
natural sciences (i.e. physics, mathematics, etc.) into other areas of human 
understanding, such as the social sciences, the military arts and philosophy, represents 
in general terms the overall intellectual context of the Enlightenment period. If the 
breakdown in Enlightenment war theory can be described as the rise in a new form of 
scepticism, one which dug to the very core of methodology, and one which could not 
be suppressed simply by balancing genius against principle, it was only made possible 
because some legwork had already taken place towards this deep form of scepticism 
in philosophical world, from which Clausewitz would borrow.   
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In Part I, for which I am greatly indebted to the thorough research of Azar Gat 
in A History of Military Thought, I explore a dimension which Gat himself accepts 
was outside the scope of his own research and which he only ‘roughly outline[d]’72: 
to study in greater detail the intellectual context and the philosophical, rather than the 
purely historical aspects which gave rise to Enlightenment and German Idealist 
treatises on war. To be sure, I have no intention here to go so far as to claim that the 
military writers were all busying themselves reading philosophy books. Though some 
might have done so, it is not in the purview of this text to explore each author line by 
line to make the point that direct philosophical influences are to be found or not. A 
positive or negative answer to this question would not change in any way the 
similarities. Arguably, it was the overall culture itself which was infused with science 
and certainty, and which explains the parallel development in both fields. It is the 
counterargument that matters: regardless of why these theories were written this way,  
the fact that they were allowed Clausewitz to borrow a set of philosophical arguments, 
conceived as a reply to the metaphysics directly in his case against the Enlightenment 
military thinkers.  
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the non-physical world 
and the human capacity to have knowledge of it. Suggesting that it would have any 
bearing on war theory may at first seem like quite a tenuous and unlikely argument. 
How can the quests for the scientific proof of God’s existence, interrogations 
regarding the possibility of supernatural events, and introspection into the form, 
immortality and indissolubility of the soul apply to the dramatic, real-life enquiries 
into the military arts? It is not so much the topics at hand as the type of arguments and 
methodologies, which provide the link. Specifically, as of the moment war theorists 
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broke away from the materiality of proclaiming maxims and best practices in war, and 
seeking instead fundamental, objective and immutable ‘principles of war’, they 
replicated the formula of the metaphysicians, in their quest for proving and defining 
the spiritual and the immaterial. It was this overlap, which allowed Clausewitz to 
juxtapose the methods of refutation found in the field of metaphysics, applying them 
to his refutation of the scientific principles of war, which he referred to as ‘positive 
doctrines.’  
If Clausewitz’s dialectics of war emerged as the synthesis of the metaphysical 
debates pitting Kant and Hume against Berkeley and Descartes, and the breakdown in 
military theory which the Revolutionary Wars had wrought, this however, was not 
achieved as a single process, but in two separate moments of development. In a first 
moment the dialectics of war were a negation, a refutation of the Enlightenment’s 
‘positive doctrines’ on the strategic/tactical plane of analysis or a reply to the 
question, ‘how is war to be fought?’ In this case the movement away from the 
metaphysical was with regard to methodology and validity expectations.  
The second moment in the development of Clausewitz’s dialectical war theory 
takes shape as a result of the first. As was mentioned earlier, the chessboard of 
warfare, the rules of the game, having apparently been tossed out during the 
Revolutionary Wars, the first impact of this was to question our preconceived notions 
of how wars are fought, but eventually this also begged the question, what are the true 
rules of the game, if what was taken for granted no longer applies? This second 
moment is less about methods and systems, and more about understanding war’s 
nature. A question which had until then been relegated to the metaphysical, whether 
god’s will or punishment, or else human nature: something simple, unitary, taken for 
granted, and unchangeable. However, upon closer and more systematic scrutiny, 
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Clausewitz would consider war’s paradoxical ‘real’ and the ‘absolute’ forms, and this 
would lead him to an objective observation of war’s political nature, which meant that 
war was not in fact fixed according to some divine or natural law, but dualistic, 
dynamic and changing. As such, this second moment focused on a higher level of 
analysis, which moves us from the ‘how’ in war to the ‘what is war’ also represented 
a breakaway from the traditional deistic or naturalists assumptions regarding war’s 
nature, its causes, etc. 
Kant is central to the development of both of these dialectical moments in 
Clausewitz’s thinking, however, this should not be taken to mean that other influences 
on Clausewitz are somehow relegated to an inferior role. Kant’s method did not 
undermine in any way Clausewitz’s attachment to Scharnhorst, Fichte, Machiavelli, 
and Montesquieu. None were excluded in the process of integrating Kant. In fact, they 
were arguably enhanced as a result. The method allowed him to clarify, amplify, 
substantiate, and objectively demonstrate through a sceptical and critical analysis, 
what he already come to hold as intuitively true, based on a wide range of readings. 
In order to show the methodological links between metaphysics and the art of 
war, before and after the Kantian revolution in thinking, Part I is divided into four 
chapters. The first provides an overall philosophical context regarding the fields of 
Enlightenment metaphysics and war theory, showing their methodological similarities 
and their common premises regarding the nature and scope of what science could 
provide human understanding. The second chapter presents the sceptical counterpoise 
to these methodologies and expectations, which first appears in Hume and is later 
developed in Kant, making the argument that it forms the backdrop of Clausewitz’s 
‘first dialectical moment’ in which he challenges not merely individual positive 
doctrines or principles of war from Enlightenment war theorists, but actually crushes 
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the very principle of seeking out and positing principles of war in the first place. 
Chapter 3 breaks slightly away from the narrative in order to nail the coffin shut on 
positive doctrines. Here, we consider how 19th and 20th century military thinkers who 
tried to undermine Clausewitz’s conclusions on positive doctrines generated severe 
forms of illogic in the process. Combined, chapter 2 & 3 attempt to show exactly what 
Clausewitz’s dialectical method destroyed in its path, what weeds were pulled from 
the field. And finally, the fourth chapter returns once again to the relationship 
between Kant and Clausewitz in order to consider what the dialectics of war actually 
created: the dual-concept of ‘absolute war’ / ‘real war’.  This is the ‘second dialectical 
moment’, in which the method bears fruit.  
The overview of the metaphysical debates will be limited to only the 
successive works of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kant.  Evidently, choosing such a 
narrow set of philosophers in order to discuss the wide field of metaphysics is a 
conscious editorial decision to sacrifice exhaustiveness for the sake of expediency. 
Indeed, we must return as quickly as possible to the question of war theory, more 
specifically, how Clausewitz represented a culminating point, the coming together of 
the military and metaphysical enquiries. Using these four philosophers nonetheless 
provides the basics: first, the origins of the method in Descartes, second, the 
fulfilment or apogee of its claims in Berkeley, followed by counterbalancing 
appearance of scepticism and limits in Hume representing a certain end, and 
ultimately, the achievement of a new and distinct plateau of analysis in Kant’s system 
of categories, representing a new beginning. This leaves out much, but nonetheless 
sheds a reasonable light upon the central themes and questions of this important 
philosophical journey.  
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For similar reasons, the theorists chosen to represent Enlightenment thinking 
on war do not form an exhaustive list either, but certainly represent among the best 
known and most widely read in the tradition: Montecuccoli, Quincy, de Saxe, 
Puységur, Maizeroy, Prince de Ligne, Guibert, Bulow, Jomini. Chosen first and 
foremost because they were among the theorists which Clausewitz himself had read 
(with the possible exception of Quincy and Maizeroy, who do not appear in 
Clausewitz’s notes.)73, another consideration was to match and distinguish theorists 
who wrote concurrently, as well as to showcase the evolution in the cleavages which 
marked earlier rationalism from later rationalism in the theories themselves, showing 
a progression over time from a more nuanced debate on the principles of war, to a 
black and white opposition between those who held ambitious, all-encompassing 
positive doctrines in the highest regard, and those who mocked these as pure folly.  
As we explore how and why Clausewitz first introduced dialectics into war 
theory, and later developed it further from one chapter to the next over time, we 
eventually find ourselves face to face with the problem he would eventually come 
across. The more clearly defined and mutually exclusive his categories and 
dichotomies became, the more the system was overtaking what had previously been 
written. When he wrote his final editorial note, after having completed writing Books 
VII & VIII, he had come to realize that he would need to reedit the entirety of Books I 
to VI in order to integrate what he had recently written.74 It suggests that the more 
Clausewitz began making a profound use of dialectics, that is, beginning at the end of 
Book VI and into Books VII and VIII, the more overwhelming its effects on the rest 
of the project. In writing Book VIII, Clausewitz quipped, ‘A small jump is easier than 
a large one, but no one on that account, wishing to cross a wide ditch, would jump 
                                                                
73 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 81n 
74 Clausewitz. On War, Notice, p. XXXVIII  
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half of it first.’75 In this case, we might wonder if there was not some personal truth to 
this line. When he had started On War, Clausewitz had in fact jumped halfway into 
dialectics, not knowing the full scope of where its chasms would eventually land him 
by the end of the book. And now that he had water up to his neck in dialectics and 
was making plans to start all the way back from Chapter One, Book I – maybe he was 
in fact feeling a bit overwhelmed by the consequences of jumping halfway in.  
                                                                




Chapter One – Perfection and Certainty in 




If Clausewitz’s preliminary use of dialectical reasoning is found, not in what 
his theory posited, but in what it negated or refuted, then we should therefore begin 
our exploration by looking at the Enlightenment theories of war which were the 
subject of Clausewitz’s reply. In this first chapter, the objective is to draw a parallel 
between the metaphysical philosophy found in Descartes and Berkeley and the form 
of theorizing which existed amongst war theorists. Despite their different subjects of 
inquiry, the relationship between science and reason as it was conceived during the 
Enlightenment was nonetheless identical in both fields. Without this parallel, it would 
have been impossible for Clausewitz to make such good use of Kant’s reaction to the 
metaphysicians in his own reply to the military theorists. However, before we can 
engage in this larger question, we must ask ourselves: what were these grand 
proclamations with regard to God, miracles, angels, strategy, and tactics, and in what 
sense did they overlap?  
The two fields shared a common starting point in wanting to elucidate what 
makes cosmos out of chaos, which was assumed in both cases to be some external 
form of intelligence rather than some inherent logic to the thing itself or simply a 
chaos that is naturally chaotic. Unlike phenomenology, for example, which posits 
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existence as essence, rationalist philosophy starts with the expectation that existence 
must emerge causally from essence. It is from this initial premise that the Rationalists 
and Empiricists sought God by observing that which He created, the effect to His 
cause. Similarly military theorists sought this external intelligence as it might appear 
through observation of the causes and effects that linked factors of war together, 
whether combat to victory, terrain to superiority, or angle to advantage, etc. And so, 
just as the metaphysicians Descartes and Berkeley were looking for order in the 
apparent chaos of the universe and the logic that made it intelligible in its creation, so 
too would military writers from Montecuccoli to Jomini claim that one could 
synthesize order from the apparent chaos of warfare. 
In either case, an aesthetic of perfection surrounded the project and its 
methodology, and the higher knowledge sought was assumed to exist, simply 
requiring of intellectual explorers that they should find or discover it, like America or 
the curvature of the Earth, etc. And secondly, the method for discovering it would be, 
as in the natural sciences, to remove layers of confusion that surrounded the isolated 
question: what are the true, immutable, and eternal causes of victory. Causality 
appeared to these explorers as a concept or thing external to the human mind and 
therefore possessed by some higher intelligence or ordering idea to the material 
world. For the metaphysician, the form of external knowledge was an omnipotent and 
eternal God; while for war theorists, it took the form of an omnipotent and eternal set 
of principles of war, theories whereby such things as ‘decisive points’, ‘the key to a 
country’, and ‘base lines’, among many other simple concepts, were assumed to have 
universal and absolute power to generate victory in war, regardless of the overall 
context. This was only tenable so long as the ‘decisive’, ‘key’ or ‘base’ idea 
represented by the expectation that causality was a form of absolute truth in itself held 
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strong; but should it begin to waiver, the whole edifice that linked certainty to causal 
inductions and deductions would crumble in metaphysics and war theory alike.  
War theorists and metaphysicians failed to see the problem of validity they 
were creating all-round, by which they reached a single impasse, though for opposite 
reasons. On the one hand, the metaphysicians could not prove their conclusions 
intuitively, because these were all based on immaterial concepts that could not be 
materialized for proper testing or validation. Meanwhile, the war theorists also met up 
with the problem of never achieving intuitive certainty, not because they lacked 
material proof, but as a result of the sheer surplus of it. For each example of where 
one principle had succeeded, history could provide a number of counter-examples of 
where it had failed, and this provided content enough to encourage debate amongst 
war theorists. The fact that one could make arguments for and against each and every 
principle of war stimulated the quest in the first place because it encouraged the 
expectation that these eternal truths were out there, just waiting to be uncovered. 
 
Early Enlightenment War Theorists: The Quest for Principles Begins 
  
Our first clue into the nature of Enlightenment thinking in general, and more 
specifically in the military arts is to break down the meaning of this word ‘principle’ 
which appeared to be so central to the purposes of the theorists. Making its early 
appearances in the early 1600s, it would soon spread across the field of war theory, 
both in terms of the scope of what it represented or what it could mean, and in the 




 ‘Principle’ is by no means an insignificant little word. Its claim to fame is 
none other than being the Bible’s opening word, a word that invokes the divine power 
of creation. Whereas in English, we are familiar with the phrase ‘In the beginning’ 
from the King James translation of Genesis, the word choice loses the flavour which it 
has in St-Jerome’s Latin translation, the Vulgate, which reads ‘In principio’. 
Etymologically, the word ‘principle’ is from the Latin root ‘princeps’, sharing its 
etymology with the word ‘prince’, whereby the first syllable ‘prin’ or ‘primus’ means 
‘that which is first’, and the second comes from ‘capere’, meaning ‘to take’.76 
Together, they represent the idea of that which is ‘first’ in the sense of ‘original’, as 
well as the power which the origin bestows. Hence, the word principle implies 
causality in two mutually enhancing ways, first it brings forth the notion of Causa 
Prima, or creation as consequence of a divine act, and secondly, the very formulation 
of the concept is a causal idea, where an idea has power because it is original or first. 
There is a certain self-contained logic that binds principle to causality, and both to the 
divine. That is to say that causality might be unearthed by human inquiry, but it exists 
outside of the human mind as an absolute form of truth.  
As such, ‘principle’ is distinct in its connotation from other synonyms that we 
use in various theories. ‘Groundings’ and ‘fundamentals’ imply their stability from 
being fixed from below. They have an earthly origin, or as the French say, ‘terre à 
terre’ or  ‘down to earth’ which is closer in meaning to ‘common sense’ or that which 
is ‘firmly’ established.  Meanwhile, ‘maxims’ can be translated from the Latin as 
‘big’ idea or the ‘big’ picture. ‘Adages’ and ‘Theory’ are distinctly human in their 
connotation, the former derived from ‘speaking’ and the latter from ‘seeing’. Only the 
                                                                




word ‘principle’ implies a powerful, absolute truth, derived from the primordial 
nature of things and of God. 
In the natural sciences, this spiritual connotation was reinforced by the fact 
that uncovering causality in the physical properties of objects generated formulae that 
had the power to predict events in the material world, thereby fulfilling the premise 
that causality was providing a glimpse into God’s creation and the laws which govern 
it. However, it was not so clear that this same power of prediction and understanding 
could in fact take proper form outside physics, mathematics, and geometry. But that 
did not stop the metaphysicians and war theorists from dreaming up ways to deploy 
physics, mathematics, and geometry into their respective fields.  In fact, the most 
colourful example of this in war theory was to be found in Dietrich von Bülow’s 
Kriegssystem, in which he went so far as borrowing directly the theory of gravity to 
describe the agency of military energies with mathematical certainty, arguing that 
they become weaker in ‘an inverse ratio of the square of its distance.’77 Yet, this 
extreme form of scientific theorizing would only come later in the game. Before such 
precise principles could be expounded, the question which was on the minds of war 
theorists was whether or not principles of war were even possible in the first place. In 
fact, among early Enlightenment war theorists, the word principle was avoided. The 
word itself was not associated to dictates of tactics and strategy, but to questions 
regarding how such a universal theory might eventually form through systematized 
inquiry. There was hope and confidence in the method, but there was not yet a sense 
of having achieved this end.  
                                                                




The Enlightenment’s quest for principles of war progressed vigorously, fuelled 
by growing literacy and access to printing presses, two defining characteristics of the 
time. While the 17th century had produced some 70 publications on the subject of the 
military arts, a century later the rate of publication had increased four-fold.78 Among 
these works, the two schools of thought had reached an irreconcilable distance from 
one another: on the one side, the principles of war were becoming more precise and 
grandiose, while on the other, a few counter-current authors pressed harder and used 
harsher criticism in questioning the claims to absolute certainty.     
To find the origin or the foundations of the quest for principles, we must go 
back to the early and mid 17th century, a time when Galileo and Descartes were 
publishing their works. Raimondo Montecuccoli was among the first to embark upon 
the quest for organizing a systematized and scientific study of war. Writing in roughly 
the same years, Montecuccoli did not generally use the word ‘principle’. However, 
the methodology he proposed framed war in the necessary didactical frame, upon 
which would emerge the formulation of principles. Using a tight set of calculations, 
measures, concepts and subdivisions, Montecuccoli flirted with narrower and more 
systematic notions, while never actually expounding principles. Interestingly, while 
the title of his major work was ‘Dell’Arte militare’, which he wrote between 1649 and 
1654, a French translation in 1734 would insert the word principle into the title, 
changing it from The Military Arts to ‘Principes de l’art militaire,’ or ‘Principles of 
Military Art’; a rather evident demonstration of just how central word principle had 
                                                                




become in the field of war between the time the manuscript was original written and 
when the French translation came about.79 
 Montecuccoli’s work set the foundations for a systematized study of war by 
introducing a smaller set of ideas, which aligned key items to one single, ultimate 
goal:  victory. Of course, this may appear trivial from a modern perspective, but as 
Moran explains, this ‘seemingly unexceptional claim’ was a challenging idea 
‘because it elevated an illusive military abstraction above traditionally, socially 
defined concerns with honour, glory, plunder and prestige.’80 Montecuccoli was 
giving war theory a far keener intellectual shape, which involved the relationship 
between ends and means, as well as a reduced framework for analyzing and achieving 
‘victory,’ which in fact depended on one’s mastery over each element in a set of only 
three categories of actions.  
 
La guerra è un'azione di eserciti offendentisi in ogni guisa, il cui fine si 
è la vittoria.81 [War is an action of armies which clash between 
themselves in every way, and for which the end goal is victory.] 
 
La vittoria si conseguisce per mezzo dell'apparecchio, della 
disposizione e dell'operazione.82[Victory follows by means of 
preparations, dispositions and operations.] 
                                                                
79 Raimondo Montecuccoli,  Memoires de Montecuccoli : ou Principes de l'art militaire en général 
(Amsterdam : 1734)  
80 Daniel Moran. ‘Strategic Theory and the History of War’, in Baylis et al. Strategy in the 
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 Despite the fact that this formulation at first appears to have absolute claims, 
when one proceeds to the description of these aspects of war, it becomes evident that 
their parts consist of variables, not immutable maxims. To give an example, regarding 
‘Dispositions’ Montecuccoli explains that one must:  ‘1) consult slowly, execute with 
speed. […] 3) accept the role of chance. […] 4) take profit from unforeseen situations 
[…] 6) remember that one who thinks of everything does nothing, and one who thinks 
of nothing succumbs to error.’83 These are not the words of a person who would 
profess an absolute faith in the power of science or geometry to overwhelm or 
undermine the uncertainties of war. Rather, Montecuccoli embraced these 
uncertainties and looked to enlightened leadership to profit from them.  
Well into the 18th century, this was generally the case. The word ‘principle’ 
had still not yet made complete headway into the field of military arts, even though 
certain scientific principles were finding their way through. The relationship between 
science, method and the military arts were becoming tenser, but the latter had not yet 
been overtaken by the former two. Marquis de Quincy, writing in 1728, 
systematically avoided the use of the word ‘principle’ and rather spoke of ‘maxims,’ 
‘art,’ and ‘tactics’ to make his arguments. Given that the term was known to the 
military arts and widely used in other fields of study by that time, this avoidance was 
without a doubt a conscious decision. That being said, there was an appreciation for 
what science could afford the general, but only in a subservient role. In his book, 
L'Art de la guerre: ou instructions sur l'art militaire, Quincy allowed for a co-
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existence between the art of leadership and adaptation to situations, and certain 
geometrical and mathematical imperatives of the type of warfare being fought at the 
time, given its lines and fortifications. And so, far from dismissing science as a tool in 
the quest for improving war’s outcomes and techniques, Quincy effectively applied 
scientific models to specific features of war, but made no claim to apply them as an 
ontological whole or a model by which all of war’s many intricacies could be 
understood. Thus, in his introductory comments, Quincy placed the subject of 
Geometry among the four intellectual disciplines in which a General must excel in 
order to succeed in the battlefield. He offered a compelling example of why that is 
later in his treatise, in his exploration of the difficulty involved in aiming one’s guns 
from afar at the right angle required to strike through the embrasures in the 
fortifications behind which soldiers shot at the approaching army:  
  
I have seen otherwise very competent officers fall into this trap, for 
having marked the terrain at night. One must take measures, in order to 
be precisely parallel to that which he seeks to attack. Without this, he 
weakens his ability to clear the embrasures on the side we are firing at, 
and we find it difficult to undo such a disadvantage, which may cause 
a considerable delay.84 
 
Yet, far from turning these questions of angles into foolproof systems of 
conduct, Quincy also included moral factors in the way troops were to be led to 
victory, emphasizing such things as recompense, glory, leadership and inspiration: 
                                                                




[One must] unite all the forces, and examine the advantages of terrain, 
the wind, the sun and choose a field which will accommodate size of 
one’s troops, […] and through strong speeches, showing one’s 
countenance, firmness, tranquillity and assurance, inspiring the 
strength of one’s army, and showing them their certainty of victory and 
reminding them of their duty, the necessity, the glory, the booty, the 
recompenses, and coming end of their fatigue, so that they may recall 
the great actions they have accomplished in the past.85  
 
In the case of Maurice de Saxe, writing in roughly the same years, 1732 to be 
precise, the relationship between principles and the art of war was a somewhat 
confused one. In the introduction to his Reveries, he clearly states that ‘All sciences 
have principles and rules. War has none.’86 From this categorical stance, he manages 
to pursue an argument that leads him, in the final chapters, to spell out his own set of 
‘principles’. This inconsistency however, he would probably reply, was likely caused 
by the feverish disposition he was in when he wrote the book in the first place,87 but it 
is nonetheless telling that this paradox should appear in the years in which it did, right 
before the quest for absolute principles of war truly to took off. 
By the end of the 18th century, the care that went into managing the paradox or 
uncertainties of principles and the military arts ceased. There were, on the one side, 
people like Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne, a Field Marshal under the Holy Roman 
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Empire, who were categorical their anti- ‘principles’ stance. De Ligne argued that the 
infinity of situations in war negates the very possibility of principles. ‘My 
fundamental principle in war is to not have any principles. […] Are any two situations 
perfectly identical? It is so of combat like of faces, when two are alike, that is already 
quite a lot.’88 On the other side stood Guibert, Puységur, Maizeroy, Bülow, and 
Jomini, whose works we shall consider further below, who reveled in all kinds of 
mathematical and scientific generalizations and systematization on war. What 
separates the early Enlightenment from the five I have enumerated is precisely this 
willingness to accept uncertainty in their theorizing, moving away from Quincy’s 
moderation, through Saxe admitting the paradox, and onwards to the final 
gravitations of Bülow.  
While we can easily see how optimism in the sciences might have contributed 
to this, what is missing from analysis is the jump from ‘scientific inspiration’ to 
‘scientific certainty’. Among the early Enlightenment war theorists, there is no doubt 
that ‘causal’ inferences were at the centre of all their theorizing: the induction of 
principles was based on the premise that isolation and observation caused principles 
to emerge; and reciprocally, once such principles were found, should they be found, 
they would permit the deduction of logical stratagems based on the premise that 
applying a principle to a situation causes a series of effects that would generate the 
conditions of victory. We find that there was a confidence in the premises and the 
method involved in generating and using principles of war, but in exchange there 
remained some flexibility and perhaps uncertainty about the nature and form such 
principles would take. To understand where this specific point in war theorizing is 
analogous to the metaphysics, we must turn to Descartes. He also had developed a 
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total confidence in the method, which he would use to uncover the truth about God, 
and he concluded that one could know scientifically that God existed, though he had 
not gone so far as trying to extrapolate the form and substance this God would take, 
the details behind the veil.  
 
Descartes: A Scientific Approach to the Immaterial 
 
 The year was 1641. The Church had suffered many setbacks to its official 
dogma, from Columbus to Magellan, and Copernicus to Galileo. Science was on the 
rise, but luckily for the Church, science’s interest in demonstrating God was not 
fuelled by questions of atheism, but rather an interest in heresy, in improving our 
knowledge of the divine.89 Such questions had been studied before, and the arguments 
on the topic made by Saint Anselm of Canterbury almost 600 years earlier resurfaced 
in Rene Descartes’ proof of God’s existence, as a deductive argument starting with 
God’s perfection.90 Descartes also followed in Saint Thomas of Aquinas’ footsteps in 
suggesting that God’s existence cannot be derived in and of itself, but must result 
from our experience of His effects becoming manifest to us.91 What was truly original 
in Descartes’ was not so much the conclusion or even the argumentative path he used 
to get there, but rather the method itself, given that Descartes was not a trained 
theologian or philosopher; he was a mathematician and physicist cum philosopher. 
Consequently, Descartes’ approach to the question was grounded in the scientific 
method. 
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 From this perspective, Descartes could use the systems of logic which he had 
developed in his geometry work, because he was making the assumption that even 
though objects were not necessarily numbers and figures, they could nonetheless be 
analysed as if they were.  As a result of this assumption, he could make use of ‘long 
chains of reasoning,’ like those which geometricians used in their demonstrations.92 
As a result, his Meditations made use of methods directly borrowed from the sciences, 
particularly the isolation of variables, and the deduction through sequential causal 
arguments meant to allow a logical and scientific conclusion to emerge from the 
deductive process. 
 By interposing science into his system of philosophy, Descartes hoped that he 
would re-establish a firm foundation by which to rectify his beliefs and opinions:    
 
Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had 
accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that 
consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly 
doubtful; I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my 
life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing 
anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish 
a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences.93 
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 Paradoxically, the starting point of the new certitude that would emerge from 
this process was in fact an extreme form of doubt, however as far as scepticisms go, 
this particular form is closer to a rhetorical ploy than to any sincere objective to 
generate a sceptical theory or method. Its purpose in the First Meditation was to 
generate an ‘intense sceptical doubt’ not as a way of life or philosophy, as the ancient 
sceptics would have, but rather as a tool of abstraction, a radical doubt which is not 
meant to be practical, but which was nonetheless useful to the purpose of his 
treatise.94 The argument begins by questioning perceptual information, which can 
deceive the perceiver both in dreams and our waking hours. While this argument can 
be traced back to those of the Ancients, what followed was an original form of doubt: 
the assumption, for the sake of the inquiry, that God is not the source of all truth, but 
rather a ‘malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, [and 
who] has employed all his artifice to deceive me.’95 In this hypothetical context, 
everything in the universe, as perceived by the human mind is false.  
Having established this absolute sense of doubt, Descartes was thereby free to 
focus on the self, in this fullest abandonment from the world. He could then conclude 
that even within this ultimate doubt, there existed a beacon of certainty, and this 
would become his famous maxim: ‘cogito ergo sum’. 
 
But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the 
highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all 
his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am 
deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about 
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that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. 
So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and 
carefully considered, that this I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time 
it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.96 
 
 If we recall our earlier discussion of ‘principles’, we are reminded of the 
power of a truth that comes from the origin, or the fundament. Descartes ‘Cogito’ 
takes this form because it exists in and of itself, it does not depend on some other 
truth. The Cogito was a causal relation even purer and truer than even the Causa 
Prima itself! Descartes would go so far as to refer to it as the ‘first principle of 
philosophy,’97 dethroning in the process even God as the centrality of philosophical 
inquiry. Yet it rests on something that is even more fundamental, though the 
philosopher had not recognized it. The ‘Cogito ergo sum’ rests its conclusion on a 
causal inference, where ‘thinking’ is a demonstration of ‘being’. It is upon this first, 
elementary causation that the philosopher builds up the rest of his exploration of the 
divine. 
In the Third Meditation, Descartes proceeded to call into question the 
existence of his ‘malignant demon’, arguing that it would be wrong to assume that 
God is a deceiver before having even considered the larger question of whether God 
actually exists or not.98 Having asked us to put aside the hypothetical construction 
which allowed the cogito in the first place, he reconsiders the existence of God in 
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relation to the Cogito, and thereby sets his new starting ground and basis for a new 
system of certainty. 
 
[…] since I am a thinking thing and possess in myself an idea of God, 
whatever in the end be the cause of my existence, it must of necessity 
be admitted that it is likewise a thinking being, and that it possesses 
in itself the idea and all the perfections I attribute to Deity. Then it 
may again be inquired whether this cause owes its origin and 
existence to itself, or to some other cause. For if it be self-existent, it 
follows, from what I have before laid down, that this cause is God.99  
[…] 
 
[…]and thus there can here be no difficulty with respect to them, and 
it is absolutely necessary to conclude from this alone that I am, and 
possess the idea of a being absolutely perfect, that is, of God, that his 
existence is most clearly demonstrated.100 
 
 The line of reasoning which links Descartes’ absolute doubt to his discovery 
of God is generally referred to by scholars as the Cartesian circle, because ‘the 
criterion of clear and distinct perception depends on the assumption that God exists, 
which in turn depends on the criterion of clear and distinct perception.’101 It generated 
in metaphysics a doctrine of knowledge independent of any metaphysical guarantee or 
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proof.’102 Method had in effect been elevated to the point where it had generated its 
very own sense of self-certainty, upon which Enlightenment thinking would thereafter 
rest.   
 If we look back now on the early Enlightenment war theorists, we find that 
there is a parallel situation with regard to the interrogation on the existence of 
principles. Monteccucoli was not seeking out principles, because the time for it had 
not yet arrived; this was still in the phase of asking whether or not principles could 
even exist in the first place. First, the premises for their emergence needed to be set, 
the foundations for the coming military arts. This was equally the place of Descartes 
in history. He was not trying to demonstrate God’s form and substance, but merely 
asking if one could know of God’s existence with any certainty, to which he replied 
‘yes’. It was after these preliminary conclusions that the subsequent quest to unearth 
the details of God and the principles of war emerged proper.   
 Yet, it was not until this new set of inquiry had been developed in philosophy 
that it trickled down into the military arts. During the roughly 100 years that separated 
Monteccucoli from Maurice de Saxe and Quincy, principles remained somewhat of a 
mystery, where we could imagine the potential for a future military science, but we 
could not yet assume to possess it fully. Thus the compromise which Quincy sticks 
with, and the paradox which Saxe develops. There is clear impasse. But a new 
philosophy was dawning. It would pursue new heights: to study form and substance, 
the details and depth of our knowledge of the divine, as opposed to merely the yes or 
no of its existence. And so too will some war theorists soon thereafter take on the 
quest to uncover the form and substance of principles, while no longer questioning the 
underlying premise of whether or not they did in fact exist.  
                                                                




Berkeley: The Form and Substance of God  
 
 The impetus to begin questioning Descartes’ logic, did not come so much from 
a reply directed at Descartes, as from those aimed at his disciple Berkeley, who would 
take the Cartesian method to a whole new level of ambition. His major work A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge was first published in 1710, 
and in it, he developed a far more ambitious demonstration of God. It is worth noting 
that the title takes on the word ‘principle’ which should not come as a surprise, given 
its scope to go beyond mere methodology and into the measurement of divine 
attributes. Berkeley did not make use only of the scientific method, but added to this 
scientific analogy and terminology, a modification and enhancement to the approach, 
we shall soon see, which equally occurred in the field of war theory. 
 Berkeley’s system has been described as ‘the most consistent development of 
Descartes' fundamental thesis of the priority of self- consciousness, coupled with a 
theistic conception of God and a subordination of mechanistic physics to idealistic 
metaphysics.’103 And indeed, the Cartesian influence on Berkeley was considerable 
and in fact easily confirmable thanks to notes Berkeley took in his diary.104 
Furthermore, if one takes the time to analyze where he stood on various arguments 
which had pitted Hobbes against Descartes, Berkeley almost systematically stood in 
agreement with the latter, against the former.105 Berkeley adopted the Cartesian 
project as his own and tried to clarify and improve upon its argumentation in a way 
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that would allow him to propose more ambitious conclusions, not only on the 
existence of God, but also the form and substance of the spirit. His purpose was to: 
 
[…]uncover those doctrines or principles which somehow lead to 
skepticism and atheism. He thinks he can specify which principles 
have these consequences, an important matter unto itself since these 
principles were all accepted by one or more of his predecessors. 
However, Berkeley also wants to refute scepticism and atheism; he 
claims to vindicate commonsensical views about knowledge and 
certainty and in the process establish the existence of God, thereby 
discharging two tasks at one blow.106 
 
In the Treatise, Berkeley introduced scientific methodology and analogy in a 
way that Descartes had not. His text did not limit itself to the existence of God, but 
went further, attempting also to elucidate the substance of divinity, thus integrating 
concepts from the physical world and the natural sciences, such as indivisibility and 
indissolubility into his metaphysics.   
 
We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, 
and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than the 
motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall 
natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) 
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cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; 
such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to 
say, the soul of man is naturally immortal. […]‘Hence, it is evident 
that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or 
spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the 
existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of 
men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and 
considerable than those ascribed to human agents.107 
 
Yet, regardless of the new tools and precision in the exposition, once again, 
the crux of the argument fell back on the older arguments of Aquinas and Descartes, 
whereby God’s existence is inherent to the concept of causality, the Causa Prima, the 
explanation for human perception of the natural world.   
 What is remarkable, when we transfer back to the field of war theory is that its 
evolution went through the exact same process.  Let us recall from the above section 
on the early Enlightenment war theorists that their purpose was to find principles and 
to prove that such principles were possible. Like Descartes, they were after the thing 
itself. The later Enlightenment military thinkers, convinced that they already 
possessed it, like Berkeley, went on to describe what they already possessed in much 
greater detail, leaving behind any scepticism regarding the method or the proof or 
demonstration of its conclusions. The greater the reliance metaphysicians and war 
theorists put on the ‘certainty’ of causal inferences, the greater their conclusions 
became to dependent on the validity of this very concept. This therefore meant that 
                                                                




they were at a high risk of becoming destabilized by anything that might cast doubt on 
causality itself, and its claims to certitude. Could causality lose its luster as the basis 
of all human understanding?  
 




What connects this upcoming section to the preceding one is not that 
philosophers were becoming war theorists or war theorists were becoming 
philosophers, but rather that the quest for ‘principles’ of war was in fact taking on a 
form that was increasingly mystical and metaphysical in its essence. As the principles 
were perfected and broken down into their minute parts, they became increasingly 
removed from any material reality, and their capacity to be proven empirically was 
further eclipsed by the ambition to be universally applicable and certain. By the mid 
18th century, the quest had indeed broken with the past, and taken on a path which 
began with Puységur and Maizeroy and finally culminated in the acclaimed works of 
Bülow and Jomini.  
The first representative of this new generation military theorists was Puységur, 
who wrote Art de la guerre par principe et par règle in 1743. Inspired by the famed 
French fortifications expert Vauban,108 Puységur hoped to convey the spatial and 
geometrical advances in the science of fortification to the art of war in the battlefield. 
                                                                
108 Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought, p. 37. 
82 
 
It is indeed no surprise that the initial impetus should come from the art of 
fortification, because if there was one place in the military arts where formulas and 
mathematics were essential, this was it. Again, we are reminded of what Quincy had 
to say about embrasures and angles with regard to this particular form of warfare. 
Geometry and science could indeed generate very tangible tactical ramifications in 
this case, but the question remained whether the principles would carry from this 
fixed environment to the very mobile environment of the open battlefield.  
As an interesting side note, however, while one might expect that because of 
this immobility and constancy, the art of fortifications would have been the most 
logical place to begin speaking of ‘principles,’ this was actually not the case at all. 
This does not mean he wasn’t being scientific in his calculations. His improved design 
on the ‘poudrerie’, the powder magazine, remained the official one in France for the 
following 200 years, replaced only in 1874.109 Everything was counted and organized 
systematically and meticulously, and Vauban was also known to ‘work out sets of 
tables, which related the garrison, armament and interior space to various numbers of 
bastions.’110 And yet, regardless of this, the word ‘principle’ was not on his mind. In 
his most important text, La defence des places,111 Vauban did not use the term 
‘principle’ once, even though he makes very precise observations regarding the 
methods of fortification. This was clearly a thought out word choice, since Vauban 
was quite familiar with the term principle and made regular use of it in his political 
and economic writings, such as in Les Oisivetés.112 Vauban, who died in 1707, wrote 
in a way that was perfectly in line with that of an early Enlightenment war theorist, 
                                                                
109 Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, (London : 
Routledge, 1985), p. 74 
110 Ibid. p. 74 
111 Vauban, Les Oisivetés (Sysse: Champs Valeon, 2007)  
112 Vauban, Œuvres (Amsterdam : Arkstee & Merkus, 1771)   
83 
 
even though he would became the inspiration for the principles of the later 
Enlightenment war theorists. 
 Puységur best describes what he means by a ‘principle’ his concept of 
‘principles’ in his discussion entitled, Comparing Caesar’s oblique lines at Pharsalus 
with those we should have taken at Nordlingen: reflection on the errors we commit for 
lack of principles.113 In it, Puységur explains that principles are the system of 
analysis, based in geometry, which will automatically lead the general to the best 
course of action, insofar as the situation has been properly gauged:  
                                                                
 
Among the methods used in combat by the great Roman and Greek 
captains, those that were not considered, because they were unknown 
of, since truth in the science of war (as I have said before) cannot be 
acquired until practice in armies is the result of theory founded on 
principles of geometry, which consist of comparing the moving forces 
which are acting against one another. […] After having recognized the 
numbers and the orders of battle of the enemy, this comparison of your 
forces with his offers your imagination all the different approaches one 
can take, whether to attack or defend; and once these have been 
weighed, it will make you chose the best option.114 
 
Whereas it is easy to gauge a situation when in attacking or defending a 
fortress, because the situation is generally unchanging, what is not so clear, and did in 
113 Puysegur, L’Art de la guerre par principe et par règles, Tome 2 (Paris: Charles Antoine Jombert, 
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114 Puységur, L’Art de la guerre par principe et par règles, p. 119-120 
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fact depend on a great leap of faith, was that the lessons learned from siege warfare 
could be adapted to battlefields, where angles and motion, everything, was so 
variable. The pedantry in Puységur seemed to have no limit, through mathematical 
formulas, for example, he would break down complex, possibly even day-long 
manoeuvres not to the hour or the minute, but to the precise second.115  
A few years after Puységur, this direction towards perfection continued to be 
felt, when Lieutenant-Colonel Joly de Maizeroy work, which had the stated goal to 
build ‘a theory on the science of war based on solid and invariable principles.’116 In 
his treatise entitled Mémoire sur les opinions qui partagent les militaires, Maizeroy 
wrote, ‘We begin with the well-known and invariable principle of combat, which 
consists of bringing the strong against the weak, vanquishing the enemy’s flank, and 
turning him – robbing him, as much as possible, of the ability to make movements to 
this end.’117 The language of war theory had indeed evolved, away from the 
uncertainties and exploratory nature found in the works of Montecuccoli or Quincy. 
Now, in Maizeroy, war’s methods and concepts had acquired a language which 
posited strategies and tactics that were infallible. 
This new faith continued to hold true in the works of General Guibert who 
wrote Essai général de tactique in 1770. In its pages, he complained that military 
thought had not yet managed to generate the types of scientific truth which physicists 
and astronomers had discovered in their fields hoped to develop tactics that  ‘would 
constitute a science at every period of time, in every place, and among every species 
of arms; that is to say, if ever by some revolution among the nature of arms which it is 
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not possible to foresee, the order of depth should again be adapted, there would be no 
necessity in putting the same [tactics] in practice to change either manoeuvre or 
constitution.’118  
Guibert did not mince his words. His science showed no fear. At one point, he 
would go so far as to claim that he could ‘perfectly [my emphasis] develop a theory 
regarding obliques orders.’119 Fond of demonstrating things with unquestionable 
certainty, Guibert was also of the opinion that, ‘surrounded by tumult and danger, in 
an environment where there are many wrong options and only one good one, this is 
where ‘coup d’oeil’ shows its wisdom, the judgment that wins battles. [...] The 
science of ‘coup d’oeil’ and the knowledge of terrain being intimately linked to 
tactics, we can see how many false and useless illuminations military colleges will 
give, which will not be constituted on this fundamental principle.’120  
In his own words, his ‘science’ was to be a set of ‘principles’ whereby he 
would ‘demonstrate the grand combinations of the interior mechanisms that must be 
weighed by an army in its transition from marching orders to combat dispositions.’121 
Here the use of the words ‘demonstrate’ and ‘must’ are of interest, because they are 
categorical. In fact, Guibert prided himself on having proclaimed a ‘perfect theory’, in 
which his ‘principles’ were meant to be of the ‘dogmatic’ order! 122 Typical of the 
later Enlightenment war theorists, Guibert had altogether given up on doubting any of 
his claims.  
The word dogmatic is wonderfully ironic in that on the one hand, Guibert was 
priding himself at having achieved this, but with hindsight one might say exact that: 
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his conclusions were indeed merely dogmatic. It is at this threshold that the parallel 
between Enlightenment metaphysics and war theory becomes tangible. Their 
professed certainty stands on a far more unstable ground than what any of these 
theorists could have expected, from their perspective. Given that method had been 
elevated, and material proof somewhat relegated to a subservient role, their 
pretensions were only valid insofar as they could not be properly questioned. Whereas 
this lack of materiality had as an effect in the metaphysics to render the hypotheses 
impossible to disprove for lack of material evidence, the opposite occurred in the art 
of war: there was so much material evidence with contradictory outcomes that no 
single principle could be elevated to certainty because each rule had a counter-rule, 
each example had its opposite.  
The answer to the riddle or problem of certainty in war theory was everywhere 
to be found among Enlightenment war theorists, but it seemed a surprisingly 
unconscious one. In what each of them had to say about the other, they regularly 
decried one thing in common: a thorough dissatisfaction with what all the preceding 
theories and principles written by others. Rarely building upon the works of others, 
they seemed intent on starting from scratch, as though the work of the previous 
authors had not, in fact, brought us any closer to the goal of finding immutable 
principles. This trend was best shown in the works of Jomini, as he wrote that even 
those who had served as his greatest influences and guides early on, Lloyd and 
Guibert, they had achieved only ‘more or less complete’, ‘imperfect’ and ‘deplorably 
contradictory’ theories.123  
The same people who wrote grandiose principles of war were inadvertently 
agreeing with Prince de Ligne’s argument stating that no true principle of war could 
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exist, or at least that there had not yet been any (until their own) better principles 
would suddenly shine light upon the Enlightenment’s darkness. It was precisely this 
optimism and lack of scepticism, despite the repetitive incompletion of the project and 
the dissatisfaction it wrought, which serves as the parallel we find with the 
metaphysical project. Here too, the professed certainty of the project was proportional 
and growing alongside the further application and reliance on the power of the 
scientific method and its languages and precepts. This explains equally why 
Berkeley’s claims had eclipsed the scope and range of those of his predecessors. But 
the closer one got to the final truth, the more it became evident that an inherent 




The next chapter will explain in greater detail the nature of the breakdown in 
Enlightenment thinking, and how the arguments made by Hume and Kant would 
eventually trickle into Clausewitz’s approach to the principles of war. However, it 
would be useful for us to introduce, before this more substantial discussion, an 
example of the problem of reason which Clausewitz came across, when he exposed 
the inescapable weaknesses of the writings of the most ambitious and perhaps also 
most tragic figure of all Enlightenment military theorists, Bülow.  
Bülow’s successful piece entitled Geist der neuern Kriegssystem, which was 
briefly mentioned earlier for its discussion of the theory of gravity the movements and 
forces involved in the battlefield, would become Clausewitz’s favorite target for 
mockery. The main thrust of Bülow’s argument, however, was not about forces of 
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repulsion, attraction, and gravity, but rather the very different subject of bases and 
lines of operations. Bülow claimed that the need for a regular supply of ammunitions 
to succeed in war required a geometrically calculable base upon which to rely. Using 
simplistic geometric formulas, he argued that a right angle triangle represented a 
critical point or cut-off after which any angle more acute would not allow enough 
cover to protect the base. Obtuse angles on the other hand offered the added 
advantage that any attempt by the enemy to incur into the base would leave their own 
bases undefended. Thus obtuse angles were most advantageous.124 In his concluding 
remarks, Bülow argued that beyond the 90 degree cut-off, one could ‘undertake an 
offensive operation against the enemy with safety.’125 He also argued that all retreats, 
in order to be successful, had to be accomplished using exocentric formations.126 His 
system excluded the possibility of exceptions or circumstances where these hard rules 
could not be applied or could be less efficient than alternatives.  
With regard to Bülow’s concept of base lines, Clausewitz argued that, ‘as far as 
history is concerned, we have decidedly not been led to any deductions of that kind 
through constantly recurring forms’.127 He then proceeds to explain how different 
contexts generate different best practices: 
 
What Daun did by the extent and provident choice of positions, the 
king did by keeping his army always concentrated, always hugging the 
enemy close, and by being always ready to act extemporally with his 
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whole army. The method of each general proceeded not only from the 
nature of the army he commanded, but also from the circumstances in 
which he was placed.128  
 
 Similarly, in Book IV, Clausewitz countered Bülow’s argument regarding 
exocentric retreats by providing two examples that were absolutely contrary to the 
stated rules, which was enough in itself to invalidate the rule’s claim to universality: 
 
Now and again it has been suggested (fn. In ref. to Lloyd, Bülow) to 
divide for the purpose of retreating, therefore to retreat in separate 
divisions or even eccentrically. [...] The idea of harassing the enemy by 
separate corps on both flanks at the moment when he is following up 
his victory, is a perfect anomaly; a faint-hearted pedant might be 
overawed by his enemy in that manner, and for such a case it may 
answer; but where we are not sure of this failing in our opponent it is 
better let alone. If the strategic relations after a battle require that we 
should cover ourselves right and left by detached corps, so much must 
be done, as from circumstances is unavoidable, but this fractioning 
must always be regarded as an evil, and we are seldom in a state to 
commence it the day after the battle itself. 
If Frederick the Great after the battle of Collin, and the raising of the 
siege of Prague retreated in three columns, that was done not out of 
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choice, but because the position of his forces, and the necessity of 
covering Saxony, left him no alternative. Buonaparte after the battle of 
Brienne, sent Marmont back to the Aube, whilst he himself passed the 
Seine, and turned towards Troyes; but that this did not end in disaster, 
was solely owing to the circumstance that the Allies, instead of pursuing, 
divided their forces in like manner, turned with the one part (Blucher) 
towards the Marne, while with the other (Schwartzenberg), from fear of 
being too weak, they advanced with exaggerated caution.129 
 
Having demonstrated the opposite stance, Clausewitz was not completely 
satisfied, nor would he use this to propose an alternative and opposite set of absolute 
principles replacing one set of doctrines with another. In fact, Clausewitz generally 
agreed that bases and lines were useful concepts, he simply insisted that one could not 
derive war plans from them.130 What he sought was to challenge the very principle of 
principles, and create doctrine against doctrines. If Clausewitz had only wanted to 
refute Bülow at the same level of analysis that Bülow was himself writing, he would 
have kept only to this direct refutation, but instead, if we look to other sections of On 
War, the scepticism which Clausewitz makes use of is not merely a scepticism in 
specific facts and analysis, but scepticism as an entire method of analysis.  
  The reason why Clausewitz could eventually go beyond mere direct refutation 
and question positive doctrines on a methodological or higher level was in fact the 
underlying unity, which we set out to explore in this chapter, linking the metaphysics 
to the Enlightenment war theories. What was illogical in Bulow’s attempts to turn a 
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few examples of exocentric retreats into a ‘principle’ of retreats, was not the 
reasoning itself, providing examples from past battles and deducing causal 
relationships between actions and military success. The problem was rather the 
absolute certainty that was allocated to the deduction, followed by the inference based 
on this, of an absolute principle. One could argue a logical stance both for and against 
exocentric retreats, and by extension any single positive doctrine, because of war’s 
many forces and possibilities, reciprocal actions and contradictions. And so, while 
Clausewitz could provide proof showing the opposite of Bülow’s conclusion, he 
could not demonstrate, and indeed knew not to even attempt to demonstrate, that a 
counter-example, such as the battle of Brienne could provide an opposite doctrine. In 
different contexts, there can be distinct, logical deductions which are mutually 
exclusive and opposite one another, that are nonetheless equally true, which is to say 
that the study of war had the ability to generate antinomies of pure reason, or 
mutually exclusive conditional truths which fail to demonstrate themselves or their 
opposites as unconditional truths in the process of being compared or analyzed 
jointly. (We will be breaking down this complex Kantian argument in the upcoming 
chapter.) 
The result of this ‘irreconcilable opposition between such a theory and practice’ 
was according to Clausewitz the necessary outcome of any ‘endeavour to establish 
maxims, rules, and even systems for the conduct of war,’ because it meant attempting 
to circumscribe or place into a system, something that had no definite limits.131 This 
is the source of the contradictions which appear in history, and the antinomies that 
emerge as so many examples both prove and disprove every positive doctrine. By 
bringing forward the paradox itself, rather than tying himself down to mere agreeing 
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with or disagreeing with Bülow’s conclusions, Clausewitz cut the underlying basis of 
the argument, he was escaping the endless circle of agreeing or disagreeing with any 
single principle of war, and moving his analysis to a higher level which encapsulated 




 A parallel evolution occurred in war theory and metaphysics during the 
Enlightenment. In the former case, the seed took root in the works of Montecuccoli, 
where victory was isolated as the only objective in battle, and a simplified list was 
drafted regarding how one could generate victory as a result of actions. Following this 
method, which linked causes to effects, an early rationalist tradition in war theory 
began asking whether or not it was possible to generate absolute principles of war, 
and finding themselves uncertain, they sought instead a moderate coexistence 
between art and science in the study of war. Meanwhile, in the metaphysics, thanks to 
Descartes’ methodology, which provided like Montecuccoli a sort of platform, the 
quest for proving God’s existence would eventually branch out into the far more 
ambitious question of God’s form and substance. After this process had been 
completed, and not before, a similar transition occurred in the science of war, where 
method was assumed to provide the basis upon which to unearth those principles that 
could deliver victory with predictability and certainty. The problem, however, was 
that this certainty in knowledge became detached from material proof, precisely 
because of the faith in the methods in both philosophy and war theory. Any deduction 
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and induction could be proclaimed binding and absolute, from the study of causes 
through isolation, as though each causal relationship possessed something divine to it.  
 If Clausewitz noticed within the many existing theories of war a common 
failure to actually attain the certainty they claimed, it was because he understood that 
refuting one doctrine or another was an insufficient process: the very antinomies that 
produced distinct and opposite principles were the basis of a higher, negating truth. 
Whereas the metaphysical debates were indemonstrable because they were 
immaterial, the ‘principles of war’ were indemonstrable because there was simply too 
much material contradictory evidence, too much confusion, too much chaos for the 
cosmos to ever emerge. However, for him to see this, the antimonies, the causal 
breakdowns, and the reciprocity of action that made war too dynamic to be intelligible 
in static constants, Clausewitz, had to have been well introduced and very conscious 
of Kant’s system, because it was Kant first, who interjected and responded to the 
problem of antinomies, causality and certainty in pure reason. It was Kant’s sceptical 
method that Clausewitz turned to in order to build his once-and-for-all refutation of 




Chapter Two – Clausewitz’s Scepticism: 




Scholars have argued alternative views regarding the origins Clausewitz’s 
theory of war. Some focusing on his personal history and relations, others on his 
experiences in battle, and in some cases, we come across comparisons with 20th 
century thought that attempt to ground On War in a simpler and perhaps more easily 
manageable framework. While each different approach may have some merit, none 
can individually surpass the importance of understanding how Clausewitz organized 
his thinking within the framework of a Kantian sceptical method. To exclude this 
central feature of Clausewitz’s way of philosophizing on war severely muddles how 
we interpret his work, because it means taking the substance of the work out of its 
vessel.  
A recent example, which illustrates the problem quite well, can be found in 
Antoine Bousquet’s The Scientific Way of War, in which the author avoids the 
philosophical origins of Clausewitz’s thought in order to make space for an argument 
on metaphors, which elevates the significance of thermodynamics in On War. 
Bousquet does so by citing Clausewitz’s occasional use of concepts such as ‘friction,’ 
‘perfect explosion,’ and ‘discharges’, and then by suggesting that they come together 
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as a foundational or ontological backdrop.132 In order to push forward his 
metaphorical analysis, the author makes use of a clever division that allows him to 
agree with Gat’s discussion of influences in Clausewitz, while side-stepping the 
question altogether:  
 
While Azar Gat has made a persuasive case for the influence of 
romanticism and anti-rationalist impulses on the writings of Carl von 
Clausewitz, […] it would be misleading to view Clausewitz himself as 
anti-science or anti-reason.133 
 
Bousquet is right in placing Clausewitz on this side of the divide, but he is 
wrong in suggesting that such a divide exists in the first place. While On War 
provides a careful refutation to the scientific certainties and claims made by 
Enlightenment war theorists, the either/or presentation, which places German 
Idealism against or opposed to science is false. In the context of Kantian thought, 
science is in no way dismissed, but rather elevated by its distinction from the 
metaphysics. It was precisely because the philosophical debates that had proclaimed 
and disclaimed grand, absolute truths about abstract, intangible objects such as god 
and miracles that Clausewitz could, by an analogous process, reclaim the scope of 
what science could afford war theory, and what it could not. In his first note regarding 
the project to write On War, Clausewitz explained that he was frustrated by the 
‘unscientific spirit’ of the existing theories in the military arts, suggesting that those 
who wrote them tried ‘so hard to make their systems coherent and complete that they 
                                                                
132 Bousquet. The Scientific Way of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) p.85-91 
133 Bousquet. The Scientific Way of War, 85. 
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[were] stuffed with commonplaces, truisms, and nonsense of every kind.’134 
Clausewitz was not ‘anti-science’ or ‘anti-reason’, nor is that what a philosophical 
reading would claim. Rather, Clausewitz was simply being reasonable about science, 
because he was integrating into his works Kant’s theory of human understanding, 
which was, in fact, nothing else than a scientific inquiry into reason itself. 
The distinction is an important one. Enlightenment thinkers had confused 
reason and science to the point where their quest for science had become 
unreasonable. Modern dialectics came about as a remedy to this situation, by offering 
an alternative way to conceive human understanding, allowing certain limits and 
inherent contradictions to be exposed. The outcome of this would be that the science 
of knowledge became more interested in the question of its own scope than in the 
question of its depth. Specifically, in the case of metaphysics, which was at the centre 
of these inquiries, the question transitioned from how to prove the existence of God, 
to an exploration of the proof itself: whether there could be any certainty to this 
demonstration. In order to be ‘reasonable about science’, the first requirement was a 
healthy dose of scepticism with regard to the scope human understanding and the 
relationship between observation, deduction, and certainty. 
The difference between how Clausewitz makes use of scientific analogy and 
how Enlightenment thinkers made use of it is therefore diametrically opposed. 
Whereas the latter did in fact make science an ontological feature of their work, the 
basis upon which they hoped to edify their systems, Clausewitz did no such thing. 
Clausewitz’s does use thermodynamics in a scattered and non-systematized way in 
On War, but it has a purely heuristic, not ontological, purpose. Clausewitz himself 
                                                                
134 Clausewitz. ‘Author’s preface to an unpublished manuscript on the theory of war written between 
1816 and 1818’, On War, Ed. Howard/Paret (Princeton University Press, 1989),  p. 61  
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makes that very clear. In his own words, he explains that the use of scientific 
analogies and metaphors are ‘nothing more than ornamental flourishes,’135 which is to 
say that even when he used metaphors in his own discussion, he did not attribute any 
serious value to them: his use of thermodynamics was not actually derived 
scientifically, it was merely borrowed from science and attached as an ‘ornament,’ to 
help the reader understand as an image, that which has actually derived from a mix of 
philosophy, war history, and critical analysis.   
To understand the centrality of philosophy in Clausewitz’s method requires a 
much deeper reading, which does not limit itself to extracting various snippets and 
proclaiming a whole. Indeed, as Fernandez-Vega notes, it cannot be boiled down to 
being anti-Enlightenment or not, since Clausewitz was writing at a time that was 
characterized by a combination of trends (Sturm und Drang, Kantianism, idealism, 
historicism, romanticism and nationalism).136 Picking and choosing among influences 
in an either/or way is a completely self-defeating approach to understanding 
Clausewitz. We should be doing the very opposite, finding ways to analyze the 
various influences in ways that makes room for them to coexist intellectually and 
logically. Even if the overarching system was in fact Kantian, this did not exclude 
other sources, arguably it helped Clausewitz improve and enhance the proof of their 
conclusions in a more objective way.  
The one concept that allows us to appreciate the complexity of Clausewitz’s 
frame of mind and the influences that shaped it is without a doubt also his most 
defining characteristic as a scholar: he was profoundly sceptical. It is plain to see. In 
fact, he was viscerally so, as is well illustrated in a letter written in 1827: 
                                                                
135 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. II, Ch 5, p 117 




I hate the sort of technical language that leads us to believe we can 
reduce the individual case to a universal, to the inevitable. Strategists 
manipulate these terminologies as if they were algebraic formulae, 
whose accuracy has long been established, brief formulae that may be 
used as substitutes for the original reality. But these phrases do not 
even represent clear and definite principles. Rather they are nebulous, 
ambiguous expressions, whose true meaning remains open to question. 
This is no accident. Their vagueness is intended, because they did not 
derive from what is essential and could be presented as universal truth. 
Consequently the inventors of these terms found it natural to allow a 
certain latitude in their meaning.137 
 
That being said, it is not enough to state that Clausewitz was a sceptic. The 
proper question thereafter should rather be: what kind of a sceptic was he? And to 
answer this one must be far more thorough. The specific kind of scepticism we find in 
Clausewitz first appeared in Hume, and it culminated in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason.  
  




137 Clausewitz, ‘Letter to Roeder, December 22, 1827’, Two Letters on Strategy, Ed. Peter Paret and 
Daniel Moran, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1984).  
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 No interpreter of Clausewitz has weighed in against the role of Kant in the 
formation of Clausewitz’s thought more aggressively, and with more authority, than 
Raymond Aron in Penser la guerre. It is worth noting a few of his concerns here, in 
order to keep them in mind, but ultimately I will return to his overall argument only in 
Part II, so that I may discuss his dual dismissal of both Hegel and Kant at once. With 
regard to Kant, specifically, Aron starts off by suggesting that Clausewitz never 
actually read Kant, but was merely introduced to his works indirectly. This argument, 
which is stated but not backed up in any serious way is thereafter followed by a 
blatantly weak ad hominem argument against the person who represents this indirect 
link, Prof. Kiesewetter. Aron writes that Kiesewetter was reputed as providing 
Kantian doctrines in ‘homeopathic doses’.138 Before even engaging with the question 
of a Kantian influence in Clausewitz, Aron has cast an unfounded doubt on the 
question.    
It is worth taking a bit of time to dismiss this line of argument right away, so 
that we may quickly move into Aron’s more serious points. Even though Aron may 
have considered Kiesewetter in such negative light, Kant himself did not share the 
impression, as he corresponded with Kiesewetter regularly and went so far as to ask 
his publisher in Berlin to hire Kiesewetter as the proof editor for the Critique of 
practical reason.139 There is therefore no reason to give credence to Aron’s attack on 
Kiesewetter in the first place. But even if it were true, why should we judge the 
quality of the teacher if the goal is to see whether or not Clausewitz understood Kant? 
Is it not impossible for the apprentice to outpace his master, anyway?  
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A way to determine this is to gauge whether or not when Clausewitz made 
references to Kant, he was paraphrasing the original or rather the textbooks and 
distillations written by Kiesewetter, which he would have had access to while 
studying under him. That being said, when we consider, as Aron does, that 
Kiesewetter was a ‘vulgarisateur’ (meaning someone who simplifies ideas in order 
popularize them),140 it is not a huge step to jump over Kiesewetter, especially if it 
simply means Clausewitz was paraphrasing a person who was paraphrasing Kant. The 
fact is that Clausewitz was applying Kant, and in all likelihood, and mostly, given the 
depth of his appreciation, it seems to be a near-certainty that Clausewitz would have 
read the originals, first because he was clearly interested in them, and secondly 
because as a student, then a professor and finally as the Commander of the War 
College, there is no doubt he had access to copies of the philosopher’s works if he 
wanted them, especially in a time when Kant was all the rage across Prussia, and had 
been published in Berlin. 
 That being said, there is an argument to be made which strongly suggests that 
Clausewitz had in fact read and understood Kant directly. Echevarria provides us with 
the right place where to find it, by having noticed that the paragraph below, written by 
Clausewitz, was very similar to one penned by Kiesewetter: 
 
Every educated person knows that a formal truth is the condition sine 
qua non of all truth and that it can only exist in the correct form... [By 
formal truth] we mean the agreement of a concept with respect to the 
                                                                
140 Raymond Aron, Sur Clausewitz (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1980), p. 44-45 
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laws of thought [logic]. These laws are the same for all humanity; 
consequently, logical truth must also be the same for all humanity.141 
 
 Echevarria rightly argues that the similarities Keisewetter’s version of this are 
‘too obvious to ignore’,142 but if we step back and consider the original version of this 
idea, written by Kant in the Logic, there is no reason to believe that Clausewitz was 
paraphrasing Kiesewetter and not the original. In fact, the extra words in Clausewitz’s 
version, which do not appear in the quote Echevarria uses from Kiesewetter’s Outline 
of Logic,143 renders additional elements, including the ‘agreement of a concept’ and 
the concept of ‘universality’ which is implied in Clausewitz’s mention of ‘all 
humanity.’ These two extra points do appear in the passage from Kant to which both 
were referring.144 It suggests, quite frankly, that Clausewitz understood the argument 
better, or at least summarized it better, than Kiesewetter had. 
 Aron does in fact acknowledge the fact that elements of Kant can be found in 
Clausewitz, but he minimizes them. Enumerating various examples, namely, 
reciprocity of action, synthetic/analytic knowledge, genius – all of which we shall 
discuss further below – he relegates these to something quite superficial, going so far 
as to say that Clausewitz, at best, could formulate phrases and expressions that 
sounded Kantian.145 Though it is a good start to find areas in Clausewitz which have a 
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‘family resemblance’146 to Kant, as Fernandez Vega does,147 there is much work that 
remains to be done to go beyond these snippets, and analyzing how the whole of their 
use comes together into a far more systematized understanding and convergence with 
Kant’s philosophy. Sounding is one thing, but what Clausewitz was doing was quite 
another. Granted, he did not integrate the whole of Kant systematically into his work, 
but this does not imply the reverse, that Clausewitz was not systematically and wholly 
Kantian in his own work. Clausewitz made good and proper use of those elements of 
Kantian thought that he needed, where he needed them, and at time this shows up in a 
superficial way, but that should not be construed as meaning a minor influence, let 
alone a complete lack of it. As we shall see, Clausewitz was very precise in his use of 
Kant. When he did refer to Kantian phrases and expressions, he used them ways that 
were accurate, as we saw above, but more importantly, very well chosen and relevant, 
as we shall see below. The examples of the Kantian influence here in chapter 2 and 
later in chapter 4 should be sufficient in themselves to cast some serious doubt on the 
thrust of Aron’s argument. 
 In exploring the Kantian elements in the works of Clausewitz, a frustrating 
element becomes increasingly apparent. On most occasions where Clausewitz 
borrows almost word for word from Kant, he does so in very limited and precise ways 
that apply to a specific item, and these examples can be easily identified because they 
are so clear and concise. However, as we shall explore later, in Chapter 4, the larger 
Kantian influence, the one that underpins the intellectual and philosophical context of 
On War cannot be found in one quote or another, it must be appreciated on the whole 
and this means in a somewhat abstracted way. It is impossible to merely distil this 
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overarching framework. Rather, it must be shown that On War converges 
methodologically and ontologically with the Critique of Pure Reason. The minor 
examples serve to remind us of the links, but the true influence is more significant, 
albeit less tangible. It would be a rather pointless endeavour to pick out Kantian 
influences for its own sake, were it not framed within this larger question, because it 
is this approach to human understanding itself, the scope of what can be known to the 
human mind, that allows Clausewitz to refute the Enlightenment’s positive doctrines 
with a system of scepticism.  
 
The New Scepticism: From Hume to Kant 
 
If Hume delivered a serious blow to the works of Descartes and Berkeley, this 
was not achieved by applying a whole new system of analysis so much as turning 
rationalism onto itself. He accepted the theory of ideas developed by Descartes, but 
‘followed it to its logical conclusions, or, that is, to the point that he denied genuine 
knowledge, basic realities (for example, causes, a substantial self), and real values.’148 
Hume undermined the conclusions of empiricism using its own argumentative 
techniques, salvaging the basis at the cost of the conclusions. He effectively brought 
the metaphysical debates of the past century, to a discomforting standstill, where 
certain features of empirical reasoning such as the origin of ideas and the distinctions 
between factual and relational knowledge were elevated and improved, whereas 
claims to absolute knowledge of the divine, of miracles, and supernatural events were 
                                                                
148 Norton, David Fate. David Hume : Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, (Princeton: 
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relegated to intellectual oblivion. However the complete effect was to instil in the 
empirical system a new form of scepticism that seemed impossible to remedy. The 
new scepticism found in Hume can be understood as having two widely accepted but 
divergent outcomes:  
 
The first [is to see] Hume as having advanced a radical scepticism 
which devastated the very possibility of scientific knowledge. The 
other [is to regard] Hume as having introduced a healthy scepticism 
prompting philosophers and scientists to abandon rash claims of 
modern rationalists and to embrace humbly the fact that non-trivial 
knowledge is after all only probable.149  
 
Either way, reason was forced to engage in a discussion about itself, its scope 
and depth, from which certainty in the world of ideas would never remerge entirely. 
This introspection would begin with a categorization of all knowledge as belonging to 
one of two forms. Customarily referred to as ‘Hume’s fork’, his breakdown of human 
understanding generates two distinct types of knowledge: ‘relations of ideas’ and 
‘matters of fact.’ Here, he is proposing that one must separate human understanding 
into two mutually exclusive planes, and consider as inadmissible any form of 
knowledge that claims to exist outside of the two: 
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All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided 
into two kinds, to wit, relations of ideas, and matters of fact. Of the 
first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic […] 
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not 
ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, 
however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of 
every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a 
contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and 
distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.150 
 
The significance of these two paragraphs is difficult to ascertain at first, but it 
marks a pivotal moment in philosophy, the beginning of modern dialectical reasoning, 
where an inherent contradiction serves as the basis upon which to explore the scope of 
human understanding. It is in direct opposition to the Cartesian tradition, where 
knowledge was understood as ‘global and unitary’ in that ‘all cognizable objects are 
knowable in the same way and follow an order similar to that of the terms in a 
mathematical demonstration, the whole body of human knowledge is necessarily 
one.’151 Hume understood knowledge as having two separate and mutually exclusive 
realms, an approach which would find its finality in the works of Kant, where this see 
seed is cultivated to its ultimate purpose, with the introduction of the 
synthetic/analytic division of knowledge, which was a derivative of this initial 
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argument.152 This, however, is a discussion to be had later when the text transitions to 
a discussion of Kant’s philosophy.  
More interesting for us now is how Hume cast doubt on the certitude of 
causality. Was Hume interested in the question, because he recognized that causality 
was at the central weakness of metaphysical exploration? Or did he stumble upon it in 
an attempt to save empiricism from itself? Either way, saving the empiricist doctrine 
regarding the origin of ideas had the unfortunate cost of the discrediting of our 
ordinary idea of causation.153 The two were inherent to one another. In his Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, Hume was not seeking to challenge certainty 
outright, but rather to characterize certainty in knowledge, which required that he 
study the problems of evidence and justification.154 Ultimately, this process 
uncovered that even the one thing which science took most for granted, and which 
was at the centre not only of its origin, but also each subsequent discovery, remained 
a limited concept, subject to scepticism. Causal effects could no longer be construed 
as the the absolute manifestation of truth, and consequently could not serve as the 
methodological template upon which to edify the types of inferences which Berkeley 
and Descartes had made. Hume wrote, 
 
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the 
operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover 
any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to 
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the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We 
only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The 
impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is 
the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no 
sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: 
consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and 
effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary 
connection.155 
 
‘The thrust of Hume’s analysis [was] directed toward showing that our causal 
inferences are neither intuitive, nor demonstrable, nor based on perceptions of causal 
connections or rational inference from past experience.’156 In the end, he brought to 
light a firm doubt on necessary connections and therefore causality itself. His 
conclusions were extremely damaging not only to the Cogito itself, which posits a 
causal inference regarding thought and being, but also in the entire method which 
used it as a starting point for further inferences. Indeed, if we return to the paragraphs 
taken from Descartes and Berkeley above, we find further demonstrations which 
entirely depend on causality being free from any scepticism: God’s existence is made 
‘evident’ as nothing more than a circular thought process based upon a set of inverse 
causal relations, where I think ergo I am, and since being and sentience are combined 
as causal, it becomes logical to induce the God’ existence as merely I am ergo God 
thinks. Therefore, to doubt the experience of causality, is no small matter, but forces 
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scepticism upon the entire metaphysical project, not merely in its conclusions, but 
more importantly, at every point in the method, from the inference of God as the 
Causa Prima of the universe at one end to the Cogito at the opposite end. Only one 
causal inference remains certain: if causality is no longer anointed with an immortal 
or supernatural certainty, then it appeared that certainty itself had died.  
Clausewitz’s scepticism, though it does not show itself to be in any particular 
way to be informed directly by Hume, nonetheless fits into to the tradition of thought 
bequeathed by Hume. This can be explained by the fact that Clausewitz’s knowledge 
of Kant would have introduced him to the central argument of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, which is in fact to build upon, while also refuting Hume by using critical 
reasoning to bypass or rather go beyond this initial state of scepticism in causality. 
Kant work was a transition from pure scepticism to sceptical method, but nonetheless 
to engage directly with the problem of certainty and causality. In On War, Clausewitz 
positions himself clearly in this tradition of questioning causality, and eventually 
transitioning from pure scepticism to sceptical method as well. In this passage from 
Clausewitz’s Kritik, in Book II, he expresses scepticism with regard to causality in a 
way that places him squarely in the intellectual context of Hume and Kant: 
 
From the simple narration of an historical occurrence which places 
events in chronological order, or at most only touches on their more 
immediate causes [...] As respects the tracing of effect to cause, that is 
often attended with the insuperable difficulty that the real causes are 
not known. In none of the relations of life does this so frequently 
happen as in War, where events are seldom fully known, and still less 
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motives, as the latter have been, perhaps purposely, concealed by the 
chief actor, or have been of such a transient and accidental character 
that they have been lost for history. For this reason critical narration 
must generally proceed hand in hand with historical investigation, and 
still such a want of connection between cause and effect will often 
present itself, that it does not seem justifiable to consider effects as the 
necessary results of known causes.157  
 
Even though he proposes that one can and should study causality and war, or 
at least attempt to do so through the many interfering layers of possible causes and 
effects, Clausewitz nonetheless ends the paragraph with a caveat: even if you have 
done this perfectly well, there should remain some doubt. The investigation does not 
lead to necessity, which means that on the subject of causality, its study, and its 
implications, Clausewitz clearly stands with Hume and Kant, as opposed to their 
predecessors.  
This scepticism regarding causes and effects leads Clausewitz to systematize 
his study in the form of a ‘Kritik’, found in Book II. It is worth briefly mentioning 
here that title of this section can be understood as an allusion to Kant, whose three 
major works were also titled the ‘Critiques’. This method was essentially Kant’s 
remedy to the problem of uncertainty. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains 
this succinctly: ‘The dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless 
assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending 
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unavoidably in scepticism.’158 This sentence sums up exactly what Clausewitz tried to 
resolve in his own chapter entitled ‘Kritik’.  
In response to the uncertainty he found in studying causality in war, 
Clausewitz’s solution was to make no claim to provide the soldier with absolute truths 
regarding what can be done in battle to guarantee victory. Instead, he offered a 
‘limited theory’ of war, one which replaced such laws, rules and principles, for 
adaptable concepts, designed to meet ‘the most probable cases’159 instead of all cases, 
for all time and with absolute certainty. This limited approach would nonetheless 
allow him to generate a practical guidebook for the soldier, but without falling again 
into the antinomies of reason which were the product of positive doctrines.   
 
Preliminary Features of the Kantian Methodology in Clausewitz 
 
The more we attempt to unearth the Kantian element in Clausewitz’s works, 
the less we can draw simply on quotes and details that link the two. Instead we must 
consider the larger picture regarding how one resolves problems of reason, and while 
in many cases the two overlap, which facilitates the exploration, there are some areas 
where the links are intellectual and not necessarily linguistic. This makes it slightly 
more difficult to demonstrate, but should not stop us in our tracks. For example, with 
regard to antinomies of reason, Clausewitz never in fact used the term ‘antinomy’ in 
his writings at all, but he nonetheless exposed and analyzed the problem of antinomies 
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in a Kantian way. Arguably, he probably chose to keep his language simple, because 
unlike Kant, his readers would not be philosophers, but practitioners.   
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the antimonies of pure reason to 
show that there are problems of reason that cannot be resolved without paradoxical 
conclusions. Using four distinct examples, he shows the reader that certain mutually 
exclusive and opposite ideas are nonetheless equally demonstrable and valid in pure 
reason. In one of these, he makes the parallel argument that, a) the universe is finite in 
time and space, and b) the universe is infinite in time and space, and then proceeds to 
argue that both are perfectly tenable and logical.160 The relationship between the two 
ideas is that the validation of either one necessarily invalidates the other; it is 
impossible to prove both at once. Also, the invalidation of one does not necessarily 
validate the other, since the possibility that both are false remains. If it were 
demonstrated that the universe is not determinable, it is not a thing in itself but is 
conditional and incomplete, then it could very well be neither finite nor infinite.161  
The effect of this sceptical form of thinking is that unlike Hume, who fell into blanket 
scepticism, here Kant explains, that it leads rather to a useful sceptical method. 
Instead of being bogged down by scepticism regarding each proposition, we achieve a 
level of thinking about both propositions at once that offer us better intellectual 
guidance on the subject. 
 
The transcendental dialectic, therefore, does not favour scepticism, but 
the sceptical method, which can point to the transcendental dialectic as 
an example of its great utility. For when we allow the arguments of 
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reason to oppose one another with perfect freedom, something useful 
and serviceable for the correction of our judgement will always result, 
though it may not always be what we were looking for.162 
 
Clausewitz mimics the argument, when, having discussed what appears to be a 
series of contradictions and antinomies in the science of war, he asks whether when 
faced with the ‘uncertainty of all knowledge and all of science’ it should not make 
‘him doubt himself and others’, but he eventually concludes like Kant that scepticism 
can be made serviceable:   
 
When the discernment is clear and deep, none but general principles 
[Grundsätze] and views of action from a high standpoint can be the 
result; and on these principles [Grundsätze] the opinion in each 
particular case immediately under consideration lies, as it were, at 
anchor. But to keep to these results of bygone reflection in opposition 
to the stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings 
with it is just the difficulty. Between the particular case and the 
principle [Grundsatz] there is often a wide space which cannot always 
be traversed on a visible chain of conclusions, and where a certain 
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faith in self is necessary, and a certain amount of scepticism is 
serviceable [my emphasis].163  
 
If Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding sought to salvage 
aspects of the empirical method at the expense of certainty we could say that Kant, in 
trying to repair the damages of Hume’s scepticism, and to salvage at least our 
empirical knowledge of the natural sciences, was willing to expend elements of the 
empirical method towards that end, exchanging its linear and straight path to 
unmanageable certainty and scepticism, for a dialectical path that leads to manageable 
paradoxes. Thus, Kant wrote Critique of Pure Reason with two objectives in mind: 
first, positively, to defend the possibility of scientific and everyday knowledge 
(common sense); and second, negatively, to show that traditional metaphysics are 
impossible.164 To this end, Kant started the Critique of Pure Reason by developing a 
set of categories of knowledge based on two dichotomous pairs: the synthetic/analytic 
and the a-priori/a-posteriori, meant to include all possible forms of knowledge. With 
regard to the first of the two dichotomies, he explained: 
 
Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is 
contained (though covertly) in the conception of A; or the predicate B 
lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in 
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connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgement 
analytical, in the second, synthetical.165 
 
As examples of this, Kant offers the judgement that ‘all bodies are extended’ 
for the former, because extension is a feature inherent to the definition of a ‘body’. A 
synthetic judgement, on the other hand would be ‘this body is heavy’, which cannot 
be inherently known, but which must connect the notion of body to that of gravity.  
With regard to the a-priori/a-posteriori the former represents a knowledge 
which emerges as self-evident for having been thought, whereas in latter depends on a 
process such as experimenting.166 When superimposed, these two dichotomies 
generate four quadrants. The analytic/a-priori and the synthetic/a-posteriori pose no 
problem, because we can easily conceive them. The analytic/a-posteriori is 
nonsensical. This leaves the synthetic/a-priori as the central problem of the inquiry. 
Kant formulates his thesis question for the Critique of Pure Reason in the fewest 
terms: ‘How are a-priori synthetic judgements possible?’167  
Kant explains the nature of synthetical judgements a-priori by referring to 
mathematical principles: while an equation does not require experimentation to prove, 
solving it is nonetheless a synthetic process because it requires intuition and the 
outcome is not self-evident, but is the coming together of two or more other concepts. 
Using the example 7+5=12, Kant explains that one cannot by analysis deduce that the 
number twelve is inherently the sum of 7 and 5. The same is true of various 
geometrical and physical principles. Whenever tested, these intuitive ideas become 
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materially evident. And Kant adds that metaphysics are in the same category, because 
they are synthetic propositions (i.e. God is not inherent to the definition of the 
universe), but ones that cannot be tested because they ‘leave far behind us the limits 
of experience.’168  
Kant was unsatisfied with Hume’s conclusion, arguing that Hume ‘stopped 
short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause, 
insisting that such propositions a-priori were impossible. According to his conclusion, 
then, all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion [if that were the case] 
there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science.’169 Kant’s answer to 
Hume on this question is found most unambiguously in his Second Analogy,170 in 
which he stood in ‘complete agreement with Hume that our knowledge of causal 
connections between specific events is a posteriori not a priori, synthetic, not analytic, 
inductive not logical, probable not certain. […] [He agreed with Hume in disagreeing] 
with the rationalists who thought that logical insight into causal connections was 
possible.’171 However, even though they agreed on this premise, Kant’s conclusions 
were quite different. 
Using his own terminology, Kant described the problem of causality as a 
‘synthetic proposition’, which must be dealt with using a transcendental argument or 
one where the truth of the principle is a necessary condition of experience.172 In 
answer to Hume’s scepticism towards causality, Kant explained that the problem of 
cause and effect, its subjective validity as a universal idea, can be overcome with the 
objective validity it takes on when limited to the scope of what is observable. He 
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states, ‘causality in the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of 
experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience.’173 The 
universal validity of causality in the material world or for experimentation comes 
from our ability to perceive alterations of the state of substance over time, and our 
ability to synthesize this, using our imagination, into a coherent ‘continuous 
determination of the position in time of all phenomena.’174 
What did this mean? Kant had set causality free from Hume’s grips, insofar as 
it applied to certain areas of knowledge for which we could be satisfied with it as a 
process of imagination. But that also meant that for other areas, we could not be 
satisfied, and that even when we were satisfied with it, this was not some ‘holy’ 
certainty, but a mere human acceptance of it. Causality had lost not only its divinity, 
but also its universality: it had been forced into a compartment of human knowledge, 
thus creating a chasm between that area of knowledge where causality is admissible 
as a result being experienced therefore allowing it to be intuitively demonstrable in 
the mind of man, as opposed to the plane of analysis where this human intuition is 
excluded. Kant had effectively broken apart man’s knowledge of the world from the 
world itself, the distinction between phenomena or how things appear to the human 
mind, and noumena, the things in themselves.175 Within the a-posteriori / synthetic 
category, Kant had spliced the observational sciences from the lot, allowing a general 
acceptance of causality whereby he rehabilitated natural sciences and mathematics 
from the grips of Hume’s complete scepticism, but in doing so also cut metaphysics’ 
last standing leg. Now, the material world would become infused with a type of 
certainty, but its own self-contained certainty limiting causality to the scope of that 
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which is measurable and tangible the world of objects. The world of ideas could be 
isolated from this, thereby clarifying reason itself. In the end, both ‘reason’ and 
‘science’ remerged from the Kantian process, but in the context of the two spheres: 
the ideal and the material, floating in a paradoxical stasis. This is the very same 
conceptual splice upon which Clausewitz would eventually build up his analysis of 
the ideal and real forms of war in his absolute war / real war dichotomy, which is the 
subject of the upcoming Chapter 4.  
 
Positive Doctrines in War Theory as Synthetical Judgements A-Priori 
 
Given that Clausewitz’s objective was to invalidate strict formulas, models, 
and schematics, in order for the military professional to come face to face with the 
true difficulties of winning, rather than to depend on false certitudes, which would 
blind his judgment,176 it was necessary for him to go beyond his intuition that positive 
doctrines of Enlightenment military theory were flawed, he needed to uncover the 
false logic that generated them, coupled with an explanation for why indemonstrable 
principles could find such uptake in the world, and give impressions of truth and 
certainty. Luckily for him, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had set the groundwork for 
this task.   
If Clausewitz never actually wrote, word for word, that positive doctrines are 
synthetical judgements a-priori, he nonetheless constructed his arguments in ways 
that made this point for him. In fact, he went further than this. He took for granted that 
                                                                




positive doctrines were equivalent concepts to metaphysical propositions, and his 
refutations did not innovate upon or improve Kant’s system, but simply made use of it 
in direct refutation, as though the two forms of reasoning were not merely analogous, 
they were in fact congruous to one another, identical in form and logic. This form of 
analysis appears throughout On War, but it is systematized in the Book II, Chapter 5, 
entitled the Critique, which is fitting, since the very term ‘critique’ in the Kantian 
tradition is a method by which to stop conditioned, empirical reason from constituting 
in and of itself the basis for universal principles.177 
A preliminary way to gauge this is to look at how either synthetical 
judgements a-priori or positive doctrines are expressed in form and language. The 
only way to represent them as simple and fundamental truths is that they be 
compressed or contained in a way that conveys their universality in the simplest form 
(i.e. 7+ 5 = 12). Kant had in fact concluded that:  
 
In all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgements a-priori are 
contained as principles.’178  [In allen theoretischen Wissenschaften der 
Vernunft sind synthetische Urteile a priori als Prinzipien enthalten]179 
  
 Interestingly, Clausewitz makes the exact same observation with regard to 
positive doctrines:  
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Principles, rules, prescriptions, and methods [Grundsätze, Regeln, 
Vorschriften und Methoden] are conceptions indispensable to a theory 
of the conduct of war in so far as the theory leads to positive doctrines, 
because in doctrines the truth can only crystallise itself in such 
forms.180 
 
Beyond exposing the common form which they take, Clausewitz also 
intellectualized the problem of positive doctrines using the Kantian separation of 
categories in human understanding, as he attempted to clarify where and how exactly 
the inconsistency emerges in their claims, relative to the question scope of human 
understanding. Having already described them with blunt criticism as ‘useless’, a 
‘whirl of opinions, which neither revolved on any central pivot nor according to any 
appreciable laws, could not but be distasteful to people’s minds’, and finally as simply 
unable to ‘gain ascendency in the real world,181 Clausewitz, goes on to demonstrate 
his objection to these in a more objective way:  
 
All these attempts at theory are only to be considered in their 
analytical part as progress in the province of truth, but in their 
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120 
 
 Clausewitz borrows not only the synthetic/analytic divide from Kant’s method,  
but he goes on to substantiate it by making a very clever merger between the 
arguments which Kant makes regarding what exactly makes knowledge ‘synthetical’ 
in the first place. As we saw above, while analytical knowledge is inherent to the 
object itself, synthetic knowledge is a product of experience or observation of 
relations between objects. Kant argues in the Three Analogies of Experience that there 
are some preconditions that exist in how we understand relations that allows us to 
achieve synthetic knowledge as a process. A process necessarily implies time, and so 
Kant presents to his reader three possible notions of time: permanence, sequence and 
simultaneity, in which our concept of experiment and thus synthetic knowledge is 
different. In the first, he argues that to perceive a change, it must be perceived in 
relation to something that is permanent.  So, if I can tell the difference between when 
my bicycle is dirty and when it is clean, it is also because I can recognize that both the 
dirty and the clean object before my eyes is the same, and that it is in fact still my 
bicycle, as oppose to different one. The second Analogy, as we saw above, deals with 
Hume’s problem of establishing causation in the context of sequential events, and 
how through imagination be satisfied with the validity offered by objects of 
experience. Finally, the Third Analogy considers the objects that co-exist in time. 
Kant argues that for two objects to be perceived simultaneously by a single observer, 
they must be in relation of complete reciprocal action [Wechselwirkung] to each 
other.183 This, for example, gives perceptual logic to the theory of gravity, as one 
observes how the sun and the planets interact in their orbits. Together, all three 
analogies complete the cognitive premises upon which we then edify our synthetical 
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knowledge of the world, upon which we are sufficiently satisfied with the credibility 
of our observations as to build knowledge upwards and beyond mere analysis.184 
 Right after Clausewitz writes the above passage in which he claims that the 
positive doctrines are analytic, not synthetic, he goes on to explain in three reasons 
why that is the case, and unsurprisingly, these three reasons proceed in perfect order: 
the first with regard to substance and change over time, the second with regard to 
causality, the third, reciprocal action. What is very original, however, is that he uses 
this intellectual background as the base, but he applies it very concretely to the 
question of war. First, he writes that while Enlightenment theorists sought determinate 
quantities, they failed to see that everything in war is variable. Secondly, they forgot 
to consider the actions and effects of moral and intellectual factors in war. And 
finally, in the third, Clausewitz adds, ‘they only pay regard to activity on one side, 
whilst war is a constant state of reciprocal action [Wechselwirkung], the effects of 
which are mutual.’185 While these three different bases upon which synthetical 
knowledge is constructed are completely distinct and separate, because they exist on 
three different concepts of time, Clausewitz aptly makes the case that all three issues 
are relevant to our understanding of warfare and in every single one, the positive 
doctrines fail to show themselves as admissible as a synthetical knowledge. The 
passage is not a long one, nor does it show a very dense or thorough read of the three 
Analogies, but it nonetheless fulfills its task, which again shows Clausewitz being 
pragmatic: he is interested in framing war in a Kantian structure, but he will not go so 
far as to swamp his reader with the full explication. Is this because Clausewitz himself 
had a limited understanding of Kant, or was it instead that he knew that those he 
identified as his target readers, military professionals might be lost if he did not keep 
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it simple? Either way, he has taken his argument to its fullest effect, because having 
shown that positive doctrines do not achieve a synthetic outcome in any of the three 
possible forms that synthesis can take, he has cut the entire basis of their claim to 
being synthetical. 
The positive doctrines are necessarily stuck in the analytical level, because 
they fail to elevate themselves above at least one of the premises, substance, causality, 
and reciprocal action, in which they could ground themselves as synthetical. And as 
of the moment that they try nonetheless to present themselves as synthetical even 
though they are not, they are doomed to produce contradictions, tensions and 
paradoxes. Clausewitz embraced this problem with principles of war and in fact 
would go so far as demonstrate this paradoxical tension by bringing out similar 
examples in his own works. As W.B. Gallie explains:  
 
Clausewitz discusses a number of ‘principles of war’, but it is notable 
that he nowhere tries to deduce these principles from any single source 
or to establish relations of logical priority and subsequence between 
them. Moreover, in this connection he displays a curious and at first 
sight irritating habit. He will lay down some principle which 
immediately commends itself to common sense, that of constancy in 
one’s objective, or of the concentration or economy or security in the 
use of forces, for example; but he thereupon proceeds to show how 
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some other principle of war commonly interferes with it, to modify or 
even cancel its authority in certain situations.186 
 
Clausewitz generally avoids using the word ‘principle’ altogether, though it 
regularly appears from cover to cover in the translations. In the above case, for 
example, Gallie uses the word ‘principle’ because he is citing the Howard/Paret 
translation as his primary source,187 in which the word ‘principle’ is used in ways that 
are inconsistent.188 The problem is that Clausewitz uses two distinct German words, 
‘Prinzip’ and ‘Grundsatz’, which can be translated to ‘principle’ but have distinct 
connotations which Clausewtiz recognizes in his usage of them, but which the 
translators have missed. As we saw in the opening section of part I, the etymological 
difference is quite important. While ‘Grundsatz’ is derived from earthly roots, 
meaning that something is firmly ‘grounded’, ‘Prinzip’ is the true German translation 
for the word ‘principle’, derived from the concepts of primacy and power. The latter 
of the two has an absolute and abstract connotation, whereas the former is relative and 
tangible. Clausewitz uses of the word ‘Prinzip’ very scarcely. It comes up for 
example, when he argues that war is not imbued with a ‘principle of moderation’,189 
or else, when he speaks of the ‘principle of polarity’ which exists either between the 
victor and the defeated, or the different and opposite objectives in battle.190  
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An example of where the translation problem becomes flagrant is the title of 
Clausewitz’s second most widely read book, ‘The Principles of War’,191 which is a 
rendition of a textbook he had written while serving as the tutor of the Crown Prince. 
The original title in German is Die Wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens. The 
title literally means ‘main grounding’ and would be more properly be translated as 
‘The Fundamentals of War’, because foundations are ground up, whereas principles 
are top down. The problem also appears in the Howard/Paret translation of On War, 
where they make absolutely no distinction between ‘Grundsatz’ and ‘Prinzip’. A good 
example of this can be observed by comparing the Graham and Howard/Paret 
translation in Book IV, Chapter 13, where ‘Prinzip’ occurs once and ‘Grundsatz’ 
occurs five times. The Howard/Paret translations uses the word ‘principle’ for each 
‘Grundsatz’, and simply omits the word ‘Prinzip’ altogether from the sentence in 
which it is written. Meanwhile, perhaps even more confusingly, Graham generally 
translates Grundsatz to ‘maxim’, which is a far more accurate word choice, but it is 
not always consistent. He does so for four of the five occurrences in chapter 13 and 
also uses the word ‘principle’ appropriately in the case of ‘Prinzip.’ However, he then 
goes on to use the word ‘principle’ for one of the ‘Grundsatz’ occurrences, which 
completely muddles the lot. In reality, Clausewitz saw an important difference 
between the two terms and he never used them interchangeably: ‘Grundzatz’ is what a 
soldier may use to frame his decisions on the battlefield; ‘Prinzip’ is for the higher 
conceptual sphere. The former has many examples, the latter is rarely used, and 
neither implies certainty in the link between the conceptual and the practical.  
To return to Gallie’s point, these oppositions and contradictions between 
‘Grundsatz’ are the very center of Clausewitz’s contention with regard to positive 
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doctrines. In the same way that Kant used a discussion of the antinomies of reason to 
outline the structure of human understanding, so too did Clausewitz need to build up 
antinomies regarding the inherent contradiction regarding any single Grundsatz, in 
order to make evident the problems of reason one finds in positive doctrines. By 
doing what Gallie describes as an ‘irritating habit’, Clausewitz was in fact building a 
serviceable system of scepticism as opposed to falling simply into the sterility of pure 
scepticism. This is the role of dialectical reasoning, through which one does not get 
bogged down by contradictions, but elevates understanding from a false sense of 
absolute certainty to a set of true paradoxes. In the positive doctrines, this takes on the 
forms of a limited theory of war, which lowers its pretensions and tries to cover most 
of the cases, most of the time, as opposed to all cases always. 
 Clausewitz’s conclusion on positive doctrines was categorical: what leads a 
generally good maxim in the field to become a false principle when elevated to that 
level is the intellectual ‘emptiness’ that separates the two, the very process of 
attempting to transition from the analytical to the synthetical. His best demonstration 
of this can be found in his discussion of ‘key points’, which among Enlightenment 
theorists were thought to convey absolute advantages, so much so that they were in 
fact referred to as ‘decisive points’. While Clausewitz recognized that high terrain can 
be tactically beneficial, he refused to assume that high terrain is necessarily beneficial, 
and that even when it happens to be beneficial, it should not be taken to mean that this 
factor will be decisive: 
 
 Thus the highest point on a road over a mountain is always considered 
to possess a decisive importance, and it does in fact in the majority of 
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cases, but by no means in all. Such points are very often described in 
the despatches of generals by the name of key-points; but certainly 
again in a somewhat different and generally in a more restricted sense. 
This idea has been the starting point of a false theory (of which, 
perhaps, Lloyd may be regarded as the founder); and on this account, 
elevated points from which several roads descend into the adjacent 
country, came to be regarded as the keypoints of the country—as points 
which command the country.192 
 
 Earlier in On War, in the concluding remarks to Book V, Clausewitz had 
already made the argument regarding the absolute strategic value of terrain, in which 
he brings forward an important discussion of the ‘emptiness’ or ‘hollowness’ of their 
meaning, which again, as we shall soon observe, resonates ideas which Kant 
described. Clausewitz wrote:  
 
But nevertheless the expressions ‘commanding ground,’ ‘sheltering 
position,’ ‘key of the country,’ in so far as they are founded on the 
nature of heights and descents, are hollow shells without any sound 
kernel. These imposing elements of theory have been chiefly resorted 
to in order to give a flavour to the seeming commonplace of military 
combinations; they have become the darling themes of learned soldiers, 
the magical wands of adepts in strategy, and neither the emptiness of 
these fanciful conceits […] they are drawing water in the leaky vessel 
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of the Danaides. The conditions have been mistaken for the thing itself, 
the instrument for the hand. The occupation of such and such a position 
or space of ground, has been looked upon as an exercise of power like 
a thrust or a cut […] is nothing but the lifeless instrument, a mere 
property which can only realise itself upon an object, a mere sign of 
plus or minus which wants the figures or quantities.193 
 
 In this paragraph, he shows once and for all just how well versed he is in fact 
in the works of Kant. The argument is taken from a short, lesser known text, which 
Kant wrote in the final years of life,194 specifically, chapter 3 and the appendix of the 
essay What Real Progress Has Been Made by Metaphysics in Germany Since the 
Time of Leibniz and Wolff?, which was a clarification on the subject of noumena 
(thing in itself) and phenomena (thing as it appears) in his earlier and far more widely 
read Critique of Pure Reason. Clausewitz not only drew from the Wolff text’s main 
argument, he candidly borrowed the exact same analogy which Kant used, with regard 
to the Danaïdes from Greek mythology. Kant explains that metaphysics are stuck in 
being either theoretically or practically dogmatic, but nonetheless, they give the 
illusion of being demonstrable thanks to the antinomies of pure reason which they 
create. Antinomian arguments build the impression of truth not by demonstration of 
truth, but on the logic of negating their opposite; they attempt to generate 
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unconditional knowledge, when in fact they are merely the sum of all coordinated 
conditions, where the antinomy of pure reason results in the confusion between the 
apparent and the thing itself.  And it is this very dialectic that shapes the invitation to 
pass from reasoning regarding the sensible (material things) to the super-sensible 
(immaterial things).195 Having written, slightly above that ‘materialism can never be 
employed as a principle for explaining the nature of our soul,’196 Kant can therefore 
maintain, that ‘It was a vain labor that it traditionally gave itself, to reach the super-
sensible by way of speculation and theoretical knowledge, and thus that science 
became the leaking sieve of the Danaïdes.’197 There is an illusion of progress, of 
arriving at the goal, but it only achieved through trickery of the mind, where abstract 
conceptualizing cannot be rendered intuitive, because it is not positively 
demonstrable, but only to be deduced by the deceptions of contradiction and double 
negatives. 
 The ‘emptiness’ of these formulas, which Clausewitz is referring to, is best 
described in the sections of the Critique of Pure Reason which deal with the same 
problem, in which Kant explains that, ‘The effort to acquire metaphysical knowledge 
through concepts alone, however, is doomed to fail, according to Kant, because (in its 
simplest formulation) “concepts without intuitions are empty” (A52/B76)’198 Kant is 
not only interested in showing that the metaphysical arguments are fallacious, he is 
also trying to unearth where their illusion of validity comes from. And this comes 
down to a concept which Clausewitz is referring to in the paragraph above, the 
distinction between what is conditioned and unconditioned, or the conflation between 
                                                                
195 Kant. Theoretical Philosophy After 1781 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 397 
196 Ibid. p. 395 
197 Ibid. p. 396 
198 Grier, Michelle, ‘Kant's Critique of Metaphysics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 




noumena (the unconditioned thing itself) and phenomena (the conditioned thing, as it 
appears). The ‘supreme principle of pure reason’ that provides the background 
assumption under which the metaphysician proceeds, is that ‘If the conditioned is 
given, the absolutely unconditioned […] is also given (A308/B366)’. That is to say 
that, the decision or justification for seeking the unconditioned offers a metaphysical 
principle that tells us that the unconditioned is already given […] it is ‘there’ to be 
found. 199 
 This is the crux of the case. Clausewitz could use the metaphysical arguments 
against the Enlightenment war theorists precisely because of the three layers of 
analysis we have here exposed. First, that the principles of war were assumed to exist 
prior even to being sought out, let alone found. Second, that the various antinomies of 
pure reason which, as we saw in the above chapter, war theories created produced an 
illusion of logic, because one could in fact argue for and or against virtually any 
positive doctrine, which reinforced the expectation that positive doctrines did in fact 
exist: why else would we be arguing about them? But that meant that every inch we 
got closer to them, they seemed to slip one or two more inches away. And finally, as 
this last quote from Clausewitz reminded us, when he speaks of the hand versus the 
tool, the material examples theorists referred to were merely conditions, the context of 
a demonstration, but not the demonstration itself, or the demonstration of an 
unconditional truth. If each element of certainty was indeed fixed to a single event in 
which it produced an outcome, then there was in fact nothing absolute or universal to 
it. It was this realization that allowed Clausewitz to pinpoint the role of critical 
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judgment, and its only objective measure, victory in battle, as opposed to some 
peripheral object or quantity.200     
 To achieve this conclusion, Clausewitz had to peer into the problem through 
the lens of dialectical reasoning. He had to uncover the antinomies of pure reason and 
thereby perceive the positive doctrines as mere replicas of metaphysical speculation, 
to know that pursuing the Kantian argument against their perceived validity would 
work. Otherwise, these quotes he uses from Kant would all appear vague and off-
context, when in fact they are extremely well used, and powerful to uncover the 
central weakness of Enlightenment thinking, and how it found its ways into the works 




By asking the question, ‘what kind of sceptic was Clausewitz?’, we find that 
his way of thinking follows the path cleared by Hume and Kant, especially as it 
pertains to the link between causal relationships and certainty. In his refutations of the 
positive doctrines, Clausewitz shows a very significant indebtedness to Kant, 
especially to the Critique of Pure Reason. He was not merely ‘sounding Kantian’, he 
was applying the method in clear and logical way, which had a demonstrable effect 
the power of his refutation. Clausewitz was not countering any single positive 
doctrine, he was demonstrating why their contradictory nature made them inescapably 
invalid. And this he achieved by referencing various ideas and demonstrations found 
in Kant’s major works, as well as minor works. 
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This process depended on dialectical thinking. Clausewitz appreciation of 
Kant allowed him to perceive, though he did not state it so clearly, that the 
contradictions which existed between different sets of equally valid positive doctrines, 
albeit valid only in certain contexts, formed antinomies of reason, which could which 
Kant’s sceptical method could uncover and discredit. If, as we saw in chapter one, 
these antinomies were caused by a surplus, rather than a lack of material proof, they 
nonetheless operated according to an identical form of logic, expectation, and 
validation, which was not only built on the premise of their assumed existence, but 
also further encouraged by the very quest for them, which generated arguments and 
analyses in which the principles were in fact residing. The principles existed only in 
these debates, and that is why they appeared so real to those who were busy arguing 
for and against each of their many forms. 
That being said, however, we should remember what was said regarding the 
dialectic in this thesis’s introduction: it is not a single method or concept, but rather 
implies various meaning clusters. This is also true in Clausewitz’s work, and is best 
exemplified not in any single case, but in his overall comfort with divisions, 
contradictions, and paradoxes, which he did not shun, but actually elevated. In his 
refutation of the positive doctrines, Clausewitz did use a variety of different 
dialectical tools. He brought forward the analytic/synthetic division of knowledge; he 
exposed the antinomies of reason in contradicting positive doctrines; he distinguished 
noumena from phenomena and the conditioned from the unconditioned. In all of 
these, he was showing that he could be reasonable about science, because he was 
making use of a science of reason, and this sceptical method was in many different 




Chapter Three – The Decay and Resilience 




We enter now a section of the essay where the purpose is to study the opposite 
of our topic, in order to shed more light on the topic itself. Clausewitz demonstrated 
very credibly that positive doctrines were not theoretically or practically sound, and 
yet, years after this argument was made, many nonetheless continued to hold on to 
and publish their own positive doctrines. Was Clausewitz wrong? By exploring how 
those who held on to positive doctrines did so by committing themselves to deep 
forms of illogic, we can uncover in a very clear and crisp way just how right 
Clausewitz had been to begin with.  
In fact, Clausewitz’s refutation of the positive doctrines was so successful, that 
it converted even the master of positive doctrines, Jomini, albeit kicking and 
screaming, until his new writings were mere shadows of his previous work. And 
Clausewitz’s method did even more than that, it created a way of thinking about war 
that showcases to what extent those who refuse to let go of positive doctrines, even 
today, fall into a whirlwind of circular logic and a reductio ad absurdum way of 
thinking that is self-defeating. Illogic having a wonderful capacity to make its way 
into some of the most well-read and appreciated textbooks, it is perhaps not so 
surprising that positive doctrines did so well after they had been so effectively refuted, 
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because it seems that those who read and write such books want to believe in them: 
they want principles to exist at the intersection of their debates, because it justifies in 
their own eyes their work and passions.  
This chapter comes down to two geometrical ideas: the angles 180° and 360°. 
The effect of dialectics On War theory’s positive doctrines is analogous to what 
physicists call ‘torque’, the moment of force which sets an object into rotation. 
Whereas Jomini’s discovery of Clausewitz forced him to ‘pull a 180’ and effectively 
renege almost everything he had once proclaimed in earlier works, later war theorists 
accumulated so much spin that they found themselves caught in a hopeless circular 
logic that descended into reductio ad absurdum illogic. 
 Despite this, not only did the positive doctrines not fade away immediately 
and entirely, they rose up furiously. By the 20th century, ‘principles of war’ had been 
elevated in the minds of many by the process of trying to reduce them to the simplest 
of lists: offense, manoeuvre, concentration, economy of force, liberty of action, 
certainty and initiative. 201 Unaware of the irony of their quest, theorists were in fact 
attempting to salvage the idea of ‘principles of war’, by what appears to be a strategy 
to apply these very principles onto themselves: concentrate them, make an economy 
of them, etc. These attempts to codify the non-codifiable had, according to Coutau-
Bégarie, ended up completing a full circle, whereby they ‘transformed their purpose 
from an explanatory set of principles to a principle of explanation’.202 
 
                                                                
201 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie. Traité de stratégie. 2nd ed. (Paris : Économica, 1999), p. 280 





Jomini was the last true enlightenment war theorist. His theories were 
‘characterized by a highly didactic and prescriptive approach, conveyed in an 
extensive geometric vocabulary of strategic lines, bases, and key points.’203 Scattered 
graphics, charts and maps were regularly used in his writings to ‘demonstrate’ and 
‘prove’ various maxims, principles and positive doctrines. Yet, despite his techniques 
and argumentative approach, which were of an earlier time, when we compare 
Jomini’s first books to his later works, it becomes evident that something dramatic 
changed.  
It is necessary to be categorical with regard to the argument made by various 
scholars suggesting that Clausewitz and Jomini were more often in agreement than 
not.204 This is not by any means universally true. It is a consequence of Jomini having 
read Clausewitz. The foremost proponent of this view, Handel, only came to this 
conclusion because he was citing exclusively from Jomini’s Précis sur l’art de la 
guerre,205 Jomini’s last major work, and not from his early works such as the Traité, 
published decades earlier. This is significant, because Jomini before and after 
Clauswitz is clearly a different war theorist. When scholars claim that Jomini and 
Clausewitz think alike, they must absolutely distinguish between the young and the 
old Jomini in order to clarify their stance, because the similarities appear only in 
Jomini’s later works, as a result of a significant turnaround in his point of view.  
                                                                
203 Christopher Bassford. Clausewitz and Jomini: Their Interaction, State University of Georgia, 1993. 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm  
204 Idem. 
205 See: Michael Handel. Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini (London: Frank Kass, 
1992), pp. 74 122, 126,127,  249, 370, 373. 
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In the Précis, for example, Jomini suddenly accords more importance to the 
moral and political factors of war, going so far as to make them the opening sequence 
of his book. Prior to reading Clausewitz, he had never placed any discussion of these 
matters so prominently. More dramatically still, his views and ideas about the 
‘principles of war’, which were the heart of his systems, were fully warped in the 
process. For example, we know that in a late reprint of the Traité, Jomini ‘dropped his 
insistence on interior lines, acknowledging à la Clausewitz, though without actually 
mentioning it, that the value of interior or concentric lines depended on the 
situation’.206 
Colson has argued that maturity alone can explain how Jomini’s ideas evolved 
from more extreme to more moderate.  
 
The [later] Précis is an attempt to distil what can be learned from the 
Napoleonic Wars into considerations marked with a will to return to a 
more prudent strategy, where the objective is to occupy territory rather 
than destroying the enemy’s army. […]The [earlier] Treatise reflected 
his admiration for Napoleon, Jomini arrived at a more methodical and 
territorial conception of strategy. […] Having matured with age and 




206 This is the case in a 1865 version of the Treatise, translated by Holabird (New York: Nostrand Ed. 
1865). Noted in Christopher Bassford. Clausewitz and Jomini: Their Interaction, State University of 
Georgia, 1993. http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm  
207 Bruno Colson. ‘Présentation du Précis de l’art de la guerre’, in Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre 




The ‘maturity’ argument does not account for what is altogether new, such 
sudden insistence on moral and political factors, nor does it account for the severity of 
differences with regard to the positive doctrines found in the Traité de la grande 
tactique, written in 1802-1807 and the lack of them in his later treatise Précis de l’art 
de la guerre, written in 1838. The younger Jomini believed in the perfectibility of war 
theory, whereas later, he would renege this stance almost completely, sticking only to 
a few key concepts, at the expense of many others.  
Gauging where and how Jomini changed his arguments around over time is 
quite a difficult task, given that he was re-editing his old works republishing them and 
not making any mention, footnote or explanation with regard to what these 
corrections were and where in fact he was making them. It is a puzzle. That being 
said, one can nonetheless get a partial picture, by looking at passages from a relatively 
early print of the Traité and the much the later Précis. The distinction is evident: 
 
1 - (Traité de la grande tactique, 1805)  L’idée de réduire le système de 
la guerre à une combinaison primitive dont toutes les autres dépendent, 
et qui ferait la base d’une théorie juste et simple, présente une foule 
d’avantages; elle rendrait l’instruction bien plus facile, le jugement des 
opérations toujours sain, et dès-lors les fautes moins fréquentes. Je 
crois que les généraux ne sauraient assez s’en pénétrer; qu’elle devrait 
diriger tous leurs projets, toutes leurs actions.208  
[The idea of reducing systems of war into its primary combinations on 
which all others depend, and which would establish as a base an exact 
                                                                
208 Jomini. Traité de la grande tactique (Paris: Magimel,1805), p 536 
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and simple theory, presents numerous advantages; it would improve 
instruction, improve judgements during operations, and consequently, 
lower the frequency of errors. I think generals could not make enough 
use of learning and applying it, that it should guide all their projects, 
all their actions.] 
 
2 -  (Précis de l’art de la guerre, 1838) Et si l’on rassemblait, sous la 
présidence de l’archiduc Charles ou de Wellington, un comité composé 
de toutes les notabilités stratégiques et tactiques du siècle, avec les 
habiles généraux du génie et de l’artillerie, ce comité ne parviendrait 
pas encore à faire une théorie parfaite, absolue et immuable, sur toutes 
les parties de la guerre, notamment sur la tactique!! [sic.] 209  
[Even if we were to form a committee, presided by the Archduke 
Charles or by Wellington, composed of all the notable strategists and 
tacticians of the century, with the most competent generals of 
engineering and artillery, this committee would still not achieve a 
perfect, absolute and immutable theory on the different aspects of war 
including tactics!!] 
 
We might expect that maturity would cause one to perfect his or her argument, 
clarify its structure, enhance its demonstration, and perhaps make minor adjustments 
or concessions. What we see here is nothing of the sort, but rather a 180-degree turn-
around in perspective. How did this change come about? Colson gives us two hints. 
                                                                
209 Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre, (Paris: Anselin Libraire, 1838 ), p. 33 
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Longevity had much to do with it, as well as the ‘changing times’ which he mentions 
in the above quote. Jomini lived to the ripe age of 90, which allowed his writing 
career to both precede and outlive Clausewitz’s. While Clausewitz was surrounded by 
new methods of dialectical reasoning, simply for being at the right place at the right 
time, the academic circles of Germany at the turn of the century, Jomini did not 
experience the radical change in how metaphysics had altered the way perfectibility 
and immutability of concepts should be conceived. In fact, it is said that Jomini was 
not particularly well-read beyond military textbooks. He would have been somewhat 
familiar with Montesquieu, and he had read Puységur, Lloyd, and Guibert in great 
detail, but he was unfamiliar with philosophy in general, and even less so of the 
current movements.210 
As such, the method of reasoning he discovered in On War must have been 
quite shocking, perhaps even overwhelming. He was in fact ‘deeply wounded’211 by 
what he discovered. These feelings are easily detected in his writing style, which 
breaks away from his typical didactical style, suddenly emboldened with anger and 
awe directed at Clausewitz. Seeming to accept that his earlier ideas now stood on 
wobbly grounds, Jomini began seeking out ways to reinforce key points, while 
delimiting or deleting others. That he began writing the Précis immediately after 
having come across Clausewitz should not come as a surprise. He had been personally 
attacked in it, and his reaction was clearly embittered. Within single paragraphs in 
which he discussed On War, he integrated a melodramatic and frantic mishmash of 
praise, insults and hints that he hoped to find reconciliation with the work of 
Clausewitz, even though these three goals were thoroughly contradictory. He 
                                                                
210 Jean-Jacques Langendorf, Faire la guerre: Antoine-Henri Jomini, Vol 2, (Geneva: Georg Éditeurs, 
2004), p. 77-90. 




described Clausewitz and On War within a wide spectrum of qualifiers: ‘luminous 
ideas,’ ‘greatly instructed,’ ‘well written,’ ‘vagabond,’ ‘pretentious,’ ‘savant 
labyrinth,’ ‘sophism’ ‘frequently logically faulty,’ etc.212  Uncertain of where he 
stood on Clausewitz, Jomini nonetheless wanted to protect his own works and 
arguments from this new theory, and trying to fix his ideas in reaction to Clausewitz. 
Pretentious to the finish, Jomini wrote in this new book that if only Clausewitz had 
lived long enough to read the Précis, he would have ‘accorded it some justice.’213   
                                                                
Jomini offered some mild refutations regarding Clausewitz’s stance that 
positive doctrines were invalid, but he did not try to undo the latter’s argument as a 
whole, probably because he recognized it, not as an entire truth, but at least a partial 
truth. Jomini ultimately turned his back on his old influences, Bülow and Lloyd. In 
the Précis, Jomini recalls the fact that these two authors had been so formative and 
important to his view regarding war that after reading them for the first time, in his 
youth, he thereafter burned all his previous essays, to start anew.214 Yet, many years 
later after reading Clausewitz, his exaltation suddenly waivered, and he started 
distancing himself from the two. Indeed, in the same chapter of the Précis where he 
recalls this story of his youth, he also writes that Bülow and Lloyd had in fact only 
produced a few minor interesting elements, surrounded by dogmatic and wrong ideas. 
With regard to the latter, Jomini wrote:  
 
[Lloyd] raised interesting questions about strategy, which he 
unfortunately buried in a maze of minute details on tactics and 
formations, and on the philosophy of war. While the author resolved 
212 Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre (Paris: Perrin, 2001), p. 9, 126, 137   
213 Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre (Paris: Anselin, librarie, 1838), p. 21 
214 Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre, (Bruxelles: Librarie Militaire de J-B Petit, 1841), p. 8 
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none of these questions in a way that could provide a system, we can at 
least say that he would point us in the right direction to take. The way 
he relates the Seven Years’ War, of which he only completed two 
campaigns, was more instructive (to me at least) than all his dogmatic 
writings.215  
 
As to the former, Bülow, Jomini also found new and tough words for him, 
stating that ‘he builds upon an inexact foundation, and his works thus necessarily 
contained at times erroneous maxims.’216 Clearly we find that if Jomini had in fact 
‘matured’, this had little to do with age and much more to do with method and 
renunciation. Jomini had turned his back on the works which marked his youthful 
optimism in the power of scientific methods in war. In fact, by the end of the 
transition, Langendorf notes that Jomini not only ‘attenuated his views’,217 he also ‘no 




The most dramatic aspect of Jomini’s 180° is his transition with regard to 
principles and fundamental principles. Whereas the Treatise had a number of them 
scattered throughout, only a selected few remained in the Précis. The concentration of 
                                                                
215Ibid., p. 6   
216 Ibid., p. 79 
217Langendorf. Faire la guerre: Antoine-Henri Jomini, p. 290. 
218 Langendorf. Faire la guerre: Antoine-Henri Jomini, p. 88. 
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principles after Clausewitz therefore happened first in Jomini, but it is a strategy that 
would be repeated well into the 20th century, as we shall see, further below.  
The idea that war had a plural set of ‘fundamental principles’ was first written 
in the Treatise:  
 
The Fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of 
war have always existed […] These principles are unchangeable; they 
are independent of the nature of the arms employed, of times and 
places […] For thirty centuries there have lived generals who have 
been more or less happy in their application […] While comparing the 
causes of the victories of ancient and modern times, we are greatly 
surprised to discover that the  battles of Wagram, Pharsalia and Cannae 
were gained from the same original cause.219 
 
When he wrote the Précis, he did not forget entirely the concept of fundamental 
principles, but perhaps suffered from partial amnesia. Suddenly, the indeterminate 
number of fundamental principles had been qualified to being ‘few’ and further along, 
a single overarching fundamental principle of operations would tower above all 
others. Jomini was trying to recoil to safer argumentative grounds by pruning so many 
branches of his tree he found himself with a sapling: 
 
                                                                
219 Jomini. Treatise of Grand Tactics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865), p. 445. 
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I agree that the absolute rules are few […] I concur in good faith with 
this truth, but should this mean that there can be no theory? If out of 45 
articles, one has 10 positive maxims, the other has one or two, is it not 
enough to have 150 to 200 rules to form a respectable body of strategic 
or tactical doctrine? And if you add to this the multitude of precepts that 
have occasional exceptions, would you not have more dogmas than 
necessary to fix your opinions on all the operations of war?220 
 
A few pages later, Jomini adds: 
My 20 years of experience, have fortified my conviction of the 
following: There exist a small number of fundamental principles in the 
art of war, which one could avoid only at his own peril, and quite to the 
contrary, application of these principles have practically always been 
crowned with success.221 
 
Among the remaining true fundamental principles, Jomini held on to the 
existence of one single ‘fundamental principle of all operations in war.’222 This 
fundamental principle consisted essentially of “bring[ing] forth, through strategic 
combinations, the bulk of the forces of an army, successively upon decisive points in 
a theatre of war [… and] manoeuvr[ing] against fractions of the enemy army.”223 
Jomini concedes that the difficult part, of course, is to identify the ‘decisive points’ 
                                                                
220 Jomini. Précis de l’art de la guerre (Paris: Perrin, 2001), p. 22 
221 Ibid. pp. 26-27 
222 Ibid.  p. 157 
223 Ibid. p. 158  
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which he relegates to genius in war, or in this particular case, the ‘art’, or as he writes 
later in this subsection, ‘It will be up to the talent in execution, the know-how, the 
energy, the coup-d’oeil, to complete that which good combinations will have 
prepared.’224 And finally, as an extra fortification around his principles, Jomini will 
gladly point to ‘exceptions’ to various rules on six different occasions.225 
 Though Clausewitz also speaks of key points in his works, he delimits their 
pretensions very clearly, then submits his analyses to ‘Kritik’, and at no moment does 
he make any claim to provide fundamental principles. For this reason alone, lack not 
only of ‘Kritik’ but even the possibility of ‘critiquing’, one might be tempted to 
dismiss Jomini’s argument above for having no proper theoretical test for its validity, 
discarded on the grounds that it is intellectually inadmissible, due to it being a 
hypothesis, which cannot be disproved. However there are a few examples from the 
Napoleonic Wars which we can turn to in order to isolate both of these variables at 
once, and demonstrate that not only was the one, single fundamental principle 
sophistical, it was in fact demonstrably wrong.  
 In fact, Jomini himself provides us with the very elements required to proceed 
to isolate the principle of ‘decisive points’ for empirical testing. Two examples appear 
in Jomini’s Précis: the first, individual commanders whose coup d’oeil and genius are 
unquestionable: Caesar, Frederick II and Napoleon;226 and secondly, the question of 
state capitals, where Jomini writes, ‘All [state] capitals, since they are at the centre of 
a country’s roads, would be decisive, strategic points, not only for this reason, but also 
for statistical and political motives, which add to this importance.’ Hence, in certain 
cases, we can indeed find ourselves dealing with the principle itself, denuded of its 
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expectations regaring genius and the nature of a ‘decisive point’.  In Jomini’s own 
words, the capital is necessarily decisive, and Napoleon is necessarily a genius. Thus 
the objective principle itself is separated, isolated from its subjective components.  
Clearly, the capture of Moscow is as damning a counter-argument as there can 
be. It did not prove to be a decisive event; it did not force political capitulation, nor 
did it break the enemy’s base, communications or reinforcements; actually, it 
precipitated the deterioration of France’s imperial power. Taking the capital became a 
decisive point in the defeat rather than the victory. Jomini, who was there at the time 
when it happened may have considered Moscow as an exception to the rules, but one 
cannot have it both ways, a fundamental principle is either universal, or else there is 
nothing fundamental to it. 
 
Jomini’s Genius  
 
Jomini mastered like none other the ‘genius’ sophistry. He managed to hold 
the tenuous and circular point of view by which absolute rules existed, though genius 
in application of the rules was necessary to the art of war, insofar as this genius was 
not acting contrary to the rules to begin with.  He had in fact turned the contradiction 
on its head. Though it appeared less contradictory in the process, the weakness of the 
argumentative structure would soon crumble, as the circularity of it produced a 




As it stood in Jomini’s work, ‘genius’ played the role we saw above, as the 
ultimate theoretical stopgap for safeguarding absolute principles that were inherently 
flawed. Instead of admitting a flaw in theory, one could usually always shift blame 
away from the theory by striking at the artist or the tactician as opposed to the art or 
the tactic. The formulation Jomini makes of it is carefully constructed to even further 
enhance the sophistical relationship between genius and the principles of war: 
 
Genius has a great deal to do with success, since it presides over the 
application of recognized rules, and seizes, as it were, all the subtle 
shades of which their application is susceptible. But in any case, the 
man of genius does not act contrary to these rules.227 
 
There are many highly confounding problems with the above statement, as it 
places genius both above the rules, presiding over them, while nonetheless also 
submitting to them, that is, not acting contrary to them. So which is it? Also it 
suggests that rules are both binding and formal, while also variable and to be applied 
according to context. One may be tempted to see in this great erudition, even a taste of 
dialectical complexity, but it is nothing of the sort. The double set of contradictory 
statements has no objective to improve our knowledge of either genius or principles, 
but only to muddle them enough to make any situation fit. Set up this way, the two are 
scientifically insignificant; they are a trap for rationality, whereby anything can be 
claimed to be genius, and anything can be claimed as a principle. We are stuck asking 
ourselves if one can be a genius if that simply means following the rules. And the 
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opposite problem also surfaces: is there such thing as a principle if genius can rise 
above it? 
Clausewitz again borrowed from Kant for a logical solution to this intellectual 
impasse. To begin with, the fact that he employed the term ‘Grundsatz’ rather than 
‘Prinzip’ with regard to best practices in the battlefield allowed him more flexibility 
with his use of the concept of ‘genius’, because he was not seeking certainty, and that 
meant his theory could more easily accommodate situations that did not follow certain 
lessons of best practices that may have helped contribute to victory in another context. 
By referring to Kant, Clausewitz found a way for both genius and ‘Grundsätze’ to co-
exist logically in all situations, which is the opposite of how Jomini set himself up: 
whenever genius and principles were both logical, it was because the context had 
allowed them both to be right concurrently, which means, on the victorious side of a 
war.  
Clausewitz analysis of genius is taken straight out of the Critique of 
Judgement.228 He used it very early in his life in the anonymous article he published 
in Neue Bellona, while studying under Kiesewetter. Far from showing a 
‘homeopathic’ understanding of Kant, Clausewitz aptly used this concept of ‘genius’ 
in refutating Bülow’s geometric ‘rules’ of war. Clausewitz objected Bülow’s 
conception of ‘art’ on the grounds that it did not state a ‘goal’, which is an important 
aspect of Kant’s concept of art as ‘the use of given means to achieve a higher end.’229 
Paret explains, ‘[Clausewitz’s] teacher Kiesewetter chose familiar terminology when 
he defined genius as the union of imagination and reason, brought to life by spirit. 
Clausewitz adopted this definition, adding moral and physical courage to imagination 
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and reason to characterize military genius’ (citing Kiesewetter; Clausewitz ‘On 
Military Genius’ On War). 230 Clausewitz had learned an idea written by Kant in the 
Critique of Judgement: that  ‘genius is the talent (natural ability) that establishes rules 
for the arts. Since this talent, as an innate creative ability of the artist, is itself part of 
nature, we might also express ourselves in this manner: Genius is the innate 
psychological power (ingenium) through which nature establishes rules for the arts’ 
(citing Kant, Critique of Judgement).231   
 As long as war theory avoided absolute principles and complete positive 
doctrines, it could entertain and accommodate the notion of ‘genius’ in war. From 
maxims and examples of what succeeded in the past, the general could gauge the right 
course of action in battle. However, this relationship between ‘genius’ and 
‘principles’ would become increasingly contradictory as theorists elaborated ‘perfect’ 
principles of war, which by virtue of their formulation, necessarily excluded the role 
of talent and art; yet, no theorist was actually willing to give up the role of genius and 
leadership altogether, creating an awkward relationship between the two, essentially 
downgrading ‘talent’ to the ability to follow the principles well, or alternatively, the 
ability to ‘rise above’ the principles. Either of these breaks the relation, since the 
former eliminates genius in trying to save it, and the latter undermines the 
perfectibility of principles, which was the initial purpose. 
Jomini’s sophistry worked for him, because he had always considered them 
from the perspective of the the victorious side. It should be noted that having fought 
alongside Napoleon up to Moscow, and turned his coat thereafter, Jomini was on the 
winning side throughout his entire military career. He knew tactical defeat on the 
                                                                




battlefield, but had no experience with strategic or total political defeat. Clausewitz 
had the opportunity to start juggling with the problem of genius and absolute 
principles years before, because he was analyzing these ideas from the perspective of 
the other side, the losing side, which bore the brunt of the revolutionary fervour. As 
he aptly put it years later in a letter to Roeder in 1827: 
 
The exceptional circumstances in which Bonaparte and France found 
themselves since the Wars of the Revolution, allowed him to achieve 
major victories on almost every occasion, and people began to assume 
that the plans and actions created by those circumstances 
were universal norms.232 
 
It was simple in this context to assume, from the victor’s perspective that they 
were winning because the principles were right and the generals were geniuses, but 
the causality relation war more likely the absolute reverse of this: they thought their 






232 Clausewitz. ‘Letter to Roeder, December 22, 1827’, Two Letters on Strategy, Ed. Peter Paret and 
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While there are two different faces of Jomini, one before and one after 
Clausewitz, the man nonetheless occupies a single place in the history of war theory 
that is similar in many respects to Hume’s place in philosophy. In both cases, they 
were the last of their breed: Hume the last Empiricist, and Jomini the last 
Enlightenment war theorist, both stuck at a paradoxical nexus where scepticism forces 
its way to the surface. The central reason for which they were last is that they had in 
their careful methodology achieved a point of contradiction. While Hume celebrated 
this as his purpose and his contribution to philosophy, Jomini preferred to fight it off 
as best he could, making concessions and diluting his work into an old memory of 
itself, rather than admit the existence of certain categories and limits to knowledge. 
And so, Hume was the harbinger of scepticism to his field, whereas Jomini accepted 
only as much scepticism as he was forced to by counter-arguments and historical 
incongruence in his former doctrines. Though Jomini changed in the process, he 
cannot be qualified as being ‘post-Enlightenment’ for the simple reason that he did 
not theorize in the new fashion, but simply deleted those aspects of his works where 
the weaknesses of his reasoning were most damning as a result of the transition.  
Much like Hume, Jomini did not relinquish the methods of the Enlightenment, but 
would eventually come to face an impossible threshold of scepticism which could not 
be escaped. Hume arrived at a similar place: keeping the method, but having to dilute 
the certainty of causality. 
The arrival of dialectics represented a shift so powerful in war studies that it 
broke the very backbone of most of the theories of war which existed prior. Today, 
few are those who still quote Puységur, Maizeroy and Guibert. Their geometrical and 
scientific theories became hopelessly dated. Among the Enlightenment thinkers, 
Jomini fared a bit better than the others and continues to have some minor uptake in 
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the field. However, this is only true of his later work, the Précis. His earlier Treatise is 
utterly forgotten. And none of the above authors comes close in numbers to the 
continued interest in Clausewitz. An interesting and effective way to gauge the use 
and popularity of these writers in contemporary academics is to use the Google 
Scholar search engine results for each. Two conclusions stand out: Clausewitz 
outnumbers the total of the others combined by a factor of 24; and were it not for 
Jomini’s later work, written in reaction to Clausewitz, and which outnumbers his early 
work by a factor of ten to one, he too would have succumbed, like Puységur and 
Guibert to quiet desuetude.  
 
Search Term Number of Pages 
(On July 12, 2011) 
“Jomini Treatise on Grand Military Operations” 
“Jomini Traité de grande tactique” 
12 
5 
“Jomini The Art of War” 
“Jomini Précis de l’art de la guerre” 
128 
58 
« Puysegur Art of War » 
“Puysegur Art de la guerre” 
0 
23 
“Guibert A General Essay on Tactics” 
“Guibert Essai general de tactique” 
5 
54 
“Clausewitz On War” 




While Jomini may have had the last word on Clausewitz, it seems that history 
had the last word on Jomini. That being said, history has nonetheless failed to have 
the last word on positive doctrines. Perhaps it is their simplicity of use which makes 
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them stick, because it is practical in the military arts to refer to maxims for making 
quick decisions. However, when we consider the difference between maxims and 
principles, it seems rather that the continuation of the latter may have more to do with 
personal egos, who are unsatisfied with only coining a good maxim... they would 
prefer proclaiming it an immutable principle for all the ages. But the risk of this is to 
either flirt with illogic as one tries to elevate ‘genius’ and ‘principles’ to a higher form 
of abstraction and contradiction in order to avoid having to come to terms with the 
impossibility of applying it concretely.  
 
The Descent of Principles into Reductio ad Absurdum Illogic  
 
  Despite the fact that Clausewitz’s opus had been widely available for decades, 
the belief in positive doctrines did not subside but actually only reached its 
culminating point by the mid 20th century.233  Though it was a widespread and 
worldwide tendency, we can turn to the American example to provide its archetypal 
form. True to the philosophy of Jomini’s later works, US Army field manuals did not 
proclaim perfect solutions to specific situations, but they nonetheless maintained an 
increasingly narrow set of fundamental principles, such as the ‘principle of 
concentration’ and the ‘principle of economy of force.’234 The problem was that the 
greater the dilution of principles into such wide, vague or unapplied categories, 
coupled with an even greater sense of certainty as a result of their higher scope, the 
more complete the full circle of the logic became. By the time circular motion reached 
                                                                
233 Brodie. Introduction to Clausewitz, On War, p. 50   




its end, principles of war had come to a stagnant halt, where they had effectively done 
away with the role of genius altogether. Genius could no longer rise above the rule. 
Genius could no longer make the rule. Genius and its ‘coup d’oeil’ could no longer 
serve as the go-to point for when principles failed. The fact was that genius had been 
replaced by its very opposite: common sense.  
Bernard Brodie said it best, during a conference in 1952 in which he 
explained:  
 
If by principles, we mean these maxims and axioms usually grouped 
in a list of seven to ten or more articles, considered immutable despite 
fantastic changes in everything else, then my sentiment is not that 
these are false or without utility, but that we have a tendency to 
accord them too much importance. And if this tendency becomes 
extreme and we elevate these principles to dogma, then they can 
become positively dangerous. What needs to be said about so-called 
principles of war is that above all they are propositions of common 
sense.235 
 
If ‘principles’ are meant to represent something grand, but do not manage to 
raise themselves above the realm of common sense, or the most basic assumptions 
one might have on conducting a strategy, then in what sense is their proclamation 
useful?  In Foch’s Principes de la guerre (1903), he argued that were it not for such 
                                                                
235 Brodie, Bernard. Conference held on 17 March 1952 at the Naval War College (USA).  
The passage is not perfectly quoted. While the meaning is maintained, the words may have been altered 
due to a process of double translation. (originally quoted in : Poirier, L. Les voix de la stratégie, p. 92.) 
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immutable principles existing, war could not be an art. Yet, at the same time, Foch’s 
principles were ‘of variable application which follow circumstances,’236 depending 
above all on his overarching idea that ‘no strategy can prevail against one which 
assures itself in, and aims for, victory in battle.’237 He essentially posited both the 
absoluteness of principles and their variable application at the hands of the 
strategist,238 thereby reaching an almost complete emptiness of significance. If that 
which is absolute is also variable, than it is in effect nothing. 
 Thus, the full circle described by Coutau-Bégarie began with the realization 
that strategists needed some fundamentals and notions of a probable code of conduct, 
however, as the process reached its end, it had effectively created principles that were 
so immutable and certain that they depended on artful application by the strategist to 
be of any use to the outcome sought. The more strategy was elevated by theorists, the 
more its true meaning was relegated to the level of timely and smart leadership.  
 Granted, common sense is not something that is useless in battle, nor is that 
what is being implied here. Rather, if genius and principles are nothing but 
propositions of common sense then we should not claim that they form either a 
science or even an art, let alone represent something immutable one for the ages. 
What generates uselessness is not the common sense itself, but the grand 
proclamations regarding tactics and strategy that have become so diluted as to mean 
altogether very little that is applicable or of use to one’s common sense on the 
battlefield. In Van Creveld’s Transformation of War for example, we read:  
 
                                                                
236 Foch. Des principes de la guerre, p. 9 
237 ibid. p. 41 
238 Cormier, Y. Reclaiming the Dialectic in the Study of War, M.A. thesis, deposited with the Canadian 
Department of National Defence, 2006. p. 14 
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Strategy derives its unique power from the fact that it is independent 
from the size of the conflict, the medium in which is takes place, the 
means by which it is fought, and even the amount of violence it 
involves. […] Strategy does not give a hoot whether the conflict is 
fought with guided missiles, rifles, spears or colored beans.239  
 
Another similar point of view is proposed in a section of Colin Gray’s Modern 
Strategy entitled ‘Strategy Eternal’: 
 
The near paradox lies in the fact that, although the multi-layering of 
new concerns for the strategist has proceeded apace, with the air, the 
depths of the sea, outer space, the electro-magnetic spectrum (and 
cyberspace) – as well as nuclear weapons and irregular warfare – 
adding complication upon complication, nothing essential about war 
and strategy has changed.240  
  
Depending on what is implied by the word ‘strategy’ these statements are 
either completely false, or else have so diluted the concept of strategy, to the point 
that it is interchangeable over thousands of years, that if it is true, it is only so in 
reverse proportion to just how insignificant the word ‘strategy’ has become in the 
process of making the point. The hoplite and the thermonuclear bomb are not merely 
tactically incomparable; they are strategically so distant from one another as to 
                                                                
239 Martin Van Creveld. The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991) p. 118-119 
240 Colin Gray. Modern Strategy (London: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 355-356 
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undermine the very notion of eternal strategy. The hoplite is a powerful weapon 
insofar as it is used. It pierces the battlefield. The thermonuclear weapon is only 
powerful insofar as no use is made of it. It negates, or obliterates, the very existence 
of a battlefield. Meanwhile, the idea that the networks of cyberspace can possibly be 
compatible with strategic notions of Euclidian geometry, bases and lines is altogether 
laughable. For example, a proper cyber attack is multidimensional, it cannot be 
conceived in simple geometry. One might be tempted to describe the internet 
connection between hacker and hacking victim as a line of operation or a supply line, 
but this is of little use since it the very multitude of non-linear, web-like attack means 
that disrupting one line is offset in the immediate by increasing the use of another. 
Tactically and strategically it offers no solution to the problem. And whether 
encryption should be understood as fortification would also merely confuse the issue 
and provide a rather stretched analogy. The closer to formulating an absolutely ‘true’ 
principle one gets; the further removed, abstract this principle must become. And 
reciprocally, the closer a principle is to any actual context, the less likely they are to 
be accurate as an overarching concept that can apply to other contexts. It is analogous 
to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, and also a demonstration 
of what Brodie and Couteau-Bégarie meant when they first engaged with the 
circularity of the problem. Ultimately, by claiming to be everything, these principles 






 To sum up, Clausewitz’s exploration of positive doctrines introduced a spin to 
the quest for principles of war. Jomini nearly completed a 180 degree turn, and those 
who continued the quest well into the 21st century began spinning uncontrollably into 
a spiral descent, in their attempt to elevate the principles ever more.  
The proponents of positive doctrines attempted to increase the potency of their 
principles through dilution, as though they had homeopathic properties. The more 
perfected and simplified the principle, the more abstracted and irrelevant it becomes 
to everyday usage. The work of bringing it back down to reality is greater than the 
effort required for common sense to arrive at the same dictates for a particular 
situation. Its plural conditionality is a constant reminder that none of it is singularly 
unconditional, and those that may appear so are merely illusions of logic, propped up 
by a fortuitous encounter with occasional rectitude, which was not the cause of 
victory, but actually the product of victory.  
Clausewitz’s use of Kantian dialectics, his appreciation of Kant’s notion of 
‘genius’, coupled with his understanding of the distinction between synthetic and 
analytic knowledge contributed to the line or argument that certain Enlightenment 
thinkers had, against the rising tide of positive doctrines: that they don’t work. The 
Enlightenment theorists knew it from experience. That was why they kept disagreeing 
with one other or burning their own volumes, like Jomini, when they couldn’t even 
agree with themselves. In his refutation, Clausewitz demonstrated by opposing 
contradictions and extracting his limited theory of war that these disagreements were 
in fact inescapable, the product of the endemic lack of scepticism found in 
enlightenment thinking. Ever since then, every attempt to reclaim the lost glory days 
of positive doctrines is a reminder of this one truth, that they cannot climb out of the 






Chapter 4 – Real & Absolute War: The 




Now that we have seen what Clausewitz’s dialectical war theory destroyed in 
its path, let us consider what it built. When it comes to the two practical levels of 
warfare, the tactical and the strategic, Clausewitz’s answer to this plural question 
regarding how generals should carry out war, in all its different facets (i.e. 
manoeuvres, logistics, combat, etc.) was a single, unitary solution: theory of war must 
have a limited scope. This reply to the positive doctrines is opposite to how 
Clausewitz analyzes the single, unitary question: “what is war?” Here, it is the answer 
rather than the question that takes on a plural form. Clausewitz argues that all wars 
contain two mutually exclusive and polarized concepts: ‘real war’ and ‘absolute war’. 
Whereas his refutation of the positive doctrines involved many layers of dialectical 
reasoning to achieve its results, the dichotomous break up between the real and the 
absolute represents the culmination of the method, it is in fact the overarching 
dialectic in itself. By applying it to war in the way that Kant had applied it to 
philosophy, Clausewitz provided his overall theory war with a dialectical ontology, 
thus building something altogether new and original.  
But what did these two opposite poles mean? Was it that ‘absolute war’ should 
be understood as war’s true form, its natural form, and ‘real war’ is simply the 
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consequence of policies meant to hold back and limit war, as though war were a wild 
animal, and the government its cage? Or is it the other way around, there is real war, 
understood as limited war, and then Clausewitz, by positing the notion of an ‘absolute 
war’ unleashes a new and potent nightmare for governments to dream up? Or is it 
rather that both forms are equally political, where it is politics that push war to a 
standstill or to an all-out struggle?  
Again, it is important to understand the Kantian element to this system in 
order to show how Clausewitz could use it to enhance and clarify ideas that he 
intuitively felt were right, even at a young age, but which he could not until then 
demonstrate objectively. In fact, the more we explore the depth of the Kantian 
influence in the absolute/real dichotomy, the less we shall be inclined to perceived it 
as a subjective concept based on Clausewitz’s experiences, state of mind, prejudices, 
or a change in perspective on the question. Rather, the split between the ideal and real 
represented for Clausewitz an opportunity to help him develop the subjective theory 
of his youth into a more comprehensive and far more objective theory in his later life.  
It comes down to a question of which what came first, the chicken or the egg. 
Did Clausewitz reread history and stumble upon examples of real or absolute wars, 
leading to the dialectic, or was his discovery of the dialectic what pushed him to 
discuss war as having a real and an absolute side to it? While one could seek out with 
great effort proof that the former option is the valid one, intuitively, the latter option 
appears the more logical assumption. Ockham’s razor, if you will. That being said, 
intuition need not be where this argument ends. What happened right after the note of 
1827 confirms it. Aron points out in surprise, a ‘véritable incertitude’,241 so he 
                                                                
241 Raymond Aron, ‘Clausewitz et l’état,’ Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 32e Année, No. 6 (Nov. 
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explains, that after having written the note of 1827 instead of getting right to work on 
its objective, Clausewitz instead suddenly showed a renewed interest in writing 
military campaigns. This is only surprising because Aron is seeing it from the 
opposite viewpoint. If the method came first, and the content came next, then it makes 
perfect sense that Clausewitz would have returned to his books exactly when he did.  
Far from reneging on his old ideas on extremes and standstills, he saw the two as 
fitting perfectly into a Kantian framework insofar as he could conceptualize war in a 
dialectic between the ideal form and the real form. Not only did the dichotomy co-
exist, in many ways it needed to co-exist for war to be intelligible rationally. By 
integrating the dialectic, it became possible better to explain the contradictions and 
paradoxes which he had come across early in life: the fact that war can take on an all-
out form or a standstill, as well as the relationship between politics and war. Far from 
changing his horse mid-course, Clausewitz understood that attaching his chariot to 
two horses would provide him twice the power.  Clausewitz was far too well read 
accidentally to fall upon the dialectical approach to shaping his considerations, and 
his clear understanding of the method excludes the possibility that he was stumbling 
about in self-contradictions and confusion. The paradoxes are planned and 
intellectually potent.  
 
Clarifying the Terms: ‘Absolute War’ not ‘Total War’ 
 
 A central problem with recent interpretations of Clausewitz has its origins in a 
gross translation error committed by Howard/Paret, in which they attribute to 
Clausewitz the notion of ‘total war,’ a term and concept that was not actually coined 
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for another 100 years, and one which, when it appears in Clausewitz suddenly lends 
itself to the even more problematic error of switching between ‘absolute war’ and 
‘total war’ as though they were equivalent. To be clear, the Howard/Paret translation 
did not actually make the latter error, thankfully, but the very fact of having 
introduced the anachronism has caused many others, including Van Creveld to fall 
head first into the trap of switching the two concepts around indiscriminately.  
 The passage in question is found in Book VIII chapter 6-b.   
  
Even if war were total war, the pure element of enmity unleashed, all 
factors that go to make up war and determine its salient features – the 
strength and allies of each antagonist, the character of the peoples, and 
their governments, and so forth...242   
 
Clausewitz never wrote the term ‘total war’ [totale Krieg]. The original 
German passage starts this way: ‘Diese Vorstellungsart würde selbst dann 
unentbehrlich sein, wenn der Krieg ganz Krieg [...]’ It actually reads much like the 
English expression ‘girly-girl’ where the superlative is found in repetition, so in this 
case we are dealing with something the phrase a ‘war of all wars’, with no reference 
to totality at all. Though the Graham translation also fails to present the term as a 
repetition, the advantage of having chosen the words ‘perfect war’243 is that at least 
here, it is not generating the connotations which have become associated with total 
war. The Graham translation, first published in 1873 preceded the arrival of the term 
                                                                
242 Clausewitz. On War, tr. Howard/Paret, Bk. VIII, Ch. 6B,  pp. 605-606 
243 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. VIII, Ch. 6B, p. 675  
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‘total war’ by many decades, when, in 1935 the term ‘total war’ was first used by the 
German General Erich Ludendorff, as the title of his 1935 book ‘Der Totale Krieg’.  
The problem with introducing ‘total war’ in Clausewitz is that the term is 
usually understood as a very real thing, the mobilization of an entire country, its 
people and its industrial production capacity towards the war effort, in which the 
objective is to completely annihilate the enemy’s capacity to resist. It is important to 
understand total war and absolute war as ‘unrelated concepts,’244 where the latter is 
purely conceptual and unlimited and the former is purely material and entirely limited 
by the capacity of the nation to mobilize to its maximum potential. By switching the 
two around, we undermine the value of absolute war as an idea, because we are 
limiting it, when in fact the very reason for its existence is to serve as an unlimited 
concept. Whereas total war may be the very worst type of war we can generate, 
absolute war is the very worst type of war we can dream up.  
Echevarria, emphasizes the fact that ‘the term absolute war captures the idea 
of limitless escalation, but this idea is not associated with real war.’ Actually, the 
closest Clausewitz ever got to including the word total in his analysis of ‘absolute 
war’ was not in regard to any totality of war, but in the exact opposite: to show that it 
was merely a concept, an idea. In an earlier draft of his manuscript, Echevarria notes, 
Clausewitz used the term ‘total-concept’ [Total-Begriff] to clarify the uniquely 
conceptual significance of the term, which is ‘barely conceivable in the purely logical 
sense’.245  
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It is useful to take a step back, with regard to ‘absolute war’. Though it has 
been the one term that has fueled the most aggressive and systematic attacks on 
Clausewitz ever since, it should be noted that Clausewitz only used the term four 
times in the entire opus. If we also add the few other variants which he makes, such as 
war’s ‘absolute character’ and war’s ‘absolute form’, we find ourselves with a grand 
total of ten occurrences, our roughly 20 words out of 800 pages. Furthermore, where 
he does write ‘absolute War’, on the first occasion he practically apologizes for it; on 
the second occasion he presents it as only a ‘concept’; on the third, talks about the 
‘probability’ of ‘approaching’ it as opposed to actually fighting with the ideal as one’s 
objective; and on the fourth, he writes that to ‘dwell’ on it would be to condemn one’s 
theory to falsehood.  That is to say he takes this idea not just with a grain of salt, but 
perhaps more like a shovelful.  
 
The Missing Dialectics I: Did Clausewitz suddenly change his mind? 
    
 The fact that Clausewitz was so uncomfortable with the concept of an absolute 
war, and that he was altogether reticent about using it or giving it much credence 
explains why he would need to significantly counter it with an opposite ‘real’ war. It 
is often assumed that absolute war was something that the young Clausewitz thought 
up and that in his later life, a more mature and moderate man, he would reconsider his 
stance and integrate the limiting features embodied in the notion of real war. This 
assumption, however, breaks down with closer scrutiny. Real war is a term he had 
been using for ages, whereas it was absolute war that suddenly appeared later in his 
writings and in the process, also redefined his ideas on the meaning of real war. This 
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was the challenge and not the other way around, and it also explains at least in part 
why a complete re-edit of On War was required in order to make it coherent, or at 
least consistent, from cover to cover.    
Van Creveld, for example, makes the case that Clausewitz’s integrated the 
idea of ‘limited war’ as a last-minute change of mind, and as a result of his premature 
death, it was an idea that was never fully developed into On War.246 There are many 
problems to this argument, the most obvious being the word choice: Clausewitz never 
actually talked about ‘limited war’ at all. He discussed limited aims in war, standstills, 
and extremes, but the distinction was ‘absolute’ war and ‘real’ war, not the 
limited/total war dichotomy that Van Creveld sets up as if they are synonymous. The 
point he is trying to make is that real war came first, and absolute war came second, 
though he speaks of a limited war / total war dichotomy which doesn’t in fact exist in 
the literature. 
Let us recall that the original dichotomy is as follows: Absolute war is the 
concept of what a war might be if it had no material or political restraints, if it was left 
entirely to the internal escalatory logic that violence generates when it is unleashed 
and begets a process of reciprocation towards extremes. Real war, on the other hand, 
is war as it exists materially, somewhere between a standstill and an all-out fight to 
the finish. Limited aims in war are simply one of many factors that will guide war into 
whichever form it takes materially. 
The hidden problem with Van Creveld’s argument, however is not language, it 
is history. He claims that the concept of real or limited war emerge in the works of 
Clausewitz at a later date, whereas absolute war was there from a much earlier time. 
But this is simply not true. ‘Absolute war’ is what was added later in the game, and 
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what came last was the systematic study of the two, in comparison and reciprocation. 
To be certain of this, one needs only search quickly where the two terms appear in On 
War: ‘Real war’ can be found in Books I (ch2), III, V, VI, VIII, whereas all three 
variants ‘absolute war’, the ‘absolute form’, and the ‘absolute character’ of war are 
exclusively mentioned in Books VI and VIII. From this, knowing that Clausewitz 
wrote the books in sequence and had the time to review only the first parts of Book I 
to satisfaction, it is clear that given the many references to ‘real war’ in practically 
every segment of the book, while ‘absolute war’ in fewer places and exclusively in 
later parts, that ‘real’ came first and ‘absolute’ second, not the other way around. 
The same faulty observation was also made by Paret, who made the case, 
citing passages from Clausewitz’s early books, Principles of War and Plan of 
Operations, that absolute war was an early concept. But he bases this assumption on 
the decision to accord to the words ‘utmost’ and ‘absolute’ complete 
interchangeability,247 notwithstanding the fact that the two were written some twenty 
years apart. If we look at the passages Paret uses to make suggest that young 
Clausewitz had ‘absolute’ war on his mind, it becomes clear that the argument is 
tenuous. While Clausewitz did in fact argue that in war, ‘the most decisive operations 
accord with the nature of war’,248 and that one should use his entire forces with the 
‘utmost energy,’249 he in no way mentions of develops anything immaterial or totally 
conceptual, along the lines of absolute war. In fact, the word ‘absolute war’ does it 
appear anywhere in these early works. This is not surprising, given that he did not 
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come across the concept ‘absolute war’ for another five years.250 Though we might 
observe a seed, which would explain why he adopted the idea once he came across it, 
the observations regarding the use of ‘utmost energy’ are tactical, not ontological. 
Absolute war for Clausewitz is a hypothetical concept based on the rhetorical 
question, ‘what if war had no material limits?’ The above items are contrary to this 
because they are only concerned with material manifestations of war. And so, while 
Clausewitz had begun years earlier to conceptualize war as having extremes, it was 
not until he started thinking in ‘absolute’ terms that he chose to reframe the 
conceptual counterpoise to this, thus the renewed interest, which suddenly appears in 
the late chapters of On War, in war’s limited aims and the paradoxical relationship 
between waging wars of political extermination versus wars for bargaining a peace, a 
contradiction he had been considering as early as 1804.251 Until the dialectic kicked 
in, Clausewitz understood war as merely ‘real’ war, and eventually, when he 
discovered absolute war, he generated a system which countered the real against the 
absolute, with unlimited and limited political aims serving as the moderators and 
accelerators of the dynamics between the more extreme and less extreme forms of 
war. This evolution shows Clausewitz become a more experienced and talented 
dialectician over time. 
Interestingly, the way Clausewitz used the term ‘real war’ in the early parts of 
On War (books III to V, or up to the mid-section of VI) to is quite different from the 
meaning it takes on after ‘absolute war’ was introduced (End of VI, VII, VII and I, ch 
1). In Book V, for example, ‘real war’ is used in refutation to positive doctrines 
regarding base lines, and Clausewitz is saying that these theories don’t apply in ‘real 
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war.’252 In this case, the word real has nothing conceptual to it, but is merely a 
rhetorical tool to undermine the unrealness of the other term. Otherwise, in Book III, 
Clausewitz writes that ‘real war’ is the state of crisis on the battlefield, as opposed to 
the standstills.253 Here the term is being used in very static, or unitary way, where the 
meaning of real war is something in particular, the actual fighting in war, as opposed 
to something paradoxical and fluid, which war actually encompasses all of the forms 
war can take, from the standstill at one end to the all out struggle at the other. Indeed, 
once we push forward to the end of Book VI, where ‘absolute war’ is finally 
introduced, then ‘real war’ suddenly changes in scope. It becomes a concept in flux 
between various forms. Clausewitz spells this out, ‘Real war will generally be in a 
medium between the two different tendencies, sometimes approaching nearer to one, 
sometimes to the other.’254 Later, in Book VIII, Clausewitz adds that ‘real war is no 
such consistent effort tending to an extreme, as it should be according to the abstract 
idea, but a half and half thing, a contradiction in itself.’255  
The confusion is that when Clausewitz integrated the concept of absolute war, 
he realized that the relationship this conceptual thing had to ‘real’ war was quite 
problematic. Can the absolute tend towards becoming materialized? If the political 
nature of war were to be proven through this dichotomy, then that also would give 
proper reason to go back and edit the early parts of the book. And so, what Clausewitz 
had was not a sudden turnaround, a change of heart that led him to appreciate the 
lighter side of war, but the opposite, a realization regarding the potentiality for war’s 
extremes and absolutes, which forced him to reconsider ‘real war’ from the 
perspective of this conceptual duality. In effect, ‘real war’ had suddenly become 
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arguably more real, in opposition to the ideal form, but also, paradoxically, less 
tangible too, because it was no longer a fixed concept, but a fluid one with variants. 
The order in which Clausewitz developed the real war/absolute war dichotomy has 
been regularly misrepresented in the field, and the fact that this has been thoroughly 
turned around changes our understanding of the concepts involved.  
Whereas the young Clausewitz knew that in war there were extremes and 
standstills, he could not make these fit together as belonging to a single logic until he 
had broken war into its actual and ideal forms, and it was this conception of war that 
allowed him to place existing contradictions in war into a higher level of analysis 
which made them logically connected despite their opposition. Clausewitz did not 
suddenly change his mind about war. He simply freed the dialectic, letting it 
encompass the real contradictions, such as wars tending towards both standstills and 
extremes, by allowing a higher level of conception to frame war.  
 
 
The Missing Dialectics II: Was Clausewitz in disagreement with himself? 
 
 
 Not everyone appreciates the art of thinking in paradoxes. We saw in the early 
pages of this thesis that reading Clausewitz without a dialectical lens has led to self-
fulfilling prophecies and war doctrines that advocate pre-emptive extremes. It was 
simple in the case of Foch and Liddell Hart to demonstrate that they had grossly split 
apart the dialectic in order to focus on isolated poles, which were not conceived to 
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stand alone.  However, showing that a new generation of authors have more or less 
replicated the error of excluding the dialectic is more difficult, because they do in fact 
recognize that both poles exist, and they write with more care and erudition, but they 
nonetheless fall into the trap of making a superficial interpretation of them which 
undermines the role that the dialectic played in Clausewitz’s thought.  
Whereas interpreters at the turn of the century had seemingly forgotten the 
concept of ‘real war’ altogether, today, some authors do not properly recognize the 
dichotomy as a thing in itself, a necessary relationship, and a demonstration of 
Clausewitz’s talents as a dialectician, as opposed to a case of schizophrenic self-
disagreements or intellectual weakness that leads him to contradict himself from 
cover to cover. It is rather the norm, not the exception to point out these 
contradictions disparagingly, even among scholars who are not unsympathetic to 
Clausewitz, as we saw in Gallie above, or in Heuser’s Reading Clausewitz, where she 
writes, ‘even [my emphasis] in his contradictions, [Clausewitz] shows great 
wisdom’.256 This begs the question, however, was Clausewitz’s wisdom rather not 
that he could conceptualize war within the context of such inherent contradictions? In 
fact, the way Clausewitz plans and executes contradictions –the source of his 
real/absolute dichotomy as well as various other examples in On War where 
paradoxes are drawn out – is a trick he learned from Kant. In fact, not only are they to 
be contradictory, they are meant to be as contradictory as possible, fully mutually 
exclusive conceptual pairs, which showcase the effects of antinomies of reason. When 
Clausewitz describes one thing, then its opposite, he replicates a technique that Kant 
uses, which Gallie describes particularly well in Philosophers of War: 
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The principle of division should be stated in the sharpest, most extreme 
possible form […] once our principle of division has been established 
in this extreme, unmistakable form, then we can safely consider any 
factors which may seem to modify it in particular cases. Clausewitz 
uses this methodological principle at every stage of his thought, up to 
his final revision of Book I, chapter I in order to distinguish war from 
other forms of organized social action; and the result is his idea of 
absolute war.257  
 
However, what is more interesting still, within this method, is that within these 
paradoxes, Clausewitz is able to show that both opposite propositions can in fact be 
simultaneously true. Kant explained in the Critique of Pure Reason that conflicts in 
the laws of pure reason (antinomies) produce such two-way splits [Zwiespalt], 258 and 
Clausewitz did in fact integrate this observation, even making use of the word 
‘Zwiespalt’ itself to clarify his exposition of the real/absolute dichotomy: 
 
HAVING made the requisite examination on both sides of that state of 
antagonism [Zwiespalt] in which the nature of war stands with relation 
to other interests of men individually and of the bond of society, in 
order not to neglect any of the opposing elements,—an antagonism 
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[Zwiespalt] which is founded in our own nature, and which, therefore, 
no philosophy [philosophische Verstand] can unravel. 259 
    
The division between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’ is, Hutchings explains, ‘fraught 
with paradox, as Kant himself recognizes, and none of the ways in which Kant 
grounds a connection […] is genuinely secure.’260 Indeed, this is alluded to by the fact 
that Clausewitz is saying that no philosophy can unravel it. That being said, what is 
lost in translation is that Clausewitz does in fact take the time to qualify which type of 
philosophy (Verstand) cannot unravel it, which suggests that he has plans down the 
line to propose an alternative philosophy to do the job. This quite a complex item to 
deal with, and we shall soon return to it later in this thesis. What is clear though, is 
that while these paradoxical tensions are planned and purposeful, they nonetheless 
represent a difficulty not only to the reader, but also in fact to Clausewitz himself. In 
writing about the impasse, Clausewitz found it quite difficult to cope with 
distinguishing the ideal from the real, especially in the context of Napoleon, who 
seemed to push war so far towards its absolute form that the paradox was all the more 
frustrating and fragile.  
Clausewitz’s goal in bringing up the contradiction between absolute and real 
war was to try to make sense of another underlying contradiction he had experienced 
in his own life: how the single concept ‘war’ has on the one hand a tendency towards 
a ‘struggle for life and death’, while also being capable of provoking a mere ‘state of 
observation’ between the two opposing forces, or a standstill.261 And more confusing 
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still, how is it possible that each single, particular war is equally infused with this 
paradox? Clausewitz had no intention of somehow bypassing or avoiding it, but this 
meant that dealing with the contradiction meant he might himself sound contradictory 
in the process.  
In Reading Clausewitz Heuser asks the rhetorical question, ‘How could 
Clausewitz state dogmatically that “The shattering of the enemy is the aim of war”, 
requiring the “annihilation of the inimical armed forces”, if two lines later he realized 
that the objective could be anything on a wide scale of political objectives? If only an 
insignificant patch of territory is to be conquered in time for political negotiations, 
surely it is not necessary to destroy the enemy’s entire fighting forces to do so. This 
passage thus shows the continued coexistence of his two different mind-frames.’262 
Heuser goes so far as to entitle her chapter ‘Clausewitz the Realist vs. 
Clausewitz the Idealist’, as though the conflicting ‘mind-frames’ were somehow a 
personal disposition, rather than an intellectual system of analysis. If it is a bit 
anachronistic to frame Clausewitz in such 20th century academic terms, it is not 
without merit, because it does in fact have a highly heuristic value, insofar as it helps 
us understand Clausewitz from a crisp perspective with which we are familiar. It 
establishes compartments to how we should understand the lessons one can take from 
Clausewitz. However, this ‘perspective’ into Clausewitz is not unproblematic either, 
since it frames his work by attaching it to an external set of concepts. The danger is 
that we wind up bypassing On War’s planned complexities by extracting the 
contradictions as they appear from our external framework. Clausewitz is not 
necessarily contradicting himself, if he is in fact exposing self-contradictions in war 
itself. In the chapter that precedes the one Heuser is quoting from, Clausewitz 
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explains that war has ‘inner laws’263 so that even though a nation may not have to 
annihilate another in order to take over a small territory, this does not eliminate the 
propensity of war to rise to extremes. In fact, is it not fair to say that many great wars 
started with a minor dispute? Within this reality, the political element is both the 
driver and the moderator of this propensity to extremes. Once we realize this, the 
contradiction which Heuser speaks of dissipates. War’s absolute and real natures are 
both accounted for in how Clausewitz describes war. They are interconnected. This 
does not mean that a limited war does not have something intrinsically absolute to it, 
nor does it mean that the closest one might get to waging an absolute war would not 
equally contain elements that would limit it from ever reaching this conceptual 
endpoint, which is stated as an unlimited ideal, and not a fixed and attainable point. 
To use a mathematical analogy, real war is imbued with both an absolute element and 
a limited element which are like asymptotic lines on a chart that never reach the point 
towards which they tend, in this case, because they are opposite forces exerting a 
constant pull against either approaching its end.     
The problem in Heuser’s reading of ‘twos’ in Clausewitz is that her text does 
not properly distinguish dialectics from dualism.  
 
[Clausewitz] almost falls into a new trap, that of thinking of war 
dualistically, as one of merely two possible forms: limited or unlimited. 
[…] back in 1804, Clausewitz had not yet believed that the conduct of war 
might vary as a function of its political aims. In a note of 1827, however, 
[…] he again invoked the ‘dual nature of war’. This curiously dualistic 
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notion […] almost led Clausewitz to the logical dead end of thinking of 
war as one of two possible manifestations. His own logic, however, led 
him to acknowledge elsewhere that wars have to be classified along a 
sliding scale, from defensive but unlimited […] via very limited […] to an 
all-out unlimited […] war of conquest.264 
 
 Heuser is right to point out that Clausewitz describes war as a dual concept as 
well as a sliding scale of manifestations. It is not, however, a contradiction in terms. 
To use an analogy, when a couple engages in a love-hate relationship, this does not 
exclude the existence of all the other feelings involved in their affair: passion, 
romance, frustration, etc. A love-hate dichotomy is used to describe the unlikely 
existence of mutually exclusive poles in one and the same thing, not to suggest that in 
this couple there is nothing but love and hate, one minute the former, one minute the 
latter. The novelty of such a relationship, were it to exist, would probably require a 
name of it own, given that a ‘love hate’ relationship implies something far less 
categorical and dramatic. Clausewitz’s dual concept of war, or it might be better yet to 
refer to it in the plural, ‘dual concepts of war’, is not a quest to define all of war as 
belonging to two poles, but rather a quest to understand why these two mutually 
exclusive conceptual extremities seem to exist in reciprocation in every single war 
which exists in the space between them.  
Further from the mark is the idea that a love-hate relationship automatically 
means that the hate part of the equation would be all the more hateful. This is the kind 
of reasoning that allows Van Creveld, like Liddell Hart before him, to argue that 
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because Clausewitz explored the real war/absolute war dichotomy, he was to blame 
for creating ‘brutally realistic doctrine’.265 The reason he gets to this point is that he 
isolates both poles and fails to consider them as a pair. This is well demonstrated by 
the fact that when Van Creveld decides to take on the concept of ‘absolute war’ and 
attack it from all sides, he does so without considering it alongside or in parallel to 
‘real war’, but only introduces ‘real war’ after the fact, once the rhetorical process of 
describing ‘absolute war’ as something altogether morally abhorrent is complete.  
Van Creveld brings up the partially right point that the ‘absolute’ concept  is 
borrowed from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, 266 but in reality as we shall 
see below, it was in fact a student of Kant’s, Fichte, who coined the phrase. What is 
most Kantian about it is not the term itself, but the fact that it is counterbalanced with 
the ‘real’. In Van Creveld’s defence, however, it is possible to blame a part of this 
failure to appreciate the Kantian connection properly in On War on the grounds that 
he was citing the Howard/Paret translation of On War, which systematically omits or 
misinterprets the philosophical terminologies at the heart of Clausewitz’s project. 
Indeed, the Howard/Paret translation of Clausewitz, which Van Creveld uses as his 
source in The Art of War, makes a right proper mess of the ‘real’ part of the 
real/absolute dichotomy. For example, the word ‘wirklich’ a term Clausewitz used to 
distinguish that which is ‘real’ from what is ideal or abstract is at times omitted from 
the translation, thus ‘real war’ is translated as simply ‘war’, and otherwise, the 
translators are not consistent in their word choice, interchanging, for example the 
words ‘actual’ and ‘real’ from one occurrence of ‘wirklich’ to another.267  
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 With regard to the question of whether or not Clausewitz was regularly in 
disagreement with himself, it becomes clear as we explore the true nature of his 
paradoxical observations that they were fundamental to his system of thought, 
planned, clear, and necessary to one another. The real problem however, does not 
come down to either the question of where and how this development happened, 
whether the real came before or after the absolute. And though failing to see the 
dichotomy as a thing in itself, a paradox that needs to be understood as such, has 
caused serious misinterpretations over the years, the far more interesting question to 
ask is rather: how fragile is this paradox? In trying to make war more intelligible, how 
close can it get to making itself unintelligible? 
 
 
Absolute War & Revolution 
 
 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte is the one who first coined the term ‘absoluter Krieg’ 
(absolute war) and introduced it to Clausewitz. We know this because in 1809 
Clausewitz read Fichte’s ‘On Machiavelli’ in which the term appears, and he actually 
took the time to write a letter of reply which he sent to the philosopher.  Prior to this, 
Clausewitz had not made use of the term. In fact, it seems that amongst the texts that 
have been translated to English, Clausewitz did not actually introduce the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
translations use ‘real war’ to render ‘eigentliche Krieg’ which would be clarified in this particular case 
by using the word ‘actual’ instead (p. 186 Graham; p. 222 Paret / Howard).   
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‘absolute war’ until many years later, while writing On War, a project not undertaken, 
according to Paret, until after 1815.268  
Fichte used ‘absolute war’ to describe revolutionary conflict, or a war between 
the people and their prince. Specifically, he was describing his agreement with what 
he considered to be the ‘fundamental principle of Machiavellian politics’, which is 
that in order to be stable, whoever founds a republic or state and gives it laws must 
presuppose that all men are evil, and that given the occasion they will make use of 
this evilness for their own gain. Fichte is not commenting on whether that is a right or 
wrong presumption, but rather that it serves as a premise in order for the state to act as 
a constraining or coercive institution (Zwangsanstalt). The problem is as follows, 
however: if the people refuse to recognize the laws and the authority of the prince and 
rather choose to fight and reclaim their original independence and collective 
sovereignty; they are merely confirming from the perspective of the ruler what was 
presupposed to begin with... that they are evil. And this is what justifies the prince in 
his perceived right to defend himself from the villainy of others. Hence, revolutionary 
conflicts exist at the utmost threshold of the political relations between war and peace, 
because the prince wants peace, by which he implies that he wants to maintain his 
right to make laws and maintain his sovereignty, and the people in arms cannot be 
satisfied until both this sovereignty and lawmaking are fully annihilated. A half 
victory would be no victory at all. This is what makes war absolute, since the 
objectives are themselves absolute and fundamentally irreconcilable.269 In Fichte’s 
version of it, ‘absolute War’ contains a political idea, it does not imply a judgement or 
analysis of the form the violence takes, or its strategic or tactical implications. It is 
nothing more than the armed conflict aspect of a political revolution. 
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Clausewitz borrowed this concept and enhanced it intellectually. It retains 
something deeply political to it, but brings forward much more depth with regard to 
the nature of pure political violence. When Clausewitz borrowed the concept from 
Fichte, his primary goal was visibly to clarify the role of violence unleashed in war, to 
isolate the idea in its most extreme form, so he could distinguish the political aspects 
which generate the central features of his theory, such as escalation, reciprocation, all 
out war, standstills, from the self-fulfilling nature of violence which also inherently 
produces these very same effects. So, while the violence of war is naturally or 
inherently escalatory, different policies can have the effect of restraining this 
tendency, or the opposite, releasing it and even enhancing it. Absolute war is a 
concept that is at the very threshold between the natural tendency of war and the 
political will to bring this tendency out to its extreme. And for Clausewitz, like Fichte, 
this has a revolutionary connotation.  
Clausewitz himself recognized that the closest anyone had gotten to absolute war 
were the revolutionary French, under Napoleon. Even though he often described 
Napoleon as having an unlimited approach to war, Clausewitz nonetheless reiterated 
the fact that absolute war remained a conceptual thing, an abstraction, ‘which has 
never in fact been achieved.’270 A few paragraphs below, he adds that the campaigns 
of 1805, 1807 and 1809 make it ‘easier for us to grasp the concept of modern, 
absolute war in all its devastating power.’271 He is in fact walking the tight-rope of a 
paradox, where absolute war does not exist per se, but there are ways in which 
campaigns approach it, and to understand these events of history, we must first 
understand that war can have as its objective an absolute aim, which is to annihilate 
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the capacity for a political unit to resist, and then in fact completely overturn or 
annihilate the political structures themselves. Trying to find equilibrium between his 
theoretical concept of ‘absolute war’ and Napoleon’s constant approaching of it, 
Clausewitz juggles with his concept, eventually writing ‘candidly’ that: 
 
[...] we shall have to grasp the idea that War, and the form which we 
give it, proceeds from ideas, feelings, and circumstances which 
dominate for the moment; indeed, if we would be perfectly candid we 
must admit that this has even been the case where it has taken its 
absolute character, that is, under Buonaparte.272 
 
The tension is extreme in this paragraph, which might encourage some to argue 
that Clausewitz’s concept of ‘absolute war’ was not merely an idea, but something 
concrete that could in fact be enacted. But the actual words on the page maintain the 
fact that the concept belongs to the realm of ‘ideas, feelings, and circumstances’, 
which led Bonaparte to apply war in an absolute character, which is to say, make a 
policy to have this war take on this revolutionary and absolute form. However, this 
does not mean that Bonaparte succeeded in achieving the absolute, but rather that he 
pushed his forces in this direction in ways that had arguably never been seen in the 
history of mankind. ‘Candidly’ says Clausewitz, because he hates having to say it. It 
is troubling to him, because in the same paragraph, right above this quote, Clausewitz 
reminds the reader to avoid a ‘pure conception’ and to ‘[allow] room for everything 
foreign in nature which mixes up with it and fastens itself upon it – all the natural 
                                                                
272 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. VIII, Ch. 2, p. 644 
180 
 
inertia and friction of its parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and 
hesitation (or timidity) of the human mind.’273 And so revolutionary war contains 
within it an absolute nature and propensity for extremes like no other war, but it 
remains subdued to limiting features nonetheless, even though it aspires to no limit 
other than political overthrow and annihilation. 
Napoleon was in fact ‘exporting’ the revolution, bringing to life a political 
conception of war which had as its only limit, the non-limit implied by either 
completely destroying the political structures of the other. It was not merely that 
Napoleon was conquering Europe, but that in doing so he brought forth significant 
political reforms, proclaiming, for example, new laws, rights and constitutions for the 
peoples of Prussia, of Poland, and of the Rhineland. This, however, did not mean that 
war itself had become unlimited, or had achieved the full abstraction of the absolute. 
The full abstraction was the aim and the political nature or rather revolutionary aspect 
of the war. The physical conditions of battle remain unchanged. The limiting features 
of fog and friction, for example, still haunted the commander, and, as for the most 
part technologies and tactics had not particularly changed since the Seven Years’ 
War.  
The politics had changed. And this could be felt in both the size of the 
engagements, because of the ‘levees en masse’ as well as the fervour and moral force 
of the revolutionary citizen-soldiers, or as Clausewitz explained:  
 
War had suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a 
people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself 
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as a citizen of the State […]By this participation of the people in the 
war instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural 
weight came into the scale. Henceforward, the means available—the 
efforts which might be called forth—had no longer any definite limits; 
the energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer 
any counterpoise, and consequently the danger for the adversary had 
risen to the extreme.274  
 
What made war absolute was not Napoleon himself, and surely not his tactics 
and strategies, but rather the politics of revolution, which led hundreds of thousands 
of invigorated citizen-soldiers with ambitions to do away with the Ancien Regime, at 
home and abroad.   
 
Since the time of Buonaparte, war, through being first on one side, 
then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has assumed 
quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real 
nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called forth had no 
visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the 
Government and its subjects.275  
 
Clausewitz reaffirms that what leads war towards an absolute form is the 
political nature, is in effect the ‘revolutionary’ fervour, the will to transform the 
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ambitions of policy into the ambitions of warfare. Only absolute politics can lead to 
absolute war. And the only true absolute ‘policy’ is revolution. This realization will 
serve us in the later chapters when we discuss the role of freedom and emancipation 
in shaping the modern ethos of warfare.  
That being said, what is important for the time being is to recognize that 
Clausewitz did not present absolute war as an apolitical concept and real war as the 
outcome of some external source of ‘politics’ that restrains absolute war. His analysis 
was far too complex to be satisfied with such simplicity. For Clausewitz, war contains 
this ‘absolute’ at the very centre of its concept, the reciprocation of violence leads to 
extreme, independently of politics, if let to its own devices. However, what is 
essential to add is that Clausewitz recognizes that this internal logic is understood by 
the state, when it applies reason to making use of war as a tool. It can restrain war, or 
at least try, though not always successfully, to restrain war, when objectives demand 
this, but in other cases, the policy may be to unleash war, enhance war, provide it with 
more force, more destructive technology, more soldiers, etc.   
This is precisely what Clausewitz was trying to explain in the passage cited 
above, in which he is speaking of Krieg ganz Krieg. Now we can appreciate the 
second part of the statement:  
 
This kind of idea would be indispensable even if war was perfect war 
[Krieg ganz Krieg], the perfectly unbridled element of hostility, for all 
the circumstances on which it rests, and which determine its leading 
features, viz., our own power, the enemy's power, allies on both sides, 
the characteristics of the people and their Governments respectively, 
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etc., as enumerated in the first chapter of the first book, are they not of 
a political nature, and are they not so intimately connected with the 
whole political intercourse that it is impossible to separate them.276    
 
In the world of ideas, war is absolute. It is the pure reciprocation of extremes 
producing ever greater extremes. In real war, which spans between the standstill and 
the all-out war, whether the beast is restrained or unleashed is equally the product of 
politics. That is in fact their fundamental unity. To suggest that politics only apply to 
the restraint side of the equation is to miss Clausewitz’s argument altogether. The 
failure to recognize this unity in the dialectic is precisely what leads certain 
interpreters to conceptualize Clausewitz as being dualistic, in contradiction with 
himself, and having changed his mind over time, rather than having deepened what he 






 To make the point that the absolute war / real war dichotomy is an objective 
ontological system in which to understand the nature of war, it is best to reach it by 
demonstrating the opposite: that it is not subjective. If Clausewitz had indeed 
suddenly changed his mind on the question, then it would have been subjective, but 
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this we saw was not the case, the dichotomy emerged logically both as an internally 
coherent system and one that did not appear, but developed over time through 
deepening itself. Secondly, if the dichotomy was haphazardly posited and contained 
clear signs of Clausewitz caught in hopeless self-contradiction, then again, it would 
appear to be subjective, but in fact that the paradoxes which he exposes are not self-
contradictory, but rather provide an external glance into the contradictions inherent in 
war eliminate this possibility as well. Hence, the two most likely sources of 
subjectivity having been excluded, Clausewitz’s method appears to be rather 
objective: it allows the internal logic of violence and reciprocation on one end, and 
risk aversion on the other, to coexist as two forces of policy which generate war’s 
sliding scale of manifestation. 
 That being said, however, Clausewitz offers some critical assessment to what 
he himself is writing, when he considers the problem with speaking of absolute and 
real war as separate concepts when in the context of revolution. He recognizes that 
revolution represents in some sense the breaking point or the logical limit of the real 
war / absolute war dichotomy, because it brings out the logic of the absolute in its 
manifestation of the real, because the policy of a revolution is itself absolute, a 
willingness to risk it all. The difference between the two separate concepts becomes 
terribly blurred in revolution. That is to say, the policy of revolution being absolute, 
the form of revolutionary war follows, as is the reverse case when policy has limited 
aims.  
 The discovery that both real war and absolute war were equally the products of 
policy gave Clausewitz a glimpse into war’s political nature. But to complete this 
dialectical reconciliation of the real and the absolute, he could not simply state it as 
the continuation of policy by other means, simply because jumping from the former 
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part of this equation to the latter, actually makes very little sense, unless it is grounded 
in some logic or method. Why should war’s dual concepts serve as a demonstration of 
its political nature? Could it not just as well show an infinite set of other properties or 
conclusion On War? The link had to be canalized and connected, and only then could 
Clausewitz home in on the single conclusion, and then go ahead defining the political 
element further. Had he been only influenced by Kant, Clausewitz would not have 
been able to tie the impasse between real war and absolute war directly to the 
political. He would have been forced to generate the real and the absolute alone as 
objective observations, a static impasse in itself, to which he could supplement a fully 
subjective and external corollary regarding war’s political element. However, this was 
not satisfactory. Clausewitz wanted to show objectively as well that the war was the 
continuation of policy by other means, and to do this, he had to show that it was a 
dynamic solution to the impasse he had uncovered. For this, however, he would need 
to find a metaphysical solution to Kant, a way to overcome that which philosophy of 








In Part I, we set off to demonstrate that Clausewitz’s method converged with 
Kant’s philosophy and that this shaped the first two moments in his dialectical war 
theory, the refutation of the positive doctrines, and the development of war’s dual-
nature as ‘real’ and ‘absolute. The result of this convergence of method is shown to 
have had parallel impacts in war theory as the method had had in the metaphysics. 
Instead of seeking out truth regarding war in forms that were immutable, natural and 
external to the thing, best exemplified by the quest for ‘principles of war’, Clausewitz 
pursued an opposite direction: where the object of study is the thing in itself, and the 
prescriptions are not fixed, eternal, and perfect, like God, but in flux, mortal, and 
imperfect, like man. On the one hand, fundamental principles and positive doctrines 
fail because war is so human; it is an element of ‘social life’,277 the fact that it is in 
constant mutual reciprocation between human actors makes it a game [Spiel]278 in 
which players act and react, and this is what undermines the absoluteness of doctrine. 
On the other hand, Clausewitz’s ontological exploration of war’s dual concepts again 
breaks war away from naturalistic and mystical explanations for war, because it 
shows that the forms war takes are not predestined externally, but the product of 
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human, political agency at the very centre or war’s inner essence. In either case, the 
need for systematizing causality from some divine origin is eliminated; there is no 
need for a causa prima, because even if we exclude it from the analysis, the theory of 
war remains intact logically, even in a universe where there is no God and where 
causality itself offers no certainty, war can function within an internal logic that 
straddles between game theory and politics.   
The two moments, methodological and ontological, are distinct in that the first 
is an analytical, negative task, and the second is a synthetic, positive one. In both 
cases, however, Clausewitz transposed the Kantian lessons regarding the 
Enlightenment metaphysical debates into the field of war theory. A pragmatist, no 
doubt, he most certainly did not do this for the sake of high scholasticism, but simply 
because it did the job so well. He had perceived the fact that there were similarities in 
the weaknesses he saw in the scientific theories of war and the solutions Kant had 
provided in his theories on human understanding and aesthetics. The process of 
positing and refuting the scientific demonstration of the divine generated an 
intellectual history that was incredibly informative to the study of war. And 
Clausewitz happened to be at the right place, at the right time, to be the first to make 
this transposition.  
Clausewitz did not merely refute one positive doctrine or another, but the very 
principle of codifying principles of war to begin with. Clausewitz’s scepticism 
uncovered the weaknesses that existed not only in the claims made regarding the 
observation and identification of causal relationships, but also the question of whether 
this causality, even if it were properly discovered, could serve as the edifice of 
certainty, which clearly, according to Clausewitz, it could not. Therefore, he replaced 
these doctrines with a far less ambitious idea of what war theory should and could 
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afford generals and heads of state. His was a limited theory, built not on mere 
scepticism, but on a sceptical method which made use of dialectics to uncover both 
the antinomian nature of opposing positive doctrines and the ‘Kritik’ to extract a 
moderate or relative scope of knowledge from experience and history. As a result of 
this, faith in positive doctrines began to waiver. Jomini had to rewrite his entire opus 
just to keep afloat. And the more people explored new ways of generating positive 
doctrines, the more pronounced became their descent into circular logic, until the very 
glue that was keeping it altogether, the concept of ‘genius’ was in effect replaced by 
its opposite: ‘common sense’. As of the moment Clausewitz exposed the problems of 
positive doctrines, clarified the role the Kritik, and then developed his limited theory 
of war, the field was forever changed. From that point on, all theories would be forced 
to measure up to the same standards of proof. And since principles could not be 
proven any more than their metaphysical counterpart in philosophy, these principles 
ballooned up into vagaries that were condemned to either pop or deflate whenever one 
made use of them in concrete ways.    
Meanwhile importing Kantian metaphysics into war theory had positive 
ontological implications as well. By conceiving war in twos as a reciprocation 
between opposite tendencies, towards extremes and towards standstills, Clausewitz 
was able to posit a theory of war, which unlike his stance on positive doctrines, as not 
a ‘limited theory’ but the opposite: an absolute theory of war, built on a paradox, 
which establishes two mutually exclusive concepts of war: the ‘real’ and the 
‘absolute’ in reciprocation. That is to say, that to the single question ‘what is war?’, 
Clausewitz provided a plural answer. It was this dual answer that would generate the 
political element in war, but to understand fully how this was achieved, and by what 
method, the previous chapter can only serve as a mild introduction. The connection to 
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Fichte and Kant provides only part of the answer. To understand how it was possible 
for Clausewitz to jump from the ontological realm to the ethical realm, that is, from 
positing the opposition between absolute war and real war to extracting from this the 
conclusion, ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’ we must enter into a 
discussion of how Hegel and Clausewitz converged on method, and what this meant 
for both their dialectical theories of war. At this point, we enter the third dialectical 















INTERLUDE – From Kant to Hegel: The 




In Part I, we explored the origin and scope of Kant’s role in shaping the 
dialectics that Clausewitz made use of in his war theory. What started as an 
argumentative technique regarding methods in war (tactics and strategy) grew into an 
ontological framework based on war’s dual concepts as real and absolute. The next 
phase of this exploration, in Part II, leads into the question of ethics. However, before 
taking on such a distinct task, it would be useful to ask first, how do these three layers 
of analysis link up? The goal of this short mid-section will be to make a preliminary 
suggestion with regard to the transitions from the first two dialectical moments to the 
third: these three levels of analysis are fully integrated, and mutually necessary to one 
another. The development of Clausewitz’s dialectics in On War is not only a matter of 
him learning, testing, and developing the method over time and further integrating it 
into his book, it was also in some ways a calculated plan to guide the reader into a 
deeper and deeper understanding of the dialectical method and its conclusions. On 
War moves the reader through these three moments in a logical order, from the simple 
to the complex, which is akin to how Hegel generally developed his thoughts, best 
exemplified in the Phenomenology but also elsewhere. What is more, he also 
accomplishes as Hegel does, a process whereby each subsequent moment is of a 
higher order, where that which precedes it is encompassed into the logic of that which 
follows, and that which follows grows out of the logic of what preceded it 
The first layer dealt with the single and isolated problem of violence, or the 
use of force towards defeating one’s enemy. The interrogation was happening at a 
methodological level, or at the level of the question ‘How to?’. Analytical, rather than 
synthetical, Clausewitz’s refutation of the positive doctrines had a universal character, 
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it was formulated against all principles of war, but its solution to this infinity of 
principles regarding the single issue of force’s method, was non-numerical, it was 
void and null, leading to an impasse, a non-admissibility regarding the logic that was 
supposed to bind the principles in the first place. However, in order demonstrate this 
problem of logic, Clausewitz needed to rely on a system of dialectics that could 
showcase the antinomies of reason and prove that indeed the principles, though they 
claimed to be synthetical, could make no claim to this ‘type’ of human understanding. 
Since context could always invalidate an absolute theory of strategy or tactics, only a 
limited theory was tenable.  
Having introducing dialectics at this first level, a second level of theory 
automatically emerged regard the structural question ‘what is war?’ because the 
conclusion of the first level was in fact that context determined strategy and tactics. 
So then, what was this context? What unchanging nature of war was providing a 
frame to all the elements in war that were in fact forever changing? Clausewitz went 
from a negative theory, a refutation of positive doctrines, to a positive, speculative 
theory about the nature of war as having an absolute dimension and a real dimension. 
Somewhere in a bipolar realm that is defined by standstills at one end, and all out war 
at the other, politics would determine the equilibrium point. Here, Clausewitz was not 
proposing a limited theory at all, but quite the opposite: an absolute theory based on 
there being two poles which by definition include all wars spanning from that which 
can be imagined to that which can be carried out. And out of this emerges his 
conclusion that war is political, which is to say, it is the product of a state’s 
‘intelligence’, or the activity of political deliberation and the consequent application 
of policy by the executive powers of the state. If the first level of dialectics 
represented the question ‘how’ and the second ‘what’ we find that the ‘how’ results in 
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the necessity of context for its validation, and the question ‘what’ emerges from 
asking what defines this context. 
Eventually though, Clausewitz arrives at a third moment, or plane of analysis, 
because the question ‘what’ begs a set of questions of its own. If war is a political 
thing, then why does it take the forms it takes, and what is the nature of the 
relationship that binds war to politics? The very attempt to provide an answer to these 
elevates the discussion away from the ontological to the ethical, which in effect 
confirms and validates the ontology by submitting it the ethical. That is to say that 
politics take possession of war, becomes responsible for its objectives, and the form it 
materializes into. As a result of this subjugation, the political becomes the agency, the 
focal point of war’s ethics, and can therefore be blamed if its actions are deemed 
unjustified and evil, or honored if they are deemed just and good.  
As of the moment Clausewitz began applying dialectics to his refutation, he 
became ensnared into a system of logic that eventually fulfills itself in the process of 
being applied. Clausewitz could not expect to break down the arguments of the 
Enlightenment including their methods using Kant’s tools (i.e. critique, categories of 
human understanding, antinomies) without arriving, as Kant did, to a distinction 
between the real and the ideal, since the method only succeeds in its refutation as a 
process of constructing this dichotomy between the material and the ideal. And in the 
end, the only way to make the chasm intelligible and rational was to uncover what 
was creating it in the first place, the hierarchical relationship between politics and 




Clausewitz’s dialectical reasoning contains a dynamic element to it, where 
each moment appears to be the continuation of what began in the previous moment. It 
is a boulder that accelerates once it has been nudged off the hill. Yet this movement in 
the dialectic has something distinctly non-Kantian to it, because Kant’s philosophy 
was static. And it is here that we must begin consider what then is being observed 
here. In Part II, we shall go through the entire process of uncovering the Hegelian 
influence in Clausewitz, but for now, let us present a preliminary clue regarding the 
impasse and distinction between Part I and Part II, the particle of disagreement and 
modification that allows us to jump from Kant to Hegel in our exploration of 
Clausewitz.  
In Book VIII, Clausewitz presented both the absolute and the real concepts of 
war, and eventually, these led to chapter 6-B, entitled ‘War as an Instrument of 
Policy’ where he offered to ‘look for that unity into which, in practical life [im 
praktischen Leben], these antagonistic elements combine themselves by partly 
neutralizing each other.’279 Each word in the first paragraph of Chapter 6-B must be 
taken at its full worth, because they were chosen and arranged in way that shows a 
deep understanding of Kant, which, if ignored, leaves an incomplete impression. Let 
us therefore consider the whole paragraph, while paying special attention to certain 
words for which I have provided the German original, as well as the Howard/Paret 
where the two translations differ: 
 
HAVING made the requisite examination on both sides of that state of 
antagonism [Zwiespalt] in which the nature of war stands with relation 
                                                                
279 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. VIII, Ch. 2-B, p. 674 
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to other interests of men individually and of the bond of society, in 
order not to neglect any of the opposing elements,—an antagonism 
(H/P tr. ‘incompatibility’) [Zwiespalt] which is founded in our own 
nature, and which, therefore, no philosophy (H/P trans. ‘philosophy’) 
[philosophische Verstand] can unravel,—we shall now look for that 
unity into which, in practical life (H/P trans. ‘real life’) [praktischen 
Leben], these antagonistic elements combine themselves by partly 
neutralising each other. We should have brought forward this unity at 
the very commencement, if it had not been necessary to bring out this 
contradiction very plainly, and also to look at the different elements 
separately. Now, this unity is the conception that war is only a part of 
political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in 
itself.280 
 
Some depth to the passage is missing in either translation with regard to the 
omission of the word ‘Verstand’, which was mentioned earlier, but with regard to the 
second translation issue, Howard/Paret’s use of the word ‘real’ as opposed to 
‘practical’ rob the reader of in important aspect of the text. With regard to the second 
element, practical life is not interchangeable with ‘real life’ or simply ‘life’ itself, 
because in German philosophy ‘practicality’ is a reference to moral philosophy, as is 
the case in the subject matter of the Critique of Practical Reason which is essentially 
an essay on morality and ethics. Practicality is how one renders philosophy into 
everyday use, that is to demonstrate how it applies to decision-making on ethical 
questions or how one is to act in the world:  
                                                                




Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through 
reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is 
practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, 
insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its 
consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself 
directly moves people to act.281  
 
The fact that the ontological concepts of ‘absolute’ and ‘real’ war are coming 
together in a concept that applies to ethics and morality, as opposed to a further 
ontological exploration marks an important transition. We are exiting one level of 
analysis in order to construct a higher one atop it. This dialectical upward 
construction, we will see in the upcoming section is distinctly a Hegelian use of 
dialectics. If we recall, Kant stopped short of reconciliation and understood paradoxes 
as sterile and fixed, rather than fertile and dynamic.   
To appreciate this, we must return to the term to our previous discussion of 
Kant’s two-way splits, [Zwiespalt]. Clausewitz is not making the argument that 
‘philosophy’ cannot resolve the dichotomy he has uncovered in the absolute and real 
forms of war, but actually arguing specifically with regard to a branch of philosophy, 
philosophy of reason, which in Kant’s work came to a halt, unable to resolve the 
antagonisms [Zwiespalt] that emerge from the antinomies of pure reason.282 The 
difficulty, for English readers is that the word ‘reason’ can be translated to either 
                                                                
281 Wallace, R. Jay, ‘Practical Reason’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/practical-reason. 
282 Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, First Edition, ebook locations 6342 & 3978 
197 
 
‘Vernunft’ or ‘Verstand’, which have distinct connotations. Hannah Arendt explains 
that for Kant, the latter is closer to the concept of ‘intellect’. ‘Vernunft’ is associated 
to the meaning of things whereas ‘Verstand’ is associated to knowledge of things.283 
Another way to consider the difference is to see ‘Verstand’ as the type of knowing 
which is spontaneous in the mind and can exist outside of sensorial certainty,284 but 
which is not in and of itself intuitive, like sense-certainty. ‘Vernunft’ on the other 
hand, represents the intuitive, the type of reason that ‘makes sense’ or appears to be 
intuitive, through experience for example. Vernunft is therefore the the reasoning 
which attempts, in the case of conditioned knowing, to encompass the ‘totality of 
conditions, which is to say, unconditionality.’285 And so, Clausewitz recognizes the 
impasse, the pure antinomy, as belonging to the area of philosophy of reason where 
this impasse occurs, but he is also, in this paragraph setting himself up to discuss the 
higher meaning of this impasse, and its reconciliation. But this reconciliation does not 
undo, it cannot undo, the contradiction; it merely makes sense of it, or give it 
meaning.  
Hegel’s problem with Kant was precisely in this vein, that his philosophy had in 
fact churned Vernunft into a Verstand, a discourse on meaning and pure reason that 
does not elevate itself beyond intellectualizing it, splicing it, categorizing it. In his 
own view, Vernunft’s very function is to suppress and consume the oppositions in 
Verstand.286 Keeping this in mind, it becomes clear that the paragraph introduces 
something new and ‘post-Kantian’ in Clausewitz’s thinking. Using the terms in a very 
precise way, he is bringing forward the possibility that within the paradox dividing the 
                                                                
283 Hannah Arendt. La vie de l’esprit, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992), p. 29 
284 Vaysse, Le vocabulaire de Kant, p. 36 
285 Vaysse, Le vocabulaire de Kant, p. 85 
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real from the absolute, there exists a possible ‘unity’ or consumption of the opposition 
upon which emerges a new, higher concept [Begriff]. Was he in fact flirting with 
Hegelianism? Before we can substantiate this claim, it is essential that we start by 
exploring Hegel’s philosophy and method, and this is where Part II is about to take us 
away from strategic and tactical questions, away from ontological question, and into 
















PART II – The Unresolved Ethical 
















 By understanding the dialectical system of thought as meaning not only a 
process of thinking in ‘twos’, but also of thinking in terms of how larger paradoxes 
can emerge from attempting to resolve smaller paradoxes, we begin grasp the method 
as a continuum in time. As a result, if we wish to give ourselves a full view of the 
paradox that splits apart the political ethics of Clausewitz and Hegel, it is not enough 
to consider it isolation. We should frame it, sandwich it, between the paradoxes from 
their convergence on the ‘political ethos’ emerged, and the conceptual reconciliation 
and new paradoxes which their divergence on ‘instrumentality’ and ‘right’ produce. 
It is not within the scope of this essay to uncover whether or not there is a 
logical resolution to this impasse, though it seems reasonable that there should indeed 
be one, if one is given the opportunity to seek it out. A study of the reconciliation and 
new paradoxes would probably result in a thesis as large or even larger than this one 
into this paradox itself. That being said, the previous paradox, the one which Hegel 
and Clausewitz effectively unravel and surpass is well within our means, and can be 




The commonality between Hegel and Clausewitz’s ethical systems is that they 
introduced a secular, political ethos to our concept of war, which replaced the ethical 
context in which framed warfare prior to modern times: a naturalist, theistic ethos, 
where war could be understood as a fact of nature, the wrath of God, or the fulfilment 
of scripture, where war could be legitimized insofar as it pleased the Gods. The 
modern secular ethos developed by Hegel and Clausewitz was not immaculately 
conceived, but can be understood as the logical unravelling and effective replacement 
of the paradox which was inherent to the previous theistic ethos of war. To fully 
appreciate the significance of the new ethical system, it is necessary that we should go 
back briefly in time, consider what preceded it, in order to perceive its birthplace and 
the momentum of contradiction in history which brought forward its necessary and 
logical fruition.  
 That war is a ‘political’ thing may appear to be simple and not very 
contentious a proposition to our modern ears. And indeed some 20th century authors 
have played around shaping arguments along the line of ‘so what?’ with regard to 
Clausewitz’s famed formula, ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’. 
While many have indeed raised this problem, Foucault probably phrased it best in his 
critical analysis regarding whether one should ever separate politics from war, asking: 
‘Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by 
other means?’287  
While there is good reason to agree with the counter-strategic tradition in war 
theory in which war and politics are understood as a historical and ‘mutually 
generative relationship,’288 Foucault’s counter-formula is not problem free, in that, in 
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trying to play on the reciprocity or interdependency that shapes war and politics, it 
doesn’t consider that while policy may depend on force and force on policy, war 
itself, as Clausewitz argues, does not and cannot exist independently of policy.289 
Foucault’s observation suggests that war can come first, and policy second, but this 
could very well be an indemonstrable proposition. The inverse, however, can be 
shown to be true in most instances, even those where one would least expect it. Even 
in a timarchy, where the whole apparatus of society is based on military governance, 
and where one might expect that war is most likely to emerge immaculately 
conceived as a cultural or social phenomenon that exists independently of policy, this 
is not the case. War remains a decision, and therefore an act of policy. Plans are 
drawn up. Directives are given from the generals to the foot soldiers. There might be a 
propensity, an ease in choosing to engage in war in such society, but there is no war 
until a decision has been taken to make war, regardless of how this decision-making 
process takes form. If that is the case in even the most purified form of war-related 
government, then it must necessarily be even truer of all non-military governments. 
Foucault’s inversion of the formula, though it is an aesthetically pleasing approach to 
refutation, ultimately has very little scientific weight: even if one had irrefutable data 
that demonstrated a credible set of wars that were conceived independently of policy 
and thereafter shaping policy, the argument would nonetheless remain rather 
meaningless, because, as Raymond Aron pithily explains:  
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These formulas are, formally, equivalent. They both express the 
continuity of competition and the use of alternately violent and non-
violent means towards ends which do not differ in essence.290  
 
Once war is conceived as inherently tied to the political in one way or the 
other, it is freed from all other conceptions, of which the most historically important 
would be the idea of war as an act of God or the fulfilment of scripture. 
Understanding war as policy is part and parcel with the secularization of warfare and 
its demystification. From this perspective, for example, we can even look at holy wars 
from an external standpoint and perceive them as having nothing holy to them at all, 
but merely policy orientations that happen to be dictated by clerical authorities. It is a 
significant breakthrough, first, because once observed objectively as policy, war’s 
nature can never ‘un-secularize’ itself as the above example shows, and second, 
because the ethical consequences of excluding the divine are extreme: it implies that 
responsibility in war is located at the human level, and here, the ‘greater good’ is 
constructed as an intelligible object, rather than understood as the subjective whims of 
deities.   
The difficulty with studying the ethics of modern secular war is that the notion 
of what is good and what is evil is not so clearly demarked as what we would find in 
religious ethics, which will be not only categorical, but also explicitly stated in 
scripture. That being said, breaking war away from mythology does not necessarily 
lead to more benign or more malign forms of warfare, but it does pose a major 
conundrum with regard to the locus of justification for warfare. If, on the one hand, 
the secular frame allows a more logical understanding of the motivations in war and 
                                                                




generates the bases for a sociology of war, rooted in the human condition and its 
social organization, thereby lending itself to a more systematic and scientific study, 
the difficulty that haunts it is whether or not there is such a thing as a secular 
conscience, a voice within the human world, as opposed to the divine world, which 
can serve as the ethical focal point where decisions regarding greater goods and lesser 
evils take form.  
Defining war as a purely political thing, thereby excluding the divine, is 
precisely where the dialectics of Hegel and Clausewitz converged. Clausewitz’s 
perspective on this was presented in the last chapter of Part I, and now, in the first 
chapter of Part II, we shall go over the way in which Hegel understood this political 
nature. The convergence, however, reaches an impasse when both authors draw 
conclusions with regard to the ethical form this demystification should take. While 
they both agree on the questions ‘who?’ and ‘what?’, when it comes to war’s relation 
to politics, they disagree on the questions ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ – that is to say, war is 
political, and it belongs to the state or the political will, but the ethical implications 
are distinct because they disagree on how the state takes ownership or is in possession 
of it. 
Hegel will find the ethical element of war residing in the thing itself, a self-
justifying right of the state or institutionalized political will, whereas Clausewitz 
makes a neutral conclusion, where war is an instrument of the state, and therefore 
deprived of any self-contained ethical rationale. Thus, while the political element is 
raised to the centre, the ethical element remains unresolved, because even within this 




Addressing this subject of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in war is a delicate task in that, 
regardless of the angle one takes, there is an almost oxymoronic element to the term 
‘war ethics’ that leads to the criticism that those who make the attempt are merely 
trying to cover war’s dirty, ugly face with a glossy mask. How can anyone distinguish 
good and evil in the context of war, if all sides claim to be fighting for the greater 
good, and all sides are committing evil acts? Studying ethics in war cannot undo this 
greater problem altogether, but it can contribute to improving our discernment and our 
understanding. And there are lasting and measurable effects to this, such as laws of 
war, the creation of an international criminal court to punish crimes against humanity, 
heightened care for avoiding attacks on civilians, and most importantly, as Part II will 
explore, a narrowing the set of reasons for going to war in the first place, until there is 
only one final, logically inescapable reason, as opposed to a the wide array of reasons 
that could be claimed in previous eras of human history: conquest for its own sake, 
monarchical successions, manifest destiny, evangelization, colonization, capturing 
slaves, etc.  
To codify war ethics, it is useful to frame one’s mind to renege the false 
impression that it is possible to categorize all of evil on one side of the conflict and all 
of good on the other. Rather, the problem of war ethics resides in the fact that the 
categories are usually intertwined and relative: war may be conceived as a particular 
evil within the framework of the greater good, in which there can be particular good 
actions in the context of war’s greater evil. The latter of the two is generally referred 
to as jus in bello, justice in war, an approach to finding ‘good’ practices in war, 
including, for example, prohibitions on certain types of weapons (e.g. landmines, 
mustard gas, etc.), the discrimination between civilian and military targets, 
proportionality in the application of force, etc. This subset however, is not the 
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principle subject of our discussions in Part II, though some themes might indirectly 
cross over from time to time. The subject at hand is rather the former of the two, 
generally referred as jus ad bellum, the reasons for going to war in the first place. 
Within this category, there are both highly tangible reasons for war, or a just cause for 
war, such as fighting back an invasion or punishing a grave wrong, but there has 
always been some wiggle room for much less tangible justifications for engaging in 
warfare, albeit justifications that can be far more powerful and less restricted in their 
scope and breadth compared to the tangible forms of just cause.  
It is typical in the field to speak of such wars using the term crusade, be it 
religious, liberal, revolutionary, etc. However this term is as overused as it is 
imprecise, since it assumes the intangible reasons for war lead to intangible or 
unlimited aims in warfare. A war justified by scripture or by Gods may have 
ambitions that are in fact quite limited, and unmotivated by grand schemes for 
converting new adepts or reclaiming all lands holy. Rebels fighting to topple a prince 
or a tyrant may be grounded in some ideology without necessarily having any 
intention to embark on a campaign to ‘spread’ the revolution. And so, the question at 
hand is not so much where and how far an idea can take war, but rather which ideas 
have this power to justify war in intangible ways, why and how they generate such a 
powerful sense of greater good, that they can justify not any singular evil, but forms 
of an evil that shift and evolve over time, for reasons of policy, strategy, and tactics, 
but essentially and ultimately as a result of technological development and how this 
impacts all three.  
Even in a secular notion of war ethics, the concepts ‘good’ and ‘evil’ imply 
metaphysical properties since the pair is absolutely imbued with theistic vestiges, their 
connotation and etymology being spiritual to begin with. As Nietzsche explores in the 
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Genealogy of Morals, ‘goodness’, even as a collective concept, is by no means an 
objective and immutable thing, but one that has varied dramatically in time and space 
according to the subjective values of different peoples. In fact, Nietzsche argues that 
completely opposite notions of goodness and badness can exist concurrently, 
depending on context or experiences of social life, as is the case with populations in 
positions of slavery or mastery.291  
 
The real homestead of the concept “good” is sought and located in 
the wrong place: the judgment “good” did not originate among 
those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the 
good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-
lioned, the high-minded who have felt that they themselves were 
good.292 
 
 The English word ‘good’ itself is derived from ‘god’, a fact equally true of the 
the Latin languages, where ‘bene’ (‘bien’ in French, ‘bueno’ in Spanish, etc.) is 
derived from the Indo-European roots for the word of God, which is interchangeable 
with the biblical idea of God being the Word. Given this, it is best to understand 
goodness as it pertains to being godlike or at the very least, in concordance with 
godliness. With regard to our subject, it should be assumed then that if the gods to 
which peoples pray change over time, then  one should expect a serious shift with 
regard to the reasoning behind war-fighting, or more precisely, how it is justified in 
ways that are coherent with scripture and far from heresy.  
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Without wanting to go too far into what form a theistic concept of good and 
evil takes when it is applied to war, it is worth taking a quick look, which will clarify 
the distinction of modern ethics to pre-modern ethics. In the ancient Greco-Roman 
world, justifying war as ‘godlike’ would have been a very simple thing, for the gods 
were vengeful, vain, and cruel. There had been war among the gods and the Titans. 
There were fierce episodes of violence and viciousness. Uranus ate his own children. 
Zeus sliced him open to free himself and his brothers Poseidon and Hades. In this 
world of gods, savage, eternal punishments abound and were imposed by powerful 
gods onto lower gods, or by any god onto humans. Prometheus, a god, is tied to a 
boulder and suffers the pain of having his heart eaten out by an eagle daily, only to 
regenerate by night. Sisyphus, a man, suffers another such eternal fate, to carry a 
boulder uphill only to let it roll down in order to carry it uphill again and again 
forever. To act ‘godlike’ in this context is to act as the master acts towards the slave, 
with no recognition of any right, not life, not dignity, nothing. In this context, war’s 
‘justification’ could be passed off as a misnomer altogether. Why would it need 
justification at all, if the universe is understood as an essentially brutal place, 
governed naturally by force and cruelty? Man was not responsible for war, because 
war was a fact of nature, and to fight was merely to survive, to live. In this context, 
Thucydides’ famous maxim takes its fullest meaning:  ‘The strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must’.293 
In complete opposition to this, in the Christian tradition, derived from the 
Judaic experience of exodus and slavery, the difficulty in reconciling Jesus’ pacifism 
and meekness with warfare was a more difficult task, but which could nonetheless be 
overcome. If a legitimate authority amongst Christians could identify a just cause, 
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then war could be just in the eyes of God insofar as his meek warriors intended the 
advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil, which essentially means working 
towards advancing God’s justice in the world.294 This was the needed rhetoric which 
could smooth out the coexistence between the teachings of Christ and the realpolitik 
of sustaining his Church. It was achieved by separating the idea of good and evil as it 
relates to the personal and as it relates to the universal and spiritual, making it thereby 
possible to be a warring Christian, meek and pacific in the heart, while also projecting 
a violence thoroughly external to the self, the will of God fought for the glory of God, 
as opposed to an individual act for gain and glory. Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed 
nomini tuo da gloriam was the motto of the Knights Templar: ‘Not to us, Lord, but to 
Your Name give the glory.’295 If the Greco-Roman ‘goodness’ could be found 
directly in imitation of the cruel gods, and the responsibility of the state of nature, the 
Christians needed to remove themselves from the act, thereby incarnating the divine 
(a concept that is central to Christian faith) through meekness and self-sacrifice, in 
imitation of the form of goodness expressed in the teachings and the life and death of 
their Son of God.  
Religious coherence was achieved with regard to war in both cases, though for 
very distinct reasons. The common element however, was that both forms of religious 
justification implied the non-accountability or non-responsibility of the human 
element in the inhumanity of war. The actions of war were pre-ordained in mysticism, 
because war had yet been conceived as a social construction, but assumed to belong to 
the natural order of things or to the fulfilment of god’s will. The externalization of 
responsibility in the dehumanization found in warfare is analogous and therefore the 
logical outcome of religions based on the slave/master duality, since the basis for 
                                                                
294 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Second and Revised Edition, Literally translated by 
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godliness in both cases is the outcome of this dehumanizing pair. The spiritual 
element is conceived as either cruel and warlike and causing war, or meek and 
redeeming and repairing the harms of war.  
 If Nietzsche judged it better to assume a master morality than a slave morality; 
what he missed in the process was the possibility that the master/slave relationship 
had in fact been transcended, done with conceptually, by the ideals of the bourgeois 
revolutions. The modern political realm was no longer dependent on either of the two 
moral systems which Nietzsche placed in opposition, but could be grounded in new 
precepts, where mutual recognition of rights and equality in the brotherhood of man 
would exclude the role of gods as either the justification for a brutal state of nature, or 
alternatively, a redeemer or payer of debts. The synthesis of a new war ethic from the 
vestiges of two previous ethical opposites was only possible because the new social 
relations of man excluded the dehumanization of mastery and slavery. Mutual 
recognition of rights raised the human element upwards, and rendered the divine 
unnecessary to social relations, not only within borders, but also beyond borders.  
It was the French who best constructed or verbalized the ethical doctrine of the 
modern republic in their dévise: ‘Liberté. Égalité. Fraternité.’ The triad is not a mere 
slogan, but a system of internal necessity. There can be no liberty and equality 
without mutual recognition, which is fraternity. There can be no liberty unless all men 
are equal and recognized as such. And there can be no equality unless all men are free 
and recognized as such. The emergence of this triadic concept was the ultimate 
demise of the master/slave relationship and its derivatives in serfdom, monarchy, etc. 
because it eliminated the very essence of these relationships. Thus, liberty, equality, 
and fraternity were at the very heart of a secularization process in politics, in that their 
logic was self-contained, self-ordained, and independent of an external or 
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metaphysical force to qualify or define ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Together, the three 
represented a new worldly concept of ‘goodness’ which occurred without any 
imitation of the divine. 
The process of arriving at a political rather than theistic ethical framework for 
war is no doubt a long historical process, the development of ideas about community, 
the divine, and the intersection of these two. And while we can notice in the bourgeois 
revolutions a beginning of this transition, it was not written into war theory in an 
exhaustive and systematic way until Hegel and Clausewitz stepped to the plate. As 
part two explores how this was achieved, and what methodologies made the process 
intelligible, one question that it must lead us to is whether or not the positing of a 
political ethos for war actually impacts the shape and form of war. If there is indeed a 
‘secular conscience’, which resides outside of the divine world, what form shall it 
give to war, this exercise at the very cusp of good and evil, where lesser evils are 
meant to be tolerated for greater goods, and where we often attempt to add textures 
and contours of good actions onto a canvas of a greater evil.  
At the intersection between Clausewitz and Hegel, we find that two contrary 
ideal notions of this secular ethic take form, that of ‘right’ and ‘instrumentality’, and 
in order to gauge what they mean in real life, as the inform and determine this ‘secular 
conscience’. In order to demonstrate its reality, the final chapter in Part II proposes an 
applied study where these two perspectives were applied by directly referring to either 
Clausewitz or Hegel, but not to both. During the anti-bourgeois revolutions, while the 
communists ‘connected’ to Clausewitz, the anarchists shunned him altogether and 
connected instead with Hegel. This story completes the picture. It gives life to the the 









Chapter 1 – Framing War as a Right: 






The dialectics of war experienced a dual evolution right from its inception, for 
while Clausewitz was adapting Kantian methodologies to war theory directly, Hegel 
was exploring the consequences of Kant’s ideas philosophically, trying to move 
beyond the metaphysical impasse between the real and the ideal, which had been 
bequeathed by Kant. As a result, the dialectics of war were split methodologically 
from their very onset: Clausewitz developing an isolated dialectical theory of war, and 
Hegel developing a dialectical universe which would eventually encapsulate the 
question of war as well, not so much as a distinct study, but rather as a sub-section in 
his chapter on the state. This gap would eventually converge as Clausewitz began 
experimenting with Hegelian dialectics and increasingly integrated them into his 
works. That being said, before we can start exploring this convergence, we must first 
ask what Hegelian dialectics actually are, and how they were applied to war by Hegel 
himself. 
This first chapter of Part II is devoted exclusively to the study of Hegel 
method and his use of it in understanding of the ethical underpinnings of state and 
war. To do this is no easy task, in that it is impossible to appreciate the depth of 
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Hegel’s ideas on war and state simply by extracting certain ideas and quotes; one 
must analyze his conclusions in the context of his system as a whole, or else they 
either come off as wry or altogether unintelligible. Therefore, we shall go through the 
steps of framing Hegel’s philosophy as a reply to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and 
thereafter exploring his method in its simplest form, followed by its more complex 
application to the realm of politics and society. This step by step process will clarify 
Hegel and provide the whole picture, which allows us to appreciate his most 
controversial conclusion in a more balanced way. Indeed, the oft-cited and generally 
loathed passage, “War is the moral health of peoples in their struggle against 
petrifaction,”296 will be shown to have a legitimate underlying logic, because the state 
is in-itself an ethical system meant to generate, develop and protect individual 
freedom. The strength or decay of the nation is for Hegel deeply linked to the notion 
of freedom, because freedom represents both the central raison d’être of the state or 
the modern republic as well as its modus operandi. Freedom is presented as a self-
fulfilling loop that vitalizes both the state and its citizens. And, insofar as war is 
fought for this freedom, it is by Hegelian standards justified in-itself as a ‘right’ of the 
state.  
Hegelian Dialectics: An Overview 
 
 
The Philosophy of Right is among Hegel’s last works. And it seems fitting that 
it should be, since Hegel’s method is a complex one, which he took many years to 
develop, before trying to engage it in such a difficult and wide topic as human affairs. 
For this same reason, we shall also start by presenting the origin and more simple 
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applications of the method, so that we may quickly get a modest but practical grasp of 
how it works, and thereupon begin a deeper exploration of how to use it in the context 
of war and politics.  
In the first pages of the Phenomenology, which is one of Hegel’s earlier 
works, and also serves as an introduction to his system of philosophy, Hegel explains 
his approach in the very first pages by discussing a paradox, or what he refers to as an 
‘apprehensiveness’297: the fact that one can regard cognition as either an instrument 
for understanding or constructing the world in way that makes it intelligible, or else as 
a medium, a lens through which the world makes itself known to us. The problem 
being that in either case, the truth is not arriving at us in its pure form, but either as a 
one that is distorted by the medium or shaped by the instrument.298 Hegel is in fact 
attempting to create a philosophy that falls into neither category, but tries to be both in 
the very process of being neither. The very same way in which Hegel describes his 
system, is in fact his system itself, and this becomes clear when we consider how he 
applies it to man’s first level and simplest form of understanding, which is perception, 
or how we achieve sense-certainty in space and time, through such a process 
overcoming oppositions.  
To situate where this is coming from, it is necessary first to return to the 
legacy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which was studied briefly in the previous 
chapter. Having spliced human understanding along the lines of mutually exclusive 
categories, where theology and the sciences no longer co-existed, Kant had created a 
chasm between the real and the ideal. In answer to this impasse, Hegel questioned its 
very premise on the grounds that it was impossible for an idea to be beyond or outside 
the scope of the real world, since the very act of conceiving an idea happens in the 
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real world. Hegel thereby exposed a major contradiction at the very heart of Kantian 
thought, in that this abstract world of ideas, which is supposedly external to actual 
thought, is in fact posited by thought in the first place.299 To break down the divide 
between the real and the ideal, Hegel proposed rather that, ‘what is rational is actual 
and what is actual is rational,’300 in effect transitioning from the dichotomous chasm 
left by Kant, to a higher order of understanding meant to encompass both the real and 
the ideal realms.  
To do this, Hegel returned to the original problem formulated by Hume, 
questioning the possibility of ‘necessary connection’, which had been the central 
impetus for Kant’s work, and then he turned it on its head. Hume had argued that, ‘we 
are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary 
connection,’301 and now Hegel, instead of accepting that necessary connection was 
not in the purview of human understanding, would reverse the question and generate 
instead a ‘system of necessary connection’,302 in which necessary connection is no 
longer the unattainable conceptual end that Hume had uncovered, nor must it lead to 
Kant’s strict categorization, but is in fact the universe’s underlying logic itself, a 
dialectical process by which the ideal becomes manifest in the real world, or what 
Hegel referred to as the ‘spirit of the world’, or ‘Geist’.  
                                                                
The implications of this are significant, because if ‘what is actual is rational’ 
and ‘what is rational is actual’, then the logic behind this universe depends on the fact 
that the rational can be actualized and the actual can just as well be rationalized. This 
is the major objective of Hegelian thought. He was trying to show us how these 
processes take place. In the first pages of the Phenomenology, Hegel starts by 
299 Charles Taylor. Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 117 
300 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, preface, p. 10.  
301 David Hume. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902), p. 63 
302 Taylor. Hegel, p. 128 
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demonstrating how reason works, by using the simplest form, where the individual 
perceives his world and become self-conscious. However as we read onwards, we 
realize that reason builds upon these first steps and raises itself into more complex 
levels. Yet, no matter how complex knowledge happens to be, Hegel presents it as 
developing according to the same logic unfolding at each new and higher layer, where 
negation plays the central role in the formation of knowledge.  
In Hegel’s initial section on sense certainty, with which he opens the 
Phenomenology, this process becomes evident. We find that one understands ‘seeing’ 
only insofar as one has seen, and then not seen, a same object. This ability to discern 
between something one sees and something one doesn’t see is precisely the basis 
upon which negation generates knowledge. This process of negation is what one 
could call a negation upwards, where the simple is transformed into the more 
complex, where two acts of perception (positive and negative) come together as one 
process of understanding. But the higher understanding that emerges depends on 
transcending the contradiction in a way by which the ‘lower stage is both annulled 
and preserved in a higher one.’303 
For ‘seeing’ to occur, Hegel explains, the observer and the object observed 
must be in relation to one another in time and place. Yet, there are a variety of 
mutually exclusive possibilities within this occurrence of a relation, given the 
questions of how we define the ‘here’ and the ‘now’. For example, Hegel proposes 
that one can be looking ‘here’ and see a ‘tree’ or looking at another ‘here’ and see its 
opposite, ‘not a tree’. Also, the act of seeing is happening ‘now’ but this could be for 
example ‘day’ or ‘night’.304 How can any of the posited ideas be true, if, depending 
on context, it is possible that the very opposite is just as valid? These are not absolute, 
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but rather fleeting notions of truth: ‘Both truths have the same authenticity−−the 
immediacy of seeing and the certainty and assurance both have as to their specific 
way of knowing; but the one certainty disappears in the other.’305  
So we reach a first impasse. Now I see a tree, then I turn 180 degrees and, in 
the new now, I no longer see a tree. Yet, there remains one universally valid reality 
within these opposites: the ego in either time or space is nonetheless ‘seeing’.306 
Recognizing that one can ‘see’ is the higher level or plateau, but it can only be 
achieved conceptually as a result of reasoning: if I saw something then, and now I 
don’t see it, then there must be a relation between these two. The fact that I can 
distinguish having seen from not seeing is precisely the source of ‘seeing’s 
universality as a concept. It exists outside of me; it is objective, because one can 
conceptualize both its posited reality and its negated reality. Despite the opposites 
which were demonstrated, the Here and the Now do not disappear, but continue to 
exists throughout their disappearance.307 This is the second moment in the process of 
cognition: where the negation subdues what has been posited. Yet, something greater 
has emerged, albeit without a full sense of certainty or even utility yet.  
When we try to conceptualize the ‘now’ we go through the same impossibility 
of seizing it, since as soon as one has pointed it out, it has ceased to be. To understand 
time, we must conceptualize how the Now is no longer now once it has been 
identified as now. The truth about the Now is that, when it is shown to us, it is already 
a ‘has-been’.308 In this case, the act of ‘pointing out’ is an act of negating. Yet it is in 
this very ‘movement’ that we uncover its truth: when one acknowledges the ‘has-
been’ as ‘having-been’, then the negation is itself negated and the idea is elevated or 
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superseded. Hegel describes our knowledge of the Here and the Now as ‘self-reflected 
movements’, where to achieve knowledge of them, we must have gone through three 
phases, or what Hegel refers to as ‘moments’: positing, negating, and negating the 
negation. Unlike the philosophers of the Enlightenment who saw knowledge as a 
static object for us subjects to grasp, Hegel is making the argument for a concept of 
knowledge which is in constant flux, a process which advances in time and builds up 
its own certainty as well as its self-awareness: 
 
It is clear from all this that the dialectic process involved in sense−certainty is 
nothing else than the mere history of its process−of its experience; and 
sense−certainty itself is nothing else than simply this history.309 
 
The process of overcoming dichotomous pairs and achieving new levels of 
knowledge is what Hegel calls the ‘Aufhebung’ which translates roughly in English to 
‘sublation’. It is the coming together of opposites towards achieving a higher 
conceptual plateau.  While on occasion one might come across this word translated 
directly as ‘negation’ or ‘invalidation,’ these undermine an important aspect of the 
process: what is sublated is neither lost and vanished nor is it made false, but rather 
incorporated. Through ‘Aufhebung’, ‘the higher unity integrates the principles found 
at the lower level and supplies new content on its own. The principles at the lower 
level acquire new patterns of meaning by being integrated into the higher 
conception.’310 This is how knowledge develops and materializes in time, not only in 
scope, but also in depth and richness as its scope gives us a glimpse into its parts. It is 
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220 
 
enhanced through each opposition and overcoming of opposition.311 Indeed, every 
Aufhebung becomes the starting point for a new triad. The Aufhebung having been 
posited, it thereby must also eventually find itself annulled and preserved over time. 
Thus, Hegel explains that truth, all truth, is a process of creating and developing itself 
over time:  
 
The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential 
nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own 
development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a 
result.312  
 
If we saw in the question of sense-certainty, Hegel’s micro-level of analysis, we 
are now catching a glimpse of the other extreme, the macro-level, which is useful 
here, because it gives us a sense of where the individual and the state exist, 
somewhere between these two poles. Given that he was answering Kant’s discussion 
of the universe and its breakdown into the real and the ideal; Hegel had to 
conceptualize the whole as well. If reason is indeed making its way through time, 
materializing and deepening itself as a process of encountering and overcoming 
dichotomies. Should there be an end point to this progress of knowledge, it could only 
be one thing, the whole of knowledge reflected onto itself and recognizing itself 
objectively as this whole. There is a godly aura to this, as though the universe is 
somehow the spirit making itself manifest in the universe. Hegel considers that 
‘reason’ materialized is a real whole, it is imbued with a certain substantive life of its 
own, a power of sorts, but only insofar as it has become objective, or self-aware of its 
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totality. Hegel refers to this self-awareness of reason as a whole, negated and 
transcended into objectiveness as the ‘spirit of the world’ or ‘Geist’. Hence, the 
‘Geist’ represents the ultimate synthesis of all that is ideal with all that is actual. 
Existing within it and one could say ‘for it’, individuals and states give the spirit its 
shape and substantive life: they are the ‘vehicles’ by which Geist exists in the world. 
‘In this process,’ Taylor explains, ‘men come to a new understanding of self: they see 
themselves not just as individual fragments of the universe, but rather as vehicles of 
cosmic spirit. And hence, men can achieve at once the greatest unity with nature, i.e. 
with the spirit which unfolds itself in nature’313 That is to say, in a world of inherent 
oppositions and contradiction, the arrival at certainty and unity in the world is 
achieved as a process, a method that consists of becoming aware of paradoxes and 
learning to integrate them into our understanding onwards to larger and more complex 
paradoxes.  
 In order to move now into a discussion of politics then, we must keep in mind 
that this realm occurs somewhere in the mid-section between Hegel’s most basic form 
of material history, sensory knowledge, and its complete form having cosmic 
proportions. The logic that generates this mid-section is no different for Hegel, and it 
also advances and develops itself as the progression of rationality making itself 
evermore manifest in the universe throughout history.  
 
 




313 Idem.  
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A good place to start in our quest to understand the basic form of Hegel’s 
political philosophy is to contrast it with Kant’s famous essay Perpetual Peace. 
Published in 1795, the short manifesto stands out not only as one of Kant’s last 
articles, but also because it is also one of the rare political pieces he wrote. The two 
philosophers had extremely opposed views on the question and the process of 
deconstructing the parts of the argument will help us build up a better understanding 
of how Hegel’s opposite conclusion stems from its basis in a distinct philosophical 
system from which the modern or ideal state is not assumed as a thing in itself so 
much as an idea that emerges in history and asserts itself materially as a right of 
constituted free men.  
Timing explains part of the disagreement. Kant was writing at the height of the 
French Revolution, fuelled therefore by a certain optimism regarding the possibilities 
for peace among the emerging republics. Europe at the time was still scarred by the 
memory of the Seven Years’ War, which had been fought on an unprecedented scale: 
the size of the engagements as well as the global reach of the conflict, beyond oceans. 
The war had been so expensive that it would alter the geopolitics of Europe, kings 
were bankrupted, heavily indebted and on the decline, while bourgeois class rose in 
wealth, power and prestige, a presage of years to come. Many still viewed the Seven 
Years’ War as completely unjustified because of relative imbalance between the level 
of violence and the futility of its objectives. Voltaire’s description was particularly 
pithy: ‘It is another kind of folly. You know that these two countries are at war for a 
few acres of snow in Canada, and they spend over this beautiful war much more than 
Canada is worth.’314 The arrival of new regimes provided a hope that war, these 
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violent whims of a disconnected and irresponsible nobility, belonged to less 
advanced, less perfected forms of government.  
Hegel, on the other hand, was writing after the Napoleonic Wars, and 
consequently was perhaps rather less hopeful and optimistic. He had seen the power 
of counter-revolution, the massive effect of France’s levées en masse, and the 
passions and power of its citizen-army as they brought war from one end of Europe to 
another. In this context, he could not think of war as merely an unjustified game 
played by kings for the control of populations to tax and colonies to exploit. He had to 
ask himself if free citizens of France had the right to wage war against counter-
revolutionary movements coming from Austria, England or Russia, and to spread the 
new constitutions and liberties of the revolution abroad. If war could be justified for 
reasons of independence from foreign occupiers or to safeguard the institution of a 
government for and by the people, what exactly was the source of this right, how was 
it ethically constructed? This was the finality of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which 
begins with a discussion of the formation of individual rights and moves towards the 
question of the rights of states. 
Historical context explains in part why Kant could easily understand war as a 
defect of the political system, attributable to royal discretion, moral decadence and the 
failure of reason to prevail, but more importantly, the Enlightenment’s optimism and 
its ideal of ‘perfectibility’ was still present in Kant’s writing.   
 
The principle of the moral politician will be that if defects have slipped 
either into the constitution of the state or into the relations of states with 
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one another, it is principally the duty of the chiefs to make instantly such 
amendments as are conformable to the natural right founded on reason.315 
 
According to Kant, providence, destiny and nature have the ‘aim to produce a 
harmony among men, against their will and indeed through their discord.’316 Hence, 
while Kant’s sympathies in the matter of revolution were on the side of the French 
Revolution, his sympathies in the matter of war were squarely with peace.317 
Republicanism, Kant argued, allowed reason to reign, not only internally, but also in 
interstate relations. War represented a threat to these structures of rationality, which 
explains why Kant wrote that ‘reason, from its throne of supreme moral legislating 
authority, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a 
direct duty, even though peace cannot be established or secured except by a compact 
of nations.’318 Kant sought a ‘judiciary order’ for the world, and only the federative 
model could achieve this while respecting the freedoms of states.319  Through 
federation, states would establish a world sphere governed by reason, where laws and 
reciprocity among state would lead to morality on an international scale. Kant’s 
Preliminary Articles enumerated a set of such laws to reduce and limit the causes of 
war among states, including for example the signing of secret treaties, the purchase or 
exchange of states amongst powers, the way in which foreign debt was contracted, 
and the abolition of standing armies.320 
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 At first reading of Hegel’s reaction to this proposal, one might be tempted to 
call it a pragmatists’ take. But there is much more to it. Without a higher power to 
impose international law, Hegel argued that these best intentions would crumble 
whenever states failed to achieve consensus or harmonization of policy. By resting a 
world order atop the sovereignty of states, international law would be doomed to 
existing only as mere contingency, rules that ‘ought to be kept’ but can never ‘go 
beyond an ought-to-be’,321 because:   
 
There is no Praetor to judge between states; at best there may be an 
arbitrator or mediator, and even he exercises his functions contingently 
only, i.e. in dependence on the particular wills of the disputants. Kant 
had an idea for securing ‘perpetual peace’ by a League of Nations to 
adjust every dispute. It was to be a power recognized by each individual 
state, and was to arbitrate all cases of dissension in order to make it 
impossible for disputants to resort to war in order to settle them. This 
idea presupposes an accord between states; this would rest on moral or 
religious grounds and considerations, but in any cases would always 
depend ultimately on particular sovereigns will and for that reason 
would remain infected with contingency.  
 
It follows that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be 
harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war.322 
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 A simplistic reading of these passages can lead one to describe Hegel as an 
early equivalent of 20th century realists, who sees states and their agents moralistically 
as ‘bad’ or unable to operate within the framework of international norms and laws. 
However, his view is quite contrary to this, for Hegel saw in the state a higher order 
of reason an instrument for materializing the ‘ethical life’ within it, where the 
common good constitutes a higher sphere which integrates but does not submerge the 
claims of individuality.323 Actually, the reason why Hegel’s ideal state is not expected 
to fully submit itself to an external international order, beyond contingency and 
national interest, is not that it is subjectively bad in its external dealings, but the 
opposite, because it is objectively good in its internal purpose, which is to protect its 
citizens’ freedoms and interest.  
Where Hegel and Kant agreed with regard to war, was that it is an act of 
discretion. And while Kant saw that as a bad thing, Hegel rather thought that as long 
as it is an act of discretion that belongs to freely constituted citizens, it is imbued with 
the ethics inherent to the state. Hegel understood the state as having a universal 
character, for when citizens constitute the state, they are creating an absolute power 
under which all are governed equally, an ethical realm in which laws can be 
legitimately written, and legitimately enforced: the ‘substance of the state [is that it 
has an] absolute power against everything individual and particular, against life, 
property, and their rights, even against societies and associations.’324 In order for the 
state to be everything that it pertains to be internally, universal and absolute, it must 
equally embody this ‘universal’ character in its exterior dealings. It does not need to 
impose its laws on other states, but the very process of encountering other states 
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confirms its own universality, in reciprocation. By recognizing the existence of states 
and their own universality, it reaffirms its own concept of ‘self’: 
 
The negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the 
relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something 
external. […] This negative relation is that moment in the state which is 
most supremely its own, the state’s actual infinity as the ideality of 
everything finite within it. […] [become] an accomplished fact [bringing] 
it home to consciousness.325  
 
 We can now see more clearly why treaties and international systems find 
themselves always subject to contingency and state interest. The very process of 
interacting with other states creates within the state a higher appreciation of its own 
universal role towards its constituents. The rise of self-consciousness within the state 
is reciprocal amongst states and thus reinforces contingency at every step that is taken 
towards harmonization and cooperation. The contradiction becomes truly evident 
when we consider treaties like the Kyoto Protocol or the Convention on Biodiversity, 
where numerous signatories are actively, consciously, strategically, and 
systematically undermining their own commitments, despite having ratified certain 
obligations into national law. Contingency is inherent to treaty making, and to blame 
treaty failures on morality is to pass the buck: vilifying individuals and political 
parties, instead of seeing in their actions a systemic weakness in the concept 
international law in the first place.    
                                                                
325 Idem.  
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This leaves us with a question: is there legitimacy to the state’s subjectivity? If 
Hegel relegates war to the ethical legitimacy of statehood, what is this ethical ground 
upon which the state is elevated? What gives the state the ‘right’ to view all other 
forms of law making, including international treaties as ‘mere contingency’? For 
Hegel, this special status of the state depends on its ability to provide freedom to its 
citizens. That is the moral basis for the state’s right to act upon the world. And this at 
times, can be taken to mean war. 
That being said, Hegel was by no means an advocate of war, nor did he 
believe society should be organized in a Spartan or militaristic tradition. Rather, he 
hoped wars would be rare and only fought for vital interests of the state, such as the 
redress of injustices or the protection of national independence. Plamenatz notes that: 
 
The Prussians had fought a hard war against Napoleon which had led 
to domestic reforms and to a burst of patriotism which had other good 
effects. It is not surprising that a German who had lived through the 
war of liberation should have believed that war was good for the moral 
health of the people [...] Hegel does not advocate frequent or 
continuous wars or suggest that war is the noblest activity of man.326 
 
Many passages from Hegel’s works show him ‘to have been acutely aware of 
its evils, even though he held that there were times when it was both necessary and 
right […] nothing in his words justifies the charge that he "glorified" war, and to 
maintain that he did is to give an extravagant and misleading description of his 
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ideas.’327 To illustrate this, we can turn to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, in which he 
wrote:  
 
Now in Europe each nation is limited by another one and it should not, 
arbitrarily, start a war against another. When we traverse the realm of 
morality up to its highest stage, the life of the state, and watch whether 
its purposes are fulfilled or not, we certainly will experience that many 
are, but more, even the greatest and noblest of them, are spoiled and 
frustrated through the passions and viciousness of man.328 
 
There is a clear distinction between to be made between the fact that someone 
may disagree with the premises of international perpetual peace, and making the 
argument that he who stands on this side of the argument is a war monger. It rather 
comes down to a question of ethics, rather than a question of war and peace. One 
should be asking what kind of peace shall we have, and will it be a good peace? Or 
shall this peace be the undoing of what we hold as the central purpose of modern 
citizenship: individual freedom? Where is the greater good? It is this notion of a 
greater good versus a lesser evil that frames the overarching question: what 
constitutes an ethically justifiable war?  
From these questions, we can begin framing the disagreement between the two 
philosophers based on their distinct definitions of freedom, especially with regard to 
how this idea exists in the relationship between state and citizen. To begin with, 
Pinkard explains:  
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328 Idem. (quoting various passages from Hegel)  
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The basic concept for Hegel’s ethics – like that of Kant – is freedom. 
The Philosophy of Right is an articulation via dialectical 
argumentation of what the ontological and institutional conditions for 
freedom would be. Both Hegel and Kant are concerned with explaining 
the possibility of freedom. However, whereas Kant’s explanation rests 
on the idea of the will’s legislating for itself, Hegel […] [would argue 
that] only when our straightforward desires (the particulars) coincide 
with our evaluations of what would be good and right to desire (the 
universal), is our will truly free.329 
 
Thus, both authors agree that freedom is rational, but whereas Kant’s freedom 
stands alone, Hegel’s freedom is contingent on there being consistency between what 
one might call the immediate good and the greater good. When applied to the state, 
this consistency takes the form of there being a mutually constitutive freedom which 
arises jointly from the state and the citizen. The coinciding of universal and particular 
desires is pursued in time by the state contributing to the enhancement and 
development of the individual’s empowerment and freedom to act out his or her 
desires. The state doesn’t simply grant freedom to its citizens, it is the act of 
becoming a state, the mutual recognition of citizens that constitutes the individual as 
free, and this, Hegel understands as an enhancement of individual freedom, making 
the individual more free, more complete than he could be outside the state or in the 
natural world. Ultimately, the state’s existential justification is its effect on human 
development (and here the UNDP, with its Human Development Index, would likely 
agree). The state is this freedom itself. And while it can appear instrumental, in a 
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sense, that is, the citizen empowers him or herself through and by the state, the state is 
not for this reason a mere tool of freedom, but the embodiment of freedom in which 




The State as an Ethical Realm 
 
 
 Before taking on any concrete form, whether a border crossing, barracks, a 
parliament, a president or a passport; the ideal Hegelian state is first and foremost a 
state of mind, an idea that binds people within a single political community, and 
makes itself manifest through the creation and upkeep of various institutions, 
founding documents, laws, etc. The idea of state also includes mutual recognition of 
legal and political rights amongst citizens, which can, for example, take the form of 
abiding by the outcome of election, even if one is on the losing side of it. These 
consensual relationships are however paradoxical in that they are at any time being 
coerced onto the people by the state structures, while also being willed by the people 
themselves. The state structures are composed of people: judges, police, public 
servants, politicians, etc. all of whom are making decisions and taking actions within 
a code of conduct which frames their duties and obligations within the state apparatus. 
That is to say, that whether one is willing the form of the laws and institutions of the 
state, or one is forming the will of the laws and institutions of the state, all are acting 
within a frame of mind with regard to what they perceive as the greater good, in 
abstraction of personal gain, but in concordance with personal goodness in the 
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conduct of the affairs of the state. Thus, it can indeed be claimed that beyond its 
material features, the state is beyond these, an ethical frame of analysis, within which 
people are making decisions and taking action within the state.   
As we saw while discussing perpetual peace and the relation of freedom 
between state and citizen, it is possible and perhaps even beneficial, when reading 
Hegel, to move away from the metaphysical implications of materialized reason as a 
cosmic or higher power as we saw above, and instead view individuals and states as 
‘vehicles’ of reason for its own sake, for the immediate benefits of applied rationality, 
as opposed to the continuing quest to make sense of the divine, by further 
rationalizing its existence. Frost proposes that by excluding the higher end 
metaphysical aspects of Hegel’s system, we can focus in on how Hegel established a 
‘constitutive theory of the individual,’330 where the state exists conceptually as the 
‘Aufhebung’ of individuals acceding to higher levels of reason by transcending or 
surpassing simpler forms of social unity to more abstract or more ‘reasoned’ or 
intellectually constructed forms, from family life, to civil society, to citizenship within 
the state. These ‘moments’ in the development or actualization of the self represent 
three distinct ethical realities, which exist, develop and come to fruition as the state 
(which is both an idea in its citizens as well as a material expression of this idea in the 
world). 
Hegelian dialectics are central to his understanding of politics, because the 
state and the individuals exist in history and are part of its progression. The individual 
at birth is not the same as the emancipated and empowered adult citizen. But the 
process that leads individuals from their birth and family life, to existence in a society 
of others, to becoming part of the actual governance of this society represent three 
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distinct conceptual plateaus which are linked in that each one, emerges from the 
Aufhebung of the preceding one. They are tied dialectically to one another. And while 
the individual develops in time by further ‘constituting’ himself as a full participant of 
the state, a dialectical reverse to this can also be perceived. The more the state exists 
as an individual and social idea, the greater the state itself is materialized in the world. 
The state is a tool that contributes to constituting, developing the individual, while the 
process of individual constitution is the state itself. A state without citizens is no state. 
It is a mutually-binding and mutually-building relationship.   
Hegel built this constitutive theory in reaction to the ‘contractarian’ tradition 
we find in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The difference between the two approaches 
is how they reconcile individual rights with state sovereignty. In contract theory, the 
autonomous rights holder agrees to subject himself to the state out of self-interest, to 
secure his rights.331 Thus, the individual is the true sovereign, and the state is an 
institution serving this fundamental sovereignty. The state comes into being because 
the individual has willed it and accepted self-imposed constraints. On the other hand, 
‘for constitutive theory, to be a rights holder at all already presupposes a constraining 
relationship with other people.’332  
One of the reasons why Hegel is often cited alongside examples of 
totalitarianism is that he was in fact deeply against the idea of humans being endowed 
with ‘natural rights’. ‘Hegel [was] better known as a critic of rights than as a 
defender. In the first place, he attacked natural rights theories for proposing an 
“atomistic" conception of the self as denuded of all cultural traits and 
characteristics.’333 In the Hegelian tradition, rights are not considered to be a-priori 
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conditions of human existence, but rather posited within the social context. These 
emerge and grow in scope and depth as the individual transitions into increasingly 
complex relationships from those within the family, to interactions in civil society, 
and finally at the state and citizen level. Hegel’s central criticism of the contractarian 
methodology, as Benhabib explains, was that:  
 
It ignores the condition of men in the human community and begins 
with an arbitrary abstraction called the ‘state of nature’. The modern 
tradition falsely considers human nature or rationality to be given, 
argued Hegel. As long as individuals are seen as complete and mature 
outside the bounds of ethical life, as long as their fundamental nature 
is juxtaposed to their life in civil society, the relation of the individual 
to the ethical community is perceived as accidental.334  
 
Instead of making judgments regarding man’s rights in nature, Hegel is 
analyzing man within his social system, arguing that his rights are built up and 
strengthened by the increased rationalization of social relations which we find in the 
state, and these are protected or guaranteed by sovereignty. The constitutive theory of 
the state tries to understand the individual processes that lead to the state, and the 
effect of the state on the individual, arguing that this process or rationalization, or 
Geist, allows individuals to form something greater than themselves, and, through this 
process, achieve a final and higher state of personal development as well. The 
individual is born into freedom within the family unit, but freedom as it exists in the 
family is incomplete and limited. It is confined in emotion and is inward facing. This 
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leads to an impasse and dissolution that only civil society can resolve. But civil societ 
itself is found to be incomplete itself, unless the freedom it produces can be enforced, 
and protected, which ultimately leads to the full actualization of freedom that comes 
with citizenship in the state.  
Starting with families, Hegel recognizes that certain forms of family life are 
unethical. For example, in Roman law, the father was granted the right to the life or 
death of his own children, or the right to sell them off into slavery. This, Hegel argued 
was inadmissible, since the ethical basis for an ideal family is that the child must be 
considered a nascent autonomous or free person in becoming.335 Only ‘love’ can thus 
bind such a family, for there is no gain or proprietorship in the family relationship. 
However this very strength is also the family’s greatest shortcoming, from the 
perspective of individual development, because basing one’s rights on mere ‘feelings’ 
is not enough. Feelings cannot be demanded as a right since they are inherently 
changeable, and therefore they are not as secure a basis for ethical life as laws, which 
are consciously recognized instead of being merely felt. The family’s second 
shortcoming stems from the individual not being fully capable of expressing their 
personality, since they are forever a part of the family unit, a member.336 In order to 
pursue their development, the individual must eventually break the bonds of the 
family and engage with the world outside, to seek ‘the development and realization of 
his particular needs, interests and purposes’.337 Far from destroying the family, when 
one leaves the family and goes out into the world, they bring with them what they 
have learned to be as part of the family, and they also bring back to the family 
whatever recognition they might gain in the next level of ethical life, civil society. 
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The family has been negated, but integrated into the next plateau of development: 
civil society. 
Hegel was the first to distinguish civil society from the state.  He used the term 
to ‘describe the particular dimension of the modern state as a political community – 
the ‘civil’ sphere in which individuals seek to satisfy each others’ needs through 
work, production and exchange; in which there is a thorough-going division of labour 
and a system of social classes; and in which law courts, corporate bodies and public 
regulatory and welfare authorities (‘the police’) promote security and property, 
livelihood and other rights’338 In his own words, Hegel described ‘civil society’ as 
‘the battlefield where everyone’s individual private interest meets everyone else’s.’339 
While property might exist within the family as a whole, it did not feature within the 
family internal ethics; however, in civil society, property becomes the definitive 
aspect of relations on this level, where people who are born free and equal can now 
test this equality and freedom by engaging in private interactions in the public space 
generated by the state for them to do so. In this sense, Hegel was not at all a friend of 
aristocracy, though his detractors have attempted to brand him this way – the way 
private interest and public authority attract and repel each other makes aristocracies 
verge on tyranny and anarchy.340 
Civil society is also an ethical realm, albeit on a different intellectual level as 
the one which develops within the family. Its laws and norms, its expectations 
regarding trustworthiness, fairness, virtue, in fact, every process of operating material 
exchanges within civil society is a process of rationalizing interactions between 
individuals. This rationalization which is shaped in law provides increased 
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efficiencies because it creates predictability, regularity, and coercive guarantees. ‘The 
regulation of social life through general norms,’ explains Benhabib, ‘guarantee 
uniformity of treatment and rend the behaviour of the central authority predictable, 
from the standpoint of modern economic and legal actors.’341  Unlike the family, 
transactions in civil society cannot be (or rather could not rationally be) bound in 
‘love’ towards everyone else in society. Therefore, they depend on a different set of 
values, a different ethical realm involving contracts for the exchange of property and 
services. If love is what allowed the individual to be recognized as a nascent free 
individual within the family, it also places a limit to what freedom can be enjoyed 
within it. Love is a subjective feeling within the family that is there but cannot be 
earned, it is unsatisfactory to the individual’s development.  Once children have been 
‘educated to freedom of personality and have come of age within the family, they 
become recognized as person in the eyes of the law;’342 they go forth into society and 
found their own families. Yet, within the family, one could only experience the ethical 
idea, freedom, still in its concept, it is a particularity, not a universal principle, always 
inward facing rather than all-encompassing. This is what causes the dissolution of the 
family and the emergence of civil society, the need for the individual to transition and 
develop their freedom relative to others, through mutual recognition of such a 
principle in the external world.343 Only in civil society will the individual discover all 
others, and by recognizing their rights, and perceiving their recognition of his rights, 
will he at last confirm or take possession of his status as a objective ‘rights’ holder, 
rather than someone merely born into rights.  
Hegel’s system distinguishes itself strongly from Rousseau’s social contract. 
With Hegel, the idea of contracts exists only in the realm of ‘civil society’, that is, 
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neither at the family level or the state level, which are the other two moments in this 
constitutive process. He disagrees with Rousseau’s social contract on the grounds that 
it implies a mere amalgamation of sovereign individuals in contract.344  For Hegel, the 
individual is neither born sovereign, nor does the state grant individuals sovereignty. 
The existence of the state as sovereignty, actually renders personal sovereignty 
impossible: the individual has no right to make and apply his own, subjective laws 
and attempt to impose them on others. In the state, men are no longer in the same state 
of freedom that they were prior to being citizens. Freedom has either been restricted 
or transformed, and the new freedom which the state provides is a higher freedom 
allowing citizens to act at a universal level. In contrast, social contract theory falls 
short, as Pelczynski explains:  
 
Rousseau’s general will remains an artificial construct, the will of all or 
majority will, instead of becoming the living ethos of a political 
community.  345 
 
Unlike Rousseau, Hegel did not see the state as an amalgam of sovereign 
people who are born free, but rather understands citizenship as the socialization and 
development of individuals into freedom. Hegel saw the state as the process by which 
and through which the individual can succeed in his quest for freedom: born 
predisposed to freedom, but not yet in full possession of this freedom, the individual 
progresses in society from the family, to civil society to active citizenship. Through 
these structures and institutions, the individual transcends the natural potential for 
freedom and achieves a higher form of freedom, mutually recognized, and 
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materialized by institutions which the citizen ultimately takes possession of as well. It 
is not mere freedom as an endowment, it is freedom that is built up, surpassed and 
taken as one’s own to further develop as one sees fit. It is the ultimate, perfected 
freedom in that it provides the empowerment, the tool and the personal space required 
for a free person to define what his or her freedom shall resemble.  
This type of freedom is not construed as something one ‘has’, but something 
that takes shape through an evolving process of self-constitution, through moments in 
one’s social development. Hegel was positing the existence of three social categories, 
or as Pinkard explains, ‘expressions of a basic form of unity among people – a 
structure of mutual acknowledgement – in which various moral principles (rights, 
duties and virtues) are embodied and which explains their possibility, [which Hegel 
refers to as] “ethical substance”.’346 Within these categories, ethical life, as Hegel 
understands it […] is the ‘concept of freedom developed into the existing world’.347  
As such it comprises certain specific structures and institutions that are required for, 
and promote, freedom.’348 Freedom and, equally important, the recognition of 
freedom in the political community both remain contingent on the presence of a 
higher power, as Frost explains: 
 
In civil society, the individual gains recognition as a free person able to 
own property and enter into transactions with other people who are 
free in the same way. The importance of these rights is recognized in a 
system of law which is impartially administered and enforced.349  
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Unless there exists an impartial guarantor, administrator and enforcer upon 
which civil society can depend, these interactions and transactions could not take on a 
universal form. As was the case with the family, an inherent weakness emerges from 
the very strength of civil society’s ethical realm as well. Freedom demands mutual 
recognition and virtuous dealings among individuals, but these relations which can 
only exist if guided by a certain degree of self-interest, cannot guarantee themselves 
as fair, since each side is subjective. There must be an objective arbiter in order for 
various self-interests in competition to be beneficial and rational in a systematized 
way. Only a mutually recognized higher authority can act in such a role. Even 
mediation and arbitration depends on the existence of a higher power that generates 
contract laws in the first place. At this conjecture, this conflict at the heart of civil 
society, the idea of state emerges as necessity. A civil society cannot properly operate 
without this political oversight, rule-making and rule-enforcing. 
If civil society was a ‘battlefield’ where private interest meet, at the state level, 
‘we have the struggle (a) of private interests against particular matters of common 
concern and (b) of both of these together against the organization of the state and its 
higher outlook.’350 This concept of a ‘higher outlook’ is essential to the state because 
it implies the ethical frame of mind which an individual must be in, when thinking as 
a citizen, a statesman or an administrator of the state. The ‘higher outlook’ is the 
source of the state’s objectivity towards what is internal to it: its police, its judges and 
its laws; yet it is equally the source of its subjectivity towards what is external to it. 
To act as the guarantor of its people’s freedoms, the state is infused with structures 
that protect individuals from individuals whether at the family or civil society level, 
and equally protect this sovereignty from outside threats to this freedom and 
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independence. ‘As such, Hegel says, the state must be a ‘union’ organized for the sake 
of common defence, and war, or at least the willingness to wage war is a major 
component of statehood.’351 
This is where the famous statement, mentioned in the introduction, can take on 
its full significance and become intelligible. That ‘the state is the actuality of concrete 
freedom’ means that it is the materialized fulfilment of individual freedoms within its 
borders, infused with the external freedom to act and guarantee this internal freedom. 
Most importantly, to become fully ‘actualized’ this notion of ‘freedom’ as embodied 
by the state must become aware of itself, recognizing its role and purpose in the 
minds of those who incarnate the state: judges, police, military, civil servants, 
politicians, etc. In their minds specifically, and in the minds of all citizens more 
generally, the state becomes self-aware and empowered to actualize freedom. Hegel 
writes:  
 
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom 
consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not 
only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition 
for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and of civil society) 
but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the 
interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the 
universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they 
take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit.352  
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The ‘actuality of concrete freedom,’ emerges from the same methodology 
which Hegel used to discover the truth of sense-certainty as a dialectical process in 
time, but this time applied to the social realm. Freedom is almost construed as a self-
fulfilling loop, whereby the individual seeks individual freedom and thus wills 
himself a state to act as the guarantor of this freedom, but the only way by which it 
can act as guarantor is for it to be free as well: universal, subjective and potent. When 
freedom is the ethical grounds upon which society is built, every aspect of society 
must in the end embody that ethic, and this is achieved by maintaining this dialectical 
tension between the collective and the individual, the particular and the universal: 
where each is the source of the other’s greater freedom. And this realization is the 
third and final moment of the constitutive process: I recognize the state as my own, 
because through its freedom, my freedom is enhanced and universalized. 
The ideal state exists to embody the citizens’ collective best interest in the 
world, and reciprocally, when the citizen recognizes this purpose of the state, he takes 
ownership of it – the state works by me and for me – and this very appropriation 
completes itself a moment of the individual’s development: when the individual 
comes to terms with the negation of his potential individual sovereignty in exchange 
for a role or space in the universal. This recognition of ownership which Hegel calls 
patriotism binds the citizens of a state into an ethical whole in a way not entirely 
different from the way love binds the family or laws bind civil society. Hence, for 
Hegel, ‘what is common in love and patriotism is that the other is perceived as not 
being other.’353 However, the process of sublating the other leads also to a new 
concept of ‘others’. If patriotism binds the state, and eliminates other individuals as 
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others, it nonetheless generates, perhaps inadvertently, the concept of ‘other peoples’, 
‘other states’ to recognize and by whom to be recognized.  
The state emerges as a ‘substantive life’ because it is infused with a ‘spirit’ 
which resides in its institutions and citizens who are called upon to incarnate them. 
Thus can we speak of a somewhat mystical ‘personality’ or ‘intelligence’, which 
resides in statehood, where the state’s ‘essential being is the union of the subjective 
with the rational will.’354 By embodying both a will that is endowed with rationality, 
the idea of the state achieves its ‘actualized freedom’, its ability to use its capacity to 
reason in order to shape the material world. When the state enacts or applies laws, for 
example, these are real, objective and universal in the eyes of the citizens, despite the 
fact that they arise subjectively, from the self-consciousness of the state. As Hegel 
explains, 
 
The state, therefore, knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, 
i.e. as something thought. Hence it works and acts by reference to 
consciously adopted ends, known principles, and laws which are not 
merely implicit but are actually present to consciousness.355   
  
If the state emerges as a substantive life, in the process of constitution, and the 
transcendental process of individuals transforming themselves into citizens, it owes its 
self-awareness and self-consciousness to a process of reciprocation with other states. 
The state is confronted with the idea that it is not alone in the world: there are other 
peoples, other states, interactions, and potential conflicts. That is why Hegel 
recognizes statehood as being intimately related to war. The independence, 
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sovereignty and territory of the state are not merely founded on its armed forces, but 
built in conceptually as a necessity. The ethical element in war, Hegel explained, is 
implied by the final end of the state to provide freedom, individual life, security and 
property to its people.356 Thus, ‘war is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a 
purely external accident.’357 It can be an essential part of a state’s rational 
necessity.358 The state makes a conscious decision to apply force, grounded ethically 
on the idea that its actions are conducted in the interest of justice or self-preservation 
and on behalf of a free and constituted people.  
Reciprocally, the psychological internal reality of this ideal state is in many 
ways tied to war as well. The model citizen of the modern state would retain certain 
vestiges of ancient Athens: a freeman, democrat, merchant, and militiaman. This 
would be the foremost expression of the individual cum citizen, transcended and 
elevated by the state. In this context, we can appreciate in what sense the state cannot 
merely be an amalgam of individual sovereigns as in the contractarian tradition. The 
citizens in a constitutive system generate sovereignty; they aggrandize the state in the 
very process of aggrandizing themselves within this ethical realm that they have 
created for themselves. Thus, while in the contractarian tradition, the citizen is 
assumed to be constraining his natural rights for the sake of the social contract, in the 
constitutive sense, the citizen and the state converge in their mutual freedom: where 
the state is the source and guarantor of the individual’s particular freedom, and the 
citizen is the source and guarantor of the state’s universal freedom. And this 
coexistence is the aggrandizement of the individual, which at its utmost embodiment, 
self-sacrifice in the name of collective freedom is the epitome of courage.   
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The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in 
the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of 
courage is to actualize this final end, and the means to this end is the 
sacrifice of personal actuality […] a self-sacrifice which yet is the real 
existence of one’s freedom.359  
 
Hegel is suggesting that in war, the citizen / state relationship takes on its 
purest form. The citizen-soldier lives out the state’s ethical concept to its absolute 
depth, where he is willing to die in the application of the state’s ‘higher outlook’ and 
sovereignty. In this sense, the citizen-soldier is even better positioned than a king to 
pronounce the words ‘L’État, c’est moi,’ because, when he fights, the state belongs to 
the citizen-soldier to the extreme, and the citizen-soldier reciprocally belongs mind 
and body to the state. Should he choose not to fight, the state would be powerless and 
dead. Should he turn around in mutiny and dethrone the king, the king would be 
nothing. The state is the sum of its ethical premise plus its material exertion of 
authority in pronouncing and enforcing laws, and sustaining independence from 
outside forces. And while all of these represent an aspect the state’s ideal/material 
reality, none is more powerfully attached to this concept of statehood than the citizen-
soldier, because in their bravery and sacrifice, they are the state – an ethical concept 
backed by individuals in arms and who are willing to kill or die to ensure its collective 
survival. It is only because the state is constructed as an ethical realm worth fighting 
for, that Hegel could logically uphold the idea that ‘War is the moral health of peoples 
in their struggle against petrifaction,’360 because if a state not worth fighting for, or 
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incapable of fighting, it would be reaffirming its mortality and transience, 
disappearing in history.   
 
Critique: The Reversibility of War’s Relation to the Moral Health of 
Peoples 
 
The ethical aspect of war in Hegel resides in the fact that the state is presented 
as a pact of mutual defence among citizens, where the idea of courage and sacrifice 
epitomizes the ethical bond of statehood’s sublime or absolute endpoint. Dying 
bravely for your country is the ultimate demonstration that the very notion of this 
country does in fact exist in your mind, in your heart. Hence, for Hegel, war and 
sacrifice not only invigorate the state externally, they enhance the state in the minds 
of those who belong to it, which is the most central part of statehood to begin with, 
the idea which binds it. This, however, suggests that not all forms of warfare 
necessarily ‘reinforce’ the idea of statehood, only those actually fought by a mass of 
citizens. The next question is whether or not all forms of war generate bravery and 
sacrifice in the minds of men?  If not, we would be force to admit that the Hegelian 
ethics, while they might be demonstrable in certain contexts, might have significant 
conceptual limits outside the ideal state fighting what might be bizarrely considered 
an ‘ideal’ form of warfare, a war that necessarily makes citizens brave and patriotic.  
Where the problem first appears is in the context of usurpation of state power, 
where a tyrant or oligopoly appropriates for itself political power and force, whether 
by turning the army against the population, or else hiring mercenary forces to exert 
the power of the state as opposed to harvesting this power from the citizen base. This 
would represent a clear example of where we would not be dealing with anything near 
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an ideal state. In this context, as Machiavelli explained, relying on mercernary forces 
is a sure way to weaken the prince:361 even though the sovereign increases his 
physical power, the ethical whole collapses, because the bonds of mutual defence 
upon which his of authority and legitimacy rest begin to rot from within. How a state 
embodies its wars has a direct bearing on whether or not war contributes to the moral 
health of its people, for in the hands of mercenaries, war can be detrimental to the 
ethical bonds that make up the body politic in the very act of carrying out policy, 
because it excludes the citizen from participating as the active element of the state’s 
materialization of policy. However, the fact that mercenary warfare is contrary to the 
moral health of peoples does not fully undermine Hegel’s conclusion either, for the 
simple fact that in the process of revolt against a tyrant, the citizens united, reclaim 
their bond as an ethical community, proving in their actions against the usurper that it 
is the tyranny itself that is the rotten and petrified element of the state, and the revolt 
is the people’s moral health in action. 
At any given time, a tension exists in the state, residing in two opposite 
tendencies, one towards political apathy, immobility and pusillanimous comfort 
within the state at one extreme, counter-poised in reverse by the revolutionary, 
criminal, or violent anti-state sentiment and actions of others. And as we explained 
above in Chapter 1, elements of society that tend towards the latter can, in certain 
situations, be more state-like in their manifestation than the state itself, and infinitely 
more so than the politically apathetic. It is precisely at the intersection of these 
conflicting elements which can exist within the state that there appears a paradox in 
Hegel’s theory: the process of statehood is a quest to enhance and manifest freedom in 
the world, but the more it achieves this goal, the more complete its materialization, 
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the greater the two above internal threats become. The state cannot, on the one hand, 
provide freedom from the state to those who seek to abolish it, and on the other hand, 
it cannot undermine the provision of freedom which was its goal in order to vitalize 
those who have found comfort and apathy within it. Thus, the tension is inherent to 
the state, and becomes tenser as the state develops and empowers itself. What this 
means is that even Hegel’s ideal state is not totally free from the truest form of 
internal social decay: an interaction that opposes a fledging defence of the state 
against a powerful dissension. And if this is true of the ideal state, then how much 
more so might it be in an imperfect state? 
One can interpret from Hegel that war is to be understood as the moral health 
of peoples because it is the moment, the process whereby the citizen takes full 
possession of the state and the state takes full possession of the citizen. This should 
not be understood as claiming that Hegel was an advocate of participatory democracy 
or suggesting that the consent of the citizens is necessary to the creation of 
authoritative and legitimate policy, but rather that policy’s enactment can be modified 
or stunted in its potency by the unwillingness to comply. That being said, if state 
legitimacy is not necessarily tied to citizen consent, this should not be taken to mean 
that no consent, not even tacit consent, is necessary to generate authority. In the 
opposite contractarian viewpoint, the citizen is understood to have a permanent and 
natural ‘right’ to refuse to comply and act out the policy of state, because the premise 
of this philosophy is that the individual is sovereign, he is the focal point of 
legitimacy and authority, and merely in a contractual relation with the state at any 
given time. From a constitutive perspective, however, the individual is not sovereign. 
He is not endowed with any such right. And to claim it is to revolt, to de-constitute 
oneself. It is not an affirmation of the natural self, but the opposite... the de-
249 
 
affirmation of the constituted self. Though this de-constitution is an act that poses a 
challenge to the idea of legitimacy, what revolt and mutiny actually do is weaken 
authority in very real, concrete ways, the objection of conscience stops authority from 
manifesting itself physically. 
Exclusion is the Achilles’ heel of the constitutive approach to understanding 
the state, because regardless of whether it comes from de-constitution at the 
individual level, policy, or even technology, it breaks the concept of state as mutual 
ownership between citizen and state. The difference between constitutive and 
contractarian traditions is precisely this, that the latter is contingent – an amalgam of 
sovereigns – while the former is bound in necessity, neither is free from the other, 
since both the freedom of the person and of the state depend on the relationship. The 
problem, therefore, with exclusion is that even if the state continues to preserve and 
enhance freedom for its people relatively and internally, the exclusion of the citizen 
base from the collective security of the nation renders the citizen less free in one very 
important way: they lose their most important power within the state, which is to 
embody, to be the state’s freedom. In the context of usurpation, this is what salvages 
the moral health of peoples, since when the authority has broken with the citizens, 
then the unwillingness to comply, the objection of conscience, the decision to reverse 
the policy of the state by refusing to act, all these become acts of de-constitution. 
Non-violent mutiny and revolt is the last resort of the citizen-soldier’s political and 
ethical power within the state: to act as a pendulum, constant and balanced, but which 
only swings back when pushed to unethical extremes or when the bonds of statehood 
have been destroyed.  
For a recent example of this we can turn to Libya, where anti-Gaddafi rebels 
fought on land, and one fighter pilot crashed his own jet so as not to attack them. Had 
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this been a drone and not a fighter, the situation would have been different: the pilot 
would have been arrested on-base, court-martialled, and another drone pilot would 
have stepped in to finish the job; meanwhile the Libyan pilot could eject, land in rebel 
hands, to safety. One might say the drone is the modern mercenary, because it does 
not have the ethical bonds of statehood infused in the way it carries out its mission, 
not when it is remote controlled, and far less so if it is fully automated. The difference 
is the ability to enact individual conscience on the battlefield: this is where peaceful 
mutiny lies. However, without this pressure valve, represented by the individual 
soldier and his moral choices, tyrants would be far more difficult to depose once they 
had risen. And this relationship between tyranny and revolt is the key to uncovering 
where the right to wage war belonging to the state reaches its limits: first in the 
individual refusing to wage war on behalf of the state, which is the passive form, or in 
the active form, the emergence of either a revolt or a revolutionary war against the 
state itself, which represents a counterpoise to the state’s right to wage war, a fight to 
eliminate the sovereign’s hold on power, to reclaim and reaffirm the constitution of 
the people. 
If the exclusion of the citizen from the state’s enactment of political violence 
is a natural limit to the notion that war is a right of the state, because it reverses the 
relationship between a state’s ‘moral health’ and warfare, this is harmful to Hegel’s 
argument not because it undermines his logic, in the context of an ideal state where 
this is not the case, but because it further limits the possibility that such and ideal state 
can ever take form: usurpation is a constant threat, the relationship between apathy 
and revolt is an inherent pressure against the ideal, and finally, as technology 
increasingly distances warfare from hand to hand combat and individual acts of 
bravery, there is no going back to the heyday of warfare, the exclusion of the citizen 
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from the application of foreign policy is irreversible, state power is transferred from 
the citizen to the machinery of state.   
The exclusion of the citizen from manifesting the will of the state can take on 
various forms, such as revolt, mutiny, apathy, exclusion as a feature of policy (i.e. 
mercenaries) or exclusion as a technological feature, but regardless of which this is, it 
can be argued that in the process, the citizen has become less free, not because he or 
she has lost their so-called ‘rights’ as individual sovereigns, but the opposite, they 
have found themselves excluded from the constituted authority and legitimacy to 
which they belong, and which reversely should belong to them. This strikes at the 
centre of the ideal state, because the very raison d’être and modus operandi of the 
Hegel’s ideal state is to be a mutual process of actualizing and enhancing freedom, 
but even an ideal state, could it be materialized, would not be free from such factors 





If the purpose of the state is be free to provide the maximum freedom to its 
citizens by creating a set space where their self-chosen laws are valid, then it needs 
war, or rather the idea or the possibility of waging war, not only as a guarantee with 
regard to this space from external threats, but also as a means to resting its authority 
and ethical claim to that space internally as well, as the possessor of the monopoly of 
force. In this context, the use of force is not accidental, but a matter of right, under a 
tradition or better yet a constitution which proclaims it as such. But regardless of how 
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ideal this constitution is, it is never completely free from the risks of revolt, because 
revolt lies dormant at all times in the state, and sometimes the very act of repressing it 
is precisely what awakens it.  
War in the hands of the state, or more precisely, in the hands of constituted 
free citizens is the only basis upon which war can ever be proclaimed as something 
objectively ethical. This theoretically excludes non-state actors, rebels, tyrants, or 
usurpers of state power, because their violence cannot achieve the same objectivity. It 
is necessarily subjective. Of course, when critically assessing this point, we must 
question whether or not the state apparatuses as we know them today actually have 
achieved the model Hegel set out for them, or whether this constituted, objective 
whole actually does take form or if its wars remain subject to any biases, foundational 
predispositions, or procedural factors, rendering wars of the state no more objective 
than those of stateless powers. The relationship between war and state is forever 
befuddled in its quest for objectivity or ‘actualized freedom,’ because even at the 
epitome of the ‘Idea’, bringing together its universality and potency, there is a root of 
scepticism that can emerge. The ‘whose universality?’ and the ‘which form of 
potency?’ become conceptual problems that challenge the Hegelian ideal state, which 
are further enhanced by the technological and bureaucratic evolution of the modern 
republic since it was first constituted. 
War as a ‘right’ of the state is therefore an imperfect concept. Its limits are in 
fact best observed at the threshold described above, that of revolt and revolution, 
because it is precisely here that the objectivity comes to be challenged. Yet, to get a 
full sense of this challenge, we shall study its most extreme embodiment, found in the 
Marxist reinterpretation, or rather complete reversal of Hegel, into the basis of an all-
out revolutionary doctrine. For this reason we shall soon return to studying the 
253 
 
Hegelian tradition of dialectical war theory as it applied in the context of the great 
revolutionary doctrines that defined war during the 20th century.  But first, we must 
consider the parallel and opposite imperfection found in Clausewitz’s notion of war as 




Chapter 2 – Clausewitz and Hegel: Where 





 If Hegel’s ethical concept of war becomes problematic as it arrives at the 
threshold of revolution, Clausewitz on the other hand actually started with the 
problem of revolution in his exploration of war’s political and ethical nature. As we 
saw in Part I, by borrowing Fichte’s ‘absolute war’ he was able to develop war’s dual 
concepts in a way that allowed the coexistence of revolution at one extreme, and the 
limited scuffles and standstills that war can also become. If it was possible for 
Clausewitz to rely exclusively on his own experiences and the theories of Fichte and 
Kant in order to arrive at this chasm between the real and the absolute, what this 
chapter attempts to show is that in the final years, his work became increasingly in lin 
with the approach developed by Hegel, and it was this approach which informed and 
shaped his attempt to reconcile the two poles into the formula, ‘war is the 
continuation of policy by other means’.   
 If Hegel’s influence on Clausewitz is so contested, this stems principally from 
a lack of systematic study. Much like Gat who claims it but does not substantiate it, 
Brodie went so far as argue that the Hegelian influence was in fact more secure and 
clear than the Kantian influence.362 Based on what we have observed in Part I, given 
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the depth and scope of Clausewitz’s borrowing from Kant, it is difficult to stand in 
agreement with Brodie on this. In fact, while there is reason to believe that Hegel is 
indeed a more important influence, in that his works influenced the best elements of 
On War, it seems that the more mature Clausewitz had perhaps gained in confidence 
or at least changed his level of dependency on the works of others, for while the 
1impression of the influence is great, the textual proof is little. Clausewitz is nowhere 
near as transparent in his use of Hegel as he was in his use of Kant, but arguably this 
has much to do with the confidence he has developed as a dialectician.   
If one looks with precision at the word choices, analytical systems and 
compare these in time between texts written by a younger and an older Clausewitz, 
there seems to be a Hegelian learning curve. Whereas the texts he wrote earlier in life 
had nothing Hegelian to them, those written in the final four years of his life very 
much in line this new method of thinking.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first looks for general hints into 
the question, particularly historical information and one particular note which 
Clausewitz wrote while undertaking his final edits. The second, third and fourth 
sections are concerned with a historical comparison of various Clausewitzian concepts 
and word choices which evolved over time. They focus respectively on the subjects of 
‘Aufhebung’, ‘Intelligence of the personified state’, and the coming together of ‘real 
war’ and ‘absolute war’ into the ‘continuation of policy by other means.’   
 





Azar Gat has described Clausewitz’s later works as having ‘highly distinctive, 
new intellectual patterns’ which support the thesis of a Hegelian influence,363 though 
he does not go on to clarify what these patterns are or in what sense they are Hegelian. 
In order to confirm Gat’s claim, it would be useful to substantiate this by bringing 
more meat to the plate. That being said, before doing so, it is important to recognize 
that in speaking of Clausewitz as a Hegelian, one must walk a very fine line. The 
reason for caution stems from the fact that not all aspects of his work are constructed 
in such a way, in fact, most are not, and those that are most typically Hegelian 
nonetheless fall slightly short of the mark, as we shall consider in more detail later in 
this chapter.  
Taking this stance means going up against many credible scholars. Peter Paret, 
for example, makes the case that the question of a Hegelian influence is altogether 
irrelevant. In Clausewitz and the State, Paret dismisses it on the grounds that the 
dialectic was ‘standard equipment in German idealistic and romantic philosophy.’364 
However, this analysis robs his readers of the subtleties of the philosophical aspects of 
On War: Hegelian dialectics are quite different from those of Hume, Kant, Fichte or 
others, and the failure to discern them does not give proper merit to Clausewitz’s 
technique and erudition. In the case of Paret, this failure to discern should not come as 
a surprise, given that his knowledge of Hegel appears superficial at best: he makes the 
popular error to sum up Hegelianism as a system of ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’,365 a 
terminology which Hegel never actually used. Furthermore, there are many examples, 
which have already been cited above (and more to come below), which suggest that 
the Howard/Paret translation systematically omits or misrepresents the philosophical 
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terms which Clausewitz so often borrowed from his influences in the original 
German.  
At the other extreme, the error of overstating the influence has been made. It is 
no doubt best exemplified by Paul Creuzinger, who argued in Hegel’s Influence on 
Clausewitz (1911) that practically every inch of On War could be traced back to 
Hegel, which is not only farfetched, it is thoroughly impossible, knowing that Hegel 
was relatively unknown before 1820, when many of Clausewitz’s ideas were taking 
shape.366 Furthermore, On War is scattered with references to so many other 
influences, such as Scharnhorst, Machiavelli, Kant and Montesquieu, that it seems 
foolish to claim only one with such vigor.  In the case of each of the latter four, 
Clausewitz is quite transparent with regard to his appreciation: he referred to 
Scharnhorst as the ‘father and friend of my spirit’ in a letter to his fiancée;367 in the 
case of Machiavelli, not only did he write on the subject directly in a letter to Fichte, 
he also shared various similarities in his outlook on the question of people’s wars 
(guerrilla)368 and had shown interest in both the Prince and the Politics in many 
regards;369 regarding Montesquieu, he wrote in an editing note that ‘Montesquieu was 
vaguely on my mind’370, though the similarity in the argumentative form reveal a 
‘much deeper affinity’; 371 and finally, the debt to Kant, as we saw in the previous 
chapters is quite considerable.  
Unfortunately, for those who seek to reclaim the argument regarding a 
Hegelian influence, there are no certain references or mentions of Hegel available in 
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the letters or essays by Clausewitz.372 At best, we have circumstantial evidence, 
regarding the fact that both men were regular visitors of a common friend, 
Meusebach,373 and had been acquainted in the salons of Berlin, given their special 
parallel status: Hegel was the president of the University of Berlin, while Clausewitz 
commanded the War College in Berlin.374 Another common friend, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt is an interesting one to consider, since we know first of all that both Hegel 
and Clausewitz were on his guest list.375 Clausewitz wrote that had discussions on 
political matters with Humboldt and held him in high esteem.376 Meanwhile, although 
Humboldt did perceive some problems with Hegel’s positions in the detail, he 
claimed to be ‘very familiar’ with his work and honoured his views. 377 It is 
circumstantial evidence rather than a direct link, but it is nonetheless enhances the 
likelihood of proximity between the two individuals. 
On the grounds that we do not have a clear historical link or record, Aron 
wonders whether or not Clausewitz even read Hegel.378 However, this lack of 
demonstrated historical link should not intimidate us into not searching for clues. 
Indeed, while direct terms, ideas and methods are borrowed from Kant word for word 
throughout On War, Clausewitz never mentions the philosopher’s name, nor did he 
ever quote Montesquieu either. This, of course, did not stop Aron from claiming 
Montesquieu’s influence left, right and centre, which shows that he is not applying the 
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same academic standards to his argument in favour of one influence in his dismissal 
of others.   
Raymond Aron’s position on the Hegelian link is similar in spirit to his stance 
on their being no Kantian influence either, a question which we considered in Part I. 
Aron agrees with the overall idea that something changed dramatically in 
Clausewitz’s writing in the late 1820s, and actually goes so far as to describe these 
years as a ‘rupture in the evolution of [Clausewitz’s] thought.’379. Aron’s discussion 
implies in fact a ‘double rupture’ which is on the one hand in relation to Clausewitz’s 
late perception of the exact relation between war and politics, and secondly to 
properly box in absolute war into the realm of the unreal.380 At the time, Clausewitz 
explained in editorial notes (which we shall look over below) that one of his 
objectives in taking on such an ambitious re-edit of his works was to centre and 
enhance the importance of the political nature of war elsewhere in the book, and 
expand on the question of the ‘real’ and the ‘absolute’. Though Aron recognizes that 
‘Clausewitz ‘went to great pains to reconcile these two principles [absolute and real 
war] into a final synthesis,’381 he avoided the question of whether there was a 
Hegelian influence to this sudden breakthrough in the synthetic reconciliation of a 
dichotomy, probably since he felt that having already settled elsewhere in the book 
that there was no Hegelian influence, it did not strike him as useful to test his 
hypothesis again, in light of a different dialectic, and a different method for its 
resolution.  
                                                                
379 Aron. Penser la guerre, tome I, p. 355 
380 Michel Dobry, Clausewitz et l' "entre-deux", ou de quelques difficultés d'une recherche de paternité 
légitime, Revue française de sociologie, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1976), p. 654 
381 Aron. Sur Clausewitz, (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1980), p. 103 
260 
 
Aron does not provide an adequate reason for the ‘rupture’. He attributes 
Clausewitz’ understanding of ‘politik’ exclusively to Montesquieu,382 but this focus 
on Montesquieu does not fit the timing of the re-edit. Clausewitz had already read 
Montesquieu by 1805,383 and had mentioned him in the early phases of writing On 
War, in the note of 1818. Would he have required nine more years to integrate this 
perspective into his work? It seems untenable. It is far more likely that recent 
discoveries and readings were impacting his thoughts, or else one would not describe 
the sudden changes in such a dramatic term as a ‘rupture’. 
The first hint that we should draw our attention to, before embarking on the 
three more substantive discussions on ‘Aufhebung’, the absolute/real dichotomy, and 
the ‘Intelligence of the personified state’, is the undated note, which Azar Gat 
provides a convincing case that it was not written in 1830, as many have assumed, but 
rather in 1827, perhaps even slightly before the dated note of 1827.384 This would 
place it as far more timely than the note of a decade earlier, to which Aron sticks. In 
this more timely note, three concepts are brought together into a single whole which 
carry a distinctly Hegelian message. Clausewitz writes: 
 
Die klaren Vorstellungen in diesen Dingen sind also nicht unnütz, 
außerdem hat der menschliche Geist nun einmal ganz allgemein die 
Richtung auf Klarheit und das Bedürfnis, überall in einem 
notwendigen Zusammenhang zu stehen.385 
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Peter Paret came across the above words and was so struck by them that he 
decided to use a truncated version of this exact sentence as the epitaph for his book 
Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power. He did 
not, however, notice that he had a strong demonstration of Hegelian thought right 
under his nose. Paret’s translation of the original misses the mark, as does Graham’s, 
which may explain why the passage’s debt to Hegel has gone unnoticed. Graham has 
‘Clear ideas on these matters do, therefore, have some practical value. The human 
mind, moreover, has a universal thirst for clarity, and longs to feel itself part of an 
orderly scheme of things.’ As for Paret, we find, ‘Clear ideas on these matters are 
therefore not wholly useless; besides, the human mind has a general tendency to 
clearness, and always wants to be consistent with the necessary order of things.’ In 
both cases, we miss a trio of concepts, which when brought together actually mean far 
more in the context of philosophy. These are:  ‘notwendigen Zusammenhang’ which 
more properly translates to ‘necessary connection’; ‘allgemein die Richtung’ which 
means universal direction; and ‘menschliche Geist’, the human spirit. The translation 
should therefore read:  
 
Clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly useless; the 
human spirit, moreover, is endowed with a universal direction to 
clarity, and with a need to stand at every point in a necessary 
connection.  
 
Clausewitz’s appreciation for the concept of ‘notwendigen Zusammenhang’ 
shows a clear evolution, from when he first used it in an earlier chapter. In the Kritik 
chapter of Book II, Clausewitz wrote ‘[…] kein menschlicher Blick imstande ist, den 
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Faden des notwendigen Zusammenhanges der Dinge bis zu dem Entschluß der 
besiegten Fürsten zu verfolgen,’386 which translates to: ‘no human eye is able to 
follow the thread of the necessary connection of events, which led to the decisions of 
a defeated prince.’387 Here, we find that ‘necessary connection’ is used conceptually 
in the way that Kant and Hume understood it: a static concept of ‘causality’ itself. The 
scepticism to the phrase is quite reminiscent of Hume, though in the context of this 
chapter, which is on the whole quite Kantian, it follows that this scepticism is the 
starting point, for which critical analysis provides the necessary testing to properly 
ground theory in historical fact.  
When we move to the 1830 quote, we find that something has changed 
dramatically in Clausewitz’s understanding of ‘necessary connection’. Unlike Hume 
and Kant, Hegel’s idea of ‘necessary connection’ is not static, but is in fact the 
underlying logic of the universe in which spirit and history materialize. The Hegelian 
link comes from the fact that prior to his philosophical works, whether in Kant or 
Hume, ‘necessary connection’ was not something one could ‘stand in’, for the simple 
reason that ‘causality’ was construed in the Enlightenment tradition of an external 
phenomenon that one studies as an object. Only a Hegelian perspective allows one to 
‘stand in necessary connection’, because one is the subject, the very vehicle of this 
necessary connection making itself objective in the world. 
This transition from two versions of ‘necessary connection’ alone is a 
compelling demonstration of a matured understanding of Hegel. However, once we 
couple this one concept with the rest of the sentence, the case for a Hegelian influence 
becomes much harder to counter. Adding ‘human spirit’ and ‘universal direction,’ to 
the idea of ‘standing in necessary connection’ completes the picture. Human spirit 
                                                                
386 Clausewitz, Carl Von, Vom Kriege, Bk. II, Ch. 5, 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/Book2Ch05VK.htm 
387 Clausewitz. On War, Bk II, Ch. 5, p. 114 
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exists in the universal only insofar as it stands ‘in’ necessary connection; and 
necessary connection in Hegel is conceived precisely as this relation by which 
universal spirit is materialized through its particular embodiments or vehicles. As we 
saw in the previous chapters, for Hume there was no possibility of causal 
demonstration; for Kant, there was, but only in the context of the natural sciences; 
whereas for Hegel, ‘necessary connection’ existed in Geist. And of the three versions 
of the argument, this sentence by Clausewitz can only be made intelligible in the 
context of the third. 
When considered in light of the timing and ‘rupture’ in Clausewitz’ thought, 
we are led to the conclusion that he had discovered something useful to him, 
something significant at that moment, which forced him into revision. Clearly, if 
Hegelian ideas are directly conjured in the note he wrote when he undertook the edit, 
then we should assume that the decision to edit did in fact stem from this discovery. 
Interestingly, Clausewitz’s mention of ‘clarity’, is telling since, at last, his lifelong 
struggle with the problem of the political nature of war, it’s lack of clarity, is suddenly 
dissipated with his this new discovery, as though there is a sudden ‘Eureka!’ moment 
in Clausewitz’s later life.  
What Aron acknowledges as Clausewitz’s pain or difficulty may actually have 
stemmed from long and arduous Hegelian learning curve, considering the timing. By 
considering where, how and when Clausewitz used and understood the concept of 
‘Aufhebung’, this idea of dialectical reconciliation which we discovered in the 
previous chapter on Hegel, it becomes possible to see that Clausewitz did in fact 
understand it well, and applied on more than one occasion, in a way that suggest that 
he was perfecting his understanding of it. In this final use of the term, it presented in 
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way that almost mimics how Hegel made use of it, though perhaps not with complete 
success.  
 
‘Aufhebung’: From Discernment to Application 
 
What is most interesting in Aron’s dismissal of the Hegelian links is that, in 
doing so, he established a set of criteria upon which to judge whether or not the ideas 
of Clausewitz had a Hegelian element, without realizing that his argument provided 
the seed of its own undoing. He proposed that it was unnecessary to limit himself to a 
historical demonstration of the lack of influence (there being no record of influence) 
since, through reasoning alone, he could show that the work was simply not Hegelian. 
Focusing in on the concept of ‘defence-attack’ found in On War, Aron makes mince 
meat of Camon’s weak argument (and as it were, Gat who repeats it388) suggesting 
that Clausewitz was being Hegelian here, using a thesis, attack, an antithesis, defence, 
and a synthesis, defence-attack. Aron justifiably explained that the term had nothing 
Hegelian to it, since the second term was not in any way a proper negation of the first 
term, and the third term did not represent a superior conceptual or historical plateau 
that negated the previous two and built atop them a higher level or a new triad.389 He 
was absolutely right. 
However, much like Paret, who found the right quote, but failed to fully grasp 
its implications, Aron brings our attention to a very important passage in On War, 
regarding defence-attack, which counters his own overall dismissal of a Hegelian 
influence. And again, like with Paret, we might not have considered this particular 
                                                                
388 Gat, Origins, 234-5 
389 Aron. Penser la guerre, tome I,  pp. 363-4 
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passage in full detail had it not been used with such vigor by someone arguing the 
opposite stance. The passage reads:  
 
Eine Verteidigung des Landes also wartet nur den Angriff des Landes, 
eine Verteidigung des Kriegestheaters den Angriff des Kriegestheaters, 
eine Verteidigung der Stellung den Angriff der Stellung ab. Jede 
positive und folglich mehr oder weniger angriffsartige Tätigkeit, 
welche sie nach diesem Augenblick übt, wird den Begriff der 
Verteidigung nicht aufheben, [my emphasis]  denn das Hauptmerkmal 
derselben und ihr Hauptvorteil, das Abwarten, hat stattgefunden.390 
 
This is translated by Howard/Paret as, ‘Once the enemy has attacked, any 
active and therefore more or less offensive move made by the defender does not 
invalidate the concept of defence, for its salient feature and chief advantage, waiting, 
has been established.’ The other translation by Col. J.J. Graham proposes: ‘A defence 
of the country, therefore, only waits for attack on the country; a defence of a theatre of 
war an attack on the theatre of war; and the defence of a position the attack of that 
position. Every positive, and consequently more or less offensive, kind of action 
which the defensive uses after the above period of waiting for, does not negate the 
idea of the continuance of the defensive; for the state of expectation, which is the 
chief sign of the same, and its chief advantage, has been realised.’391 
Having taken the time to explain Hegel’s philosophy and the concept of 
‘Aufhebung,’ in the previous chapter, it is plain to see that no translation to English is 
quite adequate to savour the complexities implied in the word choice. In fact, Hegel 
                                                                
390 Clausewitz. Vom Kriege, Bk. VI, Ch. 8, 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/Book6.htm  
391 Clausewitz On War, Bk. VI, Ch. 8, p. 385 
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considered ‘Aufhebung’ to be a genial product of the German language, and this 
could explain the difficulty found in translating it to other languages.392 It is a highly 
significant term to come across in Clausewitz, because it is ‘uniquely Hegelian’393, 
representing and idea that is both purely logical and purely historical.394 The 
translations provided by either Graham or Howard/Paret do not pay justice to the 
concept by which a system of opposition sublates itself, generating a new level of 
knowledge which incorporating the lower level into the new. Clausewitz did not use 
the term ‘ungültig machen’ which means to ‘make invalid’ which would have proven 
the Howard/Paret version correct. Nor did he use the term ‘verneinen’ meaning to 
‘negate’ as Graham has it. While there were many word options available to 
Clausewitz in order to make his point, he chose the specific term ‘aufheben’, which, if 
we recall, is the ‘self-dissolution of extremes’ as they come together, or as Hegel 
wrote in the Phenomenology: 
 
...abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, which 
cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and 
thereby survives its being sublated..395  
 
 What Aron described as the criterion he was using to demonstrate that 
defence-attack was not a Hegelian concept was in effect, his take on the concept of 
Aufhebung, whereby the parts of a dialectical structure are sublated, surpassed and 
integrated into a new conceptual plateau. In the above paragraph, Clausewitz spells 
out the criterion himself, by saying he does not consider this dialectical construct as 
                                                                
392 Bernard Bourgeois, Le vocabulaire de Hegel, (Paris : Ellipses, 2011), p. 22 
393 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Hegel and the Christian God, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
Vol. 59, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), p. 72 
394 Idem. 
395 Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Mind, Tr. Baillie, 2nd Ed. p. 67 
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having the shape required to achieve a new conceptual plateau. Here he was indeed 
using, as Paret argued, a simplified dialectical construct common to German Idealism, 
but the fact that he could identify it as such demonstrates that he could differentiate 
between the regular dialectics and Hegelian dialectics. Hence, he knew of Aufhebung, 
and he knew of Hegel, though he had not yet reached the point of actually 
experimenting further with Hegelian methodology. 
 What is most striking with this quick one-off reference to Hegel in Book VI is 
that it would have been written before Books VIII and the Book I Ch. I edits. This 
suggests an earlier acquaintance to the Hegelian method, albeit an incomplete one, a 
preliminary discernment, which had not yet evolved into its systematized application. 
If we consider the timing as an introduction, leading into a learning curve, then it 
explains in what sense a slightly later period, such as the years 1827-1830, could have 
corresponded with a more mature appreciation for dialectical reconciliation.  
 However, there is more detail to add. We know that Clausewitz was interested 
in the concept of ‘active defence,’396 in his early years, which suggest that he would 
have discovered the seed of the idea of ‘defence-attack’ when studying under 
Scharnhorst. ‘Defensive warfare,’ he wrote in his textbook for the crown prince 
decades earlier, ‘therefore, does not consist of waiting idly for things to happen.’397 
The idea was already in his possession, but he did not develop it as dyadic 
relationship between offense and defence, where aspects of the former are contained 
in the latter. In these early writings, Clausewitz also made the case for transitioning 
from the defence to the offence, which is something he believed in throughout his life, 
‘We must begin, therefore, using the defensive, so as to end more successfully by the 
                                                                
396 Clausewitz, Principles of War, p. 20 
397 Ibid. p. 54  
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offensive,’398 yet, at this early stage, he presented it as sequence of events, or a 
relationship that is subsequent, rather than inherently paradoxical. Years later, when 
he wrote Book VI of On War, Clausewitz would contextualize the idea within a 
dialectical frame of analysis. He engaged with the notion of ‘Aufhebung’, as we saw 
above, and also began conceptualizing the two notions in an altogether new light, 
where one and the other are integrated, not separate and subsequent, as is made 
evident in Chapter IX, where he speaks of the defence’s ‘offensive character’ and 
refers to the ‘offensive elements which lie in every defensive battle.’399 In this case, 
we can see a clear transition from Clausewitz before he engaged with dialectical 
reasoning, and afterwards: what he once understood as two separated ideas was 
thereafter reinvented as a paradoxical, dual-concept, albeit one that did not fulfill an 
‘Aufhebung’.  
 
Real War, Absolute War, & Continuation of Policy by Other Means  
 
Real war and absolute war were originally conceived in reference to a Kantian 
system of categories. However, in order for Clausewitz to begin reconciling them into 
the ‘continuation of policy’, he could not do so using Kantian methodology. The 
reconciliation depended first and foremost on building the dichotomy in such a way 
that it could be reconciled in the first place. And this process required a Hegelian 
approach.  In a Kantian system, one would perceive the absolute and the real 
embodiments of war as being inherently and thoroughly distinct in nature, mutually 
exclusive, and suspended in stasis. This is not fully the case in a Hegelian dialectic, 
                                                                
398 Clausewitz. Principles of War, p. 58 
399 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. VI, Ch. IX, p. 400 
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where the stasis is broken and rendered dynamic, that is, the two poles are naturally 
opposed and distinct, but nonetheless contain something of the other within them, a 
universality, which is the root of their Aufhebung. Or, as Hegel explained in his 
exploration of sense certainty, seeing emerged from having seen and then not having 
seeing, a universally valid outcome that results from the sublation of the 
opposition.400  
Clausewitz identifies two examples of such inherent elements of universality 
in Book VIII, chapter 3. First, he explains that ‘results’ (or ‘success in H/P 
translation) in war can also be understood as having an absolute form and a real form, 
which are perceived as either the larger goals of war or the pursuit of minor 
advantages.401 The second is the ‘use of force’, which once again would lead to 
maximum use in the absolute, but is historically demonstrated to be always limited, 
more so at times, less so at other times. Clausewitz uses these two examples to bring 
forward the intrinsic (or internal) coherence [innerer Zusammenhang] which exists 
between the two categories of war. The term serves as the title of this section and 
again is a very telling word choice, which is lost in translation. Hegel was the first to 
try to demonstrate this concept, innerer Zusammenhang, as it exists in history,402 that 
is to say, as something dynamic, not static.  
If we were to use Aron’s criteria in our basis upon which to gauge the 
Hegelian influence, we would find that in the case of the ‘real’ and the ‘absolute’ 
dichotomy, and the development of its universals, leading to its complete form 
‘continuation of policy’ passes the test easily. In attempting to reconcile the two, 
Clausewitz makes a dialectical advance where ‘what has been surpassed is also 
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preserved’ or as Aron proposed, where the second term would negate the first, and the 
third term would represent a superior conceptual or historical plateau, upon which a 
new triad can emerge.403 By arriving at the conclusion that ‘war is nothing but a 
continuation of political intercourse, with an mixture of other means,’404 Clausewitz 
found that in both absolute and real war, this same idea remains valid, without 
invalidating the notions inherent to either of the previous constructs nor those features 
which are inherent to both. This very contradiction and its resolution did in fact 
generate a new plateau: the unitary truth of war conceptualized as an ‘instrument of 
policy’ which ‘neutralizes’ the contradiction.405  
In the first paragraph of Book VIII, Ch. 6-B, Clausewitz is not proposing an 
end in the philosophical exploration, but a new the beginning: it completes, or brings 
to a close the ontological aspects of war and its categorization, and moves the reader 
into a distinct realm, that of ethics, which emerges from the ontological analysis while 
also encompassing it: it is a higher realm. Indeed, while understanding war as 
‘absolute’ or ‘real’ implies a mechanical understanding regarding ‘how’ wars are 
fought, the ‘continuation of policy’ leads us to new questions regarding ‘why’ wars 
are fought. The set of questions that emerges from passing from the ‘what’ to the 
‘why’ clearly marks a new conceptual plateau upon which to embark. When we enter 
the realm of ethics, new contradictions can and do indeed emerge. New dialectical 
reconciliations are thereafter also possible. Hence, for the exact same reason that the 
dialectical construct of defence-attack failed to pass Aron’s test; Clausewitz’s 
‘absolute’ / ‘real’ dichotomy rendering the idea of ‘war as a continuation of policy’ 
must pass: it represents a posited abstract idea, which is negated in the real and 
observed, and both of which combined are transcended in ‘policy’, or the ‘intelligence 
                                                                
403 Aron. Penser la guerre, Tome I, pp. 363-4 
404 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. VIII, Ch. ?-B, p 674 
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of the personified state’, which acts as a higher conceptual plateau where the ideal is 
actualized, and where the ethical realm or the moral responsibility for war resides.  
In fact, if we turn now to the language Clausewitz uses to described his 
sythesis of the real and the absolute, he uses the words ‘mere continuation’ [bloßes 
Fortsetzen], in the same that Hegel did, in his own discussion of synthetical 
outcomes, in the Science of Logic, in reply to Kant’s “7+5=12” demonstration that 
mathematics are synthetical rather than analytical (which we explored previously).  
Hegel explained that the synthetical realm is not in the least a transition from 
something to something different, but that it is the ‘mere continuation’ [bloßes 
Fortsetzen], a certain repetition of what is already set in its nature in the first place. 406 
 
‘Intelligence of the Personified State’ 
 
Though the reconciliation of ‘real’ and ‘absolute’ war as the ‘continuation of 
policy by other means’ did come to Clausewitz late in his life, one must not presume 
that this means, as some have argued,407 that Clausewitz introduced the question of 
war’s political nature in the final four years of writing On War. Nothing could be 
further from reality. From very early on, Clausewitz wrote about the problématique of 
war’s relation to the political; it was not a struggle that appeared later in life.408 That 
was not the problem. The difficulty was to find an appropriate way to formulate this 
underpinning into a coherent part of his theory. And this only happened much later. 
Having set himself the challenge of establishing a theory that did not base itself on 
                                                                
406 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 791 
407 See for example Heuser, Reading Clausewitz,  p. 41 
408 Jan Willem Honig, ‘Clausewitz and the Politics of Early Modern Warfare’, in Andreas Herberg-
Rothe, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran, eds, Clausewitz, the State and War (Stuttgart & New 
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presuppositions, but on objective fact; he could not simply assert the political nature 
of war as a given; he hoped to demonstrate it by extracting his impression from 
observation. The question followed him throughout his life. Though part of his 
solution would be move away from the idea of the ‘state’ towards using instead the 
concept of ‘Politik’, the question remained intact: was the ‘political’ the soul of war, 
or did it merely give life to war?409 What was the true relationship between war and 
politics? 
In the oldest text known to have been penned by Clausewitz, at a young age, 
we find him writing in a broken French and making the argument that one needed to 
distance oneself either from the ‘principles of the art of war’ or the ‘natural interests 
of states’, and that given the choice, he preferred sticking with the latter, since 
forgoing the first would imply losing the perfection in the form, whereas forgoing the 
second would deprive the student of war’s ‘soul’.  
  
Il faut ici s’éloigner un peu ou des principes de l’art de guerre ou de 
l’intérêt naturel des états; et j’aime mieux le premier [orig. deleted: 
‘dernier’] puisque ce n’est que la perfection de la forme, qui souffre 
par-là, tandis qu’en s’éloignant de l’intérêt naturel des états on prive 
les opérations de leur âme, de cette force qui doit leur donner la vie. 
L’histoire confirme bien cette opinion.410 
 
Here, we can clearly distinguish romantic rather than idealist influences in 
young Clausewitz’s conception of the state as having a ‘soul’ or personal 
                                                                
409 Idem. 
410 Clausewitz. ʻConsidérations sur la manière de faire la guerre à la Franceʼ [February 1801–October 
1805], cited by Jan Willem Honig. Clausewitz and the Politics of Early Modern Warfare, pp 1-2 
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unity.411 However imbued with the new German intellectual currents from the 
start, Clausewitz’s idea nonetheless surpassed its initial form as the seed grew 
over time, away from the ‘soul’ and towards something far closer to the one 
being developed concurrently by Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, where the 
state is understood as materialized rationality. In the final edit of Book I, or 
roughly in 1827, a mature Clausewitz explained that ‘[policy] we regard as the 
intelligence of the personified state.’412 In this case, it is indeed essential that 
we stick with the Graham translation, since Howard/Paret translate the original 
‘Denn betrachtet man die Politik wie die Intelligenz des personifizierten 
Staates’413 very liberally as ‘If the state is thought as a person, and policy as 
the product of its brain.’414  What is strikingly Hegelian in the formulation 
cannot be understood from the Howard/Paret translation, because it attempts to 
turn the idea into a mere bodily metaphor, whereas Clausewitz’s sentence, 
metaphorical as well in some ways, escapes the mere analogy with the body 
and proposes a stand-alone concept in which the words have a far greater 
significance when they are taken at face value. Knowing how careful and 
systematic Clausewitz usually was in his word choice, it is best to translate 
him without the type of deviation attempted by Howard/Paret, as they add the 
words ‘brain’ and ‘person’ to a text where these words do not appear in the 
first place.  
The ‘intelligence of the personified state’ appears in the later works of 
Clausewitz, not the early ones, and it corresponds closely to some of the mid to late 
works of Hegel as well. If we turn to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, we find that the 
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412 Clausewitz. On War, Bk. I, Ch. 1, p. 18 
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terms similarly constructed though not identical, where ‘policy’ and ‘intelligence’ are 
swapped for ‘wisdom’: 
 
The wisdom [Weisheit] of the government, the abstract intelligence 
[Verstand] of the universal will, in the fulfilling of itself. The 
government is itself nothing else but the self-established focus, or the 
individuality of the universal will. […] it excludes all other individuals 
from its act, and on the other hand, it thereby constitutes itself a 
government that is a specific will.415 
 
One may be tempted to argue that since Clausewitz was of the opinion that 
states are the sum of various competing intelligences,416 he could not share the idea 
that the state is the ‘individuality of the universal will’. However, this point is not 
inconsistent with Hegel’s position, as the paragraph quoted above goes on to discuss 
how the singular will rises to universality, but in effect generates ‘factions’ within the 
state as a result.417  
Whereas young Clausewitz’s concept of state has nothing particularly 
Hegelian to it, his mature concept of ‘policy’ as the ‘intelligence of the personified 
state’ does. Knowing just how ‘central’ this topic was to Aron’s interpretation of 
Clausewitz, as Murielle Cozette aptly shows,418 it is indeed all the more striking that 
he should have omitted the important Hegelian resonance. That being said, without a 
clear distinction between the younger and the older Clausewitz, in his analysis of it, 
                                                                
415 Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. Miller, p. 360  [note: I’ve used the Miller translation here 
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Aron does not provide himself with the necessary tool to perceive the full scale 
reversal. Early on in Clausewitz’s writing, the notion of the state is built on a 
metaphysical and emotional basis, this romantic idea of the ‘soul’. However, the later 
concept is freed from emotion, anchored in pure reason, and heavily imbued with the 





 In this chapter we considered a variety of examples that show in what ways 
the writings of Clausewitz evolved over time and how, in the final few years of his 
life, these changes were converging in very specific ways with the thoughts and ideas 
of Hegel. While it was not useful to the scope of this research project to pinpoint the 
influence, what this convergence allows us to do is read Clausewitz from a certain 
perspective which can illuminate aspects of his work that might otherwise not be as 
clear or intelligible otherwise. Understanding the similarities between Hegel and 
Clausewitz allows us to appreciate why certain systems of logic found in Clausewitz 
make sense and come together in the way that they do. This logic having been 
explained in the works of Hegel, and in Chapter 1 above, they help us clarify how 
Clausewitz’s system sustains paradoxes logically.  
 Herberg-Rothe reminds us that Clausewitz made the point that ‘theory and 
reality correspond to one another’,419 and this is indeed a significant aspect of 
Clausewitz’s predisposition. Like Hegel, his theory is meant to bring together the real 
world and the world of ideas, rather than leaving them apart, and in statis. The fluidity 
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between how the idea of absolute war becomes materialized in varying manifestations 
of real war is precisely how his dialectical system shows itself to be post-Kantian to a 
degree. This same process or bridging the gap between the ideal and its actuality 
occurs again in Clausewitz’s new conceptualization of the state as a personified 
intelligence. In both case, we are perceiving a convergence with Hegel’s what is 
rational is actual and what is actual is rational, and we find ourselves positioning 
Clausewitz one same side as Hegel, with regard to the latter’s argument against Kant, 
mentioned earlier, that the abstract world of ideas is not external to the real world 
since it must first be ‘posited’ by actual thought.  
 As we move now into the next chapter, we will consider how this convergence 
rises in scope and gets particularly concentrated in a single place, Book I, Chapter I, 
the final section of On War written. Yet this very process of pinpointing an area in On 
War will also clarify where the links end and where a clash arises. This chapter’s 
purpose was to widen the debate and open it up, but the next chapter will propose that 









Chapter 3 – Clausewitz and Hegel: The 
Convergence Peaks in On War’s Book I, 






As was mentioned earlier, what is surprising in the way Hegel and Clausewitz 
overlap is that even though this is increasingly apparent as we move from reading a 
younger to an older Clausewitz, in the end, it is at this very nexus that the two arrive 
at their greatest disagreement. In this chapter, in order to appreciate the extent to 
which there are similarities, we will look at word choices and the order in which 
concepts and ideas are developed in the very last sections that Clausewitz wrote and 
edited in On War relative to the works of Hegel. However, we will be forced to notice 
that as the resemblances become altogether uncanny, something is still missing. There 
is a final leap that Clausewitz does not make in his approach, and it is this that leads 
him to opposite conclusions on ethics. The problem is that the two authors understood 
the terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ differently and this caused an impasse 
between what each concluded from what they observed. While this could be 
explained by the fact that Clausewitz made an informed and deliberate decision not to 
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follow suit, one other possibility worth noting is that he did not have the right 
understanding of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ to arrive at the same notion.  
In the final section of this chapter, we will consider, as we did above with 
Hegel, what limits there are to Clausewitz’s ‘instrumentality’, especially at the 
threshold of modern technology and revolutionary warfare. The chapter will ask, how 
far can we take instrumentality as a justification for war before its inner-logic begins 
to crumble upon itself? From this point, it will be possible, in the subsequent chapter 
to consider both the critiques of ‘instrumentality’ and ‘right’ in parallel. 
 
Book I, Chapter 1 and the ‘Wondrous’ Trinity 
 
 
One of the frustrations scholars might come across when they attempt to 
demonstrate the ‘influence’ of Hegel on Clausewitz is that if a learning curve or a 
crisis did occur in the late 1820s, it should be most apparent in Book I, Chapter 1 of 
On War, since it was the culmination of the new ideas that Clausewitz had in mind in 
revising his entire opus. For the most part, however, this does not happen – at least 
not on the surface. Book I, Chapter I is not constructed as a dialectical exploration. 
There is nothing particularly Hegelian in its form with regard to methodology.  This 
section of On War is not an argumentative one, but an assertive one. It front-loads all 
of Clausewitz’s major conclusions, but these will not be explained and demonstrated 
until we read the other seven books. To perceive a convergence with the ideas of 
Hegel, one cannot merely look to the conclusions found in Book I, Chapter 1, because 
what makes them similar to Hegel is not what they posit, but how Clausewitz got 
there in his argument, and this only happens in Books VI and VIII.   
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That being said, even if the method and style of the chapter are of little help, 
what is significant to the argument for a convergence between the ideas of the two 
authors is that all four observations in the previous chapter do in fact come together, 
side by side in Book I, Ch. 1: the ideas of ‘inner connection’ and Spirit from the 
editorial note; a distancing from Montesquieu; a conception of politics as materialized 
reason or the personification of intelligence; the relationship between real and 
absolute war coming together as the continuation of politics by other means.  These 
ideas, as we shall consider in more detail below, are all reciprocated elsewhere in the 
final books of On War. They are not conceived for the first time in Book I Chapter 1, 
but are in fact ideas that we come across in Books VI and VIII, which Clausewitz 
presents in his introduction, without fully spelling out in these early pages the logic by 
which he arrives at them.. 
There is however one important exception to this connection between the two 
last books, the late editorial notes, and the introduction. One idea brought forward in 
Book I, Ch. 1 is set there alone, and it does not reappear anywhere else in On War. 
And since it is the concluding subsection of this first chapter of On War, it could well 
be the very last thing written by Clausewitz in On War, before sealing the draft and 
heading off to what would be his last mission for the Prussian Army. In fact, the last 
known draft of Book 1 Chapter 1 is almost identical to the published version, but it 
did not contain this passage,420 further evidence that this was the last addition. The 
passage in question is so significant to Clausewitz that he refers to it, and only it, as 
his ‘Consequences for Theory’, though for most readers it has become known not by 
this header, but for its description of war as a ‘wondrous trinity.’421  
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been referred to ‘remarkable’ and ‘paradoxical’ (Paret), wonderful (Graham), fascinating (Bassford). 
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The purpose of showing similarities in the concepts and constructs of 
Clausewitz’s trinity and the work of Hegel, is again not to speak of influences, but to 
focus on what meaning can be drawn when we contextualize this part of On War, 
within the metaphysical debates. It will become clear that the use of a mystical term, 
the use of a reference to godliness in his discussion of war’s nature is part of a larger 
frame of analysis where a holistic method is drawn in, which encapsulates and brings 
greater meaning to the role of ‘pure reason’ in its strained, but necessary relation with 
the blind instincts of violence. Placing a Hegelian lens to our analysis of the trinity 
clarifies the relationships between its three parts, which cease to appear as a 
subjective set of assumptions made by Clausewitz, to a more objective exploration of 
his topic.   
 Before moving into this standalone trinity, let us first take the time to show 
how the other four ideas come together in Book I, Ch 1, which confirms what would 
be expected from the last section written by Clausewitz. This forms the basis of a 
compromise between those who are seeking a Hegelian influence but who are 
disappointed by not finding the clues of it where it should be most evident, the 
culmination of Clausewitz’s work, and those who deny the influence on this very 
basis. The reality is not so categorical. Hegelian methodology is not necessary in 
Book I Ch 1 to speak of converging ideas between the two, insofar as the other half of 
each of the suggestive ideas is actually developed within such a methodological 
framework elsewhere in On War.   
With regard to the ideas developed in the editorial note, the very first sentence 
of On War recalls some of the language we find in it, as well as the themes that recur 
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in the works of Hegel, with regard to ‘inner connections’ and relation of the whole to 
the particular. Like Hegel, Clausewitz has set his sight on the whole, but intends on 
building up to it from the simple to the complex, as a progression of interconnections. 
Clausewitz wrote: 
 
We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then 
each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations 
[inneren Zusammenhange]—therefore to advance from the simple to 
the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at 
the nature of the whole [das Wesen des Ganzen anzufangen], because it 
is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts the 
whole should be kept constantly in view. 
 
 This passage relates closely to the ideas cited in the editorial note, but more so 
to the two paragraphs that precede the excerpt chosen above, in which Clausewitz 
explains that generals, in planning war, have the hardest time in determining the 
proper course of action because of war’s dual concepts, which sends contradicting 
signals, which at times leads generals to choose actions out of merger of diverging 
opinions at either extreme, which wind up producing ‘a middle-course without any 
real value.’422  His solution to this problem is, unsurprisingly, to establish ‘clear 
conceptions’ of these inner connections [inneren Zusammenhange]’423 
Only in this context can Clausewitz speak of the ‘intelligence of the 
personified state’, which appears in this phrase in Book I, Ch. 1., as the definition 
upon which to ground later discussions regarding the political nature of war.  
                                                                
422 Clausewitz, On War, Editorial Note, p. XXXIX  
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 …if we regard the state policy as the intelligence of the personified 
state, then amongst all the constellations in the political sky which it 
has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of 
its relations imposes the necessity of a great war.424 
 
If the difficulty of determining a logical course of action in war is the result of 
the tensions between war’s real and absolute forms, leading to contradicting signals 
and bad decisions, it explains why Clausewitz would hope or expect that the state 
should be infused with the enough rationality and intelligence to comprehend the 
matter and ‘compute’ good policy in the face of great wars. His problem statement 
leads directly to his solution. 
With regard to the tensions in war’s dual concepts, again we find that Book I, 
Chapter 1 has integrated the later conception of the absolute and the real, which 
places the absolute squarely in the realm of the totally conceptual:  
 
If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of war an 
absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means 
which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve 
us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced 
by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If adhering closely 
to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, 
and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must 
be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, 
                                                                
424 Clausewitz, On War, Bk I, Ch. 1, p. 18 
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such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any 
means adapted to the real world.425 
 
Moving from the simple to the complex, from the particular to the whole, as 
promised in the opening paragraph, Book I, Chapter 1 builds up the argument until 
the dual concepts of war culminates into the formula ‘war is the continuation of 
policy by other means’. While this might be perceived as a sufficiently holistic 
concept for war, because it encompasses the inner logic of war as the reciprocation of 
extremes and its instrumentalization in policy, Clausewitz does not end his 
introduction here, but having put forward ‘policy’ as a product of intelligence, he ends 
on war’s subjugation to ‘pure reason’ [Verstande] itself, and frames this in a most 
holistic fashion, ending on what appears to be an analogy that draws in the divine 
with his ‘wondrous trinity’. When we contextualize this idea within its dialectical 
methodology, the choice of words ceases to be a superficial analogy, but actually fits 
within a system of logic where the progression of the simple to the complex is never 
complete until it has encompassed the universal absolute: God. The holistic 
methodology can only end in the divine, and unsurprisingly for Christians like Hegel 
and Clausewitz, this divinity is constructed in a Trinitarian tradition.  The trinity thus 
appears as ‘a unified, comprehensive concept from Clausewitz’s different and in part 
contradictory definitions, terms and formula.’426 
This coming together of contradictions in the trinity is Clausewitz’s attempt at 
a holistic representation of war. In it, he describes war as the sum and interrelations of 
three sides [Seiten]: 1) ‘the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, 
which may be looked upon as blind instinct; 2) the play of probabilities and chance, 
                                                                
425 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 5 
426 Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous Trinity’ Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political 
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which make it a free activity of the soul; 3) and the subordinate nature of a political 
instrument, by which it belongs purely to reason.’427 Clausewitz explains that ‘The 
first of these three phases concerns more the people, the second, more the General and 
his Army; the third, more the Government.’428 The third element of the trinity, 
Strachan argues ‘became particularly important to [Clausewitz’s] mental baggage, in 
that it both supplied the unifying purpose to On War and restrained absolute war’.429 
It might be more appropriate not to say ‘it became’, but rather had been latent and on 
Clausewitz’s mind for many years, but now Clausewitz had finally discovered the 
best language and method to express his idea. What is crucial in Strachan’s 
observation is the relationship between unifying the whole, while also containing the 
absolute.  This represents the difficulty with holism, and the means by which both 
Hegel and Clausewitz attempt to resolve it is to channel the divine in their work. 
Indeed, if the trinity converges with Hegelian thought in such general ways, what is 
interesting to us is just how precisely it also does in its presentation, its ordering, and 
word choices, which seems to come together as a culmination of a holistic method for 
which Hegel has been both praised and scorned. 
 In his article on the trinity, Herberg-Rothe also turns to Hegel to guide his 
reflexions on the matter, but before doing this, he offers readers of the trinity a 
interesting problem to consider, when he states that ‘it is not easy to explain how 
Clausewitz, in his wondrous trinity, can on the one hand repeat the primacy of politics 
in war, while simultaneously stressing that this primacy is just one facet of three 
tendencies, from which every war in its own particular way and means is composed. 
                                                                
427 Clausewitz, On War, p. 19 [note: for clarity, I have removed the word ‘of’ which precedes each of 
the three clauses, also, the Graham translation ends on ‘… pure to the reason’, here the word ‘the’ is 
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The problem lies with how to reconcile the purposive rationality of war (‘pure 
reason’) with the first tendency – the primordial violence of war that is to be regarded 
as a blind natural force.’430 
Herberg-Rothe argues that while one might attempt to solve this problem by 
imposing a strict hierarchy on the trinity, this would contradict Clausewitz’s picture, 
while the second option, to seek a solution as the opposition between the real and the 
absolute (Aron, Heuser, Gat) leads to the ‘unpleasant consequence’ of rejecting 
Clausewitz’s ‘ideal conception’ of war, and, at least in the case of Aron, awarding 
validity exclusively to Book I, Chapter 1, at the expense of the rest of On War. 
Herberg-Rothe offers an interesting third way forward, which consists of 
understanding the trinity as a ‘methodological starting point’ which allows him to 
avoid contradictions,431 as he pursues his objective to deduce from the trinity a 
‘differentiated coordinate system’432   
While the system he proposes is a useful tool for understanding and applying 
the trinity, and his assumption that it represents a ‘starting point’ is a far better 
alternative to the two problems he describes, for which reason he proposes his third 
way forward, it is not without problem. What we should instead consider is not a 
‘fourth’ way forward, but rather a single, one way backward, to the origin of the idea, 
which would in fact replace in the process all three approaches with a single logic that 
appears closer in spirit to what Clausewitz wrote, for one simple reason: the trinity 
was not presented by Clausewitz as a ‘beginning’ at all. It is the end point of his 
reflection, the culmination of his idea. Far from wanting it to be easily broken down 
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into ‘coordinates’ and parts, or dichotomies, Clausewitz’s trinity is meant to embody 
the whole, It is unbreakable and complete. 
The trouble is that Herberg-Rothe is right to look to Hegel for answers, but he 
does not turn to the right area of his works to uncover the key to the ‘wondrous 
trinity’s’ secrets. It is not enough to show that there are contradictions, or that every 
statement requires a counter-statement, or weights and counter-weights, which is how 
Herberg-Rothe introduces a similarity with Hegel.433 Contradictions are indeed a 
feature of dialectical thinking, but they are not an end in itsef; they serve a purpose 
forward. In the case of Hegel, what distinguishes his dialectical methods from all 
others is precisely this: that his system is not mere contradiction, but the overcoming 
of contradictions, which instead of producing various halves that are isolated and in 
stasis, generates a whole that is in constant flux.  The trinity’s similarity with 
Hegel’s work is not that is has contradictions, but that it contains within itself three 
‘moments’ that build themselves as a process of sublimating each preceding part, 
from a subjective chaos, to its objective ordering, to its self-reflection (objectivity as 
the result of the subjective reflecting the subjective) and integration into ‘pure reason’ 
in the case of Clausewtiz, or Geist in the words of Hegel. To be clear, Hegel was quite 
adamant about the importance of splitting apart the appearance of contradictions from 
contradictory outcomes or ends [I am jumping ahead with this excerpt from Hegel’s 
Logic, but we will come back to this text later, and build up to it appropriately.] ‘It is 
a mistake’, Hegel explained, ‘to think that it is reason which is in contradiction with 
itself; it does not recognize that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason 
above the limitations of understanding and the resolving of them.’434 This three-way 
process of Hegel’s is best further developed in the Science of Logic, where each 
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chapter builds up in this way towards the final chapter, entitled ‘The Notion’ 
[Begriff], which is whole, history reflected, God, in fact. When Clausewitz wrote his 
trinity using a nearly identical sequence of triadic logic he described it, perhaps 
unsurprisingly as ‘The Notion of War’ [Begriff vom Krieg] as well.435 
In both Hegel and Clausewitz, their references to ‘Begriff’ encompass or bring 
forth the subject of divinity, because they are coming from a perspective that does not 
allow for a world of ideas to exist outside the real realm, as was mentioned earlier in 
our discussion of Gat’s work on the question. Therefore, to engage in a holistic 
argument, they must consider the materiality of the divine. When we study how the 
metaphysics influenced war studies, we are always confronted with a return to 
theological arguments. Interestingly, what comes to the front, as we explore 
Clausewitz’s divinity is that it is built up methodologically in ways that are identical 
to what Hegel developed in his Lectures of the Philosophy of History, given at the 
University of Berlin during the 1820s. The problem, however, in turning to this text to 
argue a link with Clausewitz is that it is not particularly convincing, for the simple 
reason that the book itself wasn’t published until six years after both philosophers 
died. That being said, these lectures were without a doubt the talk of town in Berlin’s 
academic circles throughout most of the 13 years that Clausewitz spent as 
Commander of the War College. First delivered in 1821, and then again in 1824, 
1827, and 1830, Hegel’s lectures were well-attended and many copies of detailed 
notes taken by students were in circulation, as several of these were in fact integrated 
into the first publication of Hegel’s lecturing notes.436 These were Hegel’s glory 
years: he was appointed Rector of the University of Berlin as a result of the lectures 
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and was soon thereafter also decorated by the King for services rendered to the 
nation.437  
Did Clausewitz attend the lecture in 1827? Would that explain the sudden 
‘rupture’ in his thought? One can only speculate. Did Clausewitz discuss the topics 
with colleagues and friends? Did he come across the notes?  While this remains 
uncertain, what we do know is that one of the students at the War Academy while 
Clausewitz was Commander, and a friend of Clausewitz’s according to Creusinger, 
Gustav von Griesheim, was given the permission to audit Hegel’s lectures happening 
at the University of Berlin. The student was commended by Hegel himself for the 
accuracy of his notes, and to this day they serve as the basis for some of the editions 
of these lectures.438  
To be clear, the intention here is not to claim that Clausewitz read the notes or 
attended the event, but it is clear that had he wanted to, he would have had easy 
access to them. Rather, it is for the sake of clarity that it is useful to show the 
converging elements between Clausewitz’s work and the ideas found in the ideas in 
the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, because while the central tenants were 
written elsewhere and earlier in the works of Hegel, it is here that they are easiest to 
grasp. The incursion into the Philosophy of History can be taken as a heuristic tool, to 
help explain the method that leads Hegel to also build a trinity that consists of natural 
passions, war and historical events, subsumed in pure reason, in this very same order, 
like the structures and ideas as they appear in Clausewitz’s trinity. If indeed the origin 
of the converging ideas were caused by Clausewitz actually reading Hegel’s 
published rather than the unpublished notes taken by Greisheim, then one would have 
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to turn their attention to another, earlier book, the Science of Logic, where many of 
the ideas put forward in the Philosophy of History in a more crisp and clear way had 
already been observed, albeit in a more abstract language. These passages were 
published years earlier in 1812. All the methodological underpinnings of the triadic 
moments that make up the ‘divine’, which Hegel later drew out in Philosophy of 
History, were already established in the Science of Logic. 
That being said, before anyone should get too excited about seeing ‘threes’ 
everywhere, and jumping on a sudden urge to claim convergence between Hegel and 
Clausewitz, it is important to stress that a mere number, and a fairly commonly-used 
number at that, is clearly not sufficient to draw parallels. Christopher Bassford is right 
to point us away from the numerological interpretation that Clausewitz might have 
been obsessed, as others have been with the number three, in generating his trinity,439 
this part of On War is far too entwined with pure reason to find itself suddenly 
ingrossed with magic and superstition. That being said, when we consider the source 
of dialectical reasoning in the metaphysical debates of the Enlightenment, we are 
forced away from Bassford’s tossing aside of the mystical root to the trinity. Bassford 
argues that viewing the ‘trinity as evidence of mysticism’ is a fault caused by 
traditional, linear thought, people who have a ‘Newtonian world view, who are 
baffled by Clausewtiz’s obsession with chance, unpredictability, and 
disproportionality in the cause-effect relationship’.440 Contexualizing the trinity in 
relation to similar methods found in Hegel suggests rather that the mystical is central, 
not because it is magical, but quite the opposite, because rationality is itself the 
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mystical or spiritual realm. The reference to the mystical realm of the trinity is a 
means to anchor the trinity into a holistic philosophical system, where pure reason 
gives meaning and vitality to events in history such as war, and attempts to direct it 
and guide it, but is ultimately only confronted with its building blocks which are 
passions that may offer pull back and resistence to this very rationality pushing 
forward. As Bassford explains, the trinity in Clausewitz can be described, in more 
abstract terms, as a triad representing ‘irrationality/non-rationality/rationality,’ for 
which it is important to note that the final term ‘bloßen Verstande’ must be 
understood as ‘pure reason’ and not, as Howard & Paret wrote, ‘only reason,’441 this 
loses entirely its philosophical connotation in the German philosophical tradition. It 
might be even truer to the spirit of German thought to use the word ‘intelligence’ 
itself as the closest approximation of the word ‘Verstande’, which is the choice made 
by A.V. Miller in his well-received translations of Hegel.   
The fact that the trinity is presented directly after, and in counterpose to the 
description of war as a ‘chameleon’ is important because it allows Clausewitz to spell 
out first the fact that wars seem highly adaptable and constantly changing, but in fact, 
these changes are superficial, mere skin color changes, but in reality, the core itself is 
unchanging. Clausewitz’s trinity is the complete opposite of this: it represents a 
universal and absolute configuration for the nature of war that allows for continual 
fluctuations within a system that is itself unchanging. The chameleon is a 
manifestation of variable forms, but the trinity is the true essence and its underlying 
material form. It is ‘all-inclusive and universal’442, containing within it all the shades 
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and colours which the chameleon has taken before, can take today, and might take 
tomorrow. 
It is important to recall that the study of God in the post-Kantian context, and 
in particular in Hegel sets itself on a completely different plane of analysis than what 
was found among the earlier empiricists and theologians who sought out 
demonstration in deducing the divine, the Causa Prima, from the observation of God’s 
effect in the world. In his introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel presents 
the divine as a God who ‘governs the world, [where] the actual working of his 
government – the carrying out of his plan – is the History of the World.’443 In the 
same way, Clausewitz’s deity is also expressed as the ‘giving laws’ governing when 
describes the trinity, ‘these three tendencies, which appear like so many different 
lawgivers’.444 For Hegel, God is described in these words: ‘This essential being is the 
union of the subjective with the rational Will: it is the moral Whole, the State, which 
is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the 
condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the 
Whole.’445 Hegel’s God is understood as progression of the universe from from 
irrationality, to non-rationality, to rationality, as a historical process consisting of the 
following three moments: 
 
1) The abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit 
2) What means Spirit uses in order to realize its Idea 
3) Lastly, we must consider the shape which the perfect 
embodimentof Spirit assumes446 
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We can right away identify a preliminary similarity between this and 
Clausewitz’s trinity, since the latter also integrates first what is latent, to how it is 
utilized, to how it is integrated and subsumed in pure reason or Spirit. However, we 
must go deeper into each of the three parts in order to uncover the extent to which the 
above three are parallel to Clausewitz’s trinity not only as a whole, but also, in each 
individual part. Hegel understood the passions of man as the means through which 
reason actualizes itself in history,447 and indeed, this forms the first of the three 
moments, ‘abstract characteristics’:  
 
 The state of nature is therefore, predominantly that of injustice and 
violence, of untamed natural impulses [Naturtrieb], of inhuman deeds 
and feelings. Limitation is certainly produced by society and the 
state, but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude 
instincts; as also in a more advanced stage of culture, of the 
premeditated self-will of caprice and passion. This kind of constraint 
is part of the instrumentality by which only, the consciousness of 
Freedom and the desire for its attainment, in its true – that is rational 
and ideal form – can be obtained.448 
 
 When Clausewitz described the first ‘side’ in his own trinity, he also used the 
term ‘Naturtrieb’ and spoke of this aspect of war as composed of blind passions and 
violence.449 There is something animal and inhuman to both the first moments of the 
                                                                
447 Schlomo Avineri,  The Instrumentality of Passion in the World of Reason: Hegel and Marx: 
Political Theory, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Nov., 1973), p. 390 
448 Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 40-41 
449 Clausewitz, On War, Bk I, Ch 1, p. 19 
293 
 
triads described in Hegel and Clausewitz divinities, but ultimately, this animal 
behavior will fall prey to reason [bloßen Verstande anheimfällt]450, and in fact gets 
‘instrumentalized’ in the process, writes Hegel, above. The same finality is at the 
heart of Clausewitz’s trinity, but beyond this end, the means to achieving it also 
converge.  
Before reaching their third moment, in which reason instrumentalizes these 
passions, both Clausewitz and Hegel present war itself and its generals as the 
objectification or ordering mechanism that emerges from the chaos of passions. 
Whereas Clausewitz’s second moment is presented as the place of armies and 
generals in the equation, Hegel’s second moment is the section of the Philosophy of 
History in which he describes the role played by ‘world-historical people’ such as 
Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon.451 Their roles are presented as a disciplining of 
passions, the means by which Spirit uses in attaining its aims, ‘Passion,’ Hegel writes, 
‘is regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to 
have no passions.’452 By negating passions and structuring violence teologically, it 
becomes possible to imagine how pure reason could in fact instrumentalize it. For it 
would be impossible for reason to impose itself simply on the chaos of passions, these 
passions must be structured before reason can make anything of them. The third 
moment could not possibly exist in either Hegel or Clausewitz’s trinities were it not 
for this second moment that renders passions ‘manageable’ in the first place. But 
there could be no managing of violence if it were not for its ‘latent’453 existence 
which is the first moment. The three moments are indeed inseparable. This process of 
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instrumentalization is what Hegel refers to the ‘cunning of reason,’454 because it 
seems counterintuitive that events that appear irrational, like war and blind passionate 
violence, could be contributing to manifesting reason to the world. What Hegel meant 
by this is that ‘history fulfils its ulterior rational designs in an indirect and sly manor. 
It does so by calling into play the irrational element in human nature, the passions.’455  
Thanks to presence of the term ‘cunning of reason’ in the Philsopohy of 
History we can clearly recognize its direct reference to the Science of Logic456, in 
which  Hegel uses the term his chapter on Teleology, which has as its purpose to 
determine whether or not ‘absolute determines itself in accordance with ends.’457 In 
the first phrase of the chapter, Hegel explains that ‘where purposiveness is discerned, 
an intelligence [Verstand] is assumed as its author, and for the end we therefore 
demand the Notion’s own free Existence’.458 In Clausewitz, this freedom of spirit 
theme also appears, when in the second moment of his trinity, he describe war as the 
‘free activity of the soul’.459 
If the Philosophy of History provides us with a less conceptual, and easier to 
grasp similarities with Clausewitz’s trinity, it remains essential for us to return to the 
Science of Logic to appreciate the way Book I, Chapter 1 does in fact take on a 
Hegelian form, not generally, but near the end when it leads into the final section 
‘Consequences for Theory.’ Interestingly, the final segment right before Hegel 
reaches his own trinity has yet another particularity that may surprise readers of 
Clausewitz who are familiar with his famous quote with regard to war’s grammar and 
logic, which, though it does not appear directly in Book I, Ch 1, nonetheless does so 
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in an indirect manner, at very same place, in fact. Before Clausewitz jumps into his 
trinity, his last order of business in the introduction is to define war as the 
continuation of policy. The chapter in On War that deals with this particular subject, 
‘War is an Instrument of Policy’ (Book VIII, Chapter 6-B), is where Clausewitz 
brings up the topic of logic and grammar. He wrote:  
 
Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political 
thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not 
peculiar to itself. Accordingly, war can never be separated from political 
intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any 
way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, 
broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.460 
 
By ‘logic,’ Clausewitz meant the ‘set of rules that govern reasoning […] 
likened to the accepted set of imperatives, principles, or customs governing political 
intercourse, all of which shape the conceptual limits of strategy.’461 As for the 
‘grammar’, which are rules regarding oral and written communications, Echevarria 
explains that these should be understood as the ‘military principles, rules, or 
procedures that govern the use of armed force.’462 
 The final two pages of the introduction to the Science of Logic, before 
breaking off into a final sub-header in which he introduced Begriff as a trinity, Hegel 
                                                                
460 Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII, Ch. 6-B 
461 Antulio Echevarria. Reconsidering War's Logic and Grammar, Infinity Journal, Issue 2, Spring 
2011. (reproduced on www.clausewitz.com) 
462 Antulio Echevarria. Reconsidering War's Logic and Grammar, Infinity Journal, Issue 2, Spring 
2011. (reproduced on www.clausewitz.com) 
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differentiated between ‘logic’ and ‘grammar’ and settled their relationship to one 
another as follows:   
 
‘He who begins with the study of grammar finds in its form an isolated 
collection of definitions and terms which exhibit only the value and 
significance of what is implied in their immediate meaning; there is 
nothing to be known in them other than themselves. […] Through the 
grammar, he can recognize the expression of mind [Geist] as such, that 
is, logic. […] The first acquaintance with logic confines its significance 
to itself alone; its content passes only for a detached occupation with the 
determinations of thought, alongside which other scientific activities 
possess on their own account a matter and content of their own, on 
which logic may have a formal influence, though an influence which 
comes only from itself and which if necessary can of course also be 
dispensed with so far as the scientific structure and its study are 
concerned.’463 
   
 More significantly, though, as we read on, we uncover in the introduction to 
the Science of Logic that Hegel also builds his argument up to similar ends. In the 
final subsection of the introduction, right after having discussed the grammar and 
logic, but before developing the triadic Notion, he brings in the divine into the 
equation, which is then developed in its detail in the upcoming section entitled the 
‘General Division of Logic’. Hegel arrives at the same ultimate result as Clausewitz, 
dividing his ‘Notion’ into three interconnected, syllogical moments, but not without 
                                                                
463 Hegel, The Science of Logic, p. 57-58 
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first by contextualizing this trinity in divine terminology, ‘The soul, the world, and 
God,’464 which he then breaks down into three moments of development 
1) The logic of being 
2) The logic of essence, and 
3) The logic of the Notion465 
 
The three for a forward relationship from the latent and subjective, through its 
objective realization, and finally incorporated and self-reflected as pure reason. As 
Duquette explains,  
 
‘…into three parts: the subjective notion, the objective notion, and the 
idea which articulates the unity of subjective and objective’. The first 
part, the subjective notion, contains three “moments” or functional 
parts: universality, particularity, and individuality (¶ 163ff). These are 
particularly important as Hegel will show how the functional parts of 
the state operate according to a progressive “dialectical” movement 
from the first to the third moments and how the state as a whole, as a 
functioning and integrated totality, gives expression to the concept of 
individuality (in ¶198 Hegel refers to the state as “a system of three 
syllogisms”). Hegel treats these relationships as logical judgments and 
syllogisms but they do not merely articulate how the mind must operate 
(subjectivity) but also explain actual relationships in reality 
(objectivity).’ 466  
                                                                
464 Hegel, The Science of Logic, p. 63 
465 Hegel, The Science of Logic, p. 64 
466 Duquette, David A. Biography of Hegel, peer-reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 




Clausewitz’s trinity is precisely this, a system of three syllogisms, which is to 
say, three distinct conclusions or inferences, built into internal contradictions or 
oppositions, which exist in parallel and reinforce one another or build upon one 
another.  In this context, the state as an invididual actor can indeed be ‘personified’, 
but more importantly, it achieves this end only because it is ‘animated by Spirit’467 in 
the first place. What’s important, however is that such a system of syllogisms is 
necessarily a relational thing, rather than a set of three fix items floating 
independently from one another. As Hegel explains:  
 
According to the relation by which the subjective end is united with 
objectivity, both premises alike – the relation of the object determined as 
means to the still external object, and the relation of the subjective end 
to the object which is made means – are immediate relations.468  
 
Both Hegel and Clausewitz perceive their trinities as relational rather than as 
standalone ideas. Clausewitz refers to this twice in his discussion of the trinity, as he 
introduces it, writing that war, ‘in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in 
it, a wonderful trinity,’ which is followed up later, in the concluding remarks, ‘any 
arbitrary relation between them, would immediately become involved in such a 
contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that 
alone.’469  
These relations between the three moments clarify the process of 
instrumentalization for which the ‘Teleology’ chapter in the Science of Logic is the 
                                                                
467 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 50 
468 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 749 
469 Clausewitz, On War, p. 19 
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core argument, where Hegel understands teleology  as the very process by which ‘we 
make our ascent to the Absolute Idea,’470 which is in effect the end goal of the book, 
it is the whole, it is the Soul of the world. If the first moment, as we saw, represented 
what nature has dealt us, subjectively, and the second, how this was negated into 
objectivity through it instrumentalization, the third moment, in which pure reason is 
self-reflected in the process is also in itself the neutralization of the instrument, the 
fact that the instrument cannot exist alone:  
 
‘The means has no power of resistance against the end, as it has in the 
first instance against another immediate object […] it is a neutral and 
also as a different object, no longer self-subsistent. Its lack of self-
subsistence consists precisely in its being only in itself the totality of 
the Notion, but the latter is a being-for-itself. Consequently the object 
has the character of being powerless against the end and of serving it; 
the end is the object’s subjectivity or soul, that has in the object its 
external side. 
 
‘The object, being in this manner immediately subjected to the end, is 
not an extreme of the syllogism; but this relation constitutes one of its 
premises. But the means has also a side from which it still has self-
subsistence as against the end. The objectivity that is connected with 
the end in the means is still external to it, because it is only 
immediately so connected; and therefore the presupposition still 
persists. The activity of the end through the means is for that reason 
                                                                
470 J. N. Findlay, Hegel Today, Vol. 48, No. 1, (January, 1964), p. 8 
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still directed against this presupposition, and the end is activity and no 
longer merely an urge and a striving, precisely because the moment of 
objectivity is posited in the means in its determinateness as something 
external, and the simple unity [Einheit] of the Notion now has this 
objectivity as such in itself. 471 
 
The two paragraphs are the final parts of Hegel’s second moment in the 
Teleology chapter, the instrument itself, which exists at the middle ground between 
the blind passions of the first moment, and the pure reason of the third. In Clausewitz, 
this is the instrumental part of his trinity as well, the play of chances and the roles of 
generals and armies. When we consider that at the end of his Teleogy chapter, Hegel 
arrives almost exactly at the same conclusion as Clausewitz, who wrote in the Trinity 
that war was the ‘subordinate’472, but more strikingly, in his discussion of ‘War as an 
Instrument of Policy’ (Book VII, Ch 6-B), reaffirms that this ‘unity’ [Einheit] or the 
reconciliation of ‘absolute’ and ‘real’ war as lacking independence and being subdued 
despite its power: 
 
‘This unity [Einheit] is the conception that war is only a part of 
political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in 
itself […] policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a 
mere instrument.’ 473 
 
Finding such overlap between concepts in the Teleology and On War is highly 
significant because ‘The teleology of Hegel’s thought differentiates him from all the 
                                                                
471 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 745 
472 Clausewitz, On War, Bk I, Ch 1, p. 19 
473 Clausewitz, On War, Bk VIII, Ch 6-B, p. 674 
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philosophers.’474 What this suggests in our study of Hegel and Clausewitz, is that the 
only way for Clausewitz to have achieved similar thinking is to have come up with it 
himself, because he would not have found this anywhere else in philosophical 
literature. Either Clausewitz was directly influenced by Hegel, or else he was 
developing on his own, highly similar pattern of thinking. Either way, the logical 
constructs, when we understand them in this light, provide us with a more complete 
understanding not only of their meaning, but in what sense they are internally 
coherent, because they imply a process of ‘Aufhebung’ that leads from the irrational 
to the rational, which is in fact the experience of pure reason manifested.  
Though the trinity in Clausewitz is presented in the introduction, it should not 
be understood as the ‘beginning’ of his theory, but rather its ‘end’ point. It is the 
culmination of the holistic ‘concept’ [Begriff]. Herberg-Rothe is absolutely right to 
refer to it as Clausewitz’s ‘real legacy’, though one might question his insistence (in 
the same paragraph) on the fact that Clausewitz’s use of the word ‘first’475 should be 
understood as representing a premise or beginning to the book. This is too categorical. 
Though it appears in the introduction, it is presented its culminationm, a holistic 
conclusion, which sheds light for understanding the beginning, but to which the whole 
of the work will attempt to return to or achieve. The divine is both the end and the 
beginning. Is Clausewitz’s word choice the ‘first ray of light’ not a clear show of 
this?476 The first commands spoken by God in bible: God’s very first act of creation: 
‘Fiat Lux!’ If we understand the trinity in its convergence with a Hegelian approach, 
we can understand it from a holistic perspective which arrives at the conclusion which 
is the divine, but only insofar as the conceptual premise of this divine is built into the 
Aufhebung of the progressif moments in a teleological trinity.  
                                                                
474 J. N. Findlay, Hegel Today The Monist, Vol. 48, No. 1, (January, 1964), p. 1 
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Why does this matter in the end? The immediate reason is that this approach 
to understanding the trinity relativizes it. From this perspective, we can escape the 
interpretation of the trinity in its ‘secondary form’, where the actors suggested in the 
trinity are split away: the people, the army, the government. This alternative trinity is 
fix and rigid, and allows very limited space for conceptualizing war on the ‘whole’ 
and in its various ‘skin colours’. Clausewitz mentioned these three actors as 
examples, but did not suggest that they were the exclusive embodiments of the 
relationships in the trinity, he described the trinity as being ‘mainly’477 embodied by 
them, but not absolutely. Pulling them out and proclaiming the three as the trinity 
itself is a gross error, because it defines and imposes a model for what war is, and 
what is external to it suddenly becomes difficult to understand, and can easily lead to 
questionable claims regarding the fact that multilateral forces and non-state actors 
render Clausewitzian thought somehow less applicable or altogether inapplicable.  
By presenting the trinity as the culmination of a holistic methodology, as was 
done above, we can transition from a discussion that would attempt unconvincing 
refutations of this ‘whole’ based on poking holes here and there, but without never 
engaging in a way that properly encroaches on or dismantles the edifice. As we move 
into the final pages of this thesis, the argument will take a different shape altogether, 
in that we will consider what limits are inherent to this whole, which in effect will 
legitimize certain ethical features of both the Hegelian and the Clausewitzian theories 
of war, but will also in the process strip them of the absoluteness and their 
universality… in effect limiting the divine aura of their trinities and the distinct 
concepts of ‘Good’ that emerge from worshipping one or the other.  
                                                                
477 Clausewitz, On War, p. 19 
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While there is a clear methodological convergence in the two trinities, what 
distinguishes most is the interplay between Hegel emphasizing it as the relationship 
between the subjective world, the process of making objective as a process, and then 
reflecting this objectivity back onto itself as finality. This finality or ‘holism’ is 
alluded to in Book I Chapter 1, particular in the very first paragraph, as we saw above, 
and the final paragraphs that make up his reference to the divine and the trinity. This 
however, appears partially incomplete, since it presents war through the same lens, 
first, the subjective end is the blind natural instincts, second, the objective means is 
war’s mechanisms and deployment, and third, the finality is how these are absorbed 
cunningly within Reason.  Clausewitz is in effect presenting us with subjective and 
objective concepts, but not referring to them as such. In the end, however, unlike 
Hegel, he does not claim that the third moment in fact succeeds in encompassing the 
two others, or that war achieves an objective end. He builds up to this argument, but 
stops short near the very end. The Aufhebung of war’s political element is not the 
other two moments of the trinity, but rather its relationship to the real and the absolute 
concepts of war. When he places this conclusion in the trinity, unlike he Hegel, he 
does not place this ‘pure reason’ as resolving the other two. The linearity functions 
one way, from the subjective to the objective to the final end, but it is not self-
reflected, ‘pure reason’ is not given reign over the other two parts of the trinity, even 
if it instrumentalizes them. Clausewitz is apparently suggesting that this 
instrumentalization is imperfect, which is why the three co-exist.   
This can mean one of two things. Either Clausewitz had all the methodological 
tools needed to reach that end, but he chose not to, or else he did not have the 
necessary understanding of the relationship between the concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘objectivity’ to reach the same conclusion as Hegel. Either possibility is tenable. If it 
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was a deliberate choice to part from Hegel, it might have been for the simple reason 
that being more experienced and perhaps also less naïve about war, he understood that 
the passions and the machinery of war could in fact undermine its rational ends. His 
development of the wondrous trinity as being more of a floating triad than a linear 
one, allows Clausewitz to showcase the fact that ‘a complete reduction of war to an 
instrument of policy would be a contradiction.’478  In Hegel theory of teleology, this 
is not the case, the instrumentality is so unquestioned that sets the very basis upon 
which to edify war as a right ‘right’. Were it not for this, perfect instrumentality, then 
such a right could not emerge, since there is no such thing as an ‘imperfect’ right. It is 
an absolute concept. That being said, Clausewitz’s more careful take on 
instrumentality does not require that we go so far as to claim, as Herberg-Rothe does, 
that the three tendencies are of ‘equal importance’479. Clausewitz does not make that 
claim, nor is it implicit. Clausewitz imperfect instrumentality nonetheless starts with 
primordial violence and ends with pure reason, which is the order in which he placed 
these items, the linear relation between the three nonetheless exists by virtue of the 
fact that pure reason is meant to preside the other two, albeit, only to the best of its 
ability, since the other two continually undermine its ability to control them and 
instrumentalize them, in the Hegelian sense. There is a distinction between the two, 
but it is not so clearcut. It is possible that Clausewitz refused to take a leap of faith, 
and stopped one short of Hegel for this reason, as a way to be more realistic about 
instrumentality. Alternatively, it is possible that Clausewitz simply did not possess the 
necessary knowledge of Hegel in order to extract the same conclusion. Since we 
cannot infer with regard to the first, let us explore the latter, and once that has been 
done, it will be up to the reader to choose which of the two is more likely. Either way, 
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it is at this threshold that the convergence between Hegel and Clausewtiz come to an 
end, and the ethical divergence appears.  
 
Subjectivity & Objectivity: Source of an Ethical Divergence?  
 
 The problem, however, with making use of a holistic method, very similar to 
Hegel’s, in an ad hoc, here and there fashion, but not systematically, is that it cannot 
work in the same way that it was possible in the case of Clausewitz integrating 
concepts from Kant and Montesquieu. While one might get away with using concepts 
haphazardly and according to their immediate utility with some authors, the use of 
Hegelian concepts in such a manner becomes far more problematic, because the 
Hegelian ‘system’ is exactly that, a system. It does not stand alone in its parts. And 
trying to apply the whole to particular items, or vice versa, in the way Clausewitz was 
attempting could very likely lead to the kind of crisis that he experienced in the late 
1820s, it is a serious and difficult conundrum. As we saw in Chapter 1, the premise of 
understanding the most basic form of Hegelian thought, ‘sense-certainty’ are in some 
ways preordained by the possibility of there being an overarching ‘Geist’. The system 
does not have gaps, it is a continuum. It may be useful, as Taylor and Frost have 
argued,480 to focus in on the mid section that lies between the grand cosmic scale and 
the minute perceptual scale, but only insofar as we do not forget where this 
midsection is coming from in the first place.  
From the moment Clausewitz applied Hegelian ideas as mere ad hoc tools of 
analysis, he began generating the root of a contradiction between the two 
dialecticians: a distinct and incompatible understanding of ‘objectivity’ and 
                                                                
480 See Frost, For a Normative Theory of International Relations, p. 168. Also, Taylor argues, in Hegel, 
that even though the central spiritual and ontological thesis is dead, but that Hegel remains relevant 
nonetheless, p. 538-539 
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‘subjectivity’, which in some ways betrays Clausewitz’s slightly more modest 
understanding of philosophy in general. Objectivity and subjectivity are a long 
standing conundrum of philosophy. For subjectivity to exist, it must result from the 
existence of consciousness, or there being a subject in the first place. If consciousness 
alone exists in relation to unconscious objects, then all thoughts would necessarily be 
subjective, thereby condemning all thought to exist outside objectivity. Without 
objectivity, there could be no truth. 
So central was the question of subjectivity and objectivity to the purpose of his 
system, that Hegel decided to make it his first order of business, in the introduction to 
the Phenomenology. This is the discussion, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, 
where Hegel is describing the problem of whether systematizing our knowledge of the 
world means seeing it through a medium, or shaping it with an instrument. In either 
case, the truth is devoid of objectivity, it is dependent on some external factor. Hegel 
writes: 
 
For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of 
absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the 
application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for 
itself, but rather entails in the process, and has in view, a moulding and 
alteration of it. Or, again, if knowledge is not an instrument which we 
actively employ, but a kind of passive medium through which the light 
of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it as it is in 
itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In either case we employ 
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a means which immediately brings about the very opposite of its own 
end; or, rather, the absurdity lies in making use of any means at all.481  
 
Hegel’s solution to this impasse is his method in itself. His dialectical system 
is not an instrument meant to break down the world into various dichotomies and the 
rebuild it in parts until it forms the whole. Nor is it a medium, through which we see 
an otherwise non-dialectical world appear to us in a way it is not in itself. Typically 
Hegelian, this dichotomy is transcended and negated in way that keeps the initial truth 
of either case within its sublation. Hegelian dialectics are both an instrument and a 
medium, and more importantly, neither. It is an instrument in that we use it to see the 
world, but we do not need to rebuild the world using it since the world is already built 
in this way. And equally, the dialectic is not a medium since we are stepping back and 
letting the world appear to us as it is, in itself, but not from an external, passive 
perspective; we are part of this world.  Consequently, Hegel finds objectivity by 
integrating both forms of subjectivity and thereby transcending the divide. This is 
achieved as a process: objectivity is not posited in itself, but is the result of 
subjectivity recognizing and negating its own subjectivity. Objectivity is not a 
‘positive’, but rather a double negative. Thus, Hegel explains the possibility of a unity 
between objectivity and subjectivity:  
 
The development of spirit was indicated in the preceding movement of 
mind, where the object of consciousness, the category pure and simple, 
rose to the notion of reason. When reason observes this pure unity of 
ego and existence, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of for-
                                                                
481 Hegel. Phenomenology of Mind, Tr. J. Baillie 2nd ed., p. 28.  
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itself-ness and in-itself-ness – this unity is immanent, has the character 
of implicitness or of being ; and consciousness of reason finds itself.482 
 
 If Clausewitz learned a few tricks from Hegel regarding how to reconcile 
oppositions, he did not integrate any of Hegel’s ideas into how he understood the 
words ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. To Clausewitz, the terms are used in their laymen 
significance, or as we might say in a sentence, ‘subjectively speaking…’ or 
‘objectively speaking…’, which is more adequately understood as meaning ‘arbitrary’ 
or ‘not arbitrary’. Even in his final edits of Book I, chapter 1, there is no sign of this 
concept having been elevated in any way. For example, he will use the terms in 
discussing how war’s objective nature is that it is a calculation of probabilities, and 
that its subjective nature is that it is played out like a game [Spiel] (H/P translation 
‘gamble’).483  Elsewhere, in Book II, Chapter 2, Clausewitz refers to the ‘objective 
form of knowledge’ which he opposes to the ‘subjective […] skill in action’. His use 
of these terms is therefore quite distinct from how Hegel understands them. In the 
Hegelian system, one cannot split action and knowledge in this way, since actions are 
conscious and knowledge is posited in the material world. This split is precisely at the 
cusp of the original argument that pushed Hegel to reply to Kant in the first place. 
Furthermore, knowledge is not considered objective in itself, but objective only 
insofar as it has come to terms with its subjectivity. In Hegel, one could not split up 
action from knowledge, nor subjectivity from objectivity, and therefore even less split 
up the former by integrating the latter to it, as Clausewitz did. For Hegel, Geist is 
precisely this process of reconciling the ideal to the real, knowledge and action 
combined as subjectivity making itself objective in the world.  
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483 Clausewitz, On War, Bk. I, Ch. 1, p. 14 
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 Where the divergence becomes most apparent and also has the most impact is 
the way in which Clausewitz applies dialectical reconciliation to the real/absolute 
dichotomy. Though we recognized above that it was Hegelian in its form, we must 
now analyze in what way it was nonetheless an imperfect attempt at a Hegelian 
reconciliation, because it was tainted by the problem of subjectivity/objectivity as it is 
described in the first pages of the Phenomenology. That the authors were not using the 
terms in the same way explains how this problem might surface in the first place. But 
perhaps more importantly, it stems from the fact that Clausewitz had an idea since his 
youth, regarding the role of politics and war, but his solution came to him slowly, and 
in increments, in the shape of a Hegelian learning curve. As such, in the end, he had 
found an instrument with which he could fix his problem, thus did he fall squarely 
into the trap described by Hegel: moulding, altering the object.  
 To compare, Clausewitz’s reconciliation of the absolute and real incarnations 
of war does not achieve the hands off objectivity that is made evident in Hegel’s 
discussion of sense-certainty. The actions of ‘seeing a tree’ or ‘not seeing a tree’ are 
thoroughly mutually exclusive, though either one recalls the other’s absence in being 
posited. When we reach the universal of ‘sight’ as a new conceptual plateau, we do 
not have to seek out the items within the two first phases which would justify the 
third, or bring out similarities within them which could be aspects of the 
transcendence. The universal emerges in and of itself; its objectivity becomes 
intuitively self-evident as a result of the Aufhebung.  
 Clausewitz’s reconciliation attempts to churn out the same model by roughly 
copying the Hegelian system, but as a result, it does not fully succeed. His conclusion 
does not emerge to the reader as self-evident as was the case with Hegel’s sense-
certainty. The various parts of the argument are teased out, tooled in the process. 
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While the mimicry serves as a powerful suggestion of a Hegelian influence, it 
nonetheless also shows a failure to understand Hegel properly as well. By applying 
Hegel in this way, Clausewitz was introducing subjectivity into his theorization by  
Hegelian standards. The contradiction between the real and the absolute nature of war 
do not inherently spell out the ‘continuation of policy’; this requires modelling both 
types of war, in order to bring out not the completeness of their contradiction, but 
rather aspects of their coming together. While Hegel’s discussion of negation made 
the unifying universal self-evident, in the case of sight and seeing, Clausewitz starts 
by teasing out the similarities, before proclaiming a transcendental conclusion. Hence, 
the conclusion, regardless of how compelling and practical it is, does not emerge 
entirely objectively.  
 We could view this to be a failure on the part of Clausewitz, but it would be 
more adequate to present it rather as an outcome of his pragmatic style. The 
reconciliation which he proposes was not completely objective, but it nonetheless 
generated a useful idea for governments when conceptualizing war and making war 
plans. Furthermore, it provides not simply a self-contained ethic in itself, but a 
moralistic ethic that imposes responsibility specifically on those in government. By 
stating that war is subordinated to an outside power, it finds war’s ethical essence in 
its material source, rather than some external or mystical justification. So while 
Hegel’s objectivity generates what one might call spiritual rights for the state, 
Clausewitz’s subjectivity generates an antipodal and material moral responsibility at 
the state level, thereby serving a purpose, despite not being objective by Hegelian 
standards. Reciprocally, Hegel’s objective notion of war would not have been 
ethically pragmatic, by Clausewitzian standards.  
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An interesting anecdote which illustrates perfectly the ethical breakdown 
between Clausewitz and Hegel is their opposite reactions to the defeat at Jena-
Auerstedt. Unlike Clausewitz, who was captured and imprisoned in the aftermath of 
the battle, and whose hatred for Napoleon culminated then; Hegel, who was teaching 
in Jena when the battle took place, saw the event in a much different light, describing 
Napoleon in a far more sympathetic light, if not a halo: 
 
I saw the Emperor – this world-soul [diese Weltseele] – riding out of 
the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see 
such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a 
horse, reaches out over the world and masters it. As for the fate of the 
Prussians, in truth no better prognosis could be given. 484   
 
Hegel saw in Napoleon the incarnation of the politico-economic reforms 
required for modernity, or the fulfilment of the modern state, a vehicle of some 
cosmic destiny. From the opposite perspective, an embittered Clausewitz would write, 
‘Invasion only calls forth resistance, and it is not until there is resistance that there is 
war. A conqueror is always a lover of peace (as Buonaparte always asserted of 
himself); he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed.’485 Here the 
ethical distinction becomes evident: Clausewitz takes a moral stance and ‘blames’ one 
political actor, whereas Hegel avoids blaming one or the other of the fighting parties, 
leaving it to history to pass judgment.  
If both Hegel and Clausewitz refer to Napoleon in ‘godly’ terms, what 
differentiates the two is again what we saw in the above section on the trinity. 
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Clausewitz does not jump naïvely into concepts of perfection, whether it is with 
regard to instrumentality or to pure reason, and he is the same with regard to 
Napoleon as well. He describes him as a ‘god of war’, and places him on par with, or 
even above, the greatest military geniuses of history, but nonetheless criticizes his 
actions and describes in detail the strategic ‘errors’ and ‘true faults’486 in how he 
conducted his campaign leading up to his defeat at Waterloo, including ‘useless’ 
march and counter-march of 20,000 soldiers that amounted to a ‘capital mistake’. 487 
In the 1814 Campaign, Clausewitz goes so far as to refer to Napoleon’s final march 
towards Paris as ‘empty’, a ‘supreme risk’, the ‘gravest error of the campaign’, and in 
its final movement, Napoleon suddenly appeared ‘in all his ridiculousness’.488  
 
Critique: The Limits of Instrumentality  
  
 Though Clausewitz allowed for imperfections in the process or application of 
‘instrumentalizing’ violence, he did not present instrumentalization as having inherent 
problems within its inner logic, and this is the true limit of the concept. The logic that 
binds Clausewitz’s notion that the state or actor is morally responsible for war, and 
can in fact be blamed, is rooted in the instrumentality of war, that is, since war can 
achieve objectives that may be morally acceptable or not, then it is legitimate to pass 
judgement on those who make the policy of war. But the entire premise of the 
relationship depends on two important criteria: first, that the weapons being used can 
                                                                
486 Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1815 en France, tr. M Niessel, (Paris: Édition Champs Libre, 
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in fact be used instrumentally, that is, they can in fact coerce in the direction of a 
legitimate policy change. Secondly, if the actor is to be a moral agent, then a second 
criteria upon which to gauge this morality must be added to the first, that this violence 
be applied in a sufficiently proportional way for the decision itself to be ethically 
reasonable (i.e. that it is not genocide or massacre). The strain on these criteria has 
always existed in some relative way, and indeed, massacres during and after battle, 
against soldiers and civilians alike, are as old as time, but this strain can become 
increasingly absolute as war becomes ever more infused with indiscriminate 
destructive power. This means that to explore the limits of Clausewitz’s 
instrumentality as an ethical foundation, we should push our analysis temporarily by a 
hundred years after it was actually written, because in Clausewitz’s time, the 
machinery of war had not yet seen the impact of industrialization, let alone the 
nuclear age. In the early 1800s, the most damaging arguments against the logic that 
binds Clausewitz’s ethical system could not yet be made. Though we are breaking 
away from the central course of the narration so far, this jump forward will eventually 
form an important grounding element of our discussion of how the limits of Hegelian 
and Clausewitzian ethics shaped modern secular war and revolution.  
 The simplest way to illustrate the problem in material terms is to consider how 
nuclear weapons can turn the strategic element of war upside down. Tactical nuclear 
weapons would make such minced meat out of any invasion force as to make 
invading a nuclear power tactically unmanageable, whereas the use of strategic 
nuclear weapons would make invasion strategically irrelevant, unless one is intent on 
staking territorial claims in a radioactive fallout area. The instrumentality in this case 
is not merely disrupted, it is reversed altogether since the instrument no longer shapes 
or arrives at the end, but destroys the end in its approach. In this reversal, the agent 
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remains responsible for the action, but the action itself becomes so counter-intuitive 
that to claim responsibility, either by the side that launches the strike or the 
government that sends its troops to be massacre in one, is in effect to admit guilt, 
rather than justification. If it were merely a question of disproportionality, then the 
judgment might be severe, but that is not the question. The apparent uselessness of the 
action itself leads to a categorical, not merely severe, judgment. That being said, this 
is only a preliminary thought on the matter, since, as we shall consider in the coming 
lines, we must also distinguish between actually fighting of such a war, and 
threatening to do so. 
 Some have viewed the problems of instrumentality as a way to brush aside 
Clausewitz altogether, arguing that his means/ends analysis has become incompatible 
with the modern world. If nuclear weapons are what made this observation most clear 
to them, Colin Grey traces back the problem to an earlier time: 
 
The atom has simply served to make unavoidably clear what has been 
true all along since the day of the introduction of the machine gun and 
the internal combustion engine into the techniques of warfare […] that 
modern warfare in the grand manner, pursued by all available means 
and aimed at the total destruction of the enemy’s capacity to resist, is 
[…] of such general destructiveness that it ceases to be useful as an 
instrument of any coherent political purpose. 489 
 
                                                                




 Along the same line of argumentation, Senator W. Fulbright would add that 
the disproportionality of nuclear weapons had ‘deprived force of its utility as an 
instrument of national policy,’ adding that, ‘so long as there is reason – not virtue, but 
simply reason – in the foreign policy of great nations, nuclear weapons are not so 
much an instrument as an inhibition of policy.’490 Arendt generally agreed, suggesting 
that ‘the technological development of the implements of violence have reached the 
point where no political goal could conceivably correspond to their destructive 
potential or justify their actual use in armed conflict.’491 
 Going so far as to say that Clausewitz’s system is no longer applicable or 
useful in the nuclear age is quite an overstatement. As Moody countered, ‘Even if it is 
always irrational to fight nuclear war, it may not be irrational to risk nuclear war.’492 
Moody goes so far as to question whether or not Fulbright manages to show a real 
contradiction: ‘In Clausewitzian terms, [Fulbright] is saying that what can be achieved 
by war is negated by the means used in war:  war no longer pays. But this does not 
show that Clausewitz is obsolete: it is precisely on Clausewitzian grounds that war is 
to be avoided.’493 Indeed, nuclear weapons are in some ways the epitome of the 
Clausewitzian triad: where the ‘absolute’ concept of war is the annihilation of all 
mankind; the ‘limited’ concept of war is the impossible cost or ultimate contradiction 
of this absolute; and ‘instrumentality’ is the capacity for the government to calculate a 
rational course of action, which would guarantee its own self-preservation – in this 
case, avoiding an all out nuclear holocaust. 
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 A second way to address Fulbright’s perspective is to ask whether the 
existence of new, more potent and awe-inspiring weapons changes and undermines 
the purposes of violence and threat of violence in international relations, or rather 
reaffirms and intensifies notions for which traditional armaments were sought, namely 
the impetus of the powerful to sustain a permanent form of the geopolitical status-quo, 
and the use of threat as economical and rational means of achieving ends without 
engaging in battle, what Sun Tzu referred to as the ‘acme of skill.’494  
 The evolution of weapons in war necessarily affects the way in which tactics 
and strategies are drawn out and implemented, yet the question of whether or not this 
implies ontological changes in the nature of war, is not as clear-cut as Fulbright, Grey 
and others might claim. Actually, Clausewitz’s own formulation in many ways 
addresses the problem which Fulbright is using against him. In Book II, Chapter 1 of 
On War, Clausewitz wrote, ‘Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms 
and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is, therefore, a 
reciprocity of action [Wechselwirkung] between the two.’495 This notion of 
reciprocity of action allows for the principles of war to be defined by weapons only 
insofar as the weapons themselves come into being in response to the needs of war. 
Instead of disrupting the theoretical constructs of a dialectical war theory, the 
weapons and strategies evolve in mutuality, within, rather than opposed to the 
overarching theory. This is also observable in the response, or reciprocity of action 
between the evolution of weapons in the past decades, which instead of building ever 
more powerful weapons, brought forth ever more precise ones, so as to reaffirm 
proportionality in warfare.  
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 Modern weapons did not prove Clausewitz wrong, less so in fact when we 
consider that his analysis of the development of weapons predicts ever more powerful 
and precise systems of force. What is more interesting still is that Clausewitz 
regularly referred to war as game [Spiel], and these weapons have elevated the game 
aspect of war ever more since the reduction of instrumentality in this case has lead to, 
as Moody indentified a willingness to risk, but not necessarily fight war. What 
happened in effect is that we went from waging war to wagering war. Strategy is not 
gone even though the stakes have risen. There has been a relative decline in 
instrumentality, which has changed the way we play the game, but the strategy 
remains a different set of game theory is in place.  
 In order to understand the proper conceptual end point to instrumentality, it is 
better not to let the material question dictate our analysis, but rather consider an idea 
of war which builds in the end of instrumentality into its very essence. Whereas the 
doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ is the epitome of the technology argument 
against instrumentality, and remains partial because of the difference between 
wagering nuclear war and waging nuclear war, the concept of a ‘war to end all wars’, 
depending on how it has been constructed, can break down instrumentality in a way 
that is altogether freed of any external, material cause. To be clear, in using the term 
‘war to end all wars’, should not be understood as the impression after the fact or 
during, such as was the case with World War I, that the war having been so brutal, 
there would be no going back to war, it would be the last such war. Rather, it is meant 
to describe a type of war which, from the very start, is declared as a war to end all 
wars. Only one such concept of war was ever invented and eventually applied: the 
communist and anarchist revolution, in which the revolution was posited on the 
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premise that its fulfilment in violence would necessarily put an end to the social 
structures that generate war in the first place.  
 The circularity and totality of the proposition is such that it can never achieve 
its end until there is nothing left to fight. It is as annihilatory in essence as mutually 
assured destruction, though the capacity may not be there. That is, the war to end all 
wars is its own inferno and has no conceptual limit, because having been posited as a 
war that has no end except its own, it must and will always find something to fight, 
eventually fighting itself internally. It is the nature of social structures and institutions, 
that they will legitimize their continued raison d’être. The war to end all wars is 
necessarily self-perpetuating: for the same reason that a hammer must have a 
something to hit to be of use, and cannot be used to hit itself, war that has been 
posited as instrumental in ending itself as an instrument is logically impossible, 
because each action produces a counter-action, escalation, reciprocal violence, etc. 
Thus, even if full victory were eventually declared by these warriors, the fact that the 
victory was built on war and blood, not consensus and evolution, would set into the 
foundations of society an institutional violence that begets violence and perpetuates a 
war to end all wars, which by definition never actually ends. The only way it ends is 
when a counter-force is applied to end the circular perpetuation.  
 In both the example from modern weapons and the logic of a war to end all 
wars, instrumentality becomes problematic, because the tool cannot properly shape its 
object towards the desired effect. There is a parallel to be drawn here with what we 
concluded upon in chapter one with regard to Hegel. History has shown imperfections 
in the concepts of war as a right and as an instrument, in the former, because the 
relationship between political decay and war, could be shown to be reversible, and in 
the latter, because the linearity of instrumentality in war cannot properly cope with 
319 
 
weapons that undermine the relationship between cause and effect and concepts of 
war that are circular in their logic. These imperfections however are not absolute. 
They do not undermine Hegel and Clausewitz altogether, though they impose on the 
reader a higher level of consideration and critical analysis. In the case of Hegel, this 
meant addressing the effects of the increased distance that separates the citizens from 
the role of embodying the political will of the state. The intersection of the two 
therefore resides at the nexus of technology and revolution, a subject that we shall 





The Hegel-Clausewitz connection is not clear-cut like the one between Kant 
and Clausewitz, which we explored in Part I.  One possible explanation for this is that 
as a young scholar, Clausewitz was less confident in his writing and made far more 
use of direct borrowing in his attempts to develop his arguments, whereas in his later 
years, Clausewitz had found his own voice and could borrow ideas less directly, and 
integrate them to his works in his own words. This may be part of the explanation. Of 
course, the second element which we have seen above is that while there was clearly a 
convergence over time between Clausewitz’s ideas and the works of Hegel, this 
incremental convergence remained incomplete in the end. Regardless of how satisfied 
we are with the level of proximity between the two, it remains nonetheless extremely 
unsatisfactory to claim that there was no rapprochement. We find ourselves with a 
compromise: the Hegelian link is imperfect, it does not take the form of a single 
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citation, a clear and demonstrable ‘influence’, but an evolution in thought, a 
progression in time, and this has shown itself more manageable as a conclusion than 
the alternative one found in Aron, where the categorical argument citing a lack of a 
Hegelian influence is limited to sections written by a young Clausewitz, as opposed to 
a mature one, or found in Paret, where the question is brushed aside, the conclusion 
asserted, and the demonstration never actually made. We find ourselves with a 
demonstrated convergence, but not a demonstrated influence. It is up to the reader to 
make the leap from one to the other if they see fit.  
The principal outcome of this exploration was to show that the different 
approach Clausewitz and Hegel had to the question of objectivity and subjectivity 
created the chasm between war as a right and war as an instrument of the political. As 
we saw in chapter one and again in the final pages of chapter three, these two notions 
have inherent imperfections, which do not necessarily take away from their utility per 
se, but nonetheless can help us explain how the two parallel theories came to be 
understood and applied over time, especially with regard to major changes in the 
causes and machinery of war, as well as the objectives of war. As we move now into a 
chapter that considers 20th century warfare and revolution, the actual implication of 




Chapter 4 – Fighting Doctrines and 
Revolutionary Ethics  
 
 
If it was at the threshold of revolution that Clausewitz encountered the fragility 
of the absolute war / real war dichotomy on the ontological level, the ambitious 
Marxist and anarchist project for an ‘absolute’ revolution would in the end bring out 
in a thoroughly analogous way, the fragility and limits of the instrument / right divide 
on the ethical level. This is the main reason why the anti-bourgeois revolutionary 
thinkers are an interesting group to consider in our discussion of dialectical war 
theory. That being said, there are other reasons as well. Not only were they among the 
earliest to discover and integrate Clausewitz & Hegel into a set of fighting doctrines, 
which means they were absorbing the primary sources directly, as opposed to reading 
tainted secondary interpretations, they also did so as dialecticians themselves, which 
means they appreciated the depth of the method. They were an informed embodiment 
of the method, and therefore informative to our study of the method as it was applied 
in the real world. However, the most important and interesting feature to be 
discovered here is that they took in the distinct elements of Hegel and Clausewitz very 
categorically in their respective fighting doctrines: the communists were exclusively 
Clausewitzian, whereas the anarchists shunned Clausewitz and kept exclusively to 
Hegel. There was no overlap.  
In the coming lines, it will become clear that previous chapter’s thesis 
regarding the ethical divide between right and instrumentality had a direct bearing on 
the fighting doctrines and history of the anti-bourgeois revolutions. Using a history of 
ideas approach to the question we shall consider and elaborate on the thesis of a 
‘Clausewitz connection’ which has been evoked to described the link between 
communists and Clausewitzian war theory, and thereafter repeat the process with the 
anarchists in order to show a parallel but distinct ‘Hegel connection’ on their side of 
the revolution. Uncovering this allows us to discover the purified implications of war 
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as a ‘right’ or ‘instrument’ in the context of modern war and revolution, which 
ultimately exposes in real terms, real examples, the logical breaking points of either 
ethic, and which particular concept of freedom, common to both communists and 
anarchists allowed them to overcome the distinction and understand their revolutions 
as distinct, but unified under a single overarching ideal that emerges from the divide 
and encompasses it as well. 
There was such a keen appreciation for Clausewitz among the communists that 
western observers have often invoked a ‘Clausewitz connection’,496 in reference to 
the fact that Mao, Trotsky and Lenin were so prone to quote from his opus.  However, 
the problem with this idea of ‘connection’ is that it suggests a direct, immediate and 
natural link between the two, which is not so clear-cut once we actually dive into the 
details. As dialecticians sharing a common philosophical link to Hegel and Kant, we 
might indeed have expected that when the Marxists discovered Clausewitz, they were 
predisposed to appreciate the methodology, because it was so closely intertwined with 
their own. One might go so far as to suggest that Marx was to political economy what 
Clausewitz was to war, the one who, having inherited the modern dialectical method, 
would be the first to apply it to a specific subject of inquiry, economics and war, 
respectively. And yet, despite this methodological unity the convergence was not 
immaculately conceived amongst communists, but actually required some tinkering, 
and it was not Marx and Engels who became devout Clausewitzians, but rather the 
next generation of communists, Trotsky and Lenin. 
 With revolution now entering the forefront of the communist experience, the 
works of Clausewitz did in fact take centre stage. However, what they extracted from 
the opus was in no way its methodological or dialectical aspects, but a mere 
distillation for particular strategic gains. Pending some distortions and much cherry-
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picking of ideas, the communist revolutionaries had a very practical and isolated 
reading of Clausewitz, rather than a comprehensive one.  
 Meanwhile, in the same family lineage, the fathers of anti-bourgeois anarchist 
thought Bakunin, Proudhon497 and Kropotkin did not deign make any references to 
Clausewitz at all.498 They shunned him altogether. It is indeed surprising, since they 
too shared in this common methodological background, and would undoubtedly have 
come across Clausewitz, given that he had been introduced to left-wing circles. 
Instead, we find that in anarchist thought, there evolved a parallel, distinct, and direct 
‘Hegel connection’ in their concept of the revolution and their fighting doctrine. The 
split between the two factions is clear and total, and once we take the time to 
understand where it comes from, it is actually quite logical. The breakdown tells us 
something about how the two groups understood the ethics of political violence as 
‘instrumental’ in the Clausewitzian tradition, or as a ‘right’ in the Hegelian tradition. 
While this distinction complicated the integration of Clausewitz into communist 
doctrine, it made him altogether irrelevant to anarchist doctrine. Methodological 
keenness therefore had little to do with the two distinct ‘connections’; it was rather the 
ethical dimensions on either side that led one group to identify its fighting doctrines 
with Clausewitz, while the other chose Hegel.  
 The reason why this historical set of questions is of relevance to anyone 
currently reading Clausewitz or Hegel on the subject of war is that uncovering why all 
this picking and choosing happened in the first place allows us to distinguish and 
understand the systems of logic found in either of these two founding works in the 
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school of ‘dialectical war theory’, and most importantly, the ethical and strategic 
implications of these differences. By showcasing the distinction in a parallel study, we 
gain insight into how overarching, abstract ethical frameworks can, and indeed have, 
shaped fighting doctrines in real and concrete ways.  
 
The Communist ‘Clausewitz Connection’ 
 
 It is difficult to frame communism into a single family of revolutionaries and 
thinkers, and the danger in doing so is to risk finding ourselves with a blanket term 
that does not quite apply in encompassing all the nuances that one variation on 
communist thought might have relative to another. That being said, since this question 
is outside the scope of this chapter, it should be specified that the the use of the term 
here refers to those anti-bourgeois revolutionaries who advocated for a political 
revolution that would precede the economic and cultural revolution, which is to say, 
those who believed in the necessity of a revolutionary state to carry out the program 
of revolution as its policy.     
 The ‘Clausewitz connection’ refers to the fact that many prominent 
communists cited him, including Marx and Engels, Mao, Trotsky, and Lenin. One 
might be tempted to assume that since the two founders are included among the lot of 
‘connectees’ it would explain in what sense the remaining followers followed.  It is an 
easy trap to fall into, and the reality is rather that the earlier two were actually quite 
critical of Clausewitz and made little use of him. It was the later revolutionaries who 
would make use of the text, but only in a shallow fashion, citing a few key snippets 
that could be easily adapted to Marxist thought. 
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 Indeed, it was necessary to ‘adapt’ Clausewitz to make him relevant to the 
communists, and provide them with a useful guide in their politico-strategic 
deployment of the revolution, under the auspices of a revolutionary state. This was 
achieved by Lenin, not Marx and Engels, as the first who provided the proper basis 
with which to work out the contradictions and kinks, and integrate Clausewitz’s ideas 
to the revolution. This was no easy problem to resolve, but something quite 
fundamental: if the state is a central pillar in the works of Hegel and Clausewitz, how 
can a group intent on attacking and dismantling the state find a coherent logic which 
balances the use of a statist method against the state itself? However, before we 
answer this larger question, let us first step back, and show in what sense prior to 
Lenin, Clausewitz occupied little or no place in Communist thought generally, and 
particularly in their conception of a fighting doctrine. 
 Marx and Engels discussed Clausewitz in their correspondence on the subject 
of war between the years 1857-1862. That being said, many academics have 
exaggerated the significance of these short snippets, which is best exemplified in 
Sigmund Neumann’s writing that not only was Engels ‘greatly impressed’, but that 
Clausewitz became ‘stock-in-trade’ for the revolutionaries and ‘axiomatic’ for 
Engels.499 Lenin too was convinced that Engels and Marx were fundamentally 
Clausewitzian, as he alludes to in this passage: 
 
War is the continuation of politics by other (i.e. violent) means. 
This famous aphorism was uttered by one of the profoundest writers on 
the problems of war, Clausewitz. Marxists have always rightly 
regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views concerning the 
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significance of every given war. It was precisely from this viewpoint 
that Marx and Engels always regarded different wars.500  
 
 This paragraph does not make an argument, let alone demonstrates, that Marx 
and Engels were all that influenced by Clausewitz. It achieves neither, but instead 
takes this for granted. The only conclusion we can draw from this passage is rather the 
confirmation that Lenin himself was probably keen on Clausewitz. Lenin was in fact 
‘deeply impressed’ by On War, referring to it in speeches, texts, after first having 
commented in the margins of his copy and transcribed sections in his notebook.501 
 Opposing this claim made by Lenin and later by numerous others including 
Neumann, Azar Gat’s Clausewitz and the Marxists proposes a more detailed counter-
argument, which cuts the legs from under such an interpretation, by balancing the one 
aspect of enthusiasm that Marx and Engels showed with regard to the single analogy 
‘Combat is to war what cash payment is to commerce,’502 relative to their overall 
appreciation, which lags far behind. Gat notes that before describing this passage as 
‘witty’ [witz], Marx’s letter first stated that he was ‘hunting through [Clausewitz] 
more or less’, which can hardly be considered keenness; in fact, the passage on 
commerce was cherry picked by Engels and sent to Marx, knowing that it would be ‘a 
piece of picantry in a field which could be of interest to Marx’,503 which makes sense 
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since, as we shall delve into more further below, Marx was the economist of the two, 
while warfare was Engels’s area, and his friends even called him ‘The General’ for 
it.504 Regarding the word ‘Witz’ it might be worth adding the possibility that while 
Marx made this compliment with regard to Clausewitz’s analogy, he may also have 
chosen the term for the sake of making a playful jest on the name Clause-witz. (And 
indeed, we find occasional banter in the letters between the two friends. Another 
example of this playfulness is forthcoming.) If that were the case, it would further 
taper the extent of its significance.   
 Another example, which Gat also includes in his text, comes from the same 
series of letters: Engels wrote that On War was ‘per se very good’, which again is not 
a grand compliment, especially given that these words lead up to it, ‘[Clausewitz has 
an] odd way of philosophizing’ and in the same exchange Marx complains that he had 
to ‘spend so much time reading Clausewitz’, which might explain indeed why he 
wound up reading it only ‘more or less’. That being said, it is impossible to determine, 
simply in the one line where it appears, whether Marx’s mention of the word “witty” 
is in reply, as Gat suggests, only to the commerce analogy and not a wider reading of 
Clausewitz.505 If it had been the only introduction he had to Clausewitz this would be 
a logical assumption, but as Gat notes himself, Marx had read pieces of On War 
several months earlier. It was indeed Marx who introduced the subject of Clausewitz 
into the conversation several months earlier.506  
 One must therefore tread carefully in making sense of such a disparate set of 
somewhat positive, somewhat negative reactions. Citing the same passages above, 
Gat concludes that, ‘[neither Marx or Engels] had any special interest in, or 
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appreciation of Clausewitz’s work.’507 This might be slightly too strong, at least in the 
case of Engels. As for Marx, it is not a stretch to say that he showed little or no 
interest, it was true of war in general. He was far more interested in economics, and 
preferred relegating the topic of war to Engels, going so far as to offer some friendly 
teasing at the expense of the latter, ‘It strikes me that you allow yourself to be 
influenced by the military aspect of things a little too much. As to the economic stuff, 
I don’t propose to burden you with it on your journey.’508 Knowing this about Marx, 
it becomes frankly laughable, to stand with Vincent Esposito, who wrote that ‘Marx 
rejoiced at finding in such an eminent military authority substantiation for his own 
theory of the relationship between war and politics. Thereafter, Clausewitz became 
imbedded in revolutionary doctrine.’509 Marx had no such interest at all.  
 However, given that Marx and Engels worked so closely together, and were at 
times ghostwriting510 for one another or co-signing articles and texts, it is not enough 
to demonstrate that one of the two was not interested, since the two in many ways 
were but one. In the case of Engels, claiming a complete detachment from 
Clausewitzian thought can only be achieved by elevating some passages at the 
expense of others, just as those who claim an opposite viewpoint did.  
 The text that Gat cites to nail his case shut is not an altogether fair assessment 
of the relationship. It is a letter to J. Weydemeyer from 1853, in which Engels writes 
‘[in the end] Jomini gives the best account of [the Napoleonic Wars]; despite many 
fine things, I can’t really bring myself to like that natural genius, Clausewitz.’511 The 
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fact is that this reaction predates the discussion with Marx by five years, and 
represents Engels’s earliest reading of the text. As late as June 1851, Engels had not 
yet read Clausewitz, as he explains in a prior letter to the same man,512 but soon 
thereafter, in early 1853, he knows On War well enough to comment on the whole, 
negatively. The timeframe is relatively precise, we can essentially pinpoint Engels 
first reading of Clausewitz within an 18 month range, which corresponds well with 
Gallie’s suggestion that an article written for the New York Daily Tribune in 
September 1852 showed a ‘trace of a hasty first reading of Clausewitz in the opening 
sentences.’513 This fits exactly where we would expect it. 
 It is therefore rash to cite such an early reaction by Engels, in arguing a formal 
dislike of Clausewitz, since anyone who reads On War for the first time could in all 
honesty feel that way, but upon returning to it for a second or third read they might 
arrive at a complete different take on the matter. The same can be said regarding the 
works of Marx and Engels. 
 We should therefore focus our attention to the letters that appear after 1858, at 
which point we know that Engels has become sufficiently well-acquainted to with 
Clausewitz, enough to introduce Marx to a few points of interest, including a 
reference to the war as a science vs. an art and the analogy with commerce.514 Here 
we find ourselves forced into a middle ground between Gat’s stance and those on the 
other extreme, or rather an off-centre ground which is much closer to Gat’s viewpoint. 
If neither Engels nor Marx had been influenced by Clausewitz beyond the mere 
snippets exchanged in the three letters of 1858, it should have been expected that the 
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subject would have disappeared altogether, among all the other considerations the two 
had to keep in mind in their political activism and literary contributions. However, we 
find rather that the two continued to refer to Clausewitz in the years that followed, 
even Marx began a text in 1859 in which he cites On War on the subject of Austrian 
war plans. Engels uses Clausewitz in 1862 in his discussion of the American Civil 
War, and refers to him again in 1871 on the topic of the Napoleonic wars. If 
Clausewitz were as insignificant as Gat seems to indicate, why would he still be on 
Engels’s mind roughly 20 years after he first read the book?  
 That being said, while the ‘Clausewitz connection’ to Marx and Engels was 
long-lasting, it remained somewhat weak and definitely sporadic. Engels’s interest in 
Jomini is well-evidenced in Gat’s work,515 and it appears all the more true when one 
turns Engels’s writings on the American Civil War, where three additional examples 
are striking. Engels uses what Jomini describes as the ‘fundamental principle’516 in 
two distinct ways, first in discussing the need to ‘cut the secessionists’ territory in two 
and enable the Unionists to beat one part after another,’517 and later in arguing that the 
north should sacrifice minor positions in order to strike harder on the decisive points. 
And finally, in a most damning example of a non-Clausewitzian point of view, Engels 
completely undermines the moral aspects of war, when writing, ‘The seizure of 
Richmond and the advance of the Potomac army further south — difficult on account 
of the many rivers that cut across the line of march -could produce a tremendous 
                                                                
515 Gat. pp. 498-501. Gat’s quotations include Clausewitz writing that ‘Jomini gives the best account 
[of the Napoleonic campaigns’ and a reference to Engels’s reaction the Austo-Prussian war of 1866 
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moral effect. From a purely military standpoint, they would decide nothing.’ 518  The 
continued references to Clausewitz years after Engels first discovered him suggest 
some affinities, albeit not on the most important of his ideas, such as the moral forces, 
and, evidently, On War’s highly effective refutation of Jominian positive doctrines. It 
therefore appears all the more likely that Engels and Marx were not in any serious 
way devout Clausewitzians, and that Engels, at least, shows much closer ties to 
Jominian than to Clausewitzian thought. That being said, the fact that Marx and 
Engels introduced Clausewitz to the communist movement did make its mark, and no 
doubt contributed to its uptake in communism’s revolutionary phase. 
 In the end, any attempt to pinpoint the views of Engels and Marx on war must 
inevitably hit the unfortunate realization that it was not actually central to their 
theorizing on communism. Engels, who was the analytical mind, rather than the 
synthetic mind of the two, was busy contextualizing and understanding conflicts, but 
did not produce any compelling overall ‘communist theory of war’. And Marx would 
not either, simply out of general disinterest in these matters. A communist theory of 
war would emerge logically, and in due time, when it was needed: when communism 
entered its revolutionary phase.  
 If war had not been a central pillar of early communist theorizing, eventually 
Lenin is the one who would ‘put it there.’519 The main problem was how communists 
understood statehood and policy as subjective, rather than objective.  
 
Apply [Marx and Engels’s] view to [World War I]. You will see that 
for decades, for almost half a century, the governments and the ruling 
classes of England, and France, and Germany, and Italy, and Austria, 
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and Russia, pursued a policy of plundering colonies, of oppressing 
other nations, of suppressing the working-class movement. It is this, 
and only this policy that is being continued in the present war.520 
 
 The issue of Marx’s disagreement with Hegel is alluded to in Gat’s discussion 
of Lenin,521 but is worth developing it slightly further, in order to see not only how it 
influenced Lenin’s interpretation of Clausewitz, but in a larger sense, how this 
argument complicated the direct or coherent uptake of Clausewitz towards communist 
doctrine. To appreciate the problem, it is best to go back to the origin, when Marx, in 
the process of applying a Hegelian methodology to his interrogations on society and 
economics, eventually found himself in disagreement with Hegel. Marx built a 
conceptual history of the world in which the proletarian and bourgeoisie were 
inherently opposed, and historically bound towards their historical transcendence, a 
formula quite similar to the master slave dichotomy presented in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind. In the Phenomenology, the overcoming of dichotomies, or 
‘Aufhebung’, is described as an ‘... abstract negation, not the negation characteristic 
of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is 
sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.’522 The revolution represented a 
reaction to the idea that the bourgeoisie exists only insofar as it subjugates the 
proletariat (much as there can be no master without a slave), the act of creating it 
represents in fact the creation of a negative reciprocation of itself; and more 
importantly, the more the bourgeois class exploits and organizes the proletariat to 
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maximize its efficiency and wealth-productiveness, the more it empowers it with the 
capacity to overthrow the capitalist order of production and provides reasons for 
doing so. The end point is anti-political, in that once the revolution is achieved, only 
stateless free, classless men and women remain; to reach this end goal is a political 
process, a policy-making initiative that dictates warfare towards building the socio-
economic and cultural bases of an anti-political society. The relationship is linear. 
And what remains of the proletarian and bourgeois class is merely their history, their 
moment in leading towards a classless human existence … their ‘Aufhebung’.  
 Marx explains in Capital that while his methodology Hegelian in spirit, he was 
in fact challenging the system as a whole, referring to his own work as Hegel’s ‘direct 
opposite’, turning the methodology onto itself and ‘standing it on its head.’523 Years 
earlier, Marx had also written in his doctoral thesis that he disagreed with Hegel on 
the threshold that separates the mystical from the political, that is, in Hegel, the state 
is understood as a ‘vehicle of cosmic spirit’524 or ‘Geist’, the spirit of rationality 
making itself manifest in the world. Since the concept of the state in Hegel is 
understood as a necessary, natural, and rational development of freely constituted 
peoples, inherently embodying their collective greater good, this poses a problem to 
Marx, who, seeing an entire class of exploited people having become the means of 
production, without having either access to the decision-making bodies or even the 
fruit of their own labour, he wonders if these men are indeed free. And are they in fact 
freely-constituted, or have they inherited an authority structure which coerces them 
into a dehumanizing role in society? This is the root of Marx’s disagreement with 
Hegel. For Marx, the state is not an end in-itself or a means to a higher spiritual end, 
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and thus not a result of a universal, objective idea, but rather an instrument that would 
generate and maintain a subjective idea, in this case, capitalism, and its usurpation of 
political power towards its own ends. As the paragraph below explains, the state is a 
subjective idea that attempts, strives to pass itself off as objective:   
 
The fact is that the state issues from the mass of men existing as 
members of families and of civil society; but speculative philosophy525 
expresses this fact as an achievement of the Idea, not the idea of the 
mass, but rather as the deed of an Idea-Subject which is differentiated 
from the fact itself) in such a way that the function assigned to the 
individual (earlier the discussion was only of the assignment of 
individuals to the spheres of family and civil society) is visibly 
mediated by circumstances, caprice, etc. Thus empirical actuality is 
admitted just as it is and is also said to be rational; but not rational 
because of its own reason, but because the empirical fact in its 
empirical existence has a significance which is other than it itself. The 
fact, which is the starting point, is not conceived to be such but rather 
to be the mystical result. The actual becomes phenomenon, but the Idea 
has no other content than this phenomenon. Moreover, the idea has no 
other than the logical aim, namely, ‘to become explicit as infinite 
actual mind.526 
 
 Since the Marxists question from the very onset the idea that states possess an 
objective universality, it would be impossible for them to come to terms directly with 
                                                                
525 Speculative philosophy is the term Hegel uses to describe his own writings. 
526 Karl Marx, The State as Manifestation of Idea or Product of Man: Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right, ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).  
335 
 
Clausewitz’s ‘intelligence of the personified state’527 or his ‘continuation of policy by 
other means’.528 They would be asking questions like, ‘the intelligence of whose 
state?’ and ‘the policy of which class?’ In more concrete terms, one place to look to in 
order to find the crux of this disagreement is the fact that while Hegel identified the 
bureaucracy as the ‘universal’ class in society, Marx reserved this universality to the 
proletariat class.529 Thus, the link from the communists to Clausewitz is not at all 
direct, but requires some modification to be logical. It is actually formed out of a 
careful addition of words. 
 The first step for Lenin to develop coherence between Clausewitz and 
communism was to begin reflecting on the subject of the causes of war:  
 
It seems to me that the most important thing that is usually overlooked 
in the question of war, a key issue to which insufficient attention is 
paid and over which there is so much dispute useless, hopeless, idle 
dispute, I should say is the question of the class character of the war: 
what caused that war, what classes are waging it, and what historical 
and historico-economic conditions gave rise to it.530  
 
 Upon this analysis, he would come to the conclusion that that imperialism and 
capitalist states made war inevitable, and only an armed struggle of the working class 
could eliminate war.531  
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 The formulation of war as the ‘continuation of policy,’ becomes very 
significant in this context, because Lenin had uncovered what seems to be opposing 
policies or ideas existing not merely in the state itself, but even at the juncture that 
explains the causes of war. Using this formula alone would have been problematic in 
serving this purpose. In the Hegelian sense especially, and the Clausewitzian sense 
depending on one’s reading of it, the state represents a single focal point of policy, a 
universal policy which is either representative of the people’s political greater good, 
or is essentially the people’s will and freedom, materialized in-itself-and-for-itself. 
Therefore, to embark on the state-toppling adventure would be a self-defeating 
project, an attack against one’s own institutions. Before Marxists could fully adopt the 
terminology of ‘continuation of policy’ they needed to clarify its distinction from the 
state. Instead of being a universally objective thing, or in Hegel’s words, the ‘actuality 
of concrete freedom’532 of those who make it up, the state would come to be 
presented as a subjective entity, an instrument of the bourgeoisie, and its ‘policy’ not 
a higher purpose in itself, but the very reason for revolt: the antagonism between 
bourgeois policy versus proletariat policy. From this point of view, like all facets of 
the bourgeois state, even its wars represent one of the many forms which the 
exploitation of the proletariat can take. One class is sent off to fight imperial wars for 
the enrichment of another class. Lenin had in fact stumbled upon the fundamental 
problem between Marxism and the concept of war as continuation of policy – that it 
assumes there can be a single policy, when in fact many (or at least two, in this case) 
policies are struggling against one another. He writes: 
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How, then, can we disclose and define the “substance” of a war? War 
is the continuation of policy. Consequently, we must examine the 
policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about 
the war [World War I]. If it was an imperialist policy, i.e., one designed 
to safeguard the interests of finance capital and rob and oppress 
colonies and foreign countries, then the war stemming from that policy 
is imperialist. If it was a national liberation policy, i.e., one expressive 
of the mass movement against national oppression, then the war 
stemming from that policy is a war of national liberation.533 
 
If the ‘continuation of policy’ was at first contrary and destabilizing to the idea of a 
revolution against the state, Lenin had thus made it into its absolute opposite: an 
ultimate justification for the revolution, which in the very process of being stated, also 
served to better identify the enemy, not only in theory – the bourgeois class – but 
more importantly, seeing it as a usurper of political power, anchored firmly in the 
state as an institution in its own image, it became possible for the communist to see an 
attack on the state as an attack on the bourgeoisie itself. The pursuit of an alternative 
‘policy’, a policy of the proletariat, and conceptualizing the war as a ‘continuation’ of 
this policy, as opposed to an objective and universal concept of ’policy’, further 
anchored the premise of communism’s justification for the revolutionary state. 
Clausewitz’s formula was in effect reinforcing the communist doctrine in being 
applied.   
 That is why there should be no surprise to find just how important and how 
well cited this idea of ‘continuation of policy’ becomes amongst the revolutionary 
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communists. It dominates all other quotes from Clausewitz. Lenin cites it regularly 
and one occasion cites it three times in a single text.534 Trotsky made use of the term 
116 times altogether,535 and it also appears in repetition at times. Eventually, this idea 
also found its way into the dark and poetic, dichotomous interpretation proclaimed by 
Mao, ‘Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed.’536 
 Whereas we might have expected that methodological affinities would explain 
why the ‘Clausewitz connection’ took form, what we find instead is that on the one 
hand, the founders of the Marxist methodology were not all that interested in 
Clausewitz, and those later Marxists, who were very Clausewitzian, were fond of only 
a few maxims and simple concepts they could distil, not bothering at all with 
Clausewitz’s methodology or larger analyses. The revolutionaries were very practical 
and choosy in their reading. They cited Clausewitz, often, very often, but did not cite 
him widely or in depth. Only a pocketful of ideas made it through the communist 
distillation and only those which were particularly strategic in solving specific 
problems or achieving specific gains.  
 One specific case, which Gat discusses at length, is that of Trotsky who made 
much use of On War and showed himself in direct opposition to Engels, during a brief 
period of strife between the ranks, while he was serving as Minister of Defence. A 
disagreement emerged on the question of defining war plans and tactics within the 
communist movement. Trotsky referred heavily to Clausewitz in attempting to ward 
off a group of young military officials (Frunze, Gusev, Tukhachevsky, and others) 
who sought the creation of a ‘Unified Military Doctrine’ which would spell out the 
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character of a communist revolutionary fighting force.537 In order to quell their 
ambitions, Trotsky referred to Clausewitz’s discussion of positive doctrines, rejecting 
the notion that there existed a science of war, based on internal principles.538 'There is 
not and there never has been a military "science"', argued Trotsky. 'What is commonly 
called the theory of war or military science represents not a totality of scientific laws 
explaining objective events but an aggregate of practical usages, methods of 
adaptation and proficiencies.'539 
 Inherent to this discussion of the science of war, the moral forces in war and 
the historical conditioning of war could not be far behind. Thus, Trotsky also referred 
to these other features of Clausewitzian thought in order to deepen and strengthen his 
argument against the ‘Unified Military Doctrine’. In this case, he was completely 
turning his back on Engels’s viewpoint, which was to pay little heed to the role of 
moral factors in war: 
 
War is a specific form of relations between men. In consequence, war 
methods and war usages depend upon the anatomical and psychical 
qualities of individuals, upon the form of organization of the collective 
man, upon his technology, his physical or cultural-historical 
environment, and so on. The usages and methods of warfare are thus 
determined by changing circumstances and, therefore, they themselves 
can in no-wise be eternal.… An army leader requires the knowledge of 
a whole number of sciences in order to feel himself fully equipped for 
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his art. But military science does not exist; there does exist a military 
craft which can be raised to the level of a military art.540 
 
 Of greater interest to our overall examination regarding why communists 
adopted Clausewitz and anarchists did not has little to do whether or not there could 
be a scientific combat ‘doctrine’ for the revolutionary state and its forces, but rather 
what overarching, abstract doctrine was framing the whole, that is, the meaning and 
definition of tactics, strategy, objectives, and concept of victory. This turned out to be 
of grave consequence because, on the one hand, it brought forward the revolutionary 
fervour, the concept of ‘absolute war’, which both Fichte and Clausewitz understood 
as being a product of revolution. Fichte, who first coined the term used it to describe 
how a people rises up against a tyrant, which is to say that their political objective is 
absolute, because no truce or compromise is possible when the goal is to dethrone a 
prince and found a new government.541 Clausewitz, who was familiar with this 
discussion by Fichte (he had read the essay and sent a letter to Fichte about it in 
1809), improved the concept of ‘absolute war’ by making it more abstract and ideal, 
as a way to better study the propensity of war to escalate. In Clausewitz, ‘absolute 
war’ becomes a ‘total-concept’ [Total-Begriff] which is purely ideal and implies a 
concept of war devoid of all limits, material as well as to its political objectives. It is 
‘barely conceivable in the purely logical sense’.542 This was intended not as a real 
measure of war’s material potential, but more so its conceptual potential, not the wars 
we fight, but the wars that might be dreamt up. The revolutionaries entertained this 
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idea of absoluteness in their war, a political objective to which there was no 
compromise, and for which the linear movement to this end could justify the means, 
and render them ever more unlimited. This clarified both the instrumentality of their 
war, as well as idea that the war could not be won until the other duellist was 
overthrown, through a series of engagements leading to a victory that is total: the 
opponent has been altogether annihilated politically. As Trotsky wrote:  
 
If we consider that the purpose of our action is the overthrow of the 
autocracy, then, of course, we have not attained that aim .… But our 
tactics, comrades, arc not at all based on that model [of protesting and 
striking]. Our actions are a series of consecutive battles . … 
Understand this: in discussing whether or not we should continue the 
strike, we are in substance discussing whether to retain the 
demonstrative nature of the strike or to turn it into a decisive struggle, 
that is, to continue it to the point of total victory or defeat. We are not 
afraid of battles or defeats. Our defeats are but steps to our victory.543
  
 
 From this paragraph, we can see that Trotsky fully adopted Clausewitz’s view 
on the relationship between tactics and strategy, where the former consists of how one 
wins a battle and the latter represents how one uses successive battles towards a final 
outcome.544  The logic of this sequence allowed him to imagine the notion of a ‘total 
victory’ or ‘total defeat’ for the revolution, based on the earlier premise that the two 
                                                                
543 Leon Trotsky ‘The November Strike’, in 1905,tr. Anya Bostock, (London: Vintage Books, 1972) 
permission granted to the Marxist Internet Archive, 2006. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1907/1905/ch15.htm  
544 Clausewitz, On War, Bk. II, Ch. 1, p. 65. 
342 
 
opposing factions or classes are in a gruesome, existential duel: failure to dismantle 
the bourgeois state would imply the failure to achieve the revolutionary, given that 
one was perceived as the complete opposite and negation of the other.  
 This strategic understanding of war consisting in a linear sequence of battles 
towards gains against the opponent is precisely the conceptual frame that explains the 
‘Clausewitz connection’ among communists, because first as a political party and then 
as a revolutionary state, the movement is a strategic entity, it is a centralized approach 
to policy making that takes possession of war towards ends that it has defined and for 
which it thereafter takes responsibility. The idea that war is an instrument of policy is 
only intelligible insofar as there is agency, some entity to incarnate this ‘intelligence 
of the personified state’545 to act as both the policy-maker and the executor of its will: 
war is to the communist state what the hammer and sickle are to the carpenter and a 
farmer. The insignia itself is a reminder of the underlying logic of the communist 
movement, which is a linear relationship between means and ends.  
 
The Anarchist ‘Hegel Connection’? 
 
 Despite the similarities between the communist and anarchist project to topple 
the bourgeois states by applying violence, the early anarchists snubbed Clausewitz 
altogether. Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin made no references to Clausewitz, even 
though they were writing at a time when his works were already quite renowned, 
including on the Left, as we saw above. In exchange, anarchist ideas about war, most 
strikingly in the works of Bakunin, were strictly Hegelian. Having seen what 
Clausewitz had to offer the communists, what made the anarchists exclude him? Not 
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only was war as an instrument not ethically in line with the anarchist project, it was 
altogether unintelligible within their non-linear, anti-political concept of the 
revolution.    
 Indeed, the distinct doctrines of the communists and anarchists were shaped by 
their understanding of the political element of revolution, and most specifically, the 
goods and evils of the revolutionary state. Bakunin perceived the state as an anti-
revolutionary and repressive institution by definition, which must not be maintained 
for a single instant, once the revolution is accomplished, no matter what pretext.546 
‘Bourgeois socialists’ is the term Bakunin used to describe those who advocated that a 
political revolution should precede the social and economic revolution, which 
necessarily included all those who advocated for a revolutionary state to politically 
engender the remaining two facets of the revolution.547 Bakunin explained:  
 
...equality should be established in the world by a spontaneous 
organization of labor and collective property, by the free organization 
of producers' associations into communes, and free federation of 
communes — but nowise by means of the supreme tutelary action of 
the State .… It is this point which mainly divides the Socialists or 
revolutionary collectivists from the authoritarian Communists, the 
partisans of the absolute initiative of the State. The goal of both is the 
same. same. [...] Only the Communists imagine that they can attain 
through development and organization of the political power of the 
working classes, and chiefly of the city proletariat, aided by bourgeois 
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radicalism — whereas the revolutionary Socialists, the enemies of all 
ambiguous alliances, believe, on the contrary, that this common goal 
can be attained not through the political but through the social (and 
therefore anti-political) organization and power of the working masses 
of the cities and villages.548 
 
 This provides us with an important clue into Clausewitz’s absence from 
anarchist thought. If the revolution is to be ‘anti-political’ as Bakunin wrote, what is 
the use of conceptualizing the revolution and the war between classes as Clausewitz 
did, subjected to the political? If the whole revolution did not have to be preceded by 
political revolution, but could instead be achieved as a simultaneous process of socio-
cultural and politico-economic liberation, then what would this revolution look like? 
How could violence rise to the purpose of revolution, without taking the shape of a 
linear policy, nor for that matter as the policy of a revolutionary state? According to 
Bakunin, and those who were committing targeted acts of violence, it could, insofar as 
these acts were coherent in themselves and with the project. They did not need to be 
organized in the Clausewitizian tradition as a sequence of tactics, adding up to the 
pursuit of strategic goals, because revolutionary acts, from the anarchist perspective, 
inspired revolution in being carried out and therefore contributed to the philosophical 
emancipation of those who perceived the deeds and admitted their legitimacy.  
 Hegel is omnipresent in this perception of violence as having within itself the 
capacity to awaken the people. Beneath it lies another idea, interconnected to the 
concept of ‘Geist’: that the revolution is not an end, but a process. There is no 
revolutionary state required because the revolution is itself this Spirit. Bakunin was 
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borrowing heavily from ideas taken in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of 
Right, in suggesting that  
 
Civil war, so destructive to the power of states, is, on the contrary, and 
because of this very fact, always favourable to the awakening of 
popular initiative and to the intellectual, moral, and even the material 
interests of the populace. And for this very simple reason: civil war 
upsets and shakes the masses out of their sheepish state, a condition 
very dear to all governments, a condition which turns peoples into 
herds to be utilized and shorn at the whims of their shepherds. Civil 
war breaks through the brutalizing monotony of men’s daily existence, 
and arrests that mechanistic routine which robs them of creative 
thought.549 
 
 The revolution and its violence which are referred to in this passage reminds 
us of Hegel’s notion that ‘'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their 
indifference to the stabilisation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds 
preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so 
also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual', 
peace.',’550 where the idea of self-justification resides in the act itself, and for this 
reason, Hegel can also maintain the argument that ‘war is not to be regarded as an 
absolute evil and as a purely external accident.’551 Indeed, the above statement from 
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Bakunin strikes deeply Hegelian chords and appears to borrow its essence from this 
passage in Hegel’s Phenomenology: 
 
In order not to let [the citizens] get rooted and settled in this isolation 
and thus break up the whole into fragments and let the common spirit 
evaporate, Government has from time to time to shake them to the very 
centre by War .… By thus breaking up the form of fixed stability, spirit 
guards the ethical order from sinking into merely natural existence, 
preserves the self of which it is conscious, and raises that self to the 
level of freedom and its own powers.552 
 
 If war must indeed ‘shake’ the masses, as Hegel and Bakunin seem to agree 
on, then the methods of war should inspire this motion. Indeed, this is the central 
aspect of the anarchist fighting doctrine, the propaganda of the deed, whereby the idea 
is infused directly into the action. Though it was first coined by the Italian Carlo 
Pisacane,553 Bakunin was also amongst those who jumped on board and made use of 
the term soon thereafter. In fact, in the same letter quoted above, Bakunin also wrote:  
 
‘We must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this 
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 What shape would these revolutionary actions take? It is a aspect of history 
which is perhaps too often forgotten in the mainstream today, but the anarchists of the 
late 19th and early 20th century succeeded in carrying out many high-profile acts of 
terror: the Wall Street Bombing of 1920, as well as the assassination an American 
president, two Spanish prime ministers, a French president, a Russian Tsar, a King of 
Greece, an Empress of Austria, an heir to the Austro-Hungarian empire and many 
other high ranking officials, and prominent nobles. Kropotkin argued that political 
assassinations were ethical even on the grounds which normally should exclude 
murder altogether, the Golden Rule itself: that one should treat others as one wishes to 
be treated. To this he replied, ‘To kill not only a tyrant, but a mere viper. Yes, 
certainly! Because any man with a heart asks beforehand that he may be slain, if ever 
he becomes venomous; that a dagger may be plunged into his heart, if ever he should 
take the place of a dethroned tyrant.’555 For anarchists, the choice of targets, attacking 
symbolic figures and never aiming at allies, peasants or proletarians, was in fact the 
justification for the act, embodied in the action itself.  
 Anarchists had no need for Clausewitz. They were not seeking a policy to 
guide their war, nor were they even institutionalized in way that would allow them to 
frame and generate centralized policy in the first place. What they sought instead was 
justification in the act itself as opposed to its potential, eventual outcome. So powerful 
was this principle that each element of the revolution had to be internally coherent, 
and justified in-itself that Kropotkin, for example, maintained that he would rather be 
killed than to kill someone who had done him no harm.556 By making this exclusion, 
the anarchists were able to infuse violence with right directly, and by excluding the 
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principle of instrumentality, they reached a conceptual end-point to their ethical 
claims.  
 The problem which emerged is that they were in fact transposing the ethical 
logic that defines war as a right of peoples into a legitimization of the purified 
violence itself. The revolution was the process itself, for having extracted itself from 
the ends/means formula, and eventually, this implied that the revolution was in itself 
violence and only violence, that is, unlike the communists who could delineate 
between the violence of the revolution and the outcomes or other policies of the 
revolution, the anarchists, having so closely intertwined violence and revolution into a 
single set of self-justified acts and an internally coherent whole, could not distance 
themselves from the violence. New targets necessarily emerged each time one was put 
down, because there could be no deliberation to establish frame or limit this 




 Both the anarchist’s understanding of violence as an objective right and the 
communist’s violence as the instrument of policy of the subjective revolutionary state 
(against the subjective bourgeois state) must eventually attain an impasse in the hearts 
and minds of any free citizen, or citizen aspiring to political emancipation. In the 
former case, attempting to justify violence in-itself will necessarily breed critique, 
resentment, fear, etc. because, in associating violence directly, rather than indirectly to 
right, the anarchists turned the Hegelian logic of war as a ‘right’ inside out. In Hegel, 
the right to wage war was not inherent, but rested on the logos of ‘actualized 
freedom’, a voice of reason that forms in the confines of the state and frames its ethos 
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upon the development and constitution of the individual through phases of 
development in the family, in civil society, and the state; however, the anarchist’s 
notion of a right to violence is not built and constituted, it is assumed, and it is not 
deliberated upon and rendered a manifestation of reason or collective intelligence, but 
acts silently, and according to its preordained logic, a designed war. It is the opposite 
of enacting war as a legitimate and free activity of citizens. As such, its violence does 
not include the citizen, but excludes him, and this exclusion self-defeats the notion of 
right, since this very right is derived from the inclusive ethical realm which the 
political community generates in the process of making policy manifest. Without this 
right, any application of force calls for resistance, because eventually the exclusion 
catches up, calling into question even the most basic anarchist assumption, that 
monarchs, bourgeois statesmen, and other perceived usurpers are necessarily 
legitimate targets. But this self-proclaimed legitimacy of violence is itself a product of 
usurpation, since it is a right belonging to constituted citizens, which has been 
extracted and detached via their exclusion from deliberation, and attached to pre-
conceived notions of who the enemy is and what should be done to punish him. When 
war is not an instrument of policy, it eventually reaches an end point in its legitimacy 
and uptake amongst citizens, since their exclusion from policy is in effect a form of 
tyranny, in this case, tyranny of an immutable idea. 
 In the case of the communists, even though they claimed to frame 
instrumentality in policy, they nonetheless arrived at the very same impasse, because 
their revolution being pre-ordained, it may have been instrumental, it may have been a 
‘continuation of policy’, but the mistake was to think that the project was in fact 
‘policy’. There is no true ‘policy’ without free and open deliberation. The communists 
were implementing the ‘continuation of ideology’ not a ‘continuation of policy’. Both 
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groups where therefore condemned to exerting violence to sustain their inner logic, 
because there existed no means for policy-based checks and balances to this violence: 
the only possible containment or possibility of limiting their use of force was to meet 
it with a counter-force, on observation that Clausewitz had indeed made on the 
subject.557 
 In the end, the most dramatic manifestation of both the necessary dependence 
on violence and the distinct ethics and doctrines pitting anarchist against communist 
was how despite fighting a common enemy, they also fell regularly into serious in-
fighting. With violence as both the tool and inner logic of their movements, when the 
two arrived face to face with a ethical and conceptual impasse between  one’s 
‘instrumentality’ and one’s ‘right’, the tension was unavoidable and the fighting 
inescapable.  
 The communist held a deep distrust of the anarchists because they thought 
their methods ‘disarmed’ the proletariat and ‘prepared the ground for the politics of 
the enemy class.’558 Meanwhile, the anarchist rejected the consolidation of state 
power in the hands of the communists, going so far as to attack, on one particular 
occasion, the Communist Headquarters in Moscow, during the Revolution, killing 12 
and wounding 55, including Yuda Roshchin, the one anarchist leader who had tried to 
reconcile the two factions, but was jeered off as a traitor to the cause.559 On another 
occasion, when Kropotkin died, Lenin wished to offer him a state funeral, but the 
family of the late anarchist rejected it, and instead, 20,000 people marched along his 
cortege waving placards and banners bearing demands for the release of all anarchists 
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from prison and such mottoes as ‘Where there is authority there is no freedom’ and 
‘The liberation of the working class is the task of the workers themselves.’560  
 The instrumentality / right divide depended on different temporal schemes and 
therefore, it did not matter that the anarchist and communist were fighting for a same 
end purpose. The temporality of communism was sequential and that of the anarchists 
was simultaneous, and consequently, these two concepts of time being categorically 
exclusive, the linearity of one group was ethically inconsistent with the holistic vision 
of the other, since for one it meant the ends justifying the means, and for the other 
means being self-justifying. If either saw in the other the impossibility of 
revolutionary success or dangers of tyranny which it implied, it was because they 
were both right in their apprehensions regarding the other, though their idealism may 
have warped their ability to see the fault underlying their own self-defeating tyranny 
within.  
 Choosing Clausewitz as a mentor made sense to those who set out to fight a 
war towards their revolution. And choosing Hegel made sense to those who thought 
they could embody the ‘spirit’ of their revolution in itself. That being said, we find 
ourselves side by side with Aron who argued that Marxist view of war was merely 
partial, and Clausewitz’s all-encompassing.561 The same could be said of the 
Anarchist view of war, relative to Hegels. In the end, however, the sheer violence of 
these partial propositions ultimately killed their universal idols. Both instrumentality 
and right are only ethical insofar as they are limited in their scope, and submitted to 
the living ethos of deliberative population who conceptualize what the ‘greater good’ 
entails, but the revolutionaries had dreamt up an unlimited, absolute war that marched 
forward regardless of consent: it might have been a war waged ‘for the people’, but 
                                                                
560 Ibid, pp. 297-298 
561 Julien Freund, Guerre et politique de Karl von Clausewitz à Raymond Aron, Revue française de 
sociologie, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1976), p. 644 
352 
 
instead of being achieved ‘by the people’, it was achieved ‘by the book’. Therefore it 
















This thesis was grounded on a premise firmly rooted in the dialectical 
tradition: that the isolation as a method study has its limits, and sometimes one gets a 
better understanding not by delving deeper and deeper into a single direction, but 
rather by comparing ideas and considering their intersection. By studying Clausewitz, 
Hegel and Kant where they meet, we can heighten our understanding of how the 
methodologies found in all three were conducive to understanding war on three 
interrelated levels: a limited theory on the methods of war that imposes scepticism on 
claims that specific strategies and tactics can ‘cause’ victory; a dual ontological theory 
regarding war’s unbounded reciprocation of extremes and war’s embodiment in 
reality; and finally, a dual ethical theory of war, which clearly distinguishes war’s 
‘instrumentality’ from the notion of ‘right’. Like dialectics themselves, this thesis is a 
balancing act, where the production of three insights into war is only made possible 
insofar as there is a limit set on how deeply each of three thinkers is explored in 
detail, so that there is space enough to explore what they achieved collectively.   
 If Part I focused on the intersection of Kant and Clausewitz, and Part II on the 
intersection of Clausewitz and Hegel, one should not therefore assume that this was in 
fact the purpose of either of the two parts: to showcase similarities or influences, and 
to stop there. To appreciate the purpose of both parts, it is best to take a step back to a 
more the larger picture of what we have accomplished throughout this thesis. 
Following the history of these ideas, from their genealogy to the exposition of their 
historical clash, there are two narrations happening in parallel: with regard to war’s 
‘grammar,’ and with regard to war’s ‘logic’, to use Clausewitz’s terms. 
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 We considered war’s grammar, its interconnections from the simple, the noun 
or the verb, the building blocks which are the tactics and strategies, into its conceptual 
forms, the real and the absolute, ending with the question of ‘greater good’ by which 
an ethical frame which gives structure and meaning to how these are assembled and 
put into action. As the story evolved, we followed principally the evolution of fighting 
doctrines which began in th pseudo-sciences of the Enlightenment, which were 
negated, refuted, tossed into the abyss of time, but in the end instead of attaching 
fighting doctrines directly to the science or perfection of methodology, we noticed 
that it was in fact possible for these to be attached directly to the other two moments 
of development: the ontological and the ethical as well. Arguably, the frenzy of 
nationalism and total war experienced in the first and second World Wars were 
intertwined with the idea that the ‘spirit’ or ‘total concept’ of absolute war could be 
‘channelled’ from the realm of the ideal and incarnated into a real manifestation. This 
however was a false synthesis. It was rather at the ethical realm that we finally came 
across a synthetic blockage that could in fact generate two separate fighting doctrines, 
one for each separate ethical system. 
This story about the grammar of war as it evolved through time was the source 
of certain conclusions about the ‘logic’ proposed by the dialectical theories of war. On 
the one hand, the goal was to demonstrate that while the problems brought up in the 
Caveat regarding the works of Clausewitz and Hegel were of a certain conditional 
order, there could be a better solution to framing this discussion merely on conditions. 
Instead of repudiating the conclusions Hegel and Clausewitz in a wholesale manner, 
where the overall dismissals on technicalities, pinning synthetical judgements against 
analytical arguments, one could instead set limits to the holistic elements, as a means 
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of admitting final contradictions, without necessarily needing to demonstrate actual 
flaws in the theorizing.  
By studying how the anarchists and communists integrated Hegel and 
Clausewitz, we were able to consider the tight relationship between ethics and 
fighting doctrines, and how these relate regardless of statehood, and are in fact more 
heavily anchored in the question of whether or not the state is perceived as the 
required tool for the achievement of a societal project. In this context, war is not ‘only 
war’ when it is fought by the state, as was alluded to in refutations of Clausewitz, but 
it is in fact true that war can take on very different forms when fought by the state, the 
state-seeking, or state-fearing. The separation of these three variants was not merely 
in regard to the institution itself, but the ethical relation that individuals and groups 
have towards it. The perception of greater good within the state, towards the state, or 
without the state, turned out to be more significant to fighting doctrines than the state 
itself, especially in the context of wars where the fighting doctrines were defined in 
their relation to war’s ethics, as opposed to war’s methods or war’s nature. There was 
no clearcut contradiction to be made on state wars and non-state wars to justify the 
kind of dismissals brought forward against Clausewitz, nor more so against Hegel. 
The question was far more fluid and complex and framed not on the state as a thing in 
itself, but as something that is perceived and manifested as relations within, relations 
outwards, and relations towards. We were forced to consider it as relative and living 
concept, rather than absolute and fixed one.   
An important contribution that the dialectical theories of war provided 
posterity was grounding war once and for all in the human experience, away from an 
aesthetic of perfection derived from metaphysics and pre-conceived notions of what is 
‘natural’ or ‘divine’. Even though Hegel and Clausewitz did return to this attempted 
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perfection of theory, where they thought it they might still ‘get away with it’ on the 
one level analysis where holism appeared legitimate, the ethical realm, this thesis 
attempted to take them down from this last pedestal as well. In effect, what we 
uncovered in the pages above was that if one turns the dialectics onto themselves, 
there is room for further critical analysis of the logic and its final claim to perfection. 
However, this is by no means a point of no return, it a mere line drawn in the sand. It 
is a process forward, because the final contradictions exposed above are perhaps 
fruitful and reconcilable. The limits set prepare the ground for further analysis, by 
calming the black and white dismissals of dialectical war theory and highlighting the 
many tones of grey that appear when we carefully split apart the ‘how’ the ‘what’ and 
the ‘why’ of war. And these questions cannot be fixed in time, with one grand 
conclusion on the matter, since the methods of warfare change rapidly; since the 
ontological basis of war is a balancing act between the wars we fight and the wars we 
dream up; and since the ethics of war are always set at the ‘red line’, the threshold of 
what we are willing to tolerate, and what is to be understood as greater good and 
lesser evil, which may not be the most volatile of these three factors, but clearly the 
most determinant.  
Many will not be satisfied with an ethical framework for war that is limited, 
constrained, and contradictory in such a fashion, because it requires far more effort to 
wrap our heads around it than, mere slogans like Kropotkin’s ‘absolute freedom’ that 
when critically assessed amount to very little because of the vagueness and scope of 
its claim, and yet, perhaps that is exactly this unsatisfactory concept of ethics, 
incomplete and uncertain that is needed to stimulate ourselves into truly personifying 
‘Intelligence’ when we claim to be acting collectively in the name of reason. 
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 Ultimately, helping to define the scope and limits of justification is perhaps 
greatest contribution dialectical reasoning can offer our reflexions on war: it clarifies 
and distinguishes those aspects of war that are conceptually limited and conceptually 
unlimited. In Hegel and Clausewitz, the dialectics of war purified our understanding of 
war’s nature by stripping the concept to its core, eliminating the external layers such as 
tradition and convention, and allowing its political ethos to emerge from where it hid, 
behind the veil of nature and God, as a fix and unchanging thing over which mankind had 
no control, to a product of society, a phenomenon that is entirely man’s to define and to 
embody, as a process of reciprocating his relationship with others. War is nothing more 
than this reciprocation, it is not God’s will, it is not a natural instinct, it is only man’s 
creation. As such, Hegel and Clausewitz provided us with a call to secularization and a 
call to responsibilization.  
In their ethics, whether it is directly stated or tacitly implied, both Hegel and 
Clausewitz presented us with a phenomenogically unlimited ethical frame, which 
ultimately could be shown to have limits that were not merely conditional, but inherent to 
the the very idea. When both ‘right’ and ‘instrumentality’ were pushed to their extreme, 
in the context of revolutionary war that had universal and absolute goals, absolute 
weapons, and circular logic to sustain a fragile intellectual balance between war’s means 
and its ends, for which the only solution was to relativize the absolute, we were forced to 
reclaim the centrality of policy-making and the role of the citizen in generating and 
embodying political rationality.  
Once theological ethics have been replaced with secular ethics, the danger is to 
fall again into the trap of ‘mystification’, where the ideas of what we fight for are abstract 
and intangible, and detached the very source of what can make war ethical: the idea that 
where there is freedom, human rights, good government, and the absence of violence and 
cohersion, the secular conscience in the voice of the people is given the opportunity not 
359 
 
only to be heard, but also to be enacted as a process of liberation and human 
development. In that sense, though one can justify war as a right and as an instrument, 
this can only be done insofar as two criteria are met, first that this instrumentality and 
right are firmly grounded in the deliberative process that gives rise to their legitimacy as a 
‘greater good’, and secondly that this process does indeed generate the expectation that a 
free and open deliberative process gives rise to reason, intelligence and ‘Spirit’ in the real 
world.   
While both authors sought a holistic and nearly-divine concept of war ethics, 
as a trinity in the case of Clausewitz and as part of Geist making itself manifest in the 
world in the case of Hegel, what we found was that the theories could not perfectly 
achieve what they set out to, there were in fact inherent contradictions to the 
conclusions that war was either a ‘right’ or an ‘instrument’.  With regard to ‘right’ the 
problem was that the relationship between political decay and war could be shown to 
be reversible, in which case the social and ethical relationships that gave ‘right’ to 
war, could become undermined by forms of warfare that were contrary to the 
manifestation of these very ethical bonds. With regard to ‘instrumentality’, beyond 
the conditioned problem of weapons that undermine the strategic relationship between 
cause and effect, there was also the problem of concepts of war constructed in circular 
logic: the war to end all wars, where the means undermine the end, regardless of the 
specific form taken by the tool. We found that the holistic approaches of either Hegel 
or Clausewitz led to problems that were not merely conditioned, but were in fact 
unconditioned and necessarily implied in the concept.  
Even though it took time and historical progress for these problems to show 
themselves, both as consequences of technology and ideology, they were not external 
counter-arguments like those which were explored earlier in the Caveat section of this 
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thesis. The arguments about historical inapplicability and self-fulfilling prophecies 
might have appeared convincing, but their general attempt to undermine the synthetic 
by providing analytical examples of inapplicability was incomplete. They could 
demonstrate errors of interpretation quite well. They could show specific weaknesses 
tied to specific examples, but they could not undo the holistic element. The counter-
arguments provided were ambitious in their claims, but systematically hit at the 
margin because they were replicating the problem of not separating the synthetical 
from the analytical, and the conditioned from the unconditioned. 
What differentiates this thesis from the example refutations provided in the 
Caveat was that it slowed down the process of analysis. By focusing on the 
development of the dialectical theories of war, it was possible to avoid considering 
Hegel and Clausewitz’s conclusions until they had been framed within, rather than 
without their underlying logical constructs. It was precisely this that allowed us to 
break apart the synthetical from the analytical elements, and the condition from the 
unconditioned, to tailor the conclusions very carefully to where they applied. Instead 
of attempting a wholehearted rejection or elevation of Hegel and Clausewitz, the 
strategy was to set limits to their claims, at the very nexus of where both Hegel and 
Clausewitz have attempted a limitless, holistic argument, on the question of ethics. As 
was argued in the introduction to Part II, though the concept of goodness may have 
varied historically, it remains part and parcel with our concept of the divine, and 
though historical progress brought us to conceive a synthetical, modern, secular 
concept of goodness, there was no escaping the vestiges of meaning associated to the 
divine. This relationship explains why considering the political ethics that divide 
Hegel and Clausewitz could give us such a clear glimpse into the metaphysical aspect 
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of their argument. Ethics and holism come hand in hand, construed as a single divine 
light, an illumination that guides us like a beacon upon the hill. 
It is therefore perhaps fitting that the exporation of the limits of this ‘light’ was 
modelled in part on the theory of optics. When waves are crossed one atop the other, 
should their amplitudes and frequencies coincide they may either add themselves or 
cancel each other out. At the intersection of ‘right’ and ‘instrumentality’, we could 
conceive where they came together, united under a single ‘holistic’ revolutionary 
project, but they also collapsed onto themselves and neutralized their light in 
opposition to one another, where the very critique of one relative to the other was the 
rationality that was required to set limits to its claims. Like the antinomies of reason 
we uncovered in Part I, it became possible at the intersection of ‘right’ and 
‘instrumentality’ to uncover once again the problem of conditionality and 
unconditionality: the validity of either sides of the antinomy was not perfect in itself, 
but conceived as valid in the negation of its opposite. It was an argumentative 
construct that was giving impression that either of the ethics were ‘whole’ and perfect, 
in relation to the fault of the other, when in fact, we were being blinded by the light, 
its imperfections blurred by the halos. These imperfections were examined in theory 
in the two critiques brought forward in chapters 1 and 3 and then documented and 
tested in the historic case study of the anti-bourgeois revolutions. We found ourselves 
studying a war to end all wars (the first critique in chapter 3), which built its policy 
outside deliberation (the central critique in chapter 1), as ideology, and even 
culminated in the build-up of annihilatory weapons (the second critique in chapter 3) 
in the process, in the name of an objective that had the metaphysical properties of 
universality and absoluteness: the quest for ‘Absolute freedom, nothing but freedom, 
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all of freedom,’562 so claimed Kropotkin. This objective brought us to the threshold 
required to consider our critiques in the context of limitless conflict, an ‘absolute, 
absolute war’ as it were, absolute for being revolutionary, and absolute again for 
being fought with absolute weapons and absolute objectives. This was precisely 
where we should expect to see the light amplified, or no longer to see the light at all.  
The analytical breakdown in instrumentality and right could thus be observed 
empirically, by studying what happens when either concept of ethical justification for 
war are taken to their logical extreme, that is, when right and instrumentality are 
proclaimed as ethical concepts in-and-for-themselves, external and unconditioned. It 
was here that we observed that these lose the very ethical basis upon which they are 
meant to be drawn… their condition itself: constitution and the public appropriation 
of political violence via legitimate forms of deliberation that attempt to 
institutionalize rationality. This root of the ethics of ‘right’ and ‘instrumentality’ were 
entirely built on relativity, on the relationship between citizens, and their dialogues. 
The problem was that through a twist of logic, it appeared reasonable to withdraw 
‘dialogue’ from the equation, and nonetheless claim, using dialectics, that one could 
equate ‘speaking in twos’ to ‘the speaking of two’. The former is dialectics, the latter 
is dialogue. The one is absolute. The other is relative. Insofar as the ‘instrumentality’ 
and ‘right’ remained relative, rather than absolute concepts, they could indeed be 
validated, but when either was claimed as an absolute, this resulted in breakdowns in 
their logic, the appearance of absurd or illogical propositions. This being the natural 
limit of pure reason, so too did it appear as a limit to war ethics proclaimed in its 
name.   
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